FROM  PRIVATE  TO 
FIELD -MARSHAL 


Sir  WUlwm  Robertson 


FROM    PRIVATE  TO   FIELD-MARSHAL 


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Uhr.     (nihrr 

f/rrtr,  n  rS'„r,/j.,/ir-i  InLni  l-i/  an  .     (inriirrni    tVrlih'rr  nl  fr/-/rn  :  ,  Irjlri 


FROM    PRIVATE 
TO   FIELD-MARSHAL 

BY  FIELD-MARSHAL 
Sir  WILLIAM   ROBERTSON   Bart. 

G.C.B.,  G.C.M.G.,  K.C.V.O.,  D.S.O. 
Hon.  LL.D.  Cambridge,  Hon.  D.C.L.  Oxford 


ILLUSTRATED 


BOSTON   AND   NEW    YORK 

HOUGHTON   MIFFLIN   COMPANY 

1921 


Printed  in  Great  Dyttain. 


S)eMcate& 

^  TO    THE    MEMORY    OF    MY    MOTHER 

^  TO   WHOSE   AFFECTIONATE   AND   INSPIRING    TEACHINGS 

^  IN    EARLY    LIFE    IS    ATTRIBUTABLE    SUCH    MERIT, 

Zj 

=C  IF    ANY,    AS    MAY    ATTACH    TO    MY    CAREER. 


&c 


PREFACE 

The  only  justification  for  publishing  this  book  is  that  it 
describes  the  climbing  of  a  soldier  from  the  bottom  to  the 
top  of  the  miUtary  ladder,  and  even  in  this  feat  there  is 
nothing  remarkable  beyond  the  fact  that  it  happens  to  be 
the  first  of  its  kind  in  the  annals  of  the  British  Army. 

Energy  and  determination  are  usually  essential  to 
advancement  in  any  vocation,  and  are  at  the  disposal  of 
every  one  possessing  a  good  constitution.  Given  the  exercise 
of  these  qualities  and  the  same  help  from  real  friends  as  I 
enjoyed — friends  who  had  nothing  to  gain  and  perhaps 
something  to  lose  by  showing  friendship — any  man  can 
equal  what  I  have  accomplished. 

Still,  the  story  here  given  may  not  be  wholly  without 
interest,  especially  to  those  who  have  their  lives  in  front  of 
them,  and  in  the  hope  that  it  will  prove  to  be  so  I  have  decided 
to  let  it  go  forth.  Doubtless  it  has  many  defects,  both  in 
substance  and  style,  which  would  have  been  less  apparent 
if  its  preparation  had  been  in  more  practised  hands,  and  for 
these  imperfections  I  ask  lenient  treatment. 

In  writing  the  chapters  dealing  with  my  service  in  the 
ranks  and  as  a  Subaltern  Officer  I  have  had  to  depend 
chiefly  upon  memory,  which  has  become  blurred  and 
unreliable  owing  to  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  crowded 
events  of  the  last  few  years.  Consequently  it  has  not  been 
possible  to  make  this  part  of  the  book  as  complete  as,  to 
my  mind,  it  deserves  to  be,  for  the  period  in  question  was 
in  some  ways  the  most  fascinating  and  happy  of  all.  For 
instance,  I  derived  greater  satisfaction  from  being  pro- 
moted Lance-Corporal  in  1878 — the  first  rung  of  the  ladder 
— than  I  did  from  being  created  a  Baronet  forty  years  later  ; 


viii         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and,  as  Lieutenant,  I  felt  prouder  to  be  in  command  at 
the  railhead  of  a  Frontier  Expeditionary  Force  in  India  of 
less  than  10,000  men  than,  as  General,  to  be  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff  in  the  greatest  conflict  the  world 
has  ever  known,  when  the  number  of  our  troops  ran  into 
several  millions. 

In  building  up  the  chapters  referring  to  the  Great  War, 
I  was  embarrassed  by  having  not  too  little  but  too  much 
material.  The  difficulty  here  was  to  make  a  suitable 
selection,  and  to  include  just  so  much  about  my  share  of 
the  war  as  seemed  appropriately  to  fall  within  the  scope  of 
the  book.  In  particular  I  tried  to  avoid  enlarging  upon 
old  controversies  connected  with  the  supreme  direction  of 
the  war,  and  which  occur  to  a  greater  or  less  extent  in  all 
wars.  I  felt  that  a  discussion  of  them  would  merely  bore 
the  ordinary  reader,  who  is  content  to  know  that  the  war 
was  in  fact  won  ;  while  it  would  be  of  little  use  to  any  one 
unless  the  points  in  dispute  were  thoroughly  examined  in 
the  light  of  complete  evidence,  and  this  would  require  a 
book  for  itself  as  well  as  access  to  official  documents  which 
are  not  at  my  disposal.  I  have  therefore  made,  as  a  rule, 
no  more  reference  to  these  matters  than  was  required  to 
enable  me  to  illustrate  the  work  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff,  of  which  I  was  Chief  for  about  half  the  period  of  the 
war — four  other  officers  filling  that  post  at  different  times 
during  the  remaining  half — and  to  emphasise  the  achieve- 
ments, though  very  inadequately,  of  the  regimental  officers 
and  men  of  the  Imperial  Forces  who  won  the  war  for  us, 
and  with  whom  I  have  had  the  honour  to  be  associated 
for  nearly  forty-four  years. 

W.  R.  ROBERTSON, 
Field-Marshal. 


CONTENTS 

CHAPTER    I 

Recruit  at  Aldershot         .  .  .  .  • 

EnUstment  in  i6th  Lancers— The  "  Old  Soldier  "  in  the 
'Seventies  —  Barrack-room  Ufe  —  Rations  —  Pay  —  Kit  and 
equipment— Uniform— Drills— Treatment  of  sick— Breaking 
out  of  barracks  —  Sundays  —  First  Christmas  Day  — Night 
guards  —  MiUtary  offences  and  punishments  —  Guard-room — 
Articles  of  War — Muster  parade — Punishment  drill— Musketry 
course— Dismissed  driUs— Day  guards— I  allow  a  deserter  to 
escape  and  so  commit  my  first  "  crime  " — Imprisoned  in 
guard-room — My  second  "  crime  " — Promoted  Lance-Corporal 
— Backward  state  of  training — Field-days — Reasons  for  defect- 
ive training — Lord  Wolseley,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  other 
rising  Generals  effect  great  reforms — Successes  in  competitions 
at  skill-at-arms. 


CHAPTER    H 

Non-commissioned  Officer   .  .  .  .  • 

Promoted  Corporal— Stationed  at  Brighton— My  third  and 
last  "  crime  "—Special  duty  at  Chatham— Rejoin  regiment  and 
go  to  York — Promoted  Lance-Sergeant — Special  duties  while 
at  York — Musketry  course  at  Hythe — Promoted  Sergeant — 
SignaUing  course  at  Aldershot— Regiment  goes  to  Dundalk— 
State  of  Ireland — Appointed  Assistant  Instructor  of  Signalling 
— Lieutenant  Dugdale— Success  of  signallers  announced  in 
regimental  orders— Assistant  Instructor  of  Musketry  and 
Military  Reconnaissance — Escort  prisoners  to  Limerick  Gaol — 
Regiment  goes  to  DubUn — Promoted  Troop  Sergeant-Major— 
Suicide  of  predecessor — Influence  of  Troop  Sergeant-Ma jor-- 
Consider  possibility  of  obtaining  commission — Difficulties  in 
the  way  of  this — Regimental  officer's  expenses — DecUne  Com- 
manding Officer's  offer  of  a  commission — Accept  the  same  offer 
made  by  his  successor — Vexatious  delays  retard  commission — 
Pass  examination  for  commission — Regiment  goes  to  Aldershot 
—Gazetted  Second  Lieutenant  in  3rd  Dragoon  Guards— Leave 
the  1 6th  Lancers. 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


CHAPTER   III 

PACE 

Subaltern  in  India  .  .  .  .  .  .34 

Join  Cavalry  Depot  at  Canterbury — Officer's  course  of 
musketry  at  Hythe — Leave  England  for  India — Life  on  board 
a  troopship — Join  3rd  Dragoon  Guards — Camp  of  exercise  at 
Meerut — Pass  Lower  Standard  Examination  in  Hindustani — 
Life  at  Muttra — Acting  Adjutant  and  Station  Staff  Officer — 
Beer-tasting  committees— Regiment  attends  Muridki  Camp  of 
exercise  en  route  to  Rawal  Pindi— Ludicrous  spectacle  presented 
by  native  followers — State  of  training  in  India  and  reforms 
effected  by  General  Luck— Visit  of  Prince  Albert  Victor  to 
Muridki — Pass  Higher  Standard  Examination  in  Hindustani — 
Successes  at  Rawal  Pindi  District  Assault-at-Arms — On  detach- 
ment at  Murree — Pass  examination  in  Persian — In  charge  of 
Government  Grass  Farm  at  Rawal  Pindi — In  charge  of  regi- 
mental signallers— Acting  Station  Staff  Officer  and  Secretary 
of  Assault-at-Arms  Committee — Pass  examinations  in  Punjabi 
and  Pushtu— Black  Mountain  Expedition— Miranzai  Expedi- 
tion— Some  amusing  incidents  in  connection  with  the  latter 

Posted  to  Army  Headquarters,  Simla. 


CHAPTER    IV 

In  the  Intelligence  Branch,  Simla  .  .  .50 

Indian  Intelligence  Branch  reorganised  by  General  Sir  H. 
Brackenbury — Curious  division  of  duties  at  Army  Head- 
quarters— Comparison  with  system  at  home — Society  favourites 
thought  to  have  best  chance  of  Staff  employment — Colonels 
Elles  and  Mason — First  permanent  Staff  appointment — 
Countries  dealt  with  by  North-West  Frontier  Section  in  which 
I  am  employed  —  Situation  in  Afghanistan  —  Kafiristan— 
Intricate  frontier  questions  to  be  settled — Proceed  on  leave  to 
England — Death  of  my  mother — Frontier  matters  still  dis- 
turbed on  return  to  India — Question  of  Russian  advance  on 
India  via  the  Pamirs — Ordered  to  reconnoitre  route  leading  to 
Pamirs — Srinagar — Bridges     in     Kashmir — Gilgit — Rakapushi 

Mountain — Hunza — Meet    Townshend    and    Fowler — Yasin 

Darkot   Pass— The   Pamirs— Return   to   India  via  the   Indus, 
Chilas,  and  Abbottabad — Pass  examination  in  Gurkhali. 


CHAPTER    V 

On    the    Intelligence    Staff    ok    the    Chitral    Relikf 

F"0RCE 66 

Punitive    expedition    sent    into    Waziristan— In    temporary 
charge  of  Frontier  Section— Events  leading  up  to  the  siege  of 


CONTENTS  xi 


PAGE 


Chitral  Fort — Umra  Khan  of  Jandol  implicated — Despatch  of 
Chitral  Relief  Force  from  India  and  a  detachment  from  Gilgit — 
Appointed  to  Headquarters  Staff  of  the  ReUef  Force — Sir 
Robert  Low — Colonel  Bindon  Blood — Captain  Nixon — Nature 
of  country  to  be  traversed — Capture  of  the  Malakand  Pass — 
Action  at  Khar — Passage  of  Swat  river — Effective  action  of 
cavalry  —  Reconnaissances  to  Panjkora  river  and  towards 
Umra  Khan's  headquarters— Fine  fighting  of  Guides  Infantry — 
Reconnaissance  up  the  Panjkora — Meet  Roddy  Owen — Ad- 
vance on  Miankilai  and  flight  of  Umra  Khan — Siege  of  Chitral 
is  raised — Reconnaissance  down  the  Panjkora — Treacherously 
attacked  by  my  two  guides — Severely  wounded — Sent  back  to 
India — Mentioned  in  Despatches  and  awarded  D.S.O.- — Pro- 
moted Captain  —  Preparation  for  Staff  College  Entrance 
Examination — Nominated  for  entrance — Leave  for  England — 
Some  reflections  on  service  in  India. 


CHAPTER   VI 

Student  at  the  Staff  College      .... 

Colonel  Hildyard — His  views  on  the  education  of  officers — 
Nature  of  the  Staff  College  Course — Colonel  Henderson — Lord 
Roberts'  appreciation  of  him — First  year's  work  at  the  college 
— Go  to  France  to  learn  the  language — Second  year's  work — 
Visit  to  battlefields  of  1870  war — Visit  the  Meuse  Valley  and 
Belgian  Ardennes  —  Umpire  at  army  manoeuvres  —  Sir  H. 
Brackenbury— Inspection  of  Staff  College  by  Lord  Wolseley — 
Value  of  Staff  College  training. 


CHAPTER   VII 

On  the  Intelligence  Staff,  War  Office  .  -91 

Posted  to  the  Intelligence  Division,  War  Office — Sir  John 
Ardagh — Status  of  the  Division — Its  duties — Mr.  Stanhope's 
memorandum  regarding  miUtary  policy — Hartington  Com- 
mission recommends  appointment  of  a  Chief  of  the  Staff — Sir 
Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  dissents — Recommendation  not 
carried  out — Effect  of  this  in  South  African  War — Colonial 
Defence  Committee — Work  in  the  Russian  Section — Appointed 
Staff  Captain  in  the  Colonial  Section — Captain  Altham — 
Description  of  Colonial  Empire — Work  in  the  Colonial  Section 
— Effect  of  our  general  unreadiness  for  war  in  regard  to  the 
South  African  situation — War  declared  against  the  South 
African  Republics — Forecast  of  cost  of  war — Sir  George  White 
sent  to  command  in  Natal — Altham  goes  with  him  and  I  take 
charge  of  the  Colonial  Section — Early  developments  in  the  war 
— Dependence  on  the  Press  for  information — Reverses  at  Storm- 
berg,  Magersfontein,  and  Colenso — BuUer  suggests  abandon- 
ment of  attempt  to  reheve  Ladysmith — Am  consulted  by  a 
Cabinet   Minister   as   to   what   should   be   done — Recommend 


xii         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

PAGE 

appointment  of  Commander-in-Chief  as  distinct  from  the  Com- 
mander in  Natal — Defence  Committee  of  Cabinet  appoint  Lord 
Roberts,  with  Lord  Kitchener  as  Chief  of  Stafi — Proceed  to 
South  Africa  to  join  the  Staff  of  Lord  Roberts. 


CHAPTER   VIH 

On   the    Headquarters    Staff   in   the   South    African 

War  .  .  .  .  .  •  .104 

Situation  on  arrival  at  Cape  Town — Formation  of  mounted 
infantry — Lord  Roberts'  plan  of  operations  and  measures 
taken  to  preserve  secrecy — Composition  of  Intelligence  Staff 
at  Headquarters — Arrival  of  Headquarters  at  Modder  liver — 
Lord  Roberts'  care  for  his  troops — Mystifying  Cronje  as  to 
the  proposed  line  of  advance— General  situation  at  this  time — 
Buller  asks  for  reinforcements — Lord  Roberts  adheres  to  his 
plan — Cavalry  Division  crosses  Free  State  frontier  and  relieves 
Kimberley — Pursuit  of  Cronje — Battle  of  Paardeberg — Con- 
fusion caused  by  bad  system  of  command — Investment  of 
Cronje — Cronje  surrenders  and  is  brought  into  camp— He  is 
sent  to  St.  Helena — Grierson  joins  Headquarters — His  efforts 
to  improve  defective  methods  of  staff  work— Lord  Roberts' 
instructions  in  regard  to  battle  of  Poplar  Grove — Imperfect 
arrangements  for  the  battle  enable  Boer  forces  to  make  good 
their  retreat — Advance  continued  to  Bloemfontein — Summary 
of  events  to  date — Standard  of  staff  work  and  tactics  inferior 
to  strategy — Strategy  never  so  good  again — Some  reasons  for 
this — Henderson's  health  breaks  down  and  he  returns  to 
England — He  commences  to  write  the  Official  History  of  the 
War — His  death  in  Egypt  in  1903 — The  soldier's  difficulties  in 
writing  official  histories — The  advance  from  Bloemfontein  to 
Kronstad  and  thence  to  Pretoria — Boer  guerilla  warfare — Lord 
Roberts'  plan — Hardships  of  march  and  fine  spirit  of  the  men 
— Action  of  Diamond  Hill — The  advance  to  Middelburg— The 
De  Wet  hunts — Recalled  to  the  War  Office — Reach  rank  of 
Major^Promoted  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  for  services  in 
the  war. 


CHAPTER    IX 

Head  of  the  Foreign  Intelligence  Section,  War  Office     127 

Resume  work  in  Intelligence  Division — Lord  Roberts  returns 
to  England  and  becomes  Commander-in-Chief — Visit  defended 
ports — Intelligence  and  mobilisation  combined  under  the  charge 
of  Sir  W.  Nicholson — Am  made  head  of  the  Foreign  Section  of 
InteUigence — Promoted  Colonel,  1904 — Selection  of  military 
attaches — Preparations  for  war  hampered  by  lack  of  a  yolicy 
— Our  International  position— Defence  of  India — Examination 
of  it  and  Lord  Kitchener's  objections  to  our  calculations — 
Esher  Committee^Reorganisation  of  War  Office  and   forma- 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGE 

tion  of  General  Staff — Post  of  Commander-in-Chief  abolished 
— Sir  N.  Lyttelton  becomes  first  Chief  of  the  General  Staff — 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence  established — War  preparations 
now  become  more  feasible — Bogy  of  Russian  attack  on  India 
disappears  and  contingency  of  war  with  Germany  begins  to 
take  its  place — Agreements  with  France,  Russia,  and  Japan — 
Expeditionary  Force  formed — Grierson  and  Huguet  largely 
instrumental  in  this— Lord  Roberts  resigns  from  Committee 
of  Imperial  Defence — First  attempt  to  give  a  mihtary  lecture 
— Visits  between  1902  and  1906  to  Northern  Africa,  Canada, 
America,  the  Balkans,  Belgium,  Portugal,  Germany,  and  other 
European  countries — Leave  War  Office  on  expiration  of 
appointment — Placed  on  half-pay,  1907. 


CHAPTER   X 

Brigadier-General,  General  Staff,  Aldershot  .  .152 

Translate  German  regulations  regarding  heavy  artillery — 
Assistant  Quartermaster-General,  Aldershot,  1907 — Become 
Chief  of  General  Staff  there  six  months  later — Smith-Dorrien — 
Officers  on  the  Aldershot  Staff — Comparison  of  soldier's  Ufe  in 
1907  with  that  in  1877 — Similar  comparison  in  regard  to  train- 
ing— Smith-Dorrien's  methods — Weakness  of  units — Innova- 
tions in  organisation  and  improvements  in  training — System 
of  obtaining  ground  for  manoeuvres — False  teaching  of 
manoeuvres — Smith-Dorrien's  practical  views — Staff  tours — 
Visits  of  King  Edward — Visits  of  King  George  and  Queen 
Mary — Aeroplanes — Balloons — The  Caterpillar — -Ordered  to 
take  up  post  of  Commandant,  Staff  College. 


CHAPTER    XI 

Commandant  of  the  Staff  College  .  .  .169 

History  of  College— Students  and  staff — Promoted  Major- 
General — Subjects  of  study — Nature  of  staff  tours — System 
of  classifying  the  students — Defects  in  instruction — Points  on 
which  special  emphasis  was  laid — Importance  of  considering 
defensive  as  well  as  offensive  warfare — Warning  given  to 
students  about  war  with  Germany — Naval  War  College — 
Admirals  Jackson  and  Colville — Visits  to  the  Loire  and  Amiens 
battlefields  of  1870  war — My  first  speech  in  French — General 
Picquart — With  the  King's  suite  on  army  manoeuvres — ■ 
Adventures  with  Oxley  while  motoring— Trinity  College — 
Created  Knight  of  the  Victorian  Order — Leave  the  Staff 
College  to  become  Director  of  Mihtary  Training. 


xiv         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


CHAPTER    XH 


PAGE 


Director  of  Military  Training     .  .  .  .186 

Duties — Unsatisfactory  responsibility  for  training — Arrange- 
ments for  command  at  home  in  time  of  war  — "Staff" 
cannot  "  command  " — Question  of  invasion — Invasion  ruled 
out  as  impracticable  and  replaced  by  theory  of  raids — 
Reversion  to  invasion  theory — Question  mainly  one  for  the 
Admiralty — Constant  discussions  finally  settled  in  August  1914 
— Policy  as  to  invasion  during  the  Great  War — Economy 
exercised  to  the  detriment  of  training — "  Curragh  incident  " 
and  its  effect  on  Army  officers — "  Joe  "  Maude — Collapse  of 
the  proposed  coercion  of  Ulster  and  resignation  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  and 
the  Adjutant-General — Sir  Charles  Douglas — Army  manoeuvres 
arranged  for  1914 — War  with  Germany  declared — Am  appointed 
Quartermaster-General  of  the  British  Expeditionary  Force. 


CHAPTER   Xin 

Quartermaster-General,   British    Expeditionary   Force     197 

Organisation  and  duties  of  G.H.Q. — System  of  supply  and 
maintenance — The  I.G.C. — His  duties  are  curtailed — The 
"  Directors  " — My  Staff — Arrive  at  Paris  with  the  Commander- 
in-Chief — Stay  at  the  Hotel  Crillon— Visit  J  off  re  at  Vitry-le- 
Fran9ois — Reach  G.H.Q.  at  Le  Cateau — Concentration  of  the 
Force — Various  situations  to  be  thought  out — Discuss  change 
of  base  with  I.G.C. — Commander-in-Chief's  conference  before 
battle  of  Mons — The  retreat  from  Mons — Replacement  of 
clothing  and  equipment  lost  in  the  retreat — Confusion  caused 
by  change  of  base — Control  of  railways  in  French  hands — 
Difficulty  of  knowing  where  troops  were — Phght  of  refugees— 
WiUing  spirit  shown  by  all  ranks  to  help  each  other — Despatch 
riders — G.H.Q.  move  successively  to  St.  Quentin,  Noyon, 
Compi^gne,  Dammartin,  Lagny,  Melun — The  move  from  Dam- 
martin  to  Lagny — Force  becomes  part  of  Paris  garrison  under 
Gallieni — Battle  of  the  Marne — BrutaUties  of  German  troops — 
G.H.Q.  at  Coulommiers  and  F6re-en-Tardenois — Want  of  heavy 
artillery  on  the  Aisne — Move  round  to  Flanders —First  battle 
of  Ypres — State  of  trenches — Cross  the  Channel  with  Lord 
Roberts — His  death  at  St.  Omer — Succeed  Murray  as  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  at  G.H.Q. 


CHAPTER    XIV 

Chief   of  the   General    Staff,    British   Expeditionary 

Force       .  .  .  •  •  .219 

Duties— Arrangements   for  training — Reorganisation  of  the 
General    Staff— My    principal    assistants — Signal    communica- 


CONTENTS  XV 

PAGE 

tions — Flying  Corps — Life  at  G.H.Q. — Relations  with  units  at 
the  front — Liaison  officers — Situation  on  West  Front  at 
beginning  of  1915 — Position  of  British  Commander-in-Chief — 
Results  of  unreadiness  for  war — Uncertainty  as  to  reinforce- 
ments and  war  material — Neuve  Chapelle — Second  battle  of 
Ypres — Withdrawal  from  part  of  the  SaUent — Festubert — 
Loos — Alhes  short  of  war  material — Joffre's  first  conference  of 
Allied  Representatives — My  views  on  the  general  situation  and 
conduct  of  the  war — Decide  to  send  them  to  the  C.I.G.S.  at 
the  War  Office — He  forwards  them  to  the  Cabinet — Lord 
Kitchener  asks  me  to  become  C.LG.S. — I  send  him  my  views 
as  to  the  status  and  duties  of  the  General  Staff — He  cannot 
agree  with  some  of  them  and  proposes  to  resign — Meet  him  at 
Calais  and  discuss  his  objections — They  are  satisfactorily 
removed — I  leave  G.H.Q.  for  the  War  Office. 


CHAPTER   XV 

Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,   19 16        .  .     246 

General  situation  in  all  theatres — Reorganisation  of  the 
General  Staff — Position  of  C.LG.S. — Relations  with  Joffre, 
Cadorna,  and  Alexeieff — War  Council  and  War  Cabinet — - 
Relations  between  Ministers  and  their  professional  advisers — 
Proposed  war  policy  approved  by  Cabinet — Send  instructions 
to  Commanders-in-Chief — Steps  to  improve  training  and 
organisation  of  troops  at  home  and  abroad — Home  Defence — 
India  and  India  Office  responsible  for  Mesopotamia — Need  for 
comprehensive  plan  for  utilising  man-power — Cabinet  Com- 
mittee set  up  to  deal  with  the  question — Lord  Kitchener 
and  compulsory  service — Many  people  objected  to  it — Problem 
of  providing  officers — Production  of  tanks — Evacuation  of 
GalUpoU — Operations  in  Mesopotamia — Campaign  is  handed 
over  to  the  War  Office — Fall  of  Kut-el-Amara- — Appointment 
of  Maude  as  Commander-in-Chief— His  successes — Operations  in 
Egypt  and  Macedonia — Disadvantages  of  employing  armies  of 
mixed  nationalities — East  Africa — Smuts  and  Van  Dewenter — 
Operations  on  the  West  Front — Verdun  and  the  Somme — 
Situation  at  the  end  of  the  year — Ministers'  dissatisfaction — • 
Tendency  to  try  new  methods  and  plans — Joffre  superseded 
by  Nivelle  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  French  armies — His  plan 
for  1917  rejected  by  Governments  in  favour  of  Nivelle 's  plan — 
My  relations  with  Joffre — Change  of  Government — My  relations 
with  Lord  Kitchener — The  part  he  played  in  the  war. 


CHAPTER   XVI 

Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,   191 7-18  .     291 

AUied  Conference  at  Rome — Method  of  conducting  these 
conferences — Admiral  Bacon — Dover  patrol — Relations  with 
Admiralty  Staff — Admirals  Jackson,  Jellicoe,  and  Wemyss — Re- 
organisation of  Admiralty  Staff — Lord  Fisher — Visit  to  Italian 


xvi        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

PAGE 

Front  —  General  Staff  views  on  man-power — Difficulty  of 
providing  drafts — Question  many  times  raised  during  19 17 — 
Young  soldier  battalions — ^Events  on  Russian  Front — Palestine 
Campaign — Operations  on  West  Front — Nivelle  replaced  by 
Petain — Foch  becomes  Chief  of  French  General  Staff — My 
relations  with  him  —  Messines  —  Passchendaele  —  Cambrai  — 
Defeat  of  ItaUans  —  Alternative  plans  suggested  during  the 
year — Evils  attending  unnecessary  changes  of  plan — Difficulty 
of  keeping  strategical  direction  of  war  on  right  lines — Con- 
sideration by  General  Staff  of  plans  for  1918 — Conclusions 
reached — Anxiety  regarding  man-power  and  shipping — Generals 
Pershing  and  Bliss — Question  of  unity  of  command — Various 
proposals  made  in  191 5 — Calais  agreement  of  February 
191 7 — Consideration  by  military  authorities  in  summer  of 
191 7 — Rapallo  Conference  establishes  a  Supreme  War  Council — 
A  pohtical  not  a  mihtary  body — The  technical  advisers  of  the 
Council  become  executive  officers — Am  unable  to  accept  the 
Government's  arrangement  for  giving  effect  to  this  decision 
— This  leads  to  my  removal  from  the  War  Office — Measures 
taken  after  the  German  offensive  in  March  1918 — My  in- 
debtedness to  many  friends  whilst  C.I.G.S. 


CHAPTER   XVn 

Commander-in-Chief,  Great  Britain  .  .  .     342 

Appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  Eastern  Command — 
Excessive  number  of  men  retained  in  United  Kingdom — Re- 
organisation of  the  Eastern  Command  Staff — Become  Com- 
mander-in-Chief, Great  Britain — Reorganisation  of  Head- 
quarters Staff — Organisation  of  commands — Inspections — 
Good  work  of  hospitals — -Defence  schemes  —  Anti-aircraft 
defences — Air  warfare  of  the  future — Science  should  be  given 
a  more  prominent  place  in  our  war  preparations — Visits  to 
the  Grand  Fleet — Co-operation  of  American  Navy — Admiral 
Sims — Discontent  on  demobihsation — Industrial  unrest — Chair- 
man of  Committee  on  Officers'  Pay — King  reviews  young 
soldier  battaUons  in  Hyde  Park — Appointed  to  command  the 
British  Army  of  the  Rhine. 


CHAPTER   XVIII 

Commander-in-Chief,  British  Army  of  the  Rhine  .     357 

Composition  of  Headciuarters  Staff — Distribution  of  AUied 
troops — The  British  zone — The  MiUtary  Governor — Adminis- 
tration of  the  occupied  territory — Meaning  of  martial  law — 
Policy  as  to  industrial  questions — Strength  of  Army — Its 
reorganisation — Preparations  for  the  advance  into  unoccupied 
territory — Visit  of  the  King  and  Queen  of  the  Belgians- 
Visits  of  the  Duke  of  Connaught,  Marshal  Foch,  Marslial  Joffre, 
General  Pershing,  and  other  distinguished  officers — Visit  of  the 


CONTENTS  xvii 


PAGE 


Army  Council — Interchange  of  visits  with  Allied  Generals — 
Peace  celebrations  at  Paris,  Brussels,  and  London— Deer- 
stalking in  Scotland — Sir  Michael  Culme-Seymour — Lord 
Charles  Beresford — Changes  made  in  system  of  administration 
and  reduction  of  Army  on  ratification  of  peace — Farewells 
previous  to  leaving  for  England — Promoted  Field-Marshal. 


CHAPTER   XIX 

Some  Final  Reflections       .....     380 

Characteristics  of  British  soldier — Unpopularity  of  the  army 
as  compared  with  the  navy — Study  of  military  history  by 
statesmen — Results  of  its  neglect. 


DATES  OF   PROMOTION     .              .  .              .  .387 

FOREIGN      HONOURS      RECEIVED  DURING  THE 

GREAT  WAR      .              .              .  .              .  .388 

INDEX             .              .              .              .  .              .  .389 


LIST   OF   ILLUSTRATIONS 


Portrait  of  Author 

At  the  Army  Manceuvres,  1 9 1 3  . 

Lord  Roberts  at  the  Staff  College 

Gentlemen  Cadets  making  a  Cask-bridge 

Marshal  Joflfre   . 

Inspection  of  Gentlemen  Cadets 

Lord  Kitchener. 

Allied  Conference  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay 

Visit  to  the  Italian  Front 

Marshal  Foch    . 

Inspection  of  Italian  troops 

Canadian  Officers 

General  Allen,  American  army   . 

General  Michel,  Belgian  army    . 

General  Mangin,  French  army    . 

General  Gouraud,  French  army  . 

At  Laeken  Palace 


Fro7itispiece 

FACING  PAGS 

1 66 


176 
186 
244 
266 
288 
292 
296 
310 
312 
344 
358 
366 
368 
370 
376 


Map  illustrating  journey  to  Pamirs,  1894,  and  Chitral  Expedition, 
1895 


80 


CHAPTER  I 

RECRUIT   AT   ALDERSHOT 

Enlistment  in  i6th  Lancers — The  "  Old  Soldier  "  in  the  'Seventies — 
Barrack-room  life — Rations — Pay — Kit  and  equipment — Uniform 
— Drills — ^Treatment  of  sick — Breaking  out  of  barracks — Sundays 
— First  Christmas  Day — Night  guards — MiUtary  offences  and 
punishments — Guard-room — Articles  of  War — Muster  parade — 
Punishment  drill— Musketry  course — Dismissed  drills — -Day  guards 
— I  allow  a  deserter  to  escape  and  so  commit  my  first  "  crime  " — 
Imprisoned  in  guard-room — My  second  "  crime  " — Promoted  Lance- 
Corporal — Backward  state  of  training — Field-days— Reasons  for 
defective  training — Lord  Wolseley,  Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  and  other 
rising  Generals  effect  great  reforms — Successes  in  competitions  at 
skill-at-arms. 

I  WAS  seventeen  and  three-quarters  years  old  when,  having 
decided  to  seek  mj'^  fortune  in  the  army,  I  took  the  "  Queen's 
ShiUing  "  from  a  recruiting  sergeant  in  the  city  of  Worcester 
on  the  13th  of  November  1877.  The  minimum  age  for  en- 
hstment  was  eighteen,  but  as  I  was  tall  for  my  years  the 
sergeant  said  that  the  deficient  three  months  would  involve 
no  difficulty,  and  he  promptly  wrote  me  down  as  eighteen 
years  and  two  months — so  as  to  be  on  the  safe  side — and 
that  has  been  the  basis  of  my  offtcial  age  ever  since.  For 
some  reason  that  has  now  escaped  my  memory  I  was 
detained  at  Worcester  for  four  days,  receiving  in  the  mean- 
time two  shillings  and  a  halfpenny  per  diem  for  board  and 
lodgings.  The  odd  halfpenny  strikes  one  as  being  a  queer 
item,  but  it  had  no  doubt  been  arrived  at  by  Her  Majesty's 
Treasury  after  careful  calculation  of  the  cost  actually 
incurred.  The  recruiting  sergeant,  a  kindly  disposed  in- 
dividual, took  possession  of  the  whole  sum,  giving  me  in 
return  excellent,  if  homely,  accommodation  and  food  at 
his  own  house. 

The   regiment   I   selected   to   join,   the   i6th   (Queen's) 

I  B 


2  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Lancers,  was  stationed  in  the  West  Cavalry  Barracks, 
Aldershot,  and  on  arrival  there,  on  a  wet  and  dreary 
November  evening,  the  first  people  I  met  were  the  "  orderly 
officer  "  and  the  regimental  sergeant-major,  both  of  whom 
showed  a  sympathetic  interest  in  me.  I  was  at  once  posted 
as  No.  1514  to  "  G  "  Troop,  the  officer  saying  to  me  as  I 
went  off,  "  Give  your  watch  to  the  sergeant-major  of  your 
troop,  my  lad,"  and,  as  I  wrote  home  a  few  days  later,  I 
did  so,  "  for  it  is  unsafe  to  leave  it  lying  about,  and  there  is 
nowhere  you  can  carry  it  with  safety." 

The  regiment  was  commanded  at  the  time  by  Colonel 
Whigham,  who  had  originally  served  in  the  infantry.  The 
adjutant.  Lieutenant  "  Jimmy  "  Babington,  was  a  fine  horse- 
man, a  strict  disciphnarian,  and  universally  regarded  as  an 
ideal  cavalry  officer.  He  was  more  than  that,  as  is  shown  by 
his  selection  in  1914,  when  nearly  60  years  of  age,  to  command 
one  of  the  Kitchener  Divisions.  This  he  took  out  to  France 
the  following  year,  and  from  then  onwards  was  continuously 
in  command  of  the  division  or  an  army  corps,  in  France  or 
in  Italy,  until  the  end  of  the  war,  a  task  which  proved  to  be 
beyond  the  physical  powers  of  many  a  younger  man  in  the 
hard  and  incessant  fighting  on  the  West  Front. 

"  G  "  Troop  was  commanded  by  Captain  Henry  Graham, 
one  of  the  most  kind-hearted  men  under  whom  it  has  been 
my  lot  to  serve.  His  subaltern.  Lieutenant  "  Freddy  " 
Blair,  was  somewhat  of  a  terror  to  aU  shirkers  and  wrong- 
doers in  the  troop,  but  I  have  no  recollection  of  having  been 
on  his  black  Ust  ;  and  I  am  sure  that  neither  of  us  then 
thought  that  forty-one  years  later  I  would  be  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  Eastern  Command  and  he  would  be  my 
military  secretary.     But  so  it  turned  out. 

The  hfe  of  a  recruit  in  1877  was  a  very  different  matter 
from  what  it  is  now.  The  system  introduced  in  1871-72  by 
Mr.  CardweU — one  of  the  greatest  War  Ministers  the  country 
has  ever  had — under  which  men  enlisted  for  twelve  years' 
regular  service,  had  not  yet  had  time  to  get  into  full  swing. 
Regiments  were,  therefore,  still  composed  mainly  of  old 
soldiers  who,  although  very  admirable  comrades  in  some 
respects  and  with  a  commendable  code  of  honour  of  their 
own,  were  in  many  cases — not  in  all — addicted  to  rough 


ENLISTMENT  3 

behaviour,  heavy  drinking,  and  hard  swearing.  They  could 
not  well  be  blamed  for  this.  Year  in  and  year  out  they 
went  through  the  same  routine,  were  treated  hke  machines 
— of  an  inferior  kind — and  having  httle  prospect  of  finding 
decent  employment  on  the  expiration  of  their  twenty-one 
years'  engagement,  they  lived  only  for  the  present,  the 
single  bright  spot  in  their  existence  being  the  receipt  of  a 
few  shilhngs — perhaps  not  more  than  one — on  the  weekly 
pay-day.  These  rugged  veterans  exacted  full  deference 
from  the  recruit,  who  was  assigned  the  worst  bed  in  the 
room,  given  the  smallest  amount  of  food  and  the  least 
palatable,  had  to  "  lend  "  them  articles  of  kit  which  they 
had  lost  or  sold,  "  fag  "  for  them  in  a  variety  of  ways,  and, 
finally,  was  expected  to  share  with  them  at  the  regimental 
canteen  such  cash  as  he  might  have  in  the  purchase  of  beer 
sold  at  3d.  a  quart. 

It  so  happened  that  I  joined  the  regiment  on  pay-day, 
and  accordingly  the  greater  number  of  my  newly-found 
companions  spent  the  evening  at  the  canteen — then  a  mere 
drinking  saloon — or  at  public-houses  in  the  town.  On 
return  to  quarters,  if  not  before,  old  quarrels  were  revived 
or  new  ones  were  started,  and  some  of  them  had  to  be 
settled  by  an  appeal  to  fists.  One  of  these  encounters  took 
place  on  and  near  the  bed  in  which  I  was  vainly  trying  to 
sleep,  and  which  was  itself  of  an  unattractive  and  uncom- 
fortable nature.  Argument  and  turmoil  continued  far  into 
the  night,  and  I  began  to  wonder  whether  I  had  made  a 
wise  decision  after  all.  I  continued  to  wonder  for  several 
nights  afterwards,  and  would  lie  awake  for  hours  meditating 
whether  to  see  the  matter  through,  or  get  out  of  bed,  put 
on  my  plain  clothes  (which  I  still  had),  and  "  desert."  For- 
tunately for  me  another  occupant  of  the  room  removed  the 
temptation  these  clothes  afforded,  for,  having  none  of  his 
own,  he  one  night  appropriated  mine,  went  off  in  them,  and 
never  came  back. 

Shortly  before  the  period  of  which  I  write  it  had  been 
the  custom  for  a  married  soldier  and  his  wife,  with  such 
children  as  they  possessed,  to  hve  in  one  corner  of  the 
barrack-room,  screened  off  with  blankets,  and  in  return  for 
this  accommodation  and  a  share  of  the  rations  the  wife  kept 


4  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  room  clean,  washed  and  mended  the  m.en's  under- 
clothmg,  and  attended  to  the  preparation  of  their  meals. 
This  custom  was  not  without  its  good  points,  as  the  women 
exercised  a  steadying  influence  over  the  men,  while  the 
latter  seldom  if  ever  forgot  that  a  woman  was  in  the  room, 
and  any  one  who  did  forget  was  promptly  brought  to  order 
by  the  others.  Still,  it  could  not  be  wholly  without  its 
undesirable  side,  and  the  transfer  of  all  women  to  "  married 
quarters  "  was  a  distinct  change  for  the  better. 

The  barrack-room  arrangements  for  sleeping  and  eating 
could  not  be  classed  as  luxurious.  The  brown  bed-blankets 
were  seldom  or  ever  washed  ;  clean  sheets  were  issued  once 
a  month  ;  and  clean  straw  for  the  mattresses  once  every 
three  months.  Besides  the  beds,  the  only  other  furniture 
consisted  of  four  benches  and  two  deal  tables.  The  men 
polished  their  boots  on  the  former,  and  the  latter  were  used 
for  cleaning  the  remaining  articles  of  kit  as  well  as  for  dining- 
tables.  Tablecloths  there  were  none,  and  plates  and  basins 
(paid  for  by  the  men)  were  the  only  crockery,  the  basin  being 
used  in  turn  as  a  coffee-cup,  tea-cup,  beer-mug,  soup-plate, 
shaving-mug,  and  receptacle  for  pipe-clay  with  which  to 
clean  gloves  and  belts. 

The  food  provided  free  consisted  of  one  pound  of  bread 
and  three-quarters  of  a  pound  of  meat,  and  nothing  more 
of  any  kind.  Groceries,  vegetables,  and  all  other  require- 
ments were  paid  for  by  the  men,  who  had  a  daily  deduction 
of  3^d.  made  from  their  pay  of  is.  2d.  for  that  purpose. 
The  regulation  meals  were  coffee  and  bread  for  breakfast  ; 
meat  and  potatoes  for  dinner,  with  soup  or  pudding  once  or 
twice  a  week  ;  tea  and  bread  for  tea.  If  a  man  wished  to 
have  supper  or  something  besides  dry  bread  for  breakfast 
and  tea  he  had  to  purchase  it  from  the  barrack  hawkers  or 
canteen.  Putting  the  cost  of  this  at  4^d.  a  day,  he  thus 
had  to  expend  a  total  of  eightpence  a  day  on  his  food, 
besides  which  he  was  subjected  to  a  further  daily  charge  of 
a  penny  for  washing.  This  left  him  fivepence  a  day  or 
about  three  shillings  a  week,  and  even  this  was  not  all 
clear  pocket-money,  for  after  the  first  free  issue  he  had  to 
keep  up  the  whole  of  his  underclothing  as  well  as  many 
articles  of  uniform,  and  also  supply  himself  with  cleaning 


KIT  AND  UNIFORM  5 

materials,  such  as  polishing  paste  for  brasses,  oil  for  steel 
equipment,  and  soft-soap  for  saddlery. 

A  beneficent  regulation,  recognising  these  drains  on  the 
unfortunate  man's  pay,  laid  down  that  in  no  case  should 
he  receive  less  than  a  penny  a  day  !  In  my  regiment  the 
custom  was  never  to  give  less  than  a  shilhng  a  week,  but 
even  this  sum  did  not  go  far  to  supplement  the  allowance 
of  food,  to  say  nothing  of  beer  and  tobacco.  The  Govern- 
ment now  provides  ample  food,  practically  all  clothing,  and 
the  amount  of  pay  actually  received  is  five  or  six  times 
greater  than  it  used  to  be. 

The  "  kit  "  with  which  I  was  issued  free  of  cost  consisted 
of  a  valise,  stable-bag,  hold-all  (containing  knife,  fork,  spoon, 
razor  and  comb,  shaving,  hair,  lace,  button,  clothes  and 
boot  brushes),  three  baggage  straps,  tin  of  oil,  tin  of  blacking, 
tin  of  brass  paste,  cloak,  cape,  lance-cap  and  plume,  two 
forage  caps,  tunic,  jacket,  overalls  (trousers),  pantaloons, 
canvas  ducks,  jack-boots  and  spurs,  Wellington  boots  and 
spurs,  ankle-boots,  braces,  three  shirts,  three  pairs  of  socks, 
two  pairs  of  pants,  two  towels,  and  a  piece  of  soap. 
Finally,  I  was  given  a  lance,  sword,  pistol,  cartridge-case, 
cap-case,  and  numerous  belts — an  amount  of  armament  that 
completely  staggered  me. 

Uniform  was  of  a  very  unpractical  kind,  especially  the 
undress  part  of  it.  This  comprised  skin-tight  overalls,  an 
equally  tight  "  shell-jacket  "  cut  off  short  above  the  hips, 
and  a  forage  cap  of  about  the  size  of  a  breakfast  saucer, 
and  kept  in  its  place  immediately  above  the  right  ear  by  a 
narrow  chin-strap  worn  under  the  lower  hp  (never  under 
the  chin  in  the  cavalry,  except  on  mounted  parades). 
There  were  no  "  British-warms  "  or  woollen  "  jumpers  "  as 
to-day,  and  cloaks  were  not  allowed  to  be  worn  when  off 
duty  without  a  regimental  order  to  that  effect.  This  order 
was  never  given  except  when  the  weather  was  very  inclement. 
Later  on  the  forage  cap  became  a  "  free  issue,"  and  was 
thoroughly  disUked  by  everybody  because  of  its  ugly  shape 
and  abnormally  large  size  as  compared  with  the  regimental 
pattern. 

The  first  occasion  on  which  it  was  worn  by  the  regiment 
was  at  an  inspection  by  the  Duke  of  Cambridge  at  York  in 


6  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

1881,  when  an  unofficial  hint  was  sent  round  the  barrack- 
rooms  beforehand  that  it  was  to  be  put  well  on  the  top  of  the 
head,  and  generally  made  to  appear  as  hideous  as  possible. 
Every  one  did  his  best,  or  rather  his  worst,  to  comply  with 
the  hint,  and  when  the  Duke — never  in  too  good  a  temper 
early  in  the  day — came  on  parade,  the  sight  of  the  dis- 
figured regiment  nearly  gave  him  a  fit.  It  was  alleged  that 
he  went  back  to  the  Horse  Guards  and  wrote  a  furious  letter 
to  the  War  Office  condemning  the  cap,  but  it  remained  the 
regulation  article  for  some  years  afterwards,  although  the 
original  pattern  was  still  allowed  to  be  worn  off  parade,  and 
at  the  expense  of  the  owner. 

The  cavalry  recruit  was  kept  hard  at  work,  riding- drill, 
stables,  foot-drill,  gymnastics,  and  school  following  each 
other  in  bewildering  fashion  from  six  in  the  morning  till 
six  in  the  evening,  without  any  appreciable  interval  for  rest. 
Riding-school  was  the  terror  of  most  recruits,  few  of  whom 
had  ever  before  been  across  a  horse.  For  some  weeks  no 
saddle  was  allowed,  no  stirrups  for  some  months,  and  the 
chief  aim  of  the  instructor,  or  "  rough-rider,"  was  not  to 
give  his  pupil  confidence  but  as  many  falls  as  possible. 
The  "  rough-rider  "  deserved  his  name,  for  he  was  as  rough 
with  a  young  horse  as  with  a  young  recruit.  He  seldom 
possessed  a  decent  pair  of  hands,  and  his  system  of  training 
a  horse  was  of  the  break-down  rather  than  the  break-in 
type.  These  unintelligent  methods  have  long  since  passed 
into  oblivion. 

Gymnastics,  or  physical  exercises,  were  conducted  on 
much  the  same  Hnes.  Every  recruit  was  expected  to  do 
the  same  thing  in  an  equally  proficient  way,  no  allowance 
being  made  for  differences  in  age,  build,  or  general  physical 
capacity. 

A  robust  constitution  was  required  in  winter  to  with- 
stand the  cold  and  draughty  stables  and  the  biting  winds 
which  swept  across  the  barrack  square  during  foot-drill, 
where  the  shivering  recruit  would  struggle  to  grasp  the 
explanations  of  drill  gabbled  out  by  his  instructor,  and 
painfully  endeavour  to  master  the  mysteries  of  the  "  goose- 
step  "  and  the  art  of  drawing  swords  "  by  numbers."  I 
succumbed   twice   during   my   first   winter,   once   being  in 


TREATMENT  OF  SICK  7 

hospital  for  two  months  with  rheumatic  fever  brought  on 
by  exposure. 

When  a  man  "  reported  sick  "  he  was  marched  at  about 
nine  o'clock  in  the  morning  to  the  medical  inspection  room 
of  his  regiment,  and  after  waiting  about  in  all  weathers  for 
an  indefinite  time  was  seen  by  a  medical  officer.  If  con- 
sidered a  case  for  admission  he  was  given  an  aperient, 
whether  he  wanted  it  or  not,  in  the  shape  of  half-a-pint  of 
vile-tasting  liquid  known  as  "  black-strap."  He  was  next 
marched  off  to  hospital,  which  might  be  anything  up  to  a 
mile  or  more  away,  and  there  he  was  interviewed  by  another 
doctor  before  being  "  admitted  "  to  hospital.  Next  he  was 
told  off  to  a  ward,  where  he  might  hope  to  arrive  about 
mid- day,  after  having  been  on  the  move  for  some  three  or 
four  hours.  In  the  afternoon  he  would  put  on  his  hospital 
clothing,  give  his  own  into  store,  and  lie  down  to  await  the 
visit  of  the  medical  officer  in  charge  of  the  ward  on  the 
following  morning.  He  was  then  again  examined,  treat- 
ment was  prescribed,  and  if  all  went  well  he  received  it 
during  the  afternoon,  or  some  thirty  hours  after  he  first  set 
out  from  his  barrack- room. 

Accidents  and  other  special  cases  would  be  dealt  with 
more  or  less  immediately,  but  ordinary  medical  cases 
dawdled  on  in  the  manner  I  have  described,  greatly  to  the 
discomfort  of  the  patient  and  sometimes  at  the  risk  of  his 
life.  There  was  no  nursing  service,  at  any  rate  in  the 
hospitals  I  had  the  misfortune  to  visit.  Nursing  and 
dressing  were  the  duty  of  the  "  orderly  "  of  the  ward,  and 
this  individual  was  apt  to  regulate  the  amount  of  attention 
he  gave  to  his  patients  by  the  amount  of  tips  they  gave 
to  him. 

Permission  to  be  out  of  barracks  after  "  watch-setting  " 
— ^half-past  nine  at  night — was  sparingly  granted,  and  all- 
night  passes  were  practically  never  given.  The  "  roll  " 
was  called  at  watch-setting,  when  every  man  not  on  leave 
had  to  answer  his  name,  and  to  make  sure  that  none  went 
out  afterwards  one  and  sometimes  two  "  check  "  roll-calls 
were  made  by  the  orderly  sergeant-major  at  uncertain  hours 
during  the  night.  Each  orderly-sergeant  handed  in  at 
watch-setting   a   statement   showing   the   number   of   men 


8  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

sleeping  in  each  of  his  troop  rooms,  and  equipped  with  this 
the  orderly  sergeant-major,  accompanied  by  the  corporal 
of  the  guard,  visited  the  rooms  and  counted  the  sleeping 
occupants.  It  was  a  favourite  device  of  absentees,  before 
going  out,  to  fold  up  their  bed  as  in  day-time,  so  that  the 
visiting  sergeant-major  might  perhaps  not  notice  their 
absence  ;  while  others  would  try  to  deceive  him  by  leaving 
a  made-up  dummy  in  their  beds.  "  Breaking-out  of 
barracks  "  was  the  crime,  and  twenty-eight  days'  confine- 
ment to  barracks  was  usually  the  punishment,  for  this  form 
of  absence. 

To  "  break  out  "  of  barracks  was  a  simple  matter  at 
Aldershot,  for  although  the  gates  at  the  end  of  them  were 
kept  locked  after  watch-setting,  and  had  high  walls  on 
either  side,  an  unenclosed  public  road  ran  along  the  front 
which  was  accessible  to  everybody.  This  was  not  the  case 
with  all  barracks,  most  of  them  being  surrounded  by  high 
walls,  topped  with  broken  glass.  When  we  were  at  Brighton, 
where  the  walls  were  of  this  kind,  an  amusing  incident 
occurred  in  connection  with  a  man  who  was  trying  to  get 
back  again  after  successfully  breaking  out.  Not  being 
able  to  scale  the  walls,  he  hit  on  the  idea  of  returning  in 
an  officer's  brougham,  which  was  being  brought  back  to 
barracks  by  a  friendly  coachman  after  depositing  the 
officer  and  his  wife  at  their  house  in  the  town.  Unfor- 
tunately the  military  police  sergeant  looked  inside  the 
brougham  before  allowing  it  to  leave  the  barrack  gate, 
and  the  offender  accordingly  found  himself  in  a  worse 
predicament  at  orderly  room  next  morning  than  if  he  had 
walked  into  barracks  and  surrendered. 

Of  aU  days  of  the  week  Sunday  was  the  most  hated — a 
sad  confession  to  make,  but  none  the  less  true.  After 
morning  stables  there  was  a  general  rush,  often  with  little 
or  no  time  for  breakfast,  to  turn  out  in  "  full  dress  "  for 
"  divine  service  " — attendance  at  which  was  compulsory.  On 
return  to  barracks  there  was  another  scramble  preparatory 
to  the  commanding  officer's  inspection  of  stables,  horses, 
saddlery,  and  barrack-rooms.  From  early  morning  till 
half-past  one  in  the  afternoon  there  was  more  work  to  be 
done,  more  grumbling  and  swearing,  and  more  fault-finding 


DIVINE  SERVICE  g 

than  on  any  other  day,  all  of  which  could  have  been  avoided 
had  the  inspections  been  carried  out  on  a  week-day.  The 
reason  they  were  made  on  Sunday  was  certainly  not  because 
there  was  no  time  for  them  on  other  days.  The  real  reason 
probably  was  that  Sunday  was  the  most  convenient  day  for 
the  officers,  as  it  left  them  greater  leisure  to  follow  their 
social  and  sporting  pursuits  during  the  week.  It  was  only 
natural  that  the  men  should  resent  being  hustled  about  and 
made  to  do  unnecessary  work  on  the  one  day  of  the  week 
observed  by  everybody  else  in  the  country  as  a  day  of 
rest. 

Divine  service  was  not  held  for  all  denominations  at 
the  sam.e  time,  but  at  hours  suitable  to  local  facilities.  It 
might  be  at  any  time  between  eight  o'clock  and  noon,  and 
therefore  it  was  not  uncommon  for  men,  on  moving  to  a 
new  station,  to  ask  to  change  their  religion  if  by  so  doing 
they  would  attend  church  or  chapel  at  such  an  hour  as 
would  enable  them  to  escape  from  the  detested  inspections. 
Many  amusing  stories  are  told  about  these  changes,  one  being 
of  a  man  who  asked  his  sergeant-major  to  enter  him  in  the 
books  as  belonging  to  the  "  Plymouth  Brethren."  He  was 
promptly  told  that  no  such  religion  was  officially  recognised, 
and  that  he  vvould  be  put  down  as  a  Roman  Catholic  ! 

On  Christmas  Day,  1877,  I  was  detailed  for  my  first 
military  "  duty,"  that  of  stable-guard  or  looking  after  the 
troop-horses  out  of  stable-hours.  The  custom  was  to  employ 
the  most  recently  joined  recruits  on  this  particular  day,  so 
that  the  old  soldiers  might  be  free  to  make  the  most  of  their 
Christmas  dinner,  which  was  provided  by  the  officer  com- 
manding the  troop,  and  included  a  variety  of  eatables  never 
seen  on  any  other  day,  as  well  as  a  liberal  supply  of  beer. 
The  casks  containing  the  beer  were  brought  some  time 
before  to  the  barrack-room  where  the  dinner  was  to  be  held, 
and  were  there  placed  under  charge  of  a  man  who  could  be 
depended  upon  to  see  that  they  were  not  broached  before 
the  appointed  hour.  Had  this  happened — as  it  sometimes 
did — rather  awkward  incidents  might  have  occurred  when 
the  officers  visited  the  room  just  previous  to  the  dinner  to 
wish  the  men  a  merry  Christmas  and  to  receive  similar 
wishes  in  return.     If  any  individual  did,  by  some  means  or 


10  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

other,  contrive  to  start  his  festivities  too  early,  efforts  were 
made  to  keep  him  in  the  background  until  the  officers  had 
left. 

It  was  the  practice  to  see  that  all  members  of  the 
troop  who  were  absent  on  duty  should  be  specially  well- 
cared  for,  and  in  my  case  the  dinner  brought  to  the 
stable  consisted  of  a  huge  plateful  of  miscellaneous  food 
—  beef,  goose,  ham,  vegetables,  plum  -  pudding,  blanc- 
mange— plus  a  basin  of  beer,  a  packet  of  tobacco,  and  a 
new  clay  pipe  ! 

At  night  the  horses  were  looked  after  by  a  "  night  guard," 
which  paraded  about  five  or  six  o'clock  in  the  evening  and 
came  off  duty  at  reveille  on  the  following  morning.  It  was 
mainly  composed  of  recruits  and  other  men  who  were 
required  to  attend  training  or  do  other  work  during  the 
day-time.  The  chief  duties  of  a  "  sentry  "  of  the  night 
guard  were  to  perambulate  outside  the  stables,  tie  up  any 
horse  that  might  get  loose  (some  of  the  old  troop-horses 
were  extraordinarily  clever  at  slippmg  their  head  collars 
and  finding  their  way  to  the  corn-bin),  see  that  the  doors 
were  kept  closed,  and,  in  the  phraseology  of  the  "  orders," 
"  call  the  corporal  of  the  guard  in  the  event  of  fire  or  other 
unusual  occurrence."  The  sentry  was  armed  with  either  a 
sword  or  a  carbine  (no  ammunition),  though  what  assistance 
he  was  supposed  to  derive  therefrom  in  the  performance  of 
his  duties  no  one  ever  understood. 

The  nights  were  sometimes  intensely  cold  and  always 
interminably  long,  although  the  two  hours  "  on  "  sentry 
were  followed  by  four  hours  "off,"  and  to  the  tired  recruit 
the  bales  of  forage  offered  tempting  resting-places.  That 
way  lay  danger  if  not  disaster,  for  once  he  succumbed  to 
the  temptation  to  sit  down  it  was  a  hundred  to  one  that  he 
would  fall  asleep,  and  if  he  did  he  might  wake  up  to  find 
himself  confronted  by  an  officer  or  non-commissioned 
officer  going  the  "  rounds,"  with  the  result  that  he  would 
be  made  prisoner  and  tried  by  court-martial.  The  punish- 
ment for  this  crime  was  invariably  two  months'  imprison- 
ment, and  although  young  soldiers  must  be  made  to  realise 
their  responsibihties  when  on  sentry,  a  little  more  considera- 
tion in  dealing  with  tired  lads  not  yet  out  of  their  teens 


THE  GUARD-ROOM  ii 

would  not  have  been  misplaced.  I  have  known  more  than 
one  lad  ruined  for  life  because  of  undue  severity  of  punish- 
ment for  a  first  offence. 

Forty  years  ago  every  offence,  however  trivial,  was 
classed  as  a  "  crime,"  and  the  "  prisoner  "  was  interned  in 
the  "  guard-room."  The  latter,  in  the  case  of  the  cavalry 
barracks  at  Aldershot,  was  about  fifteen  feet  square,  indif- 
ferently ventilated,  and  with  the  most  primitive  arrange- 
ments for  sanitation.  No  means  of  lighting  it  after  dark 
were  either  provided  or  permitted.  Running  along  one  of 
its  sides  was  a  sloping  wooden  stage,  measuring  about  six 
feet  from  top  to  bottom,  which  served  as  a  bed  for  all 
the  occupants,  sometimes  a  dozen  or  more  in  number  ; 
at  the  top  was  a  wooden  shelf,  slightly  raised  above  the 
level  of  the  stage,  which  acted  as  pillow  ;  and  no  blankets 
(except  in  very  cold  weather)  or  mattresses  were  allowed, 
except  for  prisoners  who  had  been  interned  for  more  than 
seven  days.  Until  then  their  only  covering,  besides  their 
ordinary  clothes — which  were  never  taken  off — consisted  of 
their  cloaks,  and  they  had  to  endure  as  best  they  could  the 
sore  hips  and  shoulders  caused  by  lying  on  the  hard  boards. 
I  shall  describe  presently  how  I  once  came  to  be  incarcerated 
in  this  horrible  place  for  a  period  of  three  weeks,  and 
will  only  say  here  that  I  was  exceedingly  glad  when  the 
first  seven  days  were  completed. 

A  prisoner  charged  with  committing  an  offence  was  kept 
in  the  guard- room  until  he  could  be  brought  before  the 
commanding  officer,  no  other  officer  in  the  regiment  having 
power  to  dispose  of  his  case,  and  if  he  were  remanded  for  a 
court-martial,  as  he  not  infrequently  was,  he  might  be 
interned  for  several  days  before  his  trial  took  place.  In 
the  meantime  he  would  have  for  company  all  classes  of 
prisoners  thrust  into  the  room  at  any  hour  of  the  day  or 
night,  some  for  drunkenness,  some  for  desertion,  some  for 
insubordination,  and  some  for  no  offence  at  all  which 
merited  confinement.  This  was  not  a  healthy  atmosphere 
in  which  to  bring  up  young  soldiers,  to  many  of  whom  the 
shady  side  of  life  was  as  yet  unknown,  and,  as  will  be  shown 
later,  a  more  sensible  and  humane  system  was  eventually 
adopted.     It  should  not  be  forgotten  that  these  harsh  and 


12  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

short-sighted  methods  were  more  or  less  common  to  the 
age,  and  were  not  confined  to  the  army. 

The  "  Articles  of  War,"  based  on  the  "  Mutiny  Act," 
constituted  the  law  which  then  governed  the  soldier.  The 
Articles  contained  a  list  of  all  military  offences,  with  their 
punishments,  and  were  read  out  to  the  men  once  a  month 
after  "  muster  parade."  Originally — they  dated  back  a 
long  time — they  were  of  excessive  severity,  inflicting  death 
or  loss  of  limb  for  almost  every  crime.  They  were  not  much 
more  lenient  in  my  early  days  from  what  I  can  remember 
of  them,  the  termination  of  most  of  them  being  to  the  effect 
that  "  any  soldier  committing  this  offence  shall,  on  conviction 
by  court-martial,  be  liable  to  suffer  death  or  such  less 
punishment  as  may  be  awarded."  In  1879  the  Articles  of 
War  and  the  Mutiny  Act  were  consolidated  in  the  "  Army 
Discipline  and  Regulations  Act."  This  was  repealed  in 
1881  and  re-enacted  with  some  amendments  in  the  present 
Army  Act,  which  is  brought  into  operation  annually  by 
another  Act  of  Parliament. 

"  Muster  parade,"  I  may  explain,  was  held  on  the  last 
day  of  each  month,  and  was  the  only  parade  at  which  every 
officer  and  man  had  to  be  present.  The  paymaster  was 
the  important  person,  as  he  had  to  satisfy  himself  that 
every  one  for  whom  he  had  issued  pay  was  actually  serving 
in  the  regiment.  It  appears  to  have  been  a  relic  of  the  days 
when  commanding  officers  received  a  lump  sum  of  money 
for  a  given  number  of  men,  and  could  not  be  trusted  to 
have  that  number  in  the  regiment, 

A  man  sentenced  to  undergo  imprisonment,  even  if  for 
some  such  short  period  as  forty-eight  hours,  had  his  hair 
closely  cropped  off,  and  was  thus  made  to  look  like  a 
convict  for  several  weeks  after  his  discharge.  "  Confinement 
to  barracks  "  included  "  punishment  drill  "  for  four  separate 
hours  each  day  except  Sunday,  and  this  again  seemed  to 
have  been  designed  to  destroy  any  shred  of  self-respect  the 
imfortunate  defaulter  might  possess.  The  "  drill "  con- 
sisted in  being  turned  and  twisted  about  on  the  barrack 
square,  in  quick  time  and  with  only  a  few  short  pauses 
during  the  hour,  the  men  carrying  their  full  kit,  strapped  on 
their  shoulders,  besides  the  lance  and  sword — a  total  weight 


A  TRAINED  SOLDIER  13 

of  some  40  or  50  lbs.  The  drill  could  be  made,  and  fre- 
quently was,  according  to  the  fancy  of  the  sergeant  in  charge, 
extremely  exasperating  and  fatiguing,  and  in  order  to  escape 
from  such  degrading  drudgery  men  would  sometimes 
deliberately  commit  a  second  and  more  serious  offence  so 
as  to  be  sent  to  prison.  In  the  cavalry  it  was  not  feasible, 
as  in  the  infantry,  to  spare  the  men  for  four  hours  a  day 
from  their  other  duties,  and  as  a  rule  the  punishment  took 
the  form  of  one  hour's  drill  and  one  or  two  of  employment 
on  "  fatigue  duties." 

In  August  1878 — or  about  nine  months  after  joining — 
I  was  "  dismissed  "  recruit-drill,  this  being  the  length  of 
time  usually  taken  to  become  classified  as  a  trained  cavalry 
soldier.  The  recruit  training  included  a  "  course "  of 
musketry  of  about  three  weeks'  duration,  most  of  the  time 
being  devoted  to  the  deadly  dull  exercise  known  as  "  bob 
and  joe  " — the  bringing  of  the  carbine  from  the  "  ready  " 
to  the  "  present  "  and  vice  versa.  Forty  rounds  of  ball 
ammunition,  no  more  and  no  less,  regardless  of  require- 
ments, were  allowed  for  each  and  every  recruit  to  make 
himself  a  proficient  shot.  The  result  was  that  not  one  in 
twenty  was  proficient,  or  anything  like  it.  I  remember 
that  I  carried  off  the  prize  for  the  best  shot  of  my  batch, 
the  prize  being  three  shillings  ! 

As  a  trained  soldier  I  now  became  available  for  "  day- 
guard,"  which  furnished  the  full-dress  sentry  on  the  barrack 
gate  and  was  responsible  for  the  safe  custody  of  the 
prisoners  in  the  guard-room.  It  was  composed  of  a  corporal, 
a  trumpeter,  and  five  men,  and  was  paraded  for  inspection 
by  the  regimental  sergeant-major.  The  parade  of  this 
guard  was  one  of  the  chief  events  of  the  day,  for  from 
amongst  the  five  men  the  sergeant-major  selected  the  two 
whom  he  thought  to  be  the  smartest  and  best  turned  out 
to  act  as  "  orderlies  "  to  the  commanding  officer  and  adjutant. 
To  be  thus  selected  was  the  ambition  of  the  whole  five,  for 
while  the  three  had  turn  about  to  spend  the  next  twenty- 
four  hours  on  sentry  on  the  barrack  gate,  the  chosen  two 
passed  their  night  in  bed  and  had  little  to  do  during  the  day. 
I  was  lucky  enough  to  be  selected  at  my  first  two  attempts, 
though  I  was  not  equally  fortunate  on  all  other  occasions. 


14  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Being  considered,  I  suppose,  to  be  a  promising  and 
trustworthy  lad,  I  was  detailed  in  the  summer  of  1878,  in 
company  with  another  man  and  a  corporal,  to  form  the 
"  escort  "  for  bringing  back  from  London  a  notorious 
deserter  who  had  been  arrested  there  by  the  civil  police. 
He  had  been  a  burglar  by  profession  before  becoming  a 
soldier,  and  notwithstanding  the  size  of  the  escort  he 
managed,  with  the  assistance  of  some  of  his  friends  who 
appeared  on  the  scene,  and  favoured  by  darkness,  to  make 
his  escape  while  we  were  passing  through  the  purlieus 
adjacent  to  Waterloo  station.  Crestfallen,  we  returned  to 
Aldershot  minus  our  prisoner.  The  corporal  was  at  once 
placed  "  in  arrest,"  whilst  I  and  my  companion  were  con- 
signed to  the  guard-room,  there  to  await  trial  by  court- 
martial,  and  in  all  probability  to  be  sentenced  to  not  less 
than  six  months'  imprisonment.  At  the  end  of  three  weeks 
the  General  commanding  the  Cavalry  Brigade  exercised,  as 
I  thought  and  still  think,  a  sensible  discretion  by  releasing 
us.  Had  he  brought  us  to  trial,  the  chances  are  that  I  would 
have  followed  in  the  steps  of  many  another  soldier  of  those 
days  and  have  become  a  hardened  offender  against  military 
law,  a  disgrace  to  myself,  and  a  burden  to  the  country. 

This  was  my  first  "  crime,"  and  the  second  followed  a 
week  or  two  later.  It  consisted  in  allowing  a  led  horse  to 
break  loose  at  exercise,  and  for  this  I  was  duly  "  repri- 
manded "  by  the  commanding  officer  (Whigham)  and 
warned  that  stern  punishment  would  be  meted  out  the 
next  time  I  misbehaved.  My  future  prospects  were  there- 
fore beginning  to  appear  somewhat  gloomy,  but  thanks  to 
the  good  sense  of  Graham,  my  troop  commander,  neither 
of  the  two  offences  were  allowed  to  count  seriously  against 
me.  He  realised  that  such  neglect  as  there  might  have 
been  was  attributable  to  nothing  worse  than  youthful 
inexperience,  and  early  in  1879  he  took  advantage  of  the 
temporary  absence  of  the  colonel  to  recommend  me  to  the 
acting  commanding  officer  for  promotion  to  lance-corporal, 
thus  obtaining  for  me  the  first  step  towards  the  rank  of 
Field- Marshal. 

Mihtary  training  lagged  far  behind,  notwithstanding  the 
many  lessons  furnished  by  the  Franco-German  War  of  1870, 


PIPE-CLAY  15 

and  was  still  mainly  based  on  the  system  inherited  from  the 
Peninsula  and  Crimean  campaigns.  Pipe-clay,  antiquated 
and  useless  forms  of  drill,  blind  obedience  to  orders,  ramrod- 
Uke  rigidity  on  parade,  and  similar  time-honoured  practices 
were  the  chief  qualifications  by  which  a  regiment  was 
judged.  Very  few  officers  had  any  ambition  beyond 
regimental  promotion.  "  Squadron  leader  "  was  a  name 
and  not  a  reality,  for  beyond  commanding  it  on  parade 
this  officer  had  no  responsibility  or  duty  of  any  kind 
connected  with  the  squadron  as  such.  In  all  other  respects 
each  of  the  two  troops  which  then  formed  a  squadron  was 
a  separate  and  independent  unit,  the  troop  commander 
being  subordinate  only  to  the  regimental  commanding 
officer.  Once  a  week  or  so  the  latter  held  his  "  field-day," 
when  the  regiment  as  a  whole  attended  parade  and  spent 
the  greater  part  of  two  or  three  hours  in  carrying  out  a 
series  of  compHcated  drill-book  movements :  equally  good 
results  could  have  been  secured  in  half  the  time,  and  with 
half  the  expenditure  of  horse-flesh  and  strong  language. 
For  the  remainder  of  the  week  training,  as  understood  in 
those  days,  was  the  preserve  of  the  adjutant,  whose  parades 
were  attended  only  by  those  officers  who  w^re  junior  to  him 
in  rank,  and  by  a  comparatively  small  proportion  of  the  men. 
For  the  drill  of  recruits  on  foot  the  adjutant  was  also 
responsible,  and  in  riding  drill  the  ridingmaster  was  supreme. 
Troop  officers  had  no  responsibility  for  either  one  or  the 
other. 

As  already  mentioned,  Lancer  regiments  carried  sword, 
lance,  and  a  muzzle-loading  horse-pistol,  and  about  half-a- 
dozen  men  in  each  troop,  known  as  scouts  or  skirmishers, 
had  a  carbine  as  well.  They  had  a  very  sketchy  knowledge 
of  the  use  of  this  weapon  and,  Uke  every  one  else,  but  a 
hazy  idea  of  either  scouting  or  skirmishing.  Later,  carbines 
were  issued  to  all  men,  and  the  horse-pistols  were  with- 
drawn ;  but  for  some  years  musketry  was  universally  hated 
and  deemed  to  be  a  degradation  and  a  bore.  In  no  case 
could  it  have  been  made  of  much  value,  since  the  annual 
allowance  of  ammunition  was  fixed  at  forty  rounds  a  man, 
and  thirty  rounds  of  these  were  fired  at  distances  between 
500  and  800  yards. 


i6  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Manoeuvres  as  practised  in  more  recent  years  were 
practically  unknown,  though  there  was  a  legend  amongst 
the  old  soldiers  that  they  had  taken  place  at  Cannock  Chase 
some  years  before  I  joined.  The  nearest  approach  to  them 
was  the  "  field-day  "  held,  perhaps  half-a-dozen  times  during 
the  year,  by  the  Generals  in  command  of  the  larger  stations, 
or  by  the  Commander-in-Chief,  the  Duke  of  Cambridge. 
The  first  one  I  attended  was  held  on  the  ground  at  the  back 
of  the  Staff  College,  the  whole  of  the  Aldershot  garrison — 
about  a  division — taking  part  in  it.  I  remember  that 
towards  the  end  of  the  battle — a  field-day  always  entailed 
a  "  battle  " — my  squadron  was  ordered  to  charge  a  battalion 
of  the  opposing  infantry.  Down  came  our  lances  to  the 
"  engage,"  the  "  charge  "  was  sounded,  and  off  we  went  at 
full  speed,  regardless  of  everything  except  the  desire  to 
make  a  brave  show  worthy  of  our  regimental  predecessors 
who  had  delivered  the  immortal  charge  at  AUwal  some 
thirty  odd  years  before.  The  enemy  received  us  in  square, 
with  fixed  bayonets,  front  rank  kneeUng  and  rear  rank 
standing,  the  orthodox  method  of  dealing  with  a  cavalry 
charge.  Finding  our  opponents  too  strong — or  for  some 
other  reason — the  order  was  given,  "  troops  right-about 
wheel,"  and  so  near  were  we  that,  in  wheeling,  the  outer 
flank  was  carried  on  to  the  infantry  and  one  of  the  horses 
received  a  bayonet  in  his  chest.  Being  too  seriously  injured 
to  live  he  was  shot,  but  in  other  respects  we  were  congratu- 
lated on  having  accomphshed  a  fine  performance.  No  doubt 
it  was  magnificent,  but  it  was  not  the  way  to  fight  against 
men  armed  with  rifles. 

These  defective  methods  of  training  in  general  were  due 
in  a  large  measure  to  the  system  of  voluntary  enUstment, 
under  which  recruits  were  received  in  driblets  throughout 
the  year,  and,  more  especially  perhaps,  to  the  fact  that  the 
four  different  arms  were  kept  severely  apart  from  each  other. 
Cavalry  training  was  the  business  of  the  Inspector-General 
of  Cavalry  at  the  Horse  Guards,  the  local  General  having 
little  or  no  say  in  the  matter.  Artillery  were  mainly 
stationed  at  Woolwich  and  engineer  units  at  Chatham,  each 
having,  like  the  cavalry,  its  own  special  Generals  and  staffs 
and  its  special  representatives  at  the  Horse  Guards.    Com- 


THE  DUKE  OF  CAMBRIDGE  17 

bined  training  of  the  different  arms,  without  which  it  is 
nonsense  to  expect  intelligent  co-operation  in  war,  was 
therefore  impossible. 

There  may  have  been,  and  probably  were,  other 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  improvement,  but  one  would  think 
that  most  of  them  could  have  been  surmounted,  given  more 
impetus  from  the  top.  It  was  not  forthcoming,  and  for 
this  the  Duke  of  Cambridge,  Commander-in-Chief  from 
1856  to  1895  (thirty-nine  years),  must  be  held  accountable. 
He  was  a  good  friend  of  the  soldier  and  extremely  popular 
with  all  ranks  in  the  army,  but  he  was  extraordinarily 
conservative  in  his  ideas  on  the  training  and  education  of 
both  officers  and  men.  He  seems  to  have  beUeved,  quite 
honestly,  that  the  army  as  he  had  found  it,  created  by  such 
a  master  of  war  as  the  Duke  of  WeUington,  must  be  the 
best  for  all  time,  and  he  had  not  realised  the  changes 
which  had  since  taken  place  in  the  armies  of  Europe.  I 
have  been  told  that  he  once  took  the  chair  at  a  lecture 
given  to  officers  of  the  Aldershot  garrison  on  the  subject 
of  foreign  cavalry,  when  he  proved  to  be  a  veritable  Balaam 
in  commending  the  lecturer  to  the  audience.  "  Why  should 
we  want  to  know  anything  about  foreign  cavalry  ?  "  he 
asked.  "  We  have  better  cavalry  of  our  own.  I  fear, 
gentlemen,  that  the  army  is  in  danger  of  becoming  a  mere 
debating  society." 

Many  of  the  younger  generation  of  officers  were  fully 
ahve  to  the  fact  that  better  organisation,  education,  and 
training  were  necessary,  the  most  notable  amongst  them 
being  Lord  Wolseley,  the  best-read  soldier  of  his  time. 
From  1882  onwards  he  was  the  moving  spirit  in  the  path 
of  progress,  and  thanks  to  his  energy  and  initiative,  and  to 
the  support  he  received  from  Sir  Evelyn  Wood  and  other 
keen-sighted  soldiers,  apathy  and  idleness  began  to  go  out 
of  fashion,  and  hard  work  became  the  rule  ;  study  was 
no  longer  considered  to  be  "  bad  form,"  but  a  duty  and  an 
essential  step  to  advancement ;  hunting  on  six  days  of 
the  week  was  no  longer  admitted  to  be  the  only  training 
required  by  a  cavalry  leader  ;  and  in  general  the  profes- 
sional qualifications  of  our  regimental  officers  began  to  reach 
a  much  higher  standard.     I  shall  refer  to  this  matter  again, 


i8  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

when  describing  my  experiences  at  Aldershot  some  thirty 
years  later. 

Before  leaving  the  subject  of  training,  I  may  mention 
that  once  a  year  the  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  of 
each  troop  had  to  compete  between  themselves  for  classifica- 
tion in  the  use  of  the  sword  and  lance,  the  troop- winners 
then  fighting  off  for  the  regimental  prize.  When  first 
introduced,  rather  crude  notions  prevailed  as  to  how  the 
competition  should  be  carried  out,  and  it  was  the  custom 
to  place  the  two  adversaries  at  opposite  ends  of  the  riding- 
school,  give  the  order  to  attack,  and  then  leave  them  to 
charge  down  on  each  other  at  full  speed  much  in  the  same 
way  as  the  picture-books  represent  the  tournaments  of 
centuries  ago.  With  the  single-stick  used  as  a  sword  not 
much  damage  could  be  done  ;  but  with  a  stout  ash  pole 
nine  feet  in  length  representing  the  lance  the  case  was 
different.  For  the  rider  and  his  horse  to  be  ridden  down  or 
rolled  over  was  a  common  occurrence,  and  it  was  seldom 
that  one  or  more  of  the  competitors  was  not  carried  off  to 
hospital,  especially  if  the  competition  happened  to  follow 
pay-day.  This  rough  business  had  its  value  as  it  taught 
the  men  how  to  defend  themselves  ;  and  incidentally  it 
afforded  a  certain  class  of  individual  an  opportunity  for 
paying  off  old  scores  against  any  non-commissioned  officer 
against  whom  he  had  a  grudge.  To  him  it  was  a  matter 
of  indifference  what  the  umpire's  decision  might  be,  provided 
he  "  got  one  in  "  against  the  object  of  his  resentment.  When 
I  became  sergeant,  and  subsequently  troop  sergeant-major,  I 
had  occasionally  to  deal  with  attacks  of  this  kind,  but  being 
careful  at  all  times  to  keep  fit  in  wind  and  limb  by  constant 
practice  with  foils  and  single-sticks,  and  by  taking  regular 
running  exercise,  I  was  capable  of  giving  back  quite  as  good 
as  I  received.  My  most  successful  year  was,  I  think,  1886, 
when  I  was  lucky  enough  to  secure  all  the  first  prizes  in  the 
troop— sword,  lance,  and  shooting— but  pride  had  its  usual 
fall  (Hterally)  when,  as  troop- winner,  I  fought  for  the 
regimental  prize  and,  with  my  horse,  was  bundled  head  over 
heels  by  a  better  man. 


CHAPTER  II 

NON-COMMISSIONED   OFFICER 

Promoted  Corporal — Stationed  at  Brighton — My  third  and  last  "  crime  " — 
Special  duty  at  Chatham — Rejoin  regiment  and  go  to  York — 
Promoted  Lance-Sergeant — Special  duties  while  at  York — Musketry 
course  at  Hythe — Promoted  Sergeant — Signalling  course  at  Alder- 
shot — Regiment  goes  to  Dundalk — State  of  Ireland — Appointed 
Assistant  Instructor  of  Signalling — Lieutenant  Dugdale — Success  of 
signallers  announced  in  regimental  orders — Assistant  Instructor 
of  Musketry  and  Military  Reconnaissance — Escort  prisoners  to 
Limerick  Gaol — Regiment  goes  to  Dublin — Promoted  Troop 
Sergeant-Ma  j  or  —  Suicide  of  predecessor  —  Influence  of  Troop 
Sergeant-Major — Consider  possibility  of  obtaining  commission — 
Difficulties  in  the  way  of  this — Regimental  officer's  expenses — 
Decline  Commanding  Officer's  offer  of  a  commission — Accept  the 
same  offer  made  by  his  successor — Vexatious  delays  retard  com- 
mission—Pass examination  for  commission — Regiment  goes  to 
Aldershot — Gazetted  Second  Lieutenant  in  3rd  Dragoon  Guards — 
Leave  the  i6th  Lancers. 

In  April  1879,  or  about  a  year  and  a  half  after  en- 
listing, I  was  promoted  full  corporal.  This  was,  for  the 
time,  almost  unprecedented  rapidity  of  advancement  in  the 
cavalry,  and  it  entailed  my  transfer  to  another  troop  under 
other  superiors  having  other  ways.  Shortly  afterwards  the 
regiment  was  ordered  to  Brighton — a  four  days'  march — 
and  I  was  selected  to  go  on  ahead  in  charge  of  the  billeting 
party  to  arrange  for  the  accommodation  of  the  men  and 
horses  of  the  troop  at  the  various  halting-places.  It  was 
in  this  way  that  I  gained  my  first  experience  in  those  duties 
of  Quartermaster- General  which  were  to  devolve  upon  me  in 
the  Great  War. 

Whilst  at  Brighton  I  committed  my  third  and  last 
"  crime."  I  had  been  detailed  with  two  men  to  act  as 
escort  to  Major-General  Newdigate,  under  whose  command 
some    Volunteer   battalions   were   having   a   field-day,    or 

19 


20  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

"  sham-fight  "  as  the  phrase  went,  on  Brighton  Downs. 
The  day  was  observed  as  a  holiday  in  the  neighbourhood, 
and  the  hohday-makers,  with  the  best  of  intentions,  insisted 
upon  offering  more  free  drinks  to  my  two  men  than  were 
good  for  them.  As  I  failed  to  keep  a  sufficiently  sharp  eye 
on  them  one  of  the  two  yielded  to  the  temptation,  and 
on  the  way  home  parted  company  with  his  horse,  which 
galloped  riderless  back  to  barracks  where  it  was  seen  arriving 
by  the  regimental  sergeant-major.  The  man  himself  was 
picked  up  in  the  street  helplessly  drunk,  and  I,  the  responsible 
party,  was  placed  "  in  arrest."  (I  may  remind  the  reader 
that  I  was  still  in  my  teens.) 

I  had  a  very  unpleasant  interview  with  the  commanding 
officer,  Whigham,  next  morning  at  orderly  room.  Looking 
at  the  record  of  my  two  previous  crimes  as  given  in  the 
"  defaulters'  book,"  he  fiercely  remarked,  "  First  you  allow 
a  man  to  escape  ;  then  you  allow  a  horse  to  escape  ;  now 
you  allow  both  a  man  and  a  horse  to  break  loose.  You  are 
'  severely  reprimanded,'  and  if  you  ever  come  before  me 
again  I  will  reduce  you  to  the  ranks."  I  knew  that  his 
bark  was  sometimes  worse  than  his  bite,  but  I  also  felt  that 
he  might  be  as  good  as  his  word,  and  that  it  behoved  me  to 
be  more  strict  in  future  in  supervising  the  men  under  my 
control.  This  was  well  rubbed  into  me  later  by  the  sergeant- 
major,  a  non-commissioned  officer  of  the  best  type  and  for 
whose  advice  I  always  had  the  greatest  respect. 

A  few  years  later  the  troop  defaulters'  book  containing  a 
list  of  my  offences  was  either  lost  or  wilfully  destroyed.  No 
one  was  able  to  discover  what  had  become  of  it.  The 
offences,  not  being  of  a  serious  nature,  had  not  been  recorded 
in  the  regimental  defaulters'  book,  or  an5rwhere  else  except 
in  the  missing  book,  and  therefore  I  was  necessarily  given, 
as  were  all  other  men  similarly  situated,  a  clean  sheet  in  the 
new  book.  It  remained  without  an  entry  throughout  my 
future  service  in  the  ranks. 

Apparently  my  latest  dereliction  of  duty  was  not  deemed 
to  be  very  heinous,  for  a  few  months  after  it  occurred  I  was 
one  of  two  non-commissioned  officers  in  the  regiment 
recommended  to  go  through  a  twelve  months'  course  at  the 
riding  establishment   at    Canterbury,  in   order    to    qualify 


SIR  EVELYN  WOOD  21 

for  the  post  of  ridingmaster.  The  final  decision  rested,  of 
course,  with  the  commanding  officer,  and  he  selected  the 
other  man.  I  was  not  sorry,  as  I  had  neither  the  desire  nor 
natural  ability  to  become  an  expert  in  equitation. 

A  more  congenial  post  was  given  me  in  the  summer  of 
1879,  when  I  was  ordered  one  day,  on  return  to  barracks 
from  a  long  morning's  drill  on  the  Downs,  to  parade  in 
"  marching  order  "  by  three  o'clock  to  proceed  to  Chatham 
in  charge  of  three  men  detailed  as  mounted  orderlies  at  the 
headquarters  of  the  Chatham  district.  It  was  already  past 
noon,  but  by  the  appointed  hour  my  detachment  was  on 
parade,  and  we  pushed  on  as  quickly  as  our  tired  horses 
would  permit,  passing  through  Lewes  and  Uckfield,  and 
reaching  our  first  halting-place,  Maresfield,  about  half-past 
seven  in  the  evening.  The  only  available  accommodation 
was  a  small  farmstead  occupied  by  an  irascible  old  lady  who 
flatly  refused  to  have  anything  to  do  with  us,  and  conse- 
quently I  had  to  ride  on  for  another  two  miles  to  a  police 
station  and  obtain  the  requisite  authority  compelling  her 
to  take  us  in.  This  brought  her  to  her  senses,  and  by  the 
time  we  had  groomed  our  horses  and  made  them  comfortable 
for  the  night,  about  ten  o'clock,  she  had  prepared  for  us 
an  excellent  supper  to  which  we  did  full  justice,  having 
had  no  food  since  our  meagre  breakfast  at  seven  o'clock 
in  the  morning. 

Next  day  we  made  Tonbridge,  where  we  were  fortunate 
in  at  once  securing  good  billets,  gooseberry  pudding  being 
a  higiily-appreciated  feature  of  the  menu.  The  local 
members  of  the  Kent  Yeomanry  showed  us  welcome  hos- 
pitality in  the  evening. 

The  following  day  we  reached  Chatham,  wet  to  the  skin, 
and  were  attached  to  a  company  of  the  army  service  corps 
for  quarters  and  rations.  It  was  at  Chatham,  while  holding 
this,  my  first  independent  command,  that  I  made  the 
acquaintance  of  the  late  Sir  Evelyn  Wood. 

The  views  I  held  about  my  mission  are  shown  in  a  letter 
I  wrote  home  : 

Taking  all  things  into  consideration  it  is  good  to  have  been 
selected  for  this  work,  as  I  am  in  sole  charge  and  no  one  will 
interfere  with  me  so  long  as  the  men  turn  out  clean  and  smart 


22 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


when  on  duty  and  keep  steady.  I  need  hardly  say  that  we  were 
all  picked  out  as  likely  to  be  a  credit  to  the  regiment  to  which  we 
belong.  I  hope  we  shall  be,  as  my  Captain  told  me  when  starting 
that  he  would  keep  up  a  correspondence  with  the  General  Com- 
manding (Sir  Evelyn  Wood,  now  in  Africa  with  the  French 
Empress)  and  will  hear  how  I  get  on,  and  that  if  cdl  goes  correct 
he  will,  on  my  return,  do  his  best  for  me. 

He  was  a  sensible  officer  this  captain — I  forget  his  name 
— to  impress  upon  me,  a  young  lad,  the  importance  of 
keeping  up  the  good  name  of  the  regiment,  and  I  may  add 
that  on  completion  of  the  duty,  about  eight  months  later, 
the  commanding  officer  received  from  the  Chatham  head- 
quarters an  official  letter  which  was  highly  complimentary 
to  myself  and  my  men. 

The  regiment  had  meantime  moved  from  Brighton  to 

Woolmch,  and  the  circumstances  in  which  I  rejoined  it 

from  Chatham  will  best  be  described  by  quoting  from  another 

letter  : 

Cock  Hotel,  Ware,  Hertfordshire, 
Sunday,  2o.2.'8i. 

Last  Wednesday  about  six  p.m.  I  was  sent  for  by  the  Brigade 
Major,  and  told  to  have  myself  and  men  ready  by  nine  a.m.  next 
morning  to  rejoin  the  regiment.  That  was  all  I  could  get  to 
know.  Next  morning  we  left  Chatham  and  covered  the  twenty- 
six  miles  to  Woolwich  in  about  four  hours,  finding  out  on  arrival 
there  that  next  day  we  would  commence  our  journey  to  York, 
there  to  remain  until  further  orders.  On  the  first  day  we  passed 
through  Greenwich,  Blackheath  and  Lewisham,  over  London 
Bridge,  through  the  city,  Islington,  Shoreditch  and  on  to 
Edmonton,  eighteen  miles.  Yesterday  we  arrived  at  Ware, 
sixteen  miles,  where  we  halted  for  Sunday.     The  following  shows 


i  from  here  to  York  : 
Monday 

Royston. 

Tuesday 

Huntingdon. 

Wednesday     . 

Peterborough 

Thursday 

Bourne. 

Friday 

Grantham. 

Saturday  | 

Newark. 

Sunday     | 

Monday 

Retford. 

Tuesday 

Doncaster. 

Wednesday     . 

Pontefract. 

Thursday 

York. 

PROMOTED  SERGEANT  23 

I  remember  that  the  winter  was  exceptionally  severe, 
and  that  we  had  to  lead  our  horses  for  a  great  part  of  the 
way,  owing  to  the  frozen  and  slippery  state  of  the  snow- 
covered  ground. 

Soon  after  arrival  at  York  I  was  promoted  lance-sergeant 
(or  provisional  sergeant),  thus  becoming  a  member  of  the 
sergeants'  mess  and  terminating  my  barrack-room  life  with 
the  men. 

As  sergeant,  my  horse,  saddlery,  and  accoutrements 
were  cleaned  by  a  batman,  who  received  six  shillings  a 
month  from  government  for  the  additional  work,  as  well 
as  certain  indulgences  granted  by  his  master.  This  was  a 
welcome  change,  for  there  was  no  harder  animal  in  the  world 
to  groom  than  a  troop  horse  in  winter,  when,  no  part  of 
him  being  clipped,  his  hair  would  be  inches  in  length,  and 
in  spite  of  rubbing  would  remain  wet  from  mud  or  perspira- 
tion for  hours,  and  until  he  was  dry  the  rubbing  had  to  be 
continued.  In  winter,  too,  many  men  would  be  absent  on 
furlough,  which  meant  that  two  and  sometimes  three  horses 
fell  to  the  lot  of  each  man  present  at  stables. 

After  being  employed  for  some  weeks  on  mounted  duty 
at  the  headquarters  of  the  York  district,  I  was  placed  in 
charge  of  the  regimental  remounts — about  forty  in  number 
— and  so  occupied  another  semi-independent  position.  My 
selection  for  these  different  posts  was  probably  due  to  the 
credit  earned  at  Chatham. 

The  following  August  I  was  sent  to  the  school  of  musketry 
at  Hythe  to  qualify  as  assistant  instructor  of  musketry. 
The  curriculum  was  then  about  as  unpractical  and  weari- 
some as  it  could  well  be,  the  greater  part  of  the  time — two 
months — being  devoted  to  acquiring  efficiency  in  repeating, 
parrot-like,  the  instructions  laid  down  in  the  drill  book. 
Little  or  no  attention  was  paid  to  the  art  of  shooting  in  the 
field,  and  the  total  amount  of  ball  ammunition  expended 
was  restricted  to  the  orthodox  forty  roimds  per  man.  It 
was  not  till  some  years  later,  under  such  commandants  as 
Ian  Hamilton  and  Monro,  that  a  more  intelligent  system, 
better  suited  to  modern  requirements,  was  introduced,  and 
Hythe  began  to  be  a  really  useful  institution. 

Both  in  going  and  returning  I  travelled  between  Hull 


24  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  London  by  boat,  making  the  journey  at  each  end 
by  rail.  This  may  not  seem  a  very  expeditious  route,  nor 
was  it.  For  instance,  when  returning  from  Hythe  I  had 
to  spend  a  day  in  London  waiting  for  a  boat ;  another  two 
days  were  taken  by  the  sea  passage  ;  and  as  I  arrived  at 
Hull  late  on  a  Sunday  I  had  to  stay  the  night  there  before 
being  able  to  get  a  train  for  York.  To  the  financial  mind, 
however,  the  itinerary  was  correct,  for  the  travelling  ex- 
penditure incurred  was  some  pence,  and  perhaps  even  some 
shillings,  less  than  it  would  have  been  had  I  travelled  all 
the  way  by  rail, 

January  1882  saw  me  promoted  full  sergeant,  by  far 
the  youngest  of  that  rank  in  the  regiment,  both  in  age  and 
service,  and  this  led  to  my  transfer  to  another  troop,  "  B," 
commanded  by  Major  Garrett.  He  was  a  general  favourite 
with  his  men,  and  I  have  pleasant  recollections  of  my  time 
under  his  command. 

In  June  I  was  deputed  to  go  through  a  course  of  in- 
struction at  the  school  of  signalling  at  Aldershot.  It  was 
considerably  more  advanced  in  its  methods  than  the  Hythe 
establishment,  but  was  nevertheless  not  as  up-to-date  as 
it  should  have  been. 

Whilst  I  was  at  Aldershot  the  regiment  moved  from 
York  to  Ireland,  headquarters  and  three  troops  going  to 
Dundalk,  and  the  remaining  five  troops  to  four  other  stations, 
of  which  Belfast  was  one.  On  completion  of  the  signalling 
course  I  was  ordered  to  join  at  Dundalk, 

Ireland  was  at  this  period,  as  at  many  other  times  in  her 
history,  suffering  from  the  effects  of  being  a  political  shuttle- 
cock, and  the  military  were  frequently  called  out  to  assist 
the  police  in  the  suppression  of  disorder.  Evictions  for 
non-payment  of  rent  were  the  most  common  source  of 
trouble,  and  some  of  them  would  be  attended  by  thousands 
of  sympathisers  from  the  countryside,  necessitating,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  authorities,  the  presence  of  a  considerable 
military  force.  I  have  known  as  much  as  a  brigade  of  all 
arms  employed  on  this  duty,  the  evicted  tenant  being  an 
old  woman  occupying  a  dilapidated  hovel,  and  the  unpaid 
rent  amounting  to  a  few  shillings  ! 

Having  passed  the  examination  at  the  signalling  school. 


LIEUTENANT  DUGDALE  25 

obtaining  282  marks  out  of  a  possible  300,  I  was  made 
assistant  instructor  of  the  regimental  signallers,  whose 
standard  was  then  very  low.  The  annual  inspection  took 
place  about  two  months  later,  and  consequently  there 
was  not  sufficient  time  to  make  much  improvement. 
The  regiment  was  reported  as  being  only  "  fair,"  and 
it  occupied  44th  place  in  the  army  "  order  of  merit." 
The  inspecting  officer  was  pleased,  however,  to  classify 
the  assistant  instructor,  myself,  as  "  very  good."  The 
commanding  officer,  now  Schwabe  in  place  of  Whigham, 
was  bent  on  achieving  much  better  results,  and  he  gave 
Lieutenant  Dugdale,  the  "  instructor,"  and  myself  a  free 
hand  to  do  as  we  liked  on  the  understanding  that  the 
necessary  improvement  should  be  made.  In  this  we  suc- 
ceeded at  the  next  annual  inspection,  when  the  regiment 
took  12th  place  in  the  army  and  3rd  place  in  Ireland.  In 
1884  we  did  still  better,  the  regiment  being  first  in  Ireland 
and  missing  first  in  the  army  only  by  a  decimal.  I  felt 
very  proud  of  myself  when  the  following  appeared  in 
regimental  orders  : 

Sir  Thomas  Steele,  General  Commanding  the  Forces  in 
Ireland,  has  been  pleased  to  express  his  intention  of  bringing  at 
the  first  opportunity  to  the  notice  of  H.R.H.  the  Field-Marshal 
Commanding-in-Chief,  that  the  i6th  Lancers  have  turned  out  the 
best  squad  of  signallers  in  Ireland.  The  Commanding  Officer 
wishes  to  express  his  sincere  thanks  to  Lieutenant  Dugdale, 
Sergeant  Robertson,  and  the  signallers  for  their  exertion  which 
has  brought  so  much  credit  to  the  regiment. 

During  our  connection  with  signalling  I  formed  a  close 
friendship  with  Dugdale,  which  lasted  imtil  his  death.  I 
stiU  have  the  case  of  pipes  he  gave  me  as  a  memento 
of  our  combined  success  ;  the  handful  of  cigars  he  gave 
me  at  the  same  time  was  consumed  that  evening  in  the 
sergeants'  mess.  He  was  a  splendid  athlete,  handsome, 
generous  to  a  fault,  and  beloved  by  all  who  knew  him.  His 
death  from  a  virulent  attack  of  influenza  some  years  ago, 
with  that  of  his  wife  from  the  same  cause  on  the  following 
day,  came  as  a  great  shock  to  their  numerous  friends.  He 
was  married  subsequent  to  our  signalling  days,  and  it  so 
happened  that  one  of  his  daughters  was  the  wife  of  one 


26  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

of  my  pupils  at  the  Staff  College  some  twenty-five  years 
later. 

Besides  the  signalHng  duty  I  officiated  as  sergeant- 
instructor  of  musketry.  This  appointment,  as  well  as  that 
of  instructor  (always  an  officer),  was  abolished  in  1883,  the 
Adjutant- General  of  the  day,  Sir  Garnet  Wolseley,  quite 
rightly  holding  troop  officers  responsible  for  the  training  of 
their  men  in  this  branch  of  their  work  as  in  all  others, 
but  as  musketry  was  still  to  a  great  extent  a  sealed  book 
to  most  cavalry  officers  I  continued  to  exercise,  under  the 
adjutant,  a  general  supervision  over  the  musketry  arrange- 
ments, to  train  the  recruits,  and  to  prepare  the  annual 
musketry  returns. 

A  third  duty,  which  fell  to  me  in  the  winter  months, 
was  that  of  assistant-instructor  in  sketching,  map-reading, 
and  other  things  coming  under  the  heading  of  recon- 
naissance. Like  most  non-commissioned  officers  of  the 
time  I  knew  practically  nothing  about  these  subjects,  but 
by  reading  such  few  books  as  existed  —  nearly  all  of 
which  made  very  intricate  what  was  really  quite  simple — 
I  learnt  a  certain  amount  which  I  passed  on  to  the  half- 
dozen  members  of  the  class.  Eventually  I  picked  up  a 
good  deal  of  useful  knowledge  which  proved  to  be  helpful 
later  in  hfe  when  employed  on  intelligence  work  in  the  field, 
but  it  was  a  slow  and  laborious  business.  Fortunately  I 
was  a  fairly  good  draughtsman.  For  much  of  what  I  learnt 
I  was  indebted  to  Captain  Lord  St.  Vincent,  a  keen  and 
capable  officer,  who  had  recently  come  to  us  from  the 
7th  Hussars.  He  met  his  death  in  Egypt  during  the 
fighting  of  the  'eighties. 

Having  these  specialist  duties  to  carry  out  I  was 
"  excused  " — as  the  phrase  went — the  ordinary  troop  and 
regimental  duties  of  a  sergeant,  and  on  the  whole  had  an 
interesting  and  pleasant  time,  for,  as  I  wrote,  "  I  have 
nothing  else  to  do  such  as  stables,  guards,  etc.,  have  all 
Sunday  to  myself,  and  get  up  and  go  to  bed  when  I  like  !  " 

Whilst  at  Dundalk  I  was  given  an  opportunity  of 
showing  whether  I  had  profited  from  my  previous  failures 
to  look  properly  after  men  committed  to  my  charge.  I  was 
ordered  to  conduct  eleven  men  from  the  Belfast  district 


ESCORT  DUTY  27 

to  Limerick  gaol,  where  they  were  to  undergo  varying 
terms  of  imprisonment,  some  being  of  considerable  length. 
My  friend  the  regimental  sergeant-major  warned  me  that 
some  of  the  prisoners  were  hardened  criminals  who  might 
try  to  get  away,  and  he  reminded  me  of  the  deserter  who 
had  made  his  escape  in  London.  The  eleven  prisoners 
were  taken  over  at  different  railway  stations  en  route  to 
Limerick,  and  as  I  received  them  I  handcuffed  them  and 
the  four  men  of  the  escort  together  in  one  long  string.  This 
was  not  by  any  means  a  comfortable  manner  in  which  to 
make  a  railway  journey  extending  over  twelve  hours,  and 
some  of  the  men  begged  that  the  handcuffs  might  be 
taken  off,  if  only  for  a  few  minutes,  so  that  they  might 
rest  their  cramped  and  aching  arms.  I  remained  obdurate 
both  to  their  entreaties  and  threats,  and  in  due  course 
they  were  safely  delivered  over  to  the  prison  authorities. 
Ruthless  as  this  treatment  may  seem,  it  was  the  only 
way  in  which  I  could  make  sure  of  carrying  out  my 
mission,  and  after  having  accompUshed  it  I  proceeded  to  a 
sergeants'  mess  in  the  Limerick  barracks,  and  there  took 
part  in  a  dance  until  reveille  sounded  the  following  morning. 

Having  thus  completed  what  I  thought  to  be  a  very 
creditable  trip,  I  returned  to  Dundalk  and  reported  that  the 
eleven  prisoners  had  been  duly  lodged  in  gaol.  The  journey 
was  not,  however,  an  unqualified  success,  for  I  managed  to 
lose  the  key  of  one  pair  of  the  handcuffs — a  matter  which 
entailed,  to  the  annoyance  of  the  commanding  officer,  a 
lengthy  correspondence  between  the  regiment  and  the 
ordnance  office.  It  terminated  by  my  being  ordered  to 
pay  threepence  to  defray  the  loss  of  the  key.  How  much 
money  had  meanwhile  been  expended  on  stamps  and 
stationery  I  cannot  say. 

At  the  end  of  February  1885  the  regiment  was  suddenly 
ordered  to  move  to  Dubhn  (Island  Bridge  barracks)  in  relief 
of  the  5th  Lancers  despatched  to  the  Sudan.  No  sooner 
had  we  arrived  there  than  we  were  confined  to  barracks 
and  all  leave  was  cancelled,  owing  to  the  demonstrations 
which  were  being  held  in  Phoenix  Park  in  sympathy  with 
Mr.  O'Brien,  M.P.,  who  had  just  been  suspended  in  the 
House  of  Commons. 


28  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

A  month  later  I  was  promoted  troop  sergeant-major  of 
"  E  "  troop.  My  predecessor  had  been  a  medical  student 
before  joining  the  army,  and  as  he  was  well  educated  his 
prospects  would  have  been  good  had  he  not  been  addicted  to 
periodical  spells  of  hard  drinking.  He  had  been  promoted  in 
the  hope  that  his  increased  responsibilities  might  help  to  keep 
him  straight,  and  he  had  promised  to  abstain  from  drink,  but 
before  manymonths  had  elapsed  the  troop  accounts,  forwhich 
he  was  answerable  to  his  troop  officer,  were  found  to  balance 
on  the  wrong  side  and  he  was  accordingly  ordered  to  revert 
to  the  rank  of  sergeant  and  to  hand  over  his  duties  to  me. 
I  v>'as  directed  to  go  to  his  quarters  to  discuss  matters,  and  I 
there  found  him  to  be  quite  drunk  and  incapable  of  explaining 
anything.  When  his  condition  became  known  to  higher 
authority  he  was  placed  "  in  arrest  "  pending  investigation 
by  the  commanding  officer. 

Next  day  a  troop  sergeant-major  went  to  escort  him  to 
the  orderly  room,  and  finding  his  door  locked  he  came  for 
me.  We  returned  together,  and  on  breaking  open  the  door 
discovered  that  the  poor  fellow  had  shot  himself  a  few 
minutes  before.  Apparently  he  had  felt  unable  at  the  last 
moment  to  face  the  ruin  and  disgrace  which  confronted 
him,  and  a  round  of  service  ammmiition  and  a  carbine  had 
done  the  rest.  For  several  days  I  was  kept  busy  in  un- 
ravelling the  tangle  into  which  the  accounts  had  been 
allowed  to  fall,  but  beyond  neglect  and  carelessness  there 
was  nothing  seriously  wrong  with  them,  the  actual  deficiency 
in  money  amounting  only  to  thirty-five  pounds.  For  this 
miserable  sum  drink  had  claimed  its  victim,  whose  hfe,  but 
for  the  one  weakness,  might  have  been  so  different. 

"  Paddy  "  Malone,  the  commander  of  my  new  troop,  was 
a  splendid  specimen  of  manhood  both  in  build  and  character, 
standing  a  good  six  feet  six  inches  in  height  and  made  in 
proportion.  Wyndham  Qumn  and  Dugdale  were  the  two 
subalterns,  and  from  all  three  I  experienced  nothing  but 
kindness  during  the  three  years  I  was  their  troop  sergeant- 
major. 

A  troop  sergeant-major  occupies  a  position  which  enables 
him  to  exert,  for  good  or  for  evil,  great  influence  over  his 
men.     It  is  said  that  the  non-commissioned  officer  is  the 


TROOP  SERGEANT-MAJOR  29 

backbone  of  the  army,  but  it  is  equally  true  that  he  can  do 
much  harm  unless  he  is  strictly  impartial  and  identifies 
himself  with  the  interests  of  his  men.  Although  the  "  old 
soldier  "  as  I  knew  him  eight  years  before  was  rapidly  dis- 
appearing, a  certain  number  still  remained  who,  with  some 
of  the  younger  ones,  required  firm  and  tactful  handUng. 
In  not  a  few  cases  the  worst  characters  were  the  best  work- 
men— that  is,  the  best  grooms  and  best  riders — when  money 
was  scarce  ;  when  it  was  plentiful  they  would  fall  under 
the  spell  of  drink,  and  this  would  lead  to  absence,  insubor- 
dination, and  other  military  offences.  Try  as  one  might 
these  men  proved  very  hard  to  reform,  and  while  I  gained 
many  gratifying  successes  I  also  had  some  failures  in  my 
efforts  to  make  them  see  the  folly  of  their  ways. 

The  fault  lay  not  nearly  so  much  with  the  men — ^who 
were  good  fellows  at  heart — as  with  the  authorities  who 
neglected  to  provide  them  with  congenial  means  of  recreation, 
to  place  greater  trust  in  their  self-respect,  and  generally  to 
call  forth  the  better  part  of  their  nature.  With  the  intro- 
duction of  comfortable  regimental  institutes  ;  the  substi- 
tution, except  when  a  really  serious  dereliction  of  duty 
had  been  committed,  of  "minor  offences"  for  "crimes"; 
the  abolition  of  the  practice  of  imprisoning  all  offenders  in 
the  guard-room  no  matter  how  trivial  the  offence  ;  greater 
hberahty  in  the  granting  of  leave  ;  and  the  adoption  all 
round  of  more  intelligent  and  S3nnpathetic  methods,  a 
marked  improvement  in  the  behaviour  of  the  men  quickly 
followed,  and  their  outlook  on  hfe  automatically  became 
quite  different. 

For  some  years  before  going  to  Dublin  I  had  cherished 
the  hope  of  obtaining  a  commission,  but  at  first  there  seemed 
no  more  chance  of  this  hope  being  reaUsed  than  of  obtaining 
the  moon.  Apart  from  ridingmasters  and  quartermasters 
it  was  very  seldom  that  any  one  was  promoted  from  the 
ranks — not  more  than  four  or  five  a  year  on  an  average — 
and  moreover  the  initial  step  lay  with  the  commanding 
officer,  a  strong  backing  from  whom  was  a  sine  qua  non. 
Whigham  was  not  friendly  disposed  towards  me,  and  he 
happened  to  be,  I  think,  one  of  those  who  held  the  view 
that  promotion  from  the  ranks  was  not  to  the  benefit  of 


30  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

either  the  man  or  the  State.  During  his  regime,  therefore, 
nothing  was  or  could  be  done. 

The  idea  of  trying  for  a  commission  had  originated 
with  Leshe  Melville,  the  rector  of  my  native  village.  Both 
he  and  his  wife  had  taken  a  kindly  interest  in  me  from 
early  boyhood,  and  the  lady,  who  had  several  relatives  in 
the  army,  was  particularly  keen  that  I  should  make  a 
name  for  myself.  Some  officers  of  the  regiment,  Dugdale 
more  than  any,  gave  me  similar  encouragement,  and  when 
Whigham  was  succeeded  by  Schwabe,  and  I  had  come  to 
the  front  a  httle  as  a  result  of  the  special  duties  I  had 
been  carrying  out,  my  prospects  seemed  brighter. 

Setting  to  work  more  systematically  and  with  greater 
confidence,  I  commenced  to  study  for  a  "  first  class  certificate 
of  education,"  this  qualification  being  necessary  before  I 
could  be  recommended  for  a  commission.  The  certificate 
was  duly  secured  in  the  autumn  of  1883,  and  I  then  turned 
to  the  professional  side,  reading  all  the  books  on  tactics, 
strategy,  and  past  campaigns  that  I  could  lay  hands  on. 
They  were  few  in  number,  as  the  regimental  library  did 
not  cater  for  this  kind  of  study — or  for  any  other  for  that 
matter — and  I  could  not  afford  to  purchase  many  books. 
The  deficiency  had  to  be  made  up  by  reading  very  carefully 
those  that  were  available.  The  ordinary  drill  books  I  knew 
from  A  to  Z. 

But  there  was  another  and  much  greater  obstacle  to  be 
considered,  about  which  I  could  not  make  up  my  mind  for 
a  long  time.  I  had  no  private  means,  and  without  some 
£300  a  year  in  addition  to  army  pay  it  was  impossible  to 
live  as  an  officer  in  a  cavalry  regiment  at  home.  The  infantry 
was  less  expensive,  but  I  could  not  entertain  the  idea  of 
leaving  my  old  arm,  the  cavalry. 

The  money  difficulty  did  not  arise  in  the  case  of  the 
so-caUed  "  ranker  "  who  sought  a  commission  through  the 
ranks  because  he  could  not,  owing  to  lack  of  brains  or 
industry,  obtain  one  through  Sandhurst  or  the  mihtia. 
Such  rankers  as  these  usually  possessed  ample  money,  and, 
being  backed  by  private  influence,  would  be  given  their 
commission,  if  at  all,  a  year  or  two  after  enlistment,  and 
were  then  able  to  resume  the  social  status  which  they  had 


ON  TAKING  A  COMMISSION  31 

temporarily  laid  down.  The  true  ranker,  having  no  influence 
behind  him,  had  to  toil  for  several  years  before  receiving  a 
commission,  and  even  then  the  chances  were  that  he  would, 
owing  to  the  want  of  private  means,  be  miserable  in  himself 
and  a  nuisance  to  his  brother  officers. 

AU  officers  were,  quite  rightly,  expected  to  live  up  to 
the  standard  of  their  regimental  mess,  and  to  bear  a  due 
share  of  the  expenses — at  some  stations  a  very  heavy  item 
— incurred  by  the  entertainment  of  mess  guests,  balls,  race- 
meetings,  and  so  forth.  Considerable  contributions  had 
also  to  be  made  towards  the  upkeep  of  the  regimental  band, 
which  was  maintained  only  to  a  very  limited  extent  from 
pubhc  funds.  An  absurd  amount  of  costly  uniform  had  to 
be  purchased  and  constantly  renewed,  while  chargers  had 
to  be  paid  for  out  of  the  officers'  pockets,  and  had  to  be  of 
first-class  quality.  A  subaltern's  pay  was  about  £120  per 
annum.  Ten  years  or  more  might  elapse  before  Captain's 
rank  was  attained,  and  then  the  pay  was  less  than  £200 
per  annum. 

It  had  hitherto  been  possible,  as  well  as  convenient,  to 
find  room  in  each  regiment  for  at  least  one  ranker  by  appoint- 
ing him  adjutant,  a  post  which  he  could  hold  for  an  in- 
definite time.  This  brought  him  useful  pecuniary  benefit, 
and  by  entrusting  to  him  much  of  the  elementary  training 
of  the  men  the  other  officers  were  able  to  enjoy  increased 
facilities  for  leave.  But  this  system  was  rapidly  passing 
away.  Troop  and  squadron  officers  were  now  being  made 
really  responsible  for  the  training  and  administration  of 
their  commands  ;  a  higher  degree  of  efficiency  was  being 
demanded  ;  and  the  post  of  adjutant,  now  limited  to  five 
years,  was  no  longer  regarded  as  the  perquisite  of  the 
ranker,  but  was  being  eagerly  sought  after  by  all  young 
officers  who  aspired  to  rise  in  their  profession. 

It  will  be  understood  that  in  these  circumstances  the 
ranker  was  not  as  welcome  to  the  officers  of  a  regiment  as 
before,  and  as  the  financial  obstacle  seemed  insurmountable 
I  decided  that  I  must  give  up  all  idea  of  reahsing  my 
ambition,  and  I  did. 

The  matter  did  not  rest  there  for  long,  as  one  day  in 
1884  Schwabe  expressed  the  wish  that   I  should  take  a 


32  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

commission  as  soon  as  possible.  Not  having  previously 
mentioned  the  subject  to  me,  his  generous  offer  came  as  a 
complete  surprise,  and  I  again  went  over  all  the  old  ground, 
wondering  whether  I  dare  accept  the  offer  or  not.  Event- 
ually, and  with  a  sad  heart,  I  reluctantly  dechned  it,  and  I 
believe  that  Schwabe  was  as  sorry  as  myself.  He  told  me 
I  was  acting  fooHshly,  and  probably  he  was  right.  Soon 
afterwards  he  was  succeeded  in  the  command  of  the  regiment 
by  Colonel  Maillard. 

Sticking  to  my  studies  in  the  hope  that  something  might 
yet  turn  up  to  justify  going  back  on  the  decision  to  which 
I  had  come,  I  became  more  and  more  devoted  to  a  military 
hfe  and  the  old  ambition  soon  reasserted  itself.  WTien, 
therefore,  in  1886,  Maillard  made  the  same  proposal  as  his 
predecessor  had  done,  and  appeared  equally  desirous  that 
I  should  not  refuse  it,  I  determined  to  put  aside  my  fears 
and  take  the  risk  of  failure  owing  to  lack  of  funds.  He 
allayed  my  anxiety  in  this  respect  by  promising  to  get  me 
posted  to  a  regiment  in  India  if  possible,  where  the  pay  would 
be  higher  and  the  expenses  much  lower  than  in  England. 
Thus  the  die  was  cast. 

Before  he  could  recommend  me  for  a  commission,  how- 
ever, I  had  the  mortification  of  having  to  undergo  a  further 
educational  examination,  the  standard  of  the  first  class 
certificate  having  been  raised  since  I  took  it  three  years 
earlier.  A  few  weeks'  study  overcame  this  stumbHng-block, 
and  in  April  1887  the  recommendation  was  at  last  sent 
on  its  way  to  the  Horse  Guards.  The  reply  came  back  in 
August  that  the  outfit  allowance  of  £150  granted  to  rankers 
on  promotion  could  not  be  given  me  during  the  current 
financial  year,  as  the  Treasury  allotment  for  that  purpose 
had  already  been  promised.  I  was  given  the  choice  of 
taking  a  commission  without  the  allowance,  and  as  I  could 
not  afford  to  do  that  the  only  alternative  was  to  wait  for 
still  another  year. 

These  vexatious  delays  terminated  early  in  February 
1888  when  I  appeared  before  a  board  of  officers  of  the  4th 
Dragoon  Guards  at  the  Royal  Barracks,  Dublin,  to  be 
examined  in  the  subjects  qualifying  for  promotion  to  Lieu- 
tenant.    The  examination  was  very  simple  and  was  passed 


GAZETTED  SECOND  LIEUTENANT  33 

almost  as  a  matter  of  course,  for  it  would  have  been  an 
unforgivable  breach  of  etiquette  for  officers  of  one  regiment 
to  plough  a  candidate  sent  up  by  another. 

In  March  my  squadron  was  ordered  to  the  Curragh,  and 
a  few  weeks  later  the  whole  regiment  moved  to  Aldershot, 
where  I  had  joined  it  as  a  recniit  about  ten  and  a  half 
years  before.  On  the  27th  of  June  I  was  gazetted  2nd 
Lieutenant  in  the  3rd  Dragoon  Guards,  then  serving  in 
India. 

It  was  with  real  regret,  not  unmixed  with  anxiety  as 
to  what  the  future  had  in  store  for  me,  that  I  parted  company 
with  my  comrades  of  the  sergeants'  mess,  where  I  had  spent 
many  pleasant  hours.  Maillard,  who  had  always  shown 
the  most  kindly  interest  in  my  welfare,  presented  me  with 
a  sword  ;  Dugdale  insisted  upon  fitting  me  out  with  saddlery  ; 
the  members  of  the  sergeants'  mess  gave  me  a  silver-mounted 
dressing-case;  and  from  many  others  in  the  regiment, 
officers  and  men,  I  received  expressions  of  goodwill.  The 
i6th  Lancers  had  become  a  home  to  me,  and  I  am  proud  to 
think  that  I  once  had  the  honour  of  serving  in  so  distin- 
guished a  regiment. 


D 


CHAPTER  III 

SUBALTERN    IN    INDIA 

Join  Cavalry  Depot  at  Canterbury — Officers'  course  of  muslsetry  at  Hytlie 
— Leave  England  for  India — Life  on  board  a  troopship — Join  3rd 
Dragoon  Guards — Camp  of  exercise  at  Meerut — Pass  Lower 
Standard  Examination  in  Hindustani — Life  at  Muttra — Acting 
Adjutant  and  Station  Staff  Officer — Beer-tasting  committees — 
Regiment  attends  Muridki  camp  of  exercise  en  route  to  Rawal 
Pindi — Ludicrous  spectacle  presented  by  native  followers — State 
of  training  in  India  and  reforms  effected  by  General  Luck — Visit  of 
Prince  Albert  Victor  to  Muridki — Pass  Higher  Standard  Examination 
in  Hindustani — Successes  at  Rawal  Pindi  District  Assault-at-Arms — 
On  detachment  at  Murree — Pass  examination  in  Persian — In  charge 
of  Government  Grass  Farm  at  Rawal  Pindi — In  charge  of  Regi- 
mental Signallers — Acting  Station  Staff  Officer  and  Secretary  of 
Assault-at-Arms  Committee — Pass  examinations  in  Punjabi  and 
Pushtu  —  Black  Mountain  Expedition  —  Miranzai  Expedition  — 
Some  amusing  incidents  in  connection  with  the  latter — Posted  to 
Army  Headquarters,  Simla. 

Being  unable  to  join  my  new  regiment  in  India  mitil  the 
"  trooping  season  "  of  the  following  autumn  I  was  posted 
to  the  depot  at  Canterbury,  where  the  depots  of  all  cavalry 
regiments  serving  abroad  were  then  located.  These  consisted 
almost  entirely  of  recruits,  and  as  their  training  was  mainly 
in  the  hands  of  the  depot  staff  the  officers  had  little  to  do 
except  enjoy  themselves.  I  therefore  took  advantage  of  the 
opportunity  to  attend  an  officers'  course  of  musketry  at 
Hythe  in  order  to  qualify  as  "  Instructor,"  as  my  sergeant's 
certificate  qualified  me  as  "  assistant  instructor "  only. 
The  chief  novelty  of  the  course  was  the  maxim  gun,  then 
in  its  experimental  stage.  After  completing  the  course  I 
went  on  two  months'  leave,  and  having  bid  good-bye  to  my 
mother — which  proved  to  be  our  final  parting — I  sailed  from 
Portsmouth  in  the  Indian  troopship  "  Euphrates  "  on  the 
2ist  November,  and  reached  Bombay  about  a  month  later. 

34 


TROOPSHIPS  35 

These  troopships  have  long  since  been  replaced  by  trans- 
ports hired  from  the  merchant  service,  and  no  one  was  sorry 
for  their  supersession.  They  had  a  speed  of  only  eight  or  nine 
knots  ;  were  manned  by  naval  personnel  who  thoroughly 
disliked  the  work  and  made  no  secret  of  it  in  their  dealings 
with  the  soldiers  ;  and  the  accommodation  was  indifferent 
and  disagreeable.  The  men  were  closely  packed  together  on 
the  lower  deck,  with  a  small  space  on  the  upper  deck  for 
use  during  the  day.  The  majority  of  the  junior  officers' 
cabins  were  on  or  below  the  water-line,  and  consequently 
were  more  or  less  in  permanent  darkness  and  without  fresh 
air.  The  children  of  the  officers  were  located  in  one  large 
cabin,  known  as  the  dove-cot,  any  berths  not  occupied  by 
them  or  their  nurses  being  assigned  to  the  wives  of  the 
most  junior  officers,  whether  they  themselves  owned  any 
of  the  infants  or  not.  The  noise  which  sometimes  prevailed 
in  this  amalgamated  nursery,  especially  in  rough  weather, 
can  be  better  imagined  than  described.  The  wives  and 
children  of  the  men  had  quarters  in  the  fore-part  of  the  ship, 
and  twice  each  night  after  ii  p.m.  these  were  visited  by  the 
military  officer  of  the  watch  in  order  to  ascertain  that  the 
sentry  on  the  door  was  fulfilling  his  duty  of  permitting  no 
man  to  enter.  I  suppose  the  visits  had  been  foimd  necessary, 
but  the  perambulation  by  subaltern  officers  through  a  maze 
of  cots  containing  sleeping  women  and  girls  could  hardly  be 
commended  from  the  standpoint  of  refinement,  and  this 
was  particularly  the  case  when  the  sea  was  rough  or  the 
weather  hot. 

In  passing  through  the  Suez  Canal  our  vessel  ran  into 
one  of  the  banks — not  an  uncommon  proceeding  on  the 
part  of  a  troopship  —  and  there  we  remained  for  about 
twelve  hours  before  we  could  be  got  off.  On  arrival  at 
Bombay  we  were  besieged  by  the  usual  crowd  of  natives 
who  wished  to  be  employed  as  personal  servants,  this  being 
the  first  trap  into  which  the  new-comer  is  apt  to  fall,  unless 
he  has  been  duly  warned  of  it  beforehand.  Not  a  few  of 
these  gentry,  more  especially  those  who  can  speak  English, 
make  a  practice  of  meeting  transports  and  inducing  officers 
arriving  in  India  for  the  first  time  to  engage  them  ;  and 
after  a  few  days  they  disappear,  having  meanwhile  fleeced 


36  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

their  newly-found  and  innocent  "  Sahib  "  of  as  many  rupees 
as  his  trustful  nature  and  ignorance  of  the  country  will  allow. 

From  Bombay  I  proceeded  to  Muttra,  the  permanent 
station  of  my  regiment,  and  thence  to  Meerut,  where  the 
regiment  itself  was  attending  a  camp  of  exercise,  or  training 
camp,  under  the  command  of  General  Sir  George  Greaves. 
I  received  a  most  friendly  welcome  from  all  members  of  the 
officers'  mess,  which  at  once  dispelled  the  anxiety  I  had  felt 
as  to  the  nature  of  the  reception  that  would  be  accorded  me, 
and  I  quickly  settled  down  to  my  new  life  and  surroundings. 

Returning  to  Muttra  on  conclusion  of  the  training,  I 
began  my  first  experience  of  an  Indian  summer,  which  is 
there  both  long  and  hot,  and  the  greater  part  of  the  day, 
from  about  ten  in  the  morning  till  six  in  the  evening,  must 
necessarily  be  spent  indoors.  By  retiring  early  to  bed  and 
leading  an  abstemious  life  I  avoided  the  rather  common  and 
injurious  habit  of  sleeping  during  the  day,  and  utilised  the 
time  in  learning  Hindustani.  My  munshi,  or  teacher,  a  man 
of  a  stout  and  lethargic  type,  was  quite  content  with  what- 
ever progress  his  pupils  made,  or  did  not  make,  provided  he 
regularly  received  his  monthly  pay  of  ten  rupees.  To  keep 
awake  when  teaching  after  his  mid- day  meal  was  entirely 
beyond  his  powers,  and  he  could  not  understand  why  I 
should  wish  to  work  while  other  Sahibs  either  took  their 
lessons  in  the  evening  or  not  at  all.  By  degrees  I  caused 
him  to  see  that  this  was  not  my  method  of  doing  business, 
and  within  three  months  the  "  lower  standard  "  examination 
was  successfully  negotiated,  and  a  commencement  made  in 
preparing  for  examination  by  the  "  higher  standard." 

There  was  excellent  sport  in  the  vicinity  of  Muttra, 
including  an  unlimited  supply  of  pig,  and  as  there  were  no 
other  troops  in  the  station  we  were  able  to  arrange  both 
shooting  and  pig-sticking  so  as  to  derive  full  advantage  from 
the  abundant  facilities  available. 

Of  work  there  was  very  little  :  the  weather  was  too  hot 
to  admit  of  much  being  done,  and,  as  at  all  cantonments  in 
the  Indian  plains,  a  large  proportion  of  the  men  were  sent  to 
a  hill-station  for  six  months  or  so  during  the  summer.  The 
adjutant  falling  ill,  I  was  detailed  to  act  for  him,  and  for 
several  weeks  this  kept  me  more  fully  employed  than  would 


MUTTRA  37 

otherwise  have  been  the  case,  and  incidentally  it  gave  me 
a  chance  to  show  what  I  could  do.  The  adjutant  also 
officiated  as  station  staff  officer  and  cantonment  magistrate, 
and  from  carrying  out  these  duties  I  learned  something  of 
the  native  customs  of  the  country.  The  troop  and  squadron 
officers  with  whom  I  was  directly  associated,  and  in  fact  all 
the  officers,  were  particularly  pleasant  and  helpful,  and  on 
the  whole  I  felt,  and  still  feel,  that  I  was  fortunate  in  having 
been  posted  to  the  regiment.  Walter,  an  ex-infantry  officer, 
was  the  captain  of  my  troop.  Some  thirty  years  later  I 
unveiled  the  memorial  erected  in  his  village  after  the  Great 
War.  On  it,  as  in  so  many  other  cases,  was  the  name  of  his 
only  son  and  child. 

The  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  of  the  regiment 
were  of  a  good  class  and  well-behaved.  Drimkenness  was 
the  principal  cause  of  the  little  misconduct  there  was,  and 
this  not  infrequently  had  its  origin  in  the  practice  which 
then  prevailed  in  India  of  "  tasting  "  the  beer  supphed  to 
the  canteen.  Once  a  week  three  or  four  non-commissioned 
officers  and  men  were  detailed,  in  accordance  with  the 
regulations,  to  taste  each  cask  of  beer  received,  before  it 
was  issued  for  consumption.  Sometimes  there  were  a  good 
many  casks  to  be  tasted,  and  therefore  it  was  an  easy  matter 
for  the  tasters  to  find  by  the  time  they  had  finished  that 
they  had  tasted  too  often — more  especially  so  as  the  weather 
was  hot  and  the  tasting  took  place,  as  a  rule,  before  break- 
fast. This  pernicious  custom  has,  I  beheve,  been  discon- 
tinued. 

In  November  1889  the  regiment  left  Muttra  by  road  for 
Muridki,  near  Lahore,  where  it  was  to  attend  a  camp  of 
exercise  with  twelve  other  cavalry  regiments  and  some 
batteries  of  horse  artillery,  and  afterwards  proceed  to  its 
new  station  at  Rawal  Pindi.  The  march  to  Muridki  occu- 
pied over  five  weeks,  and  thence  to  Rawal  Pindi  nearly 
three  weeks,  and  it  thus  afforded  a  good  opportunity  for 
seeing  the  country.  Starting  at  about  six  o'clock  in  the 
morning,  the  day's  march  of  ten  to  fifteen  miles  would 
be  finished  by  ten  o'clock  at  the  latest  ;  breakfast  and 
stables  took  another  three  hours  or  so,  after  which  there 
was  usually  plenty  of  rough  shooting  to  be  obtained  quite 


.'145686 


38  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

near  the  halting-place.  All  officers  were  accompanied,  as 
was  the  custom  in  those  days,  not  only  by  a  dozen  to  a  score 
servants  each — bearers,  khansamahs,  syces,  sweepers,  dhobis, 
bhistis,  grass-cutters — but  also  by  two  or  three  generations 
of  their  servants'  families  and  their  belongings.  For  the 
conveyance  of  these  "  followers  "  each  officer  provided  at 
least  one  and  more  often  two  or  three  bullock  wagons,  on 
and  around  which  were  piled  and  hung  every  imaginable 
kind  of  household  effects,  while  on  the  top  of  all  were 
perched  the  women,  children,  and  grand-parents.  A  more 
ludicrous  spectacle  or  unwieldy  crowd  could  not  be  seen. 

At  Kumaul,  on  the  way  to  Muridki,  the  students  of 
the  native  college  challenged  us  at  cricket.  They  wore 
the  customary  Indian  dress,  and  as  they  played  with 
naked  feet,  and  the  ground  was  as  hard  as  ffint,  they 
had  rather  a  poor  time  against  our  fast  bowling,  and  did 
well  to  make  as  many  as  thirty-five  runs.  At  several 
places  I  noticed  that  the  young  Indians  were  very  keen  on 
this  game,  and  they  were  not  over  particular  about  the 
conditions  under  which  they  played  it.  At  Lahore,  for 
instance,  I  watched  a  school  match  in  which  the  ball  used 
was  made  of  wood,  and  the  pitch  lay  across  no  fewer  than 
three  distinct  furrows  ! 

At  Ludhiana  we  crossed  the  Sutlej  by  a  ferry-train  and 
then  entered  the  Punjab,  or  country  of  "  five  rivers  " — the 
Sutlej,  Beas,  Ravi,  Chenab,  and  Jhelum — all  bemg  tribu- 
taries of  the  Indus.  The  passage  of  the  Beas  in  fiat- 
bottomed  boats  took  two  days,  and  the  Ravi,  just  be3^ond 
Lahore,  was  crossed  by  a  bridge  of  boats. 

The  camp  at  Muridki  was  under  the  command  of  Major- 
General  Luck,  who  had  recently  been  appointed  Inspector- 
General  of  Cavalry.  He  was  considered  by  some  officers 
of  the  old  school  to  be  more  of  a  drill-sergeant  than  a  cavalry 
commander,  in  that  he  required  regimental  officers  to  know 
far  more  about  their  men  and  horses  and  the  details  of  drill 
than  was  cither  reasonable  or  necessary.  To  my  mind  he 
only  asked  of  officers  what  it  was  their  duty  to  give  :  he 
expected  them  to  know  their  work  and  be  able  to  instruct 
their  men,  and  this  is  what  many  officers  in  India  and 
elsewhere  did  not  then  know  and  could  not  do.     He  imparted 


MANCEUVRES  39 

a  much-needed  impetus  to  cavalry  training  before  he  left 
India  to  become  Inspector-General  at  home. 

Much  useful  elementary  training,  of  a  character  hitherto 
unknown  in  India,  was  carried  out  during  the  first  three 
weeks  at  Muridki,  and  subsequently  the  troops  were  divided 
into  two  opposing  forces,  placed  fifty  miles  apart,  and 
exercised  in  the  role  of  independent  cavalry.  The  scheme 
was  apparently  designed  to  afford  mstruction  in  long- 
distance reconnaissance  duties  and  then  finish  with  a  great 
cavalry  fight,  which  in  those  days  was  considered  to  be  the 
orthodox  prelude  to  the  clash  of  the  main  armies.  The 
operations,  m  general,  were  conducted  on  practical  lines  : 
we  bivouacked  each  night  as  and  where  we  could,  under 
active  service  conditions,  and  lived  mainly  on  the  country 
through  which  we  passed.  There  were  some  exciting, 
though  not  very  edifpng,  encounters  between  the  opposing 
patrols,  and  these  were  the  matters  of  chief  interest  to 
junior  officers  such  as  myself.  In  one  case  a  hostile  party 
consisting  of  an  officer  and  six  men  rode  right  round  the 
rear  of  the  force  to  which  my  regiment  belonged  before  being 
observed,  or  at  any  rate  stopped.  I  was  sent  with  half  a 
troop  in  pursuit  when  the  party  was  at  last  seen,  and  rather 
proudly  returned  with  all  the  horses,  five  of  the  men,  and  the 
officer's  sword.  He  and  one  of  his  men  escaped  by  jumping 
into  a  river  and  swimming  across  to  the  other  side,  and  thus 
he  no  doubt  took  back  to  his  General  the  information  he 
had  been  sent  out  to  obtain.  Possibly  he  might  have  been 
less  successful  had  we  been  able  to  use  ball-ammunition 
instead  of  blank  while  he  was  in  the  water.  This  reminds 
me  that  the  rough  ground  and  dense  clouds  of  black  dust, 
in  which  we  were  usually  enveloped  when  working  in 
compact  bodies,  led  to  three  men  being  killed  and  several 
others  injured  before  the  manoeuvres  terminated. 

On  the  concluding  day  of  the  operations  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Lord  Roberts,  and  a  large  number  of  staff  officers 
and  ladies  from  Simla  and  Calcutta  were  present  at  the 
spot  where  it  was  expected  that  the  great  fight  would 
occur,  but  the  opposing  commanders  either  decided  not  to 
fight  at  that  particular  place  or  time,  or  they  failed  to  locate 
each  other's  main  body,  with  the  result  that  the  fight  did 


40  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

not  come  off  !  The  big  -  wigs  were  exceedingly  wroth, 
according  to  camp  gossip,  at  what  they  classed  as  the 
manifest  incompetency  of  the  commanders,  but  the  fault 
probably  lay  as  much  with  the  big-wigs  themselves — the 
framers  of  the  scheme — as  with  those  who  carried  it  out. 

Exactly  who  was  to  blame  I  cannot  say,  because  it  was 
not  yet  the  custom  for  junior  regimental  officers  to  be  told 
what  was  supposed  to  be  happening,  or  what  the  scheme  of 
operations  was.  All  I  know  for  certain  is  that  my  regiment, 
and  I  think  most  of  the  others,  walked  straight  into  its 
camp,  from  where  it  had  started  a  few  days  before,  without 
having  seen  a  sign  of  the  enemy,  and  was  very  pleased  to 
get  there  at  an  earlier  hour  than  had  been  anticipated. 

Prince  Albert  Victor,  elder  brother  of  His  Majesty,  was 
present  during  the  final  stages  of  the  training,  and  the  pro- 
ceedings were  brought  to  an  end  on  the  28th  January  with 
a  review  of  all  the  troops  and  a  charge  in  line  on  a  front 
of  nearly  two  miles.  We  in  the  ranks  could  see  practically 
nothing  for  dust,  and  I  doubt  if  the  spectators  saw  much 
more.  Other  events  which  figured  on  the  programme 
during  the  Prince's  stay  were  a  "  darbar,"  attended  by 
numerous  Indian  chiefs  in  full  war  attire,  a  smoking  concert, 
and  various  competitions  in  skill-at-arms.  A  feature  of 
the  concert  was  an  exhibition  of  sword-play  by  some 
"  sowars  "  (native  cavalrymen),  which  looked  particularly 
fine  as  seen  by  the  light  of  the  huge  camp-fire  around  which 
we  sat.  The  Prince  presented  a  silver  cup  for  the  best 
score  made  at  tent-pegging,  and  being  in  good  form  at  the 
time  I  was  a  strong  regimental  favourite.  I  struck  the  first 
peg  fair  in  the  middle,  but,  as  sometimes  happens,  it  split, 
and  as  I  failed  to  carry  it  away  I  became,  according  to  the 
rules,  ineligible  to  take  any  further  part  in  the  competition. 
There  was  some  keen  rivalry  shown  amongst  the  native 
regiments  in  the  "  lance-exercise  "  competition,  and  I  must 
confess  that,  although  one  of  the  judges,  I  was  hopeful  that 
the  prize  would  go  to  the  i8th  Bengal  Lancers,  whose  scarlet 
tunics  reminded  me  of  my  old  regiment  the  i6th  Lancers. 
Sentiment  had,  however,  to  be  kept  in  check,  and  another 
fine  regiment,  I  forget  which,  carried  off  the  prize  by  the 
narrow  margin  of  five  points  out  of  a  possible  two  hundred. 


TRAVELLING  EXPENSES  41 

Whilst  at  Muridki  I  passed  the  examination  in  the  higher 
standard  of  Hindustani,  the  language  used  being  known  as 
Hindi  and  the  character  Sanskrit,  while  for  the  lower 
standard  the  language  is  known  as  Urdu  and  the  character 
is  Persian.  I  had  been  examined  in  the  higher  standard 
three  months  before  at  Meerut,  and  felt  fairly  certain 
that  I  had  been  successful,  but  it  turned  out  that  the 
President  of  the  Examining  Board  was  not  qualified  to  act 
as  such  and  the  proceedings  were  therefore  annulled. 
According  to  the  Indian  Army  Regulations  (there  are,  or 
were,  some  twenty  or  thirty  volumes  of  them)  candidates, 
if  successful,  received  their  travelling  expenses,  and  as  the 
appointment  of  the  wrong  President  was  no  fault  of  mine  I 
claimed  these  expenses.  The  financial  reply  w^s  that  I  could 
not  have  them  as  I  had  not,  m  fact,  "  passed,"  and  my 
answer  to  this  was  that  not  only  had  I  incurred  the  expenses 
because  some  one  else  had  blundered,  but  that,  for  the  same 
reason,  I  was  now  compelled  to  go  through  a  further  course 
of  preparation,  with  its  attendant  cost.  The  correspondence 
continued  to  see-saw  in  this  manner  for  several  weeks,  and 
at  last  my  commanding  officer  became  so  infuriated  with 
the  sight  of  it  that  I  gave  up  the  contest. 

On  the  30th  January  1890  the  regiment  left  Muridki 
for  Rawal  Pindi,  amongst  the  notable  places  passed  through 
being  Gujrat,  where  was  fought  the  final  battle  in  the  Sikh 
war.  Here,  in  my  walk  round,  I  came  across  a  batch  of 
school-boys  squatted  on  the  ground  and  poring  over  a  small- 
scale  map  of  Europe,  which  was  being  explained  to  them  by 
their  master.  Like  many  people  before  them,  they  were 
surprised  and  puzzled  most  of  all  at  the  very  small  space 
occupied  by  England. 

The  500  miles'  march  from  Muttra  to  the  Jhelum  had 
lain  over  a  dead-flat  plain,  but  after  crossing  this  river  we 
entered  the  foot-hills  of  the  Himalayas,  whose  snowy 
summits  had  already  been  visible  many  marches  earlier. 
One  afternoon  I  went  some  distance  into  these  hills  so  as 
to  get  a  better  view  of  the  sunset,  and,  forgetting  that  there 
was  practically  no  twilight,  remained  gazing  too  long,  with 
the  result  that  darkness  caught  me  in  a  labyrinth  of  rocks 
and  ravines  through  which  I  had  to  crawl  and  scramble  in 


42  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  direction  where  I  hoped  the  camp  might  be.  After 
some  hours'  anxiety  lest  I  would  have  to  wait  for  daylight 
I  fortunately  saw  the  camp-fires  and  so  found  my  way  back. 
Between  Jhelum  and  Rawal  Pindi — I  forget  exactly  where 
— I  visited  the  spot  on  which  Alexander  the  Great  is 
supposed  to  have  erected,  in  326  B.C.,  the  monument  to  his 
favourite  charger,  Bucephalus. 

We  reached  Rawal  Pindi,  the  Aldershot  of  northern 
India,  on  the  17th  February,  and  shortly  afterwards  the 
annual  district  assault-at-arms  took  place.  At  this  meeting 
I  was  more  fortunate  than  at  Muridki,  winning  the  tent- 
pegging  quite  easily.  The  following  year  I  took  the  first 
prizes  in  swordsmanship  and  fencmg,  and  fought  in  the  final 
for  the  chief  prize — that  for  the  best  officer-at-arms — but 
being  fairly  and  squarely  unhorsed  by  an  officer  of  the  nth 
Bengal  Lancers  I  failed  to  win  it.  Another  officer  of  this 
regiment  against  whom  I  fought  was  Lieutenant  (now 
General  Sir  William)  Birdwood.  The  chief  prize  fell  to  me 
a  year  later,  as  did  two  other  prizes.  These  achievements, 
such  as  they  were,  were  mainly  due  to  keeping  myself 
physically  fit — not  an  easy  thing  to  do  in  the  plains  of 
India  unless  one  is  blessed  with  a  strong  constitution,  and 
is  careful  to  safeguard  it  by  temperate  habits  and  suitable 
exercise. 

I  claim  no  credit  for  pursuing  these  habits,  because  I 
had  not  the  wherewithal  to  do  otherwise.  Water  was  the 
only  drink  I  could  afford,  while  for  smoking  I  had  to  be 
content  with  a  fixed  amount  of  tobacco  and  cheroots  at 
two  shillings  a  hundred.  It  was  not  altogether  agreeable 
to  be  seen  drinking  water  at  mess  when  others  were  drinking 
champagne,  or  to  defer  smoking  till  leaving  the  mess  because 
pipes  were  not  allowed,  but  it  had  to  be  done. 

After  being  at  Rawal  Pindi  for  a  few  weeks  I  was  sent 
with  a  detachment  to  spend  the  hot  season  at  the  hill- 
station  of  Murree,  where  we  were  joined  by  a  similar  detach- 
ment of  the  Queen's  Bays,  the  combined  strength  being 
about  300  men.  I  was  appointed  acting-adjutant  for  the 
whole  and  was  of  course  responsible  for  the  training  and 
discipline  of  my  own  men.  These  duties  occupied  the 
greater  part  of  the  day,  but  by  avoiding  most  of  the  social 


FARMING  43 

engagements  common  to  hill-stations  in  India,  I  was  able  to 
give  some  three  or  four  hours  daily  to  the  study  of  a  third 
language — Persian . 

My  teacher,  a  native  of  Persia,  was  an  exasperating  but 
none  the  less  attractive  person,  who  had  evidently  led  a 
scapegrace  kind  of  life  and  possibly  for  that  reason  had 
taken  refuge  in  India.  At  one  time  he  would  be  most  regular 
in  his  attendance  and  very  smartly  dressed.  At  other  times 
he  was  quite  the  reverse,  and  for  days  did  not  put  in  an 
appearance.  I  induced  him  to  mend  his  ways,  and  as  he 
was  a  well-educated  and  capable  instructor,  the  higher 
standard  was  successfully  passed  before  I  returned  to  Rawal 
Pindi  in  the  autumn. 

Immediately  afterwards  I  was  appointed  by  the  General 
in  command,  Sir  William  Elles,  to  supervise  the  govern- 
ment grass  farm,  of  about  eleven  thousand  acres,  then  being 
started  for  the  purpose  of  supplying  the  horses  of  the  station 
with  hay  in  place  of  the  "  dhub  "  grass  which,  according  to 
the  Indian  custom,  had  hitherto  been  brought  in  daily  by  an 
army  of  "  grass-cutters."  This  appointment  proved  to  be 
a  tiresome  affair,  as  the  native  contractors  were  continually 
advancing  plausible  reasons  why  I  should  excuse  their 
breaches  of  agreement,  and  as  they  had  complete  control 
over  practically  all  the  available  coolie  labour  I  was  some- 
times in  the  predicament  of  having  to  choose  between 
accepting  inferior  work  and  getting  no  work  at  all. 

Besides  looking  after  my  farm  I  was  placed  in  charge  of 
the  regimental  signallers,  the  commanding  oihcer  telling  me 
at  the  time  that  a  very  unsatisfactory  report  on  them  had 
been  received  from  army  headquarters,  and  that  there 
must  be  a  great  improvement.  He  added  that  he  would 
allow  me  a  free  hand  as  to  their  training,  while  I  in  my 
turn  must  undertake  to  make  them  more  efficient.  I 
promised  to  do  this,  subject  to  there  being  no  mistake 
with  respect  to  the  free  hand,  and  thanks  to  the  loyal 
co-operation  of  my  men  the  regiment  gained  first  place  in 
the  order  of  merit  at  the  next  annual  inspection.  Some 
time  afterwards  I  was  offered  the  appointment  of  assistant 
inspector  of  signalling  in  India,  but  I  declined  it  as  some- 
thing more  promising  was  then  in  sight 


44  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Another  appointment  which  occasionally  devolved  upon 
me,  in  the  absence  of  the  permanent  holder,  was  that  of 
station  staff  officer,  in  which  capacity  I  served  under  Sir 
Power  Palmer  and  Sir  George  Luck,  who  respectively  held 
temporary  command  of  the  Rawal  Pindi  district.  For  two 
years  I  was  also  secretary  of  the  district  assault-at-arms 
committee.  My  hands  were  therefore  fairly  full,  but  by  a 
proper  adjustment  of  work  I  was  able  to  take  a  share  of 
regimental  duties,  as  well  as  find  sufficient  leisure  to  qualify 
in  two  more  languages,  Punjabi  and  Pushtu,  thus  making 
five  in  aU. 

Pushtu  resembles  Persian  in  many  ways,  but  the  colloquial 
is  difficult.  I  failed  in  it  at  my  first  attempt,  partly  because 
I  had  the  misfortune  to  miss  the  train  which  was  to  take  me 
to  Peshawar  for  the  examination,  and  had  to  travel  all  night 
in  the  guard's  van  of  a  luggage  train  in  order  to  present 
myself  at  the  appointed  hour  ;  and  chiefly  because  the  wild 
man,  a  Mohmand,  whom  the  examiners  produced  to  converse 
with  me,  launched  out  into  a  long  dissertation  about  the 
Christian  belief  in  the  Trinity.  Not  understanding  in  the 
least  what  he  was  talking  about  I  made  all  kinds  of  wild 
and  incorrect  guesses  in  the  endeavour  to  keep  up  the 
conversation,  with  the  result  that  I  was  hopelessly  ploughed. 
Six  months'  further  study,  plus  a  new  munshi,  enabled  me 
to  pass  with  flying  colours.  In  1920  this  munshi,  Ziaud-Din 
by  name,  sent  his  son  to  call  on  me  when  the  latter,  a  youth 
of  about  twenty  years  of  age,  came  to  London  to  study  law. 

The  pecuniary  rewards  given  by  the  Indian  Government 
for  passing  examinations  in  these  languages  was  little  more 
than  sufficient  to  pay  expenses,  but  this  little  was  not  to 
be  despised  for  it  helped  to  keep  my  head,  financially,  above 
water.  Having  established  some  reputation  as  a  linguist, 
I  was  able  to  make  a  contract  with  my  munshis  to  pa}'  a 
fixed  sum  on  passing  instead  of  the  customary  monthly 
wage  irrespective  of  passing.  When  studying  Punjabi  my 
only  spare  time  was  before  8  a.m.  and  after  5  p.m.,  and  in 
order  that  the  munshi  might  be  on  the  spot  when  required 
I  lodged  him  in  the  compound  with  the  other  natives  of  my 
household,  and  told  him  that  he  might  call  me  as  early 
as    he   liked   for  our  first  lesson.     Determined  to  earn  his 


ACTIVE  SERVICE  45 

money  in  as  short  a  time  as  possible  he  appeared  every 
morning  by  my  bedside  with  maddening  regularity  at  a 
very  early  hour,  quietly  but  persistently  calling  out, 
"  Sahib,  Sahib,"  until  I  awoke.  He  reaped  his  reward 
within  a  few  weeks,  for  as  Punjabi  has  much  in  common 
with  Hindi  it  was  easy  to  master  for  examination  purposes. 
He  has  apparently  not  yet  forgotten  his  old  pupil,  as  three 
years  ago  I  received  the  following  from  him  : 

Pandit  Dhanpat  Rai  (of  Rahon),  Officers'  Punjabi  Munshi, 
sends  his  most  respectful  salaams  for  Christmas  Day  and  his  best 
wishes  for  a  happy  new  year. 

Present  address  :   Sadar  Bazar,  Peshawar  (India). 

A  knowledge  of  oriental  languages  did  not  at  the  time 
appear  to  be  of  much  professional  use  as  the  regiment  was 
shortly  due  to  go  to  South  Africa,  and  indeed  very  few  officers 
in  British  regiments  serving  in  India  took  the  trouble  to 
study  them,  with  the  exception  of  Hindustani.  I  had 
the  impression,  however,  that  they  might  prove  useful,  and 
so  it  turned  out,  for  it  was  largely  owing  to  my  knowledge 
of  them  that  I  was  later  appointed  to  the  staff. 

Before  this  happened  I  gained  my  initial  experience  of 
active  service.  Early  in  1891  a  punitive  expedition  under 
Sir  Wilham  Elles  was  sent  against  certain  of  the  Black 
Mountain  tribes,  who  had  continued  to  give  trouble  ever 
since  the  fruitless  expedition  of  1888,  and  whilst  this  expedi- 
tion was  in  progress  some  16,000  Miranzai  tribesmen  raided 
the  frontier  near  Kohat,  doing  considerable  damage  and  get- 
tmg  within  two  or  three  miles  of  that  place.  To  deal  with 
them  a  mixed  brigade  of  infantry  and  artiUery  was  ordered 
to  be  withdrawn  from  the  Black  Mountain  and  despatched 
to  Kohat  as  quickly  as  possible.  Sir  William  Lockhart  to 
be  in  command. 

On  the  7th  April  I  was  suddenly  deputed  to  go  to 
Hassan  Abdal,  the  railhead  of  the  Black  Mountain  force, 
and  make  the  necessary  arrangements  for  railing  the  Kohat 
force  to  Kushalgarh,  which  was  the  selected  base  of  the  new 
operations  and,  at  the  time,  the  railway  terminus  in  that 
direction.  The  transport  animals,  mainly  mules,  and  their 
native  drivers  gave  me  a  good  deal  of  trouble,  especially  those 


46  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

that  had  to  be  entrained  during  the  night,  but,  to  quote  from 
a  letter  I  wrote  home,  "  a  knowledge  of  the  vernacular  ex- 
pedites matters  considerably,  more  particularly  when  rubbed 
in  with  a  stout  stick,  a  weapon  I  always  carry." 

The  wives  of  certain  officers  were  also  the  cause  of  some 
trouble,  and  in  their  case  neither  the  vernacular  nor  the 
stick  could  be  employed.  Not  having  seen  their  husbands 
for  some  weeks,  and  not  knowing  when  they  might  have 
another  opportunity  of  seeing  them,  they  came  up  by  rail 
from  Rawal  Pindi  to  meet  them  when  passing  through  Hassan 
Abdal.  There  were  no  buildings  suitable  for  Europeans 
except  the  small  wayside  station  and  a  three-roomed  dak 
bungalow,  and  therefore  these  ladies  monopohsed  practically 
all  the  accommodation  available.  They  might  more 
appropriately  have  stayed  at  home,  but  soldiering  in  India 
thirty  years  ago  was  conducted  in  an  easy-going  fashion  in 
more  ways  than  one. 

Amongst  the  officers  who  passed  through  Hassan  Abdal 
was  Prince  Christian  of  Schleswig-Holstein,  who  was  then 
serving  with  his  regiment  in  India.  I  had  not  met  him 
before,  and  when  he  came  to  ask  me  for  a  railway  warrant  I 
remarked  that  he  was  looking  rather  dirty  and  ragged  after 
his  Black  Mountam  experiences.  His  good-humoured  reply 
greatly  helped  to  dispel  the  confusion  into  which  I  fell  when 
he  gave  me  his  name.  The  Prince  was  universally  regarded 
as  a  good  officer,  and  was  very  popular  with  all  ranks. 

The  brigade  was  despatched  sufficiently  quickly  to  reach 
Kohat  before  further  damage  was  done  there,  and  I  was 
gratified  to  receive  a  telegram  from  Sir  William  Lockhart 
expressing  his  satisfaction  at  the  rapidity  and  smoothness 
with  which  the  railway  movement  had  been  carried  out. 

Being  eager  to  see  active  service  I  telegraphed  to  head- 
quarters at  Rawal  Pindi  saying  that  I  proposed  going  to 
Kushalgarh  with  the  last  train-load  of  troops,  so  as  to  ensure 
that  everything  was  in  order  at  that  place.  This  was 
approved,  but  just  as  the  train  was  due  to  start  a  second 
message  arrived  cancelling  the  first  and  telling  me  to  go  back 
to  Rawal  Pindi.  This  I  put  into  my  pocket  and,  quite 
improperly,  ignored,  hoping  that  once  I  got  to  Kushalgarh 
I  would  be  allowed  to  accompany  the  force  to  Kohat  and 


KUSHALGARH  47 

thence  into  the  Miranzai  country.  The  plot  did  not  work 
out  successfully,  for  three  days  later  I  was  again  directed 
and  in  more  peremptory  terms,  to  return. 

On  arrival  at  Rawal  Pindi,  however,  I  was  met  by  a 
staff  officer  who  told  me  that  I  was  to  go  back  to  Kushalgarh 
at  once  by  the  train  in  which  I  had  just  travelled,  and  take 
up  the  duties  of  Base  Commandant.  As  I  had  had  little  or 
nothing  to  eat  for  the  last  two  or  three  days — nothing  being 
obtainable  at  Kushalgarh — I  rephed  that  I  must  first  lay 
in  a  stock  of  supplies  and  would  then  proceed  by  a  later 
train.  He  was  not  inclined  to  consent  but  did  so  at  last, 
and  during  the  day  my  orders  were  again  changed,  and  I 
was  told  that  I  need  not  go  back.  Two  days  afterwards 
it  was  discovered  that  matters  at  Kushalgarh  had  got  into 
a  muddle,  and  I  was  then  bundled  off  at  a  few  hours'  notice 
with  direct  instructions  from  the  General  to  put  them  right. 
I  accordingly  started,  having  but  a  very  vague  idea  of  what 
was  required  of  me  in  my  new  capacity.  The  important 
thing  seemed  to  be  to  hurry  up  to  the  front  all  men,  animals, 
and  material  arriving  at  the  base,  and  send  back  to  Rawal 
Pindi  with  equal  despatch  everything  arriving  from  the 
front.  By  adhering  to  this  rough  rule  I  managed  to  give 
satisfaction  to  the  authorities  both  at  the  front  and  the  rear. 

"  Kushalgarh  "  signifies  the  "  happy  mountain,"  but  a 
more  abominable  place  in  which  to  hve  cannot  be  imagined. 
Situated  on  the  banks  of  the  Indus — which  was  crossed  at 
the  time  by  a  bridge  of  boats — it  is  notoriously  hot  in 
summer,  and  is  devoid  of  everything  save  rocks  and  sand. 
My  only  shelter  was  a  small  Indian  tent,  and  at  times  the 
heat  was  almost  unbearable.  It  would  have  been  entirely 
so  had  I  not  always  been  able  to  procure  a  cool  drink  by 
anchoring  a  hamper  of  lemonade  and  soda  water  in  the 
river,  then  in  flood  from  the  melting  snows  of  the  Hima- 
layas and  icy  cold  a  few  feet  below  the  surface.  Once,  for 
a  period  of  two  days,  we  had  a  plague  of  locusts  ;  on  the 
table,  in  the  bed,  in  clothing,  in  cooking  utensils,  every- 
where were  the  locusts.  They  were  so  thick  on  the  ground 
that  one  morning  they  actually  stopped  a  train.  There  was 
a  shght  ascent  to  the  station,  and  the  crushing  of  the 
locusts  made  the  rails  so  slippery  that  the  train  had  to 


48  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

be  brought  in  by  a  section  at  a  time,  a  party  of  men  being 
detailed  to  throw  sand  on  the  Hne  and  sweep  away  the 
pests  in  front  of  the  engine.  A  terrific  storm  of  wind 
followed,  and  this  effectively  cleared  them  off,  but  it  also 
levelled  all  our  tents  and  carried  away  my  only  suit  of 
pyjamas  ! 

Wishing  to  escape  from  the  heat  and  to  establish  more 
favourable  conditions  under  which  to  work,  I  told  the  native 
station-master  that  I  proposed  to  use  the  ladies'  waiting- 
room  as  an  ofhce  during  the  daytime,  as  no  ladies  ever  came 
to  the  station  at  that  season,  and  there  were  none  within 
fifty  miles  of  it,  but  he  suggested  that  I  should  first  obtain 
the  permission  of  the  superintendent  of  the  line.  I  therefore 
sent  a  brief  telegram  to  the  latter,  who  was  well-known  to 
me,  and  he  at  once  gave  his  consent.  Some  months  later, 
when  the  accounts  of  the  expedition  were  being  audited, 
I  received  a  letter  from  the  Adjutant-General  at  Simla  asking 
for  an  explanation  as  to  why  I  had  sent  an  official  telegram 
on  what  was  evidently  a  private  matter,  namely,  an  appUca- 
tion  to  use  a  ladies'  waiting-room  !  I  explained  the  circum- 
stances, very  clearly  I  thought,  but  failed  to  satisfy  him, 
and  was  directed  not  to  repeat  the  irregularity  in  future, 
and  meanwhile  to  defray  the  cost  of  the  telegram  amounting 
to  eight  annas. 

This  was  not  the  only  financial  trouble  into  which  I  fell 
in  connection  with  this  expedition.  On  the  breaking- up 
of  the  base  I  returned  the  camp  equipment  and  other  stores 
to  the  government  arsenal  at  Lahore,  and  on  their  arrival 
it  was  alleged  that  many  articles  were  missing,  the  value 
of  which  amounted  to  twenty  thousand  rupees.  I  was 
so  informed  in  the  usual  Babu  phraseology,  and  requested 
"  kindly  to  remit  same."  The  sum  was  so  far  in  excess 
of  my  ability  to  pay  that  it  struck  me  as  being  exceedingly 
comic,  and  after  a  lengthy  correspondence,  in  which  I  main- 
tained that  the  missing  articles  had  been  returned,  the  charge 
was  "  written  off  "  and  I  was  exonerated. 

I  may  add  here  that  I  did  not  receive  the  medal  for 
either  of  the  expeditions  referred  to  above,  as  I  had  not 
crossed  the  line  of  demarcation  which  qualified  for  it . 

Early  in  1892  the  Intelligence  Branch  at  army  head- 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  BRANCH  49 

quarters  was  about  to  be  strengthened  by  an  increased 
number  of  officers.  The  intention  was  to  take  these  officers 
partly  from  native  and  partly  from  British  regiments, 
and  after  they  had  served  a  period  of  probation  as 
"  attaches  "  to  select  from  amongst  them  for  permanent 
emplo3nnent  such  as  it  was  considered  desirable  to  retain. 
It  was  necessary,  of  course,  that  they  should  possess  the 
linguistic  attainments  required  by  the  nature  of  the  work 
they  had  to  do,  and  as  I  had  five  languages  to  my  credit 
I  was  one  of  those  chosen  from  British  regiments,  and  was 
ordered  to  proceed  to  Simla  forthwith. 


CHAPTER  IV 

IN   THE   INTELLIGENCE   BRANCH,    SIMLA 

Indian  Intelligence  Branch  reorganised  by  General  Sir  H.  Brackenbury — 
Curious  division  of  duties  at  Army  Headquarters — Comparison  with 
system  at  home — Society  favourites  thought  to  have  best  chance 
of  Staff  employment — Colonels  Elles  and  Mason — First  permanent 
Staff  appointment — Countries  dealt  with  by  North-West  Frontier 
Section,  in  which  I  am  employed— Situation  in  Afghanistan— 
Kafiristan — Intricate  frontier  questions  to  be  settled — Proceed  on 
leave  to  England — Death  of  my  mother — Frontier  matters  still 
disturbed  on  return  to  India — Question  of  Russian  advance  on 
India  via  the  Pamirs — Ordered  to  reconnoitre  route  leading  to 
Pamirs — Srinagar— Bridges  in  Kashmir — Gilgit — Rakapushi  Moun- 
tain— Hunza — Meet  Townshend  and  Fowler — Yasin — Darkot  Pass 
— The  Pamirs — Return  to  India  via  the  Indus,  Chilas,  and  Abbotta- 
bad — Pass  examination  in  GurkhaU. 

The  decision  to  reorganise  the  Intelligence  Branch  was 
due  to  the  initiative  of  General  Sir  Henry  Brackenbury,  the 
MiUtary  Member  of  the  Viceroy's  Council.  This  General 
had  previously  been  Director  of  MiUtary  IntelUgence  at 
the  War  Office,  and  he  was  quick  to  perceive  that  the  Simla 
Branch  required  much  overhauling  if  it  was  to  cope  efficiently 
with  the  miUtary  situation  then  prevaiUng  on  the  North- 
West  Frontier  and  in  Central  Asia.  At  the  time  the  In- 
telligence and  MobiHsation  Branches  were  both  subdivisions 
of  the  department  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  who  was 
responsible  for  deaUng  with  military  operations  and  questions 
of  miUtary  policy  in  general.  He  was  therefore  charged, 
in  addition  to  his  usual  duties  of  supply,  transport,  and 
barracks,  with  what  we  now  know  as  the  duties  of  the 
General  Staff,  except  that  the  Adjutant-General  was  re- 
sponsible for  training,  and  from  this  it  followed  that  he 
occupied  the  position  of  Chief  Staff  Officer  of  the  Commander- 
in-Chief. 

It   is  significant   of  the  illogical   manner  in   which   we 

50 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  BRANCH  51 

then  conducted  our  Imperial  military  affairs  that  quite 
another  system  obtained  at  home.  There  the  Adjutant- 
General  was  the  Chief  Staff  Officer  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief,  and  had  under  him  the  InteUigence  and  Mobilisation 
Branches  as  well  as  training,  while  the  Quartermaster-General 
was  concerned  only  with  the  duties  which  properly  belonged 
to  him.  Again,  when  the  War  Office  was  reorganised  in  1904 
the  Commander-in-Chief  was  abohshed  on  the  ground  that 
no  one  man  could  carry  out  the  duties  which  had  hitherto 
devolved  upon  him,  and  these  were  accordingly  divided  up 
between  a  number  of  army  councillors,  each  of  whom  was 
made  responsible  for  his  department  to  the  Secretary  of 
State  for  War.  In  India,  on  the  other  hand,  and  at  about 
the  same  period,  it  was  the  Mihtary  Member — roughly  the 
equivalent  of  the  War  Secretary  at  home  —  who  was  for 
all  practical  purposes  abohshed,  since  he  was  made  the  sub- 
ordinate of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the  latter  became 
the  supreme  head  of  all  mihtary  business  in  the  country. 
Conditions  in  India  differ  considerably  from  those  at  home, 
and  a  Commander-in-Chief  is  undoubtedly  necessary  there, 
but  the  difference  is  not  so  great  as  to  justify  having  an 
entirely  different  mihtary  system  in  other  respects,  and  it 
is  satisfactory  to  know  that  within  recent  years  the  two 
headquarters  have  been  brought  more  into  hne. 

Apart  from  the  faulty  organisation  of  headquarters  as  a 
whole,  the  InteUigence  Branch  had  suffered  because  of  the 
inadequacy — and  perhaps  of  the  inferior  quahty — of  its  per- 
sonnel. Although  much  had  been  done  by  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  Lord  Roberts,  to  ensure  that  priority  for  staff 
employment  should  be  governed  by  professional  capacity, 
favouritism  and  social  influence  were  not  yet  deemed  by  the 
outsider  to  be  extinct.  It  was  alleged  that  staff  officers 
were  still  too  often  selected  from  amongst  those  who  were 
hkely  to  be  successful  performers  in  amateur  theatricals,  or 
be  useful  in  some  other  way  at  the  various  entertainments 
provided  for  the  amusement  of  Simla  society.  I  was 
frequently  asked  on  first  arrival  at  this  smart  hill-station 
what  my  special  accomphshment  was — acting,  singing,  or 
whistling — and  what  my  contribution  to  the  amenities  of 
the  season  was  to  be.     It  was  taken  for  granted  that  I  could 


52  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

do  something  of  this  nature,  and  do  it  well,  and  my  interro- 
gators were  surprised  to  learn  that  I  could  contribute 
nothing. 

Fortunately,  this  missing  element  in  my  equipment 
was  a  recommendation  in  the  eyes  of  my  new  chief,  Colonel 
(now  General  Sir)  Edmund  Elles,  half-brother  of  the  General 
under  whom  I  had  served  at  Rawal  Pindi.  He  expected 
his  subordinates  to  keep  themselves  physically  and  mentally 
fit  by  taking  a  share  in  all  outdoor  games  and  recreations, 
but  he  also  demanded  a  full  day's  work.  To  his  sound  and 
able  guidance  I  attribute  much  of  the  success,  such  as  it  is, 
which  attended  my  subsequent  career,  and  from  both  him 
and  his  wife,  a  lady  of  gentle  and  kind  disposition,  I  received 
many  proofs  of  sincere  friendship.  Some  twenty  years 
later,  when  I  was  commandant  of  the  Staff  College,  their 
son  was  one  of  the  students,  and  in  the  Great  War  he  won 
distinction  as  commander  of  the  Tank  Corps. 

I  was  equally  happy  in  my  immediate  chief,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Mason  of  the  Royal  Engineers,  who  was  in  charge 
of  the  North- West  Frontier  section  to  which  I  was  posted. 
He  was  a  man  of  sterHng  character,  an  acknowledged  expert 
on  all  questions  relating  to  the  frontier,  and  quite  fearless 
in  the  expression  of  the  mihtary  opinions  which  he  was  called 
upon  to  lay  before  his  superiors.  Of  a  retiring  nature,  he 
was  slow  to  confide  in  new  acquaintances,  but  I  gained  his 
confidence  fairly  soon,  and  he  taught  me  much  about  the 
Ufe,  customs,  and  attitude  of  the  heterogeneous  tribes  of 
the  North- West  Frontier,  which  I  could  have  learned  so 
well  from  no  one  else.  It  was  due  to  him  and  to  Elles  that, 
within  a  few  weeks  of  my  arrival  at  Simla,  Lord  Roberts 
approved  of  my  temporary  appointment  being  made  per- 
manent for  the  usual  period  of  five  years,  and  in  this  way 
I  received  my  first  employment  on  the  staff.  Mason's 
death  from  an  attack  of  enteric  fever  two  years  later  was 
a  great  loss  to  the  army. 

My  section  dealt  with  the  whole  of  the  independent  and 
semi-independent  territories,  including  Afghanistan,  Kash- 
mir, and  Baluchistan,  which  extend  for  some  2000  miles  along 
the  North- West  Frontier  from  Tibet  on  tlic  right  to  the 
Arabian  Sea  on  the  left.     Of  Kashmir  and  Baluchistan,  both 


AFGHANISTAN  53 

within  the  border  of  Indian  administration,  there  is  nothing 
special  to  say,  while  as  to  the  trans-frontier  tribes  all  that 
need  be  said  is  that  trouble  with  one  or  another  was 
constantly  breaking  out  or  threatening  to  do  so.  We  knew 
really  very  little  about  their  territory,  and  could  not  well 
obtain  much  information  as  the  border-line  was  closed  to 
us  except  when  opened  by  a  punitive  expedition. 

Afghanistan  was  of  importance  as  being  a  "  buffer  " 
between  India  and  Russian  territory.  The  agreement  with 
the  Amir,  Abdul  Rahman,  was  that  in  return  for  an  annual 
subsidy  and  other  advantages  he  would  have  no  foreign 
relations  with  any  Power  except  the  Government  of  India. 
The  agreement  was  modified  later,  and  exactly  what  the 
arrangement  now  is  I  do  not  know.  The  country  had  been 
torn  with  war  and  dissensions  before  Abdul  Rahman  assumed 
the  rulership  in  1880,  and  in  1892,  when  I  went  to  Simla, 
he  had  not  yet  everywhere  estabhshed  order,  although  he 
had,  by  drastic  methods,  gone  far  in  that  direction. 

Afghanistan  is  one  of  the  most  difficult  countries  in  the 
world  to  govern,  for  the  inhabitants,  about  five  millions  in 
number,  are  not  of  the  same  stock  and  lineage,  and  do  not 
possess  the  same  political  interests  and  tribal  affinities. 
The  only  bond  of  union  among  them  is  that  of  religion,  and 
even  this  is  neither  strong  nor  durable,  owing  to  the  division 
of  the  people  into  the  two  great  hostile  sects  of  the  faith  of 
Muhammad,  Shiahs  and  Sunnis.  The  latter  are  now  far 
more  numerous  than  the  former.  The  two  principal  Afghan 
tribes,  properly  so-called,  are  the  Duranis  and  Ghilzais, 
the  former  being  found  chiefly  in  the  Kandahar  and  Farah 
Provinces  and  the  Ghilzais  in  the  Kabul  Province.  The 
Ghilzais  are  said  to  be  the  descendants  of  "  Ghalzoe,"  i.e. 
the  "  son  of  a  thief,"  whose  birth  took  place  within  three 
months  of  the  marriage  of  his  parents.  In  the  northern 
provinces  the  inhabitants  are  for  the  most  part  alien  to 
the  Afghan,  being  Turkomans  in  Turkistan  and  of  Persian 
origin  in  Herat.  The  army,  of  which  the  Amir  was  proud, 
was  about  130,000  strong,  of  whom  100,000  were  regulars 
and  30,000  militia.  It  comprised  the  three  arms,  cavalrv^ 
artillery,  and  infantry. 

Considered  as  a  theatre  of  war,  Afghanistan  is  a  water- 


54  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

less,  treeless,  foodless,  roadless,  mountainous  country,  and 
has  been  described  as  Spain  once  was — a  country  in  which 
a  large  army  will  starve  and  a  small  one  will  be  murdered. 
The  chief  mountain  range,  the  Hindu  Kush,  has  a  general 
elevation  of  between  12,000  and  18,000  feet,  and  is  every- 
where precipitous  and  arid.  A  more  desolate  and  inhospi- 
table region  cannot  be  imagined. 

The  routes  leading  through  the  country  between  the 
Russian  and  Indian  frontiers  we  used  to  classify  in  three 
groups  :  Pamirs  line,  Kabul  line,  and  Kandahar  line.  I  will 
refer  to  the  Pamirs  line  later,  merely  saying  here  that  the 
distance  from  the  Russian  frontier  to  Peshawar  is  about 
600  miles.  By  the  Kabul  line  there  are  several  alternative 
routes  as  far  as  the  capital,  the  distance  from  the  Oxus  to 
Peshawar  being  about  450  miles.  By  Herat  and  Kandahar 
the  distance  to  Quetta  is  650  miles.  These  distances,  coupled 
with  what  has  been  said  about  the  country,  will  serve  to 
show  the  enormous  difficulties  to  be  overcome  in  conducting 
military  operations  on  any  of  the  three  lines. 

The  Amir's  policy  was  to  permit  no  kind  of  interference 
with  his  internal  affairs,  and  although  he  received  subsidies 
and  supplies  of  arms  from  us  he  would  make  few  or  no 
concessions  in  return,  and  all  projects,  such  as  railways 
and  telegraphs,  proposed  for  the  better  defence  of  the 
country  he  viewed  with  distrust.  He  maintained  the  same 
attitude  towards  foreign  visitors,  and  beyond  the  few 
employees  he  had  at  Kabul,  no  European  was  allowed  to  set 
foot  in  the  country  except  in  the  rare  event  of  a  "  mission," 
and  the  members  of  it  would  always  be  closely  watched. 

Lord  Curzon  was  the  only  person  during  my  four  years 
at  Simla  who  entered  Afghanistan  as  a  guest,  under  the 
auspices  of  the  Amir,  He  once  gave  me  an  amusing 
description  of  the  attire  he  wore  when  meeting  the  Amir 
for  the  first  time.  It  included  a  military  frock-coat,  cocked 
hat,  boots  of  the  Household  Cavalry  type,  fierce-looking 
brass  spurs,  and  an  elaborate  presentation  sword  lent  by 
Sir  William  Lockhart.  Lord  Curzon  was  quite  right,  for 
this  kind  of  display  counts  for  much  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Eastern  chief,  who  remains  quite  unmoved  by  the  sight  of 
a  top-hat,  morning  coat,  and  white  spats. 


BOUNDARY  QUESTIONS  55 

At  the  time  I  joined  the  Intelhgence  Branch  many 
compHcated  problems  were  constantly  coming  up  for 
examination.  Umra  Khan  of  Jandol,  of  whom  more  will 
be  said  in  the  next  chapter,  was  aggressively  active  on  the 
borders  of  Kafiristan  and  elsewhere  ;  other  semi-independent 
tribes  were  fractious,  and  threatened  to  indulge  in  one  of 
their  periodical  outbreaks  ;  the  Afghan-Persian  boundary 
was  in  dispute  ;  while  Russia  was  systematically  pushing 
forward  her  outposts  on  the  Pamirs  and  disturbing  the  peace 
of  mind  of  the  Amir,  who  feared  that  he  might  be  deprived 
of  territory  which  he  asserted  belonged  to  him.  Kafiristan,  it 
may  be  explained,  was  the  name  given  by  the  Muhammadans 
to  the  country  lying  between  the  province  of  Kabul  and 
Chitral,  the  inhabitants  of  which  were  pagans  and  were 
therefore  regarded  by  the  Muhammadans  as  infidels,  or 
"  kafirs."  These  kafirs  have  no  connection  with  the  Kafir 
of  South  Africa.  They  were  finally  subdued  by  Abdul 
Rahman  about  1895,  and  compelled  to  accept  the  religion 
of  Islam. 

Following  the  Afghan  Boundary  Commission  of  1884-88, 
an  agreement  had  been  reached  with  Russia  in  respect  of 
the  Russo-Afghan  boundary  from  Badakhshan  to  Persia,  but 
that  separating  the  two  countries  in   the  vicinity  of  the 
Pamirs  remained   unsettled  for   several   years   afterwards. 
The  trouble  arose  partly  from  the  fact  that  in  an  agreement 
of  1872  the  Oxus  had  been  laid  down  as  the  boundary,  and 
however  clear  this  definition  may  have  appeared  to  those 
who  drafted  the  agreement,  it  proved  to  be  far  from  clear 
when  an  attempt  was  made  to  put  it  into  practice.     The 
reason  of  this  was  that  not  one  of  the  various  streams  in  the 
Pamir  region  which  go  to  form  the  Oxus  is  locally  known 
by  that  name,  while  more  than  one  of  them  can,  at  a  pinch, 
be  claimed  as  the  main  river  according  to  the  aims  of  the 
parties  interested.     The  incident  furnishes,  amongst  others 
I  could  quote,  rather  a  striking  example  of  the  danger  which 
attaches    to    the    drafting    of    frontier    agreements    when 
dependent,  as  in  this  case,  upon  old  and  imperfect  small 
scale  maps  and  in  the  absence  of  complete  topographical 
data. 

When  I  went  to  Simla  there  was  no  good  information 


56  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

available  as  regards  mucli  of  the  vast  area  for  which  the 
Frontier  Section  was  responsible.  We  had  to  rely  largely 
upon  the  reports  of  travellers,  and  these  seldom  gave  the 
kind  of  intelligence  that  was  needed,  much  of  it  was  many 
years  old,  while  some  of  the  travellers  were  themselves  more 
renowned  for  their  powers  of  graphic  description  than  for 
the  accuracy  of  their  statements.  By  initiating  new  and 
extended  reconnaissances,  and  introducing  a  better  method 
of  recording  and  compiling  the  information  received,  our 
stock  of  intelligence  gradually  improved  both  in  quantity 
and  quality.  One  compilation,  The  Gazetteer  and  Military 
Report  on  Afghanistan,  occupied  the  greater  part  of  my  time 
for  more  than  a  year,  the  five  volumes  of  which  it  was 
comprised  aggregating  some  three  thousand  pages.  It  was 
a  stupendous  task,  and  I  was  glad  when  it  was  finished, 
but  the  knowledge  I  gained  of  the  country  was  some 
compensation  for  the  drudgery  involved. 

In  January  1893,  having  been  over  four  years  in  India, 
I  took  six  months'  leave  to  England  as  I  wished  to  qualify 
for  promotion  to  Captain,  which  in  those  days  entailed  going 
through  what  was  known  as  a  "  garrison  class,"  or  special 
course  of  military  education.  I  was  also  anxious  to  see  my 
mother,  who  I  knew  to  be  in  failing  health,  but  on  arrival  at 
Malta  was  met  by  a  telegram  conveying  the  news  of  her  death. 
To  that  extent  the  trip  to  England  was  a  bitter  failure. 

When  I  returned  to  Simla  in  July  1893  affairs  in 
Afghanistan  and  on  the  North-West  Frontier  generally 
were  still  in  a  very  unsettled  state,  and  in  particular  the 
activities  of  Russia  on  the  Pamirs  were  feared — quite  need- 
lessly— to  constitute  a  threat  on  India,  in  the  future  if  not 
at  the  present.  It  is  incomprehensible  why  those  who  held 
this  view  never  seemed  to  appreciate  the  tremendous 
topographical  difficulties  to  be  overcome. 

Another  question  constantly  to  the  fore  was  whether, 
assuming  the  Pamir  line  of  advance  to  be  feasible  for  any- 
thing worth  calling  a  military  force,  we  ought  to  prepare  for 
it  by  adopting  what  was  known  as  a  forward  policy — that  is, 
to  push  out  our  outposts  and  establish  good  communications 
between  India  and  the  furthest  limit  possible — or  whether 
we  should  deliberately  refrain  from  doing  these  things,  so  as 


THE  KASHMIR  VALLEY  57 

to  place  on  the  potential  enemy  the  disadvantage  of  sur- 
mounting the  defensive  barrier  provided  by  nature.  There 
was  much  to  be  said  on  both  sides,  and  much  was  said, 
and  the  compromise  eventually  arrived  at  was  probably 
the  wisest  solution. 

In  June  1894  I  was  deputed  to  reconnoitre  various  routes 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  Pamirs,  in  order  to  obtain  certain 
information  of  which  we  were  specially  in  need.  Leaving 
the  railway  at  Rawal  Pindi  I  travelled  for  about  150  miles 
in  a  "  tonga,"  or  covered  two-wheeled  vehicle,  drawn  by 
two  ponies  changed  at  various  distances  en  route,  and  not 
infrequently  suffering  from  abominably  sore  shoulders. 
For  the  first  forty  miles  the  road  climbed  up  the  Murree 
hills,  whence  it  descended  to  the  Jhelum  valley  and  then 
followed  that  river  through  gorges  and  defiles  to  Baramula 
at  the  entrance  of  the  main  valley  of  Kashmir,  and  within 
a  few  miles  of  the  point  where  the  Jhelum  leaves  the  Wular 
Lake.  From  here  I  crossed  the  lake  and  ascended  the  river 
to  Srinagar  in  a  kind  of  miniature  houseboat,  which  was 
roofed  in  with  matting  and  had  a  crew  consisting  of  a  man, 
his  wife,  and  a  baby.  The  lake  is  liable  to  sudden  and 
dangerous  storms,  which  have  caused  many  a  boat  to  be 
swamped  and  wrecked,  but  my  trip  was  free  from  any 
such  adventure.  The  only  disagreeable  feature  of  the 
twenty-four  hours'  voyage  was  that  the  baby — only  a  few 
feet  away  from  me — continued  to  howl  for  the  greater 
part  of  the  night. 

The  Kashmir  valley,  some  20  miles  wide  and  nearly 
100  miles  in  length,  is  justly  renowned  for  its  scenery.  It 
is  enclosed  by  high,  wooded,  snow-covered  mountains  and 
intersected  by  numerous  streams  and  lakes,  which  with  a 
profusion  of  fruit-trees  of  every  species  and  wild  flowers 
of  every  hue,  constitute  a  picture  which  cannot  well  be 
surpassed  in  natural  beauty.  Srinagar,  the  "  city  of  the 
sun,"  is  closely  cut  up  with  canals,  and  is  sometimes  styled 
the  Venice  of  the  east.  The  impression  I  formed  was  that 
its  delights  are  more  imaginary  than  real.  Its  jumbled 
medley  of  houses,  mainly  constructed  of  timber  and  built 
out  of  the  water,  were  mostly  in  a  ramshackle  and  ruinous 
condition,   with    broken    doors    or    no    doors    at  all,    and 


58  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

windows  stopped  up  with  boards,  paper,  or  rags  ;  the  lanes 
between  them  were  narrow,  dirty,  and  ill-paved  ;  and  the 
smells  encountered  were  not  savoury. 

On  this  fringe  of  civihsation  I  completed  my  transport 
and  supply  arrangements.  Besides  the  food  and  equipment 
required  for  the  use  of  myself  and  followers,  corn  had  to  be 
carried  for  the  riding  and  transport  animals,  little  or  none 
bemg  procurable  between  the  Kashmir  valley  and  Gilgit,  a 
distance  of  228  miles. 

The  road  connecting  Srinagar  with  Gilgit  was  good  as 
roads  go  in  this  part  of  the  world,  and  on  the  third 
day's  march  I  crossed  the  Tragbal  Pass,  11,950  feet  in 
height.  It  was  covered  with  a  thick  carpet  of  flowers, 
chiefly  primulas  and  orchids,  of  every  colour,  and  afforded 
a  most  magnificent  view.  Behind,  thousands  of  feet 
below,  was  the  broad  expanse  of  the  Wular  Lake  and 
the  Kashmir  valley,  backed  by  the  snow-crested  range  of 
the  Pir  Panjal ;  and  in  front,  some  50  miles  away,  could 
be  seen  the  snowy  domes  of  Nanga  Parbat,  26,620  feet  in 
altitude,  towering  above  the  mountain  ranges  on  either  hand 
and  forming  a  landmark  visible  for  hundreds  of  miles.  From 
the  Tragbal  the  road  descended  to  and  crossed  the  Kishan- 
ganga,  and  then  a  long  and  severe  climb  led  to  the  Burzil 
Pass,  13,650  feet  high.  This  pass  is  easy  in  summer,  but 
is  practically  closed  for  the  remainder  of  the  year,  and 
possesses  a  bad  reputation  for  severe  snowstorms  at  seasons 
when  they  are  not  usually  expected.  It  forms  the  line  of 
demarcation  between  the  forest-clad  mountains  of  the  south 
and  the  bare  and  arid  region  of  the  Hindu  Kush  to  the 
north. 

Some  40  miles  farther  on  I  reached  Astor,  famous  for 
its  abundance  of  ibex,  markhor,  and  orial,  and  claiming 
to  be  the  birthplace  of  polo  or  at  any  rate  the  land  of  its 
earliest  adoption.  The  game  is  played  in  a  rough-and-ready 
manner,  and  any  number  of  players  up  to  about  a  score  a 
side  take  part  in  it. 

From  Astor  the  road  followed  the  river  of  that  name 
down  a  deep  valley  enclosed  by  high  and  precipitous 
mountains  to  Ramghat,  a  ghastly  place  surrounded  on  all 
sides  by  lofty  rocks  and  crags,  and  in  summer-time  as  hot 


BRIDGES  59 

as  a  furnace.  As  Knight  says  in  his  book  Where  Three 
Empires  Meet,  "  A  man  might  almost  as  well  pass  his  life 
in  a  stoke-hole  as  in  this  infernal  oven."  The  river  rushes 
with  terrific  force  and  deafening  noise  through  a  deep  gorge 
150  feet  wide,  over  which  the  road  is  carried  by  the  fine 
suspension  bridge  which  shortly  before  my  visit  had  replaced 
the  "  jhula  "  or  rope-bridge  common  to  the  country. 

The  "  jhula  "  is  made  of  three  ropes  of  twisted  twigs, 
and  is  stretched  across  the  river  in  the  form  of  a  triangle, 
two  parallel  ropes  acting  as  hand-rails  and  the  central  or 
lower  one  as  a  footway.  The  three  sets  of  ropes  are  tied 
together  by  similar  ropes  at  every  few  feet,  and  the  whole 
is  bound  to  baulks  anchored  to  high  rocks  or  cliffs  on  either 
side,  and  as  far  as  possible  on  the  same  level.  In  order  to 
keep  the  side  ropes  apart  cross-sticks  are  inserted  at  varying 
distances,  and  over  these  one  has  to  step — a  performance 
which  calls  for  a  certain  amount  of  acrobatic  skill,  as  the 
side  ropes  are  in  places  as  much  as  3  feet  above  the  foot- 
rope.  There  is  a  tremendous  sag  in  the  middle,  and  when 
there  is  a  strong  wind  and  the  span  is  large — some  are  as 
much  as  300  feet  in  length — the  bridge  is  apt  to  swing 
dizzily  about  in  a  manner  decidedly  trying  to  the  nerves 
of  any  one  not  accustomed  to  this  mode  of  traffic.  Perhaps 
the  worst  feature  of  the  "  jhula  "  is  that  one  never  knows 
whether  it  may  be  trusted  to  carry  the  weight  put  upon  it, 
as  the  twigs  of  which  it  is  made  quickly  dry  and  perish,  and 
the  ropes  may  then  any  day  suddenly  break. 

Where  something  more  substantial  than  a  "  jhula  "  is 
required,  a  bridge  on  the  cantilever  principle  is  constructed. 
It  consists  of  timbers  projecting  one  over  another  from  the 
opposite  banks,  their  shore  ends  being  weighted  down  with 
masonry  or  rocks.  In  the  absence  of  a  bridge  of  any  kind 
the  natives  cross  on  a  "  shinaz,"  or  inflated  hide  of  the  ox 
or  goat.  Striding  across  this  and  passing  each  leg  through 
a  loop  hanging  down  Uke  a  stirrup  leather,  the  rider  lays  his 
chest  upon  the  hide  and  plunges  into  the  current,  paddling 
with  arms  and  legs  as  in  the  act  of  swimming.  Much  skill 
and  dexterity  are  required  in  the  management  of  these  httle 
floats  to  prevent  a  capsize.  The  passage  of  rivers  is  also 
made  on  rafts   of   inflated   skins  supporting  a  framework 


6o  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

of  light  sticks  or  bamboos.  When  the  shore  is  left  these 
rafts  go  dancing  wildly  down  stream,  while  the  boatmen, 
armed  with  long  poles,  frantically  strive  to  propel  them 
across  to  the  opposite  bank  before  being  swept  past  the 
desired  landing-place. 

About  a  quarter  of  a  mile  below  Ramghat  the  Astor 
joins  the  Indus.  The  road  to  Gilgit  followed  the  left  bank 
of  the  latter  for  about  fourteen  miles,  then  crossed  to  the 
right  bank  by  another  fine  suspension  bridge,  and  than 
along  the  muddy,  boiling  Gilgit  river  to  the  Gilgit  Agency. 
Here  I  acquired  from  our  officers,  about  half-a-dozen  in 
number,  much  useful  information  respecting  the  countries 
to  be  traversed  before  reaching  my  destination,  and  while 
supplies  were  being  replenished  and  other  arrangements 
completed  for  the  onward  march  to  the  Pamirs  I  made  a 
trip  to  Hunza,  some  60  miles  up  the  valley  of  that  name. 
I  covered  this  distance  in  two  days  each  way. 

The  road  up  the  Hunza  valley — since  greatly  improved 
— crossed  several  glacier  torrents  and  bad  "  paris."  "  Pari  " 
means  a  chff,  but  the  word  is  used  to  signify  a  cliff  road 
strutted  or  bracketed  to  the  face  of  a  precipice,  seldom 
more  than  a  foot  or  two  wide,  and  often  of  very  shaky  and 
sketchy  construction. 

The  country  is  noted  for  the  number  and  size  of  its 
glaciers,  the  Nagar  river  having  its  source  in  one  of  the 
greatest  known.  A  few  miles  east  of  the  road  is  the  giant 
Rakapushi  mountain,  which  rises  sheer  19,000  feet  above 
the  level  of  the  valley,  its  height  above  sea-level  being 
25,550  feet.  There  are  several  other  summits  to  be  seen 
which  exceed  24,000  feet.  Fruit-trees  abound,  especially 
the  apricot,  mulberry,  apple,  and  walnut,  and  so  prolific 
are  the  crops  that  the  people  five  to  a  great  extent  upon 
them,  as  also  do  the  animals  and  fowls. 

To  cope  with  the  discomforts  which  attend  a  journey 
through  the  hot  valleys  in  this  part  of  the  world  the  traveller 
needs  to  be  young,  and  able  to  sleep  soundly  after  the  day's 
work  is  finished.  Flies,  of  the  most  tenacious  kind,  are  a 
perfect  pest  to  him  ;  usually  he  is  afflicted  by  an  insatiable 
thirst  which  continues  well  into  the  night ;  the  cockroach 
goes  to  bed  with  him  and  climbs  up  the  inside  of  his  pyjamas 


THE  FRINGES  OF  THE  EMPIRE  6i 

to  make  the  acquaintance  of  the  caterpillar  just  fallen  on 
his  nose  from  the  roof  of  the  tent  ;  the  mosquito  searches 
out  the  most  palatable  parts  of  his  ankles ;  the  jungle  dog 
enters  the  tent  to  ascertain  whether  anything  edible  has 
been  left  on  the  ground  ;  and  at  last  the  native  servant 
appears  to  announce  that  morning  is  here  and  breakfast 
ready.  Having  done  such  justice  to  the  meal  as  he  can, 
got  into  riding  kit,  and  donned  his  blue  spectacles  as  a 
protection  against  the  sun's  rays  reflected  from  the  bare 
and  burning  rocks,  the  traveller  mounts  an  animal  called 
a  pony,  and  the  march  is  resumed.  But  the  discomforts, 
such  as  they  are,  sit  lightly  on  the  young  and  strong  ;  there 
is  much  to  see  of  enthralling  interest  in  these  wonderful 
outlying  regions  of  the  Empire ;  and  such  is  the  influence 
of  the  British  "raj  "  that  one  feels  that  one  is  not  only 
a  man,  but,  in  the  eyes  of  the  natives,  a  sort  of  king. 

The  people  of  Hunza  and  Nagar,  known  as  Kanjutis, 
were  for  centuries  professional  brigands  and  slave-dealers. 
So  great  was  the  terror  inspired  by  them  that  whole  districts, 
formerly  well  -  cultivated  and  populated,  were  totally 
abandoned  by  their  inhabitants.  Secure  in  their  mountain 
strongholds,  and  having  ready  access  to  the  passes  leading 
north  to  the  Yarkand  valley,  the  Kanjutis  were  able  to 
waylay  and  pillage  with  impunity  the  rich  caravans  travel- 
ling by  the  great  trade  route  between  India  and  Turkestan, 
and  to  raid  the  territory  of  their  neighbours  as  and  when 
they  wished.  This  wholesale  brigandage  and  raiding,  as 
well  as  the  slave-dealing  scourge,  were  effectively  put  a 
stop  to  by  the  introduction  of  British  administrative  control 
which  followed  Colonel  Durand's  brilliant  little  Hunza- 
Nagar  campaign  in  the  winter  of  189 1. 

On  leaving  Gilgit  for  the  Pamirs  my  party  consisted  of 
an  orderly  provided  by  the  5th  Ghurkas,  who  had  accom- 
panied me  from  India,  a  Path  an  and  two  servants,  eight 
other  "  followers  "  of  various  nationalities,  a  native  guide, 
a  dozen  mules  and  ponies,  and  about  a  score  sheep  to 
supply  us  with  meat.  The  guide  claimed  to  be  the  "  Raja  " 
of  one  of  the  districts  through  which  we  were  to  pass,  but 
unluckily  for  him  some  one  else  not  only  claimed  that  title 
but  exercised  it.     I  was  afraid  that  this  difference  of  opinion 


62  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

might  be  the  cause  of  trouble,  but  it  was  not,  my  guide 
probably  being  regarded  by  the  man  in  possession  as  so 
weak  a  pretender  as  not  to  be  worth  removing. 

From  Gilgit  to  Gupis,  70  miles,  the  road  continued 
up  the  right  bank  of  the  Gilgit  river,  the  valley  seldom  being 
wider  than  to  give  room  for  the  roaring  torrent  70  to  100 
yards  across  and  in  places  running  like  a  miU-race.  The 
mountain-tops  rise  high  and  steep  on  both  sides,  and  when 
there  is  heavy  rain  or  the  snow  is  melting  it  is  necessary 
to  maintain  a  sharp  look-out  for  the  huge  avalanches 
which  come  tumbUng  down.  I  was  often  kept  awake  at 
night  by  the  terrific  noise,  resembling  the  sound  of  heavy 
gun-fire,  caused  by  these  masses  of  rock,  weighing  many 
tons,  plunging  down  from  thousands  of  feet  into  the  river 
below. 

At  Gupis  I  found  a  small  detachment  of  Kashmir  Imperial 
Service  troops,  one  of  the  many  posts  then  scattered  along 
the  route  between  Astor  and  Chitral,  each  commanded  by  a 
British  subaltern  or  captain.  The  work  done  at  this  period 
by  these  young  and  enterprising  officers  in  consolidating 
British  influence  was  of  great  value,  and  has  perhaps  never 
been  adequately  appreciated.  Amongst  those  whom  I  met, 
two — Captain  Townshend  and  Lieutenant  Fowler — were 
destined  to  play  a  prominent  part  the  following  year  in 
the  operations  in  Chitral,  and  again  in  the  Great  War. 
Townshend  was  in  command  during  the  siege  of  Chitral  and 
also  at  Kut-el-Amara,  and  Fowler  was  treacherously  made 
prisoner  on  his  way  to  Chitral.  He  was  lucky  not  to  have 
been  murdered  by  some  fanatic  or  other  before  Umra  Khan 
released  him,  a  month  after  his  capture,  and  sent  him  in  to 
the  headquarters  of  the  Relief  Force.  In  the  Great  War 
he  was  Director  of  the  "  signal  service  "  on  the  West  Front. 

A  little  above  Gupis  I  crossed  the  Gilgit  river  by  a 
rickety  wire  suspension  bridge  and  entered  the  valley  of 
Yasin.  It  was  here  that  the  intrepid  traveller  Hayward 
was  murdered  in  1870.  The  object  was  apparenth'  plunder, 
as  he  was  believed  to  be  in  possession  of  a  considerable 
amount  of  gold  as  well  as  many  valuable  presents.  The 
story  is  that,  finding  himself  threatened,  he  sat  up  in 
his  tent  all  night  with  his  loaded  rifle  on  the  table  before 


DARKOT  PASS  63 

him,  and  in  the  early  morning,  being  overcome  with 
fatigue,  he  dozed  off  and  was  immediately  pounced  upon 
b}'-  his  crafty  enemies  who  had  been  closely  watching  him 
throughout  the  night.  He  asked  permission  to  go  outside 
and  ascend  a  low  mound  in  order  to  take  a  last  look  at  the 
rising  sun,  and  after  this  had  been  granted  he  was  brutally 
done  to  death. 

For  the  benefit  of  those  who  have  not  travelled  in  this 
part  of  the  world,  I  may  explain  that  passes  of  13,000  feet 
and  over  are  closed  by  snow  for  some  five  months  or  more 
every  year,  according  to  their  altitude  ;  when  the  snow 
begins  to  melt,  and  for  some  weeks  afterwards,  the  streams 
running  down  from  them,  and  which  may  have  to  be  crossed 
many  times,  are  roaring  torrents,  and,  as  a  rule,  unfordable  ; 
this  means,  in  practice,  that  the  routes  may  be  actually 
open  only  for  two  or  three  months  in  the  year — that  is, 
after  the  streams  go  down  and  before  the  passes  again 
become  blocked  with  snow ;  and,  finally,  all  passes  of 
15,000  feet  and  over  have  on  them  perpetual  snow,  and 
this  must  be  crossed  before  the  sun  has  risen  sufficiently 
high  to  make  it  too  soft  to  traverse. 

Above  Yasin,  7300  feet  in  altitude,  the  valley  is  for  the 
most  part  hemmed  in  by  precipitous  mountains  thousands 
of  feet  high  ;  the  debris  of  many  landsHps  had  to  be  crossed  ; 
and  the  ever-recurring  ascents  and  descents  made  progress 
slow  and  laborious.  At  20  miles  from  Yasin  the  climb 
up  to  the  Darkot  Pass  began ;  bare  rock  took  the  place  of 
earth  ;  and  at  14,000  feet  the  first  glacier  was  reached. 
Having  crossed  this,  the  track  struck  the  edge  of  the  snow- 
field,  which  led  up  to  and  over  the  pass.  It  was  then 
mid- day,  and  as  the  hot  July  sun  had  made  the  snow  so 
soft  and  yielding  as  to  be  impassable  for  either  men  or 
animals,  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  halt  for  the  night 
and  resume  the  journey  early  next  morning  when  the  snow 
would  again  be  frozen  hard. 

I  spent  most  of  the  afternoon  in  gazing  upon  the  stupen- 
dous mountains  which  rose  before  me  on  all  sides,  and 
in  which  culminate  the  three  great  water-partings  of  Central 
Asia — the  Hindu  Kush,  the  Himalayas,  and  the  mountains 
of  Chinese  Turkestan.     From  this  region  the  melting  snows 


64  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

descend  eastwards  to  the  Yarkand  river  and  Gobi  desert ; 

westwards  to  the  Oxus  and  the  Aral  Sea  ;   and  southwards 

to  the  Indus  and  Indian  Ocean.     As  far  as  the  eye  could 

reach,  gigantic  peaks,  clothed  in  perpetual  snow,  soared 

proudly  up  into  the  blue  heavens  at  heights  of  25,000  feet 

and  more  above  sea-level,  and  this  incomparable  array  of 

mountain  majesty  was  rendered  the  more  impressive  by 

the  apparent  total  absence  of  Ufe  of  any  kind,  and  by  the 

great  stillness  which  everywhere  prevailed.     No  house,  tree, 

bird,  animal,  or  man  was  visible,  the  overpowering  solitude 

being  broken  only  by  the  distant  thunder  of  an  occasional 

avalanche,  when  a  grey  smoke  would  ascend  to  the  sky 

showing  where   the   mass   of   fallen   snow   had    subsided. 

I    remained    absorbed    and    appalled    by    the    magnitude 

of    Nature's    works,     feehng    but    a    very    small    atom 

in   the   Universe,  until   a   cold  shiver   told   me   that   the 

sun  had  disappeared  behind  the  mountain-tops  overlooking 

my   camp,    and   that   the   temperature,    according   to   its 

nightly  custom,  was  rapidly  falling  below  freezing-point. 

Wrapped  up  in  all  the  rugs  and  blankets  I  possessed,  and 

fortified  by  a  hot  meal,  I  lay  down  for  a  few  hours'  rest, 

but  it  was  some  time  before  the  sensations  of  the  afternoon 

allowed  me  to  fall  asleep. 

The  march  was  resumed  at  2  a.m.,  the  going  then  being 
quite  hard  and  the  snow  sparkhng  in  the  Ught  of  a  per- 
fectly clear  moon  like  a  vast  field  of  diamonds.     The  top 
of  the  pass,  15,200  feet,  was  reached  after  four  hours'  stiff 
climbing.      From   this  point  the  pass  runs  either  north- 
west   over   a   glacier   to   the   Baroghil   Pass,    12,460   feet, 
or    north-east    over    the    surface    of    another    glacier    to 
the  Shawitakh  Pass,  12,560  feet.     I  followed  the  former, 
reaching  the  farther  edge  of    the  snowfield    just    as   the 
heat  of  the  new  sun  was  causing  it  again  to  become  soft 
and    impassable.      I   halted   for    the    night    on    the    left 
bank  of  the  Yarkhun  river,  which  has  its  source  in  the 
adjacent  glaciers  and  eventually  joins    the    Kabul    river 
near    Jalalabad    under    the   name    of    the    Kunar.      The 
following  day  I   forded   this  icy-cold  stream  on  the  back 
of  a  yak,  my  bare  feet  and  legs  receiving  the  coldest  bath 
they  have  ever  had. 


THE  END  OF  THE  JOURNEY  65 

I  was  now  on  the  outskirts  of  the  Pamirs — the  Roof 
of  the  World.  "  Pamir "  signifies  a  more  or  less  level 
valley  of  considerable  width,  and  as  the  lowest  of  them  is 
12,000  feet  above  sea-level,  the  climate  is  severe  ;  in  a 
few  favoured  spots  only  is  there  much  grass  ;  trees  there 
are  none,  and  even  bushes  are  scarce  ;  strong,  biting  winds 
are  common,  and  on  the  whole  the  Pamirs  cannot  be  recom- 
mended as  a  cheerful  or  comfortable  country  in  which  to 
live. 

On  completion  of  my  work  I  returned  by  the  Shawitakh 
track,  and  early  in  August  left  Gilgit  for  India,  my  orders 
being  to  follow  the  Indus  from  Ramghat  to  Chilas,  occupied 
by  us  the  year  before,  and  thence  proceed  by  Khagan  to 
Abbottabad.  The  Indus  part  of  the  road  was  then  only  in 
course  of  construction,  and  there  were  many  difficult  stone- 
shoots  and  swift,  dangerous  torrents  to  be  negotiated  in  the 
53  miles  to  Chilas.  Thence  to  Khagan  there  was  little  that 
could  be  dignified  by  the  name  of  a  road,  and  the  track 
which  served  as  one  was  in  places  as  bad  as  it  could  be. 
The  greatest  height  crossed  was  at  the  Babusar  Pass, 
13,585  feet. 

At  Abbottabad  the  little  party  which  had  shared  my 
wanderings  broke  up.  All  the  members  of  it  had  consist- 
ently served  me  well  since  we  left  Srinagar  three  months 
before,  and  a  word  of  gratitude  is  also  due  to  my 
intelligent  and  sure-footed  riding  mules,  who  had  carried 
me  over  many  perilous  mountain  sides  with  far  greater 
safety  than  if  I  had  attempted  to  traverse  them  on  foot. 

The  Gurkha,  the  only  soldier  of  the  party,  and  a  good 
type  of  his  sturdy  race,  was  a  well-educated  man,  and  during 
our  long  marches  it  had  been  my  custom  to  converse  with 
him  in  GurkhaH,  his  native  tongue.  In  this  way  I  acquired 
a  sufficient  knowledge  of  it  to  enable  me,  before  leaving 
Abbottabad,  to  pass  the  prescribed  examination  and  so 
bring  up  the  number  of  oriental  languages  in  which  I  had 
qualified  to  a  total  of  six. 


CHAPTER  V 

ON   THE   INTELLIGENCE   STAFF   OF   THE   CHITRAL 
RELIEF   FORCE 

Punitive  expedition  sent  into  Waziristan— In  temporary  charge  of  Frontier 

Section Events  leading  up  to  the  siege  of  Chitral  Fort — Umra 

Khan  of  J andol— Despatch  of  Chitral  ReUef  Force  from  India  and 
a  detachment  from  Gilgit— Appointed  to  Headquarters  Staff  of  the 

ReUef   Force Sir   Robert   Low — Colonel   Bindon   Blood — Captain 

jvfixon Nature  of  country  to  be  traversed — capture  of  the  Mala- 

kand  Pass  —  Action  at  Khar — Passage  of  Swat  river — Effective 
action  of  cavalry — Reconnaissances  to  Panjkora  river  and  towards 
Umra  Khan's  headquarters— Fine  fighting  of  Guides  Infantry- 
Reconnaissance  up  the  Panjkora- Meet  Roddy  Owen— Advance  on 
Miankilai  and  flight  of  Umra  Khan — Siege  of  Chitral  is  raised — 
Reconnaissance  down  the  Panjkora — Treacherously  attacked  by 
my  two  guides — Severely  wounded — Sent  back  to  India — Mentioned 
in  Despatches  and  awarded  D.S.O. — Promoted  Captain — Prepara- 
tion for  Staff  College  Entrance  Examination — Nominated  for 
entrance Leave  for  England — Some  reflections  on  service  in  India. 

Towards  the  end  of  1894  a  brigade  of  all  arms  was  despatched 
to  the  borders  of  the  Mahsiid  Waziri  country,  and,  as  had 
happened  more  than  once  before  in  our  deaUngs  with  this 
truculent  tribe,  the  camp  of  the  brigade  was  attacked  one 
morning  at  dawn  while  the  troops  were  still  asleep  in  their 
tents.  We  suffered  a  considerable  number  of  casualties,  as 
well  as  loss  of  prestige,  and  it  was  therefore  decided  to 
employ  a  larger  force  under  the  command  of  General  Sir 
WilUam  Lockhart.  Mason  joined  his  staff  as  head  of  the 
Intelligence,  and  Lockhart  afterwards  applied  for  me  to 
join  it  also,  but  this  was  not  sanctioned  as  I  was  required 
to  take  charge  of  the  North-West  Frontier  Section  pending 
Mason's  absence.  I  was  naturally  disappointed  at  losing 
this  promising  opportunity  of  seeing  active  service,  but  my 

chance and  a  better  one — was  to  come  shortly  on  another 

part  of  the  frontier,  in  Chitral. 

Chitral,  one  of  the  mountainous  states  bordering  India 

66 


THE  LAW  OF  SUCCESSION  67 

on  the  north,  is  about  the  size  of  Wales  and  has  a  population 
of  upwards  of  a  hundred  thousand.  Both  the  state  and  the 
capital  are  called  by  the  same  name,  the  capital  being  some 
60  miles  on  the  Indian  side  of  the  main  watershed  of  the 
Hindu  Kush.  For  some  years  past  we  had  aimed  at 
exerting  our  influence  in  the  state,  more  especially  over  its 
external  relations,  as  it  was  important  that  we  should 
watch  the  northern  passes  to  which  it  gives  access,  and  be 
informed  of  what  was  taking  place  there. 

In  1892  the  Mehtar,  or  chief,  died,  and,  as  is  customary 
in  these  frontier  states,  a  scramble  at  once  began  for  the 
Mehtarship.  The  old  Mehtar  left  behind  him  seventeen 
sons  born  of  his  four  legitimate  wives,  and  of  these  Afzul- 
ul-Mulk  and  Nizam-ul-Mulk  were  supposed  to  have  the 
strongest  claims  to  the  succession.  Afzul-ul-Mulk,  happen- 
ing to  be  at  Chitral  at  the  time,  while  Nizam-ul-Mulk 
was  in  Yasin,  150  miles  off,  at  once  seized  all  the  arms 
and  money  in  the  fort,  murdered  such  of  his  brothers 
as  he  could  put  his  hands  on  who  were  likely  to  give  him 
trouble,  and  then  started  off  to  deal  with  Nizam-ul-Mulk. 
The  latter  deemed  discretion  the  better  part  of  valour 
and  fled  for  refuge  to  our  Agency  at  Gilgit,  leaving"  Afzul- 
ul-Mulk  in  possession. 

But  although  the  brothers  had  been  disposed  of,  the 
new  Mehtar  had  still  to  reckon  with  an  uncle,  Sher  Afzul 
by  name,  who,  in  the  years  gone  by,  had  unsuccessfully 
tried  to  oust  the  old  Mehtar  and  had  since  been  an  exile 
in  Afghanistan.  This  individual,  thinking  that  his  chances 
were  now  more  promising,  suddenly  appeared  in  front  of 
Chitral  fort,  accompanied  by  a  body  of  horsemen  picked  up 
en  route,  and  Afzul-ul-Mulk,  on  going  to  the  gate  to  ascer- 
tain what  aU  the  noise  was  about,  was  shot  down,  and 
expired  immediately  afterwards. 

Sher  Afzul  then  became  Mehtar,  but  his  reign  was  of 
even  more  brief  duration,  for  as  soon  as  Nizam-ul-Mulk 
heard  of  these  events  he  set  out  from  Gilgit  to  wrest  the 
throne  from  him.  He  was  joined  by  many  adherents  on 
the  way,  and  before  he  reached  Chitral  fort  Sher  x\fzul 
threw  up  the  sponge  and  fled  back  to  Afghan  territory  as 
rapidly  as  he  had  appeared. 


68  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Nizam-ul-Mulk  professed  himself  to  be  a  faithful  ally  of 
the  British  Government,  and  by  his  request  a  British  officer, 
Captain  (now  Sir)  Frank  Younghusband,  the  well-known 
explorer,  was  deputed  to  reside  in  the  country  as  our 
Pohtical  Agent.  Affairs  then  settled  down,  and  it  was 
hoped  that  there  would  be  no  further  trouble,  but  on  the 
ist  January  1895  Nizam-ul-Mulk  was  shot  dead  while 
out  hawking  by  a  partisan  of  his  brother  Amir-ul-Mulk, 
who  for  the  previous  two  years  had  been  Hving  with  Umra 
Khan,  the  ruler  of  the  neighbouring  state  of  Jandol. 

This  restless  and  ambitious  chief  had  recently  extended 
his  authority  over  the  Khanate  of  Dir  and  a  considerable 
part  of  Swat,  both  of  which  marched  with  his  own  territory  ; 
and  thinking  that  his  opportunity  had  arrived  for  still 
further  extending  his  dominions  he  invaded  Chitral,  osten- 
sibly with  the  object  of  supporting  his  friend  Amir-ul-Mulk, 
but  with  the  real  intention  of  annexing  the  country.  There 
was,  in  fact,  reason  to  beheve  that  he  was  not  wholly  dis- 
connected with  the  murder  of  Nizam-ul-Mulk.  He  soon 
obtained  a  footing  in  the  southern  districts,  and  was  after- 
wards joined  by  the  persevering  Sher  Afzul,  who  again 
turned  up  from  Afghanistan.  The  two  chiefs  apparently 
made  an  agreement  to  combine  forces  in  expelling  the 
British  officers,  and  then  decide  who  should  be  the  ruler. 
Collecting  some  10,000  men  they  advanced  on  Chitral 
itself,  where,  after  some  sharp  skirmishing  on  the  3rd  of 
March,  the  native  troops  forming  the  escort  of  Surgeon- 
Major  (later  Sir)  G.  Robertson  were  shut  up  within  the 
walls  of  the  fort,  and  nothing  more  was  heard  of  them  for 
several  weeks. 

Surgeon-Major  Robertson  was  our  Pohtical  Agent  at 
Gilgit,  and  had  gone  to  Chitral  at  the  end  of  January  to 
report  on  the  situation.  The  besieged  garrison  consisted  of 
100  men  of  the  14th  Sikhs,  300  men  of  the  Kashmir  Infantry, 
and  about  150  followers  and  others,  the  whole  being  under 
the  command  of  Captain  Townshend.  If  every  one  were 
put  on  half  rations  there  were  sufficient  supphes  of  food  to 
last  till  about  the  end  of  April,  and  the  ammimition  amounted 
to  300  rounds  per  rifle. 

A  few  days  later  a  British  post  of  about  50  men  was 


THE  CHITRAL  RELIEF  FORCE       69 

captured  at  Reshun,  between  Chitral  and  Mastuj,  and 
before  the  end  of  March  the  garrison  of  Mastuj,  consisting 
of  300  men,  was  besieged. 

These  stirring  events  kept  me  fairly  busy  in  the  Frontier 
Section,  but  having  learned  much  about  the  country  and  its 
inhabitants  during  my  visit  to  the  neighbourhood  in  the 
previous  year,  I  was  able  to  deal  with  them  far  more 
easily  than  would  have  been  the  case  had  this  local  know- 
ledge not  been  acquired.  When  it  became  known  in  India 
that  British  troops  had  been  attacked  by  Umra  Khan  and 
Sher  Afzul,  and  were  besieged  by  them,  there  was  nothing 
to  be  done  but  to  take  immediate  steps  for  their  relief. 
The  Government  of  India  therefore  decided  : 

(a)  The  ist  Indian  Division,  about  15,000  strong,  to 
mobilise  at  Peshawar,  move  from  a  southerly  direction 
through  Swat  and  Dir,  and  fall  on  the  rear  of  Umra  Khan. 
This  force,  designated  the  "  Chitral  Relief  Force,"  to  be 
based  on  Nowshera  (near  Peshawar),  and  be  under  the 
command  of  Major-General  (afterwards  Sir)  Robert  Low. 

(6)  A  column  of  400  men  of  the  32nd  Pioneers  (a  regular 
Indian  native  battahon),  and  two  guns  of  a  Kashmir  moun- 
tain battery,  to  move  at  the  same  time  from  the  Gilgit 
vicinity,  where  they  then  were,  and,  passing  through  Mastuj, 
endeavour  to  reach  Chitral  from  the  north.  Colonel  Kelly 
to  command. 

From  the  southern  frontier  to  Chitral  the  distance  was 
190  miles,  and  from  Gilgit  to  Chitral  220  miles.  The  number 
of  pack  animals  required  to  feed  and  maintain  the  "  Chitral 
Relief  Force  "  amounted  to  nearly  30,000. 

As  explained  in  the  preceding  chapter,  the  duties  con- 
nected with  the  management  of  field  operations,  which  in 
these  days  belong  to  the  General  Staff,  were  performed  at 
the  time  of  which  I  write  by  the  Intelligence  and  Mobilisa- 
tion Branches  of  the  Quartermaster-General's  department. 
Upon  them,  therefore,  devolved  the  task  of  working  out 
the  plan  of  operations,  and  in  the  case  of  the  Intelligence 
Branch  this  fell  upon  my  section.  When  it  was  finished, 
Sir  George  White,  who  had  succeeded  Lord  Roberts  as 
Commander-in-Chief,  appointed  me  to  the  Intelligence  Staff 
of  the  Force,  of  which  the  head  was  Captain  (now  General 


70  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Sir)  John  Nixon,  i8th  Bengal  Lancers.  The  Chief  of  the 
Staff  was  Brigadier-General  (now  Sir)  Bindon  Blood,  and 
from  both  these  officers  I  received  much  friendly  help  during 
the  campaign  which  went  far  to  improve  my  crude  know- 
ledge of  staff  duties  in  the  field. 

Topographical  information  of  the  line  of  advance  was 
vague,  and  almost  entirely  derived  from  native  sources. 
Before  entering  Swat,  the  first  independent  country  to  be 
traversed,  a  range  of  rugged  hills  varying  between  3000 
and  6000  feet  in  height  had  to  be  crossed,  and  although 
these  had  confronted  us  for  years  at  only  a  few  miles  from 
our  boundary  no  one  knew  what  their  difficulties  really  were, 
or  what  the  country  on  the  other  side  of  them  was  like.  It 
was  known,  however,  that  at  least  four  mountain  ranges — 
of  which  the  altitude  of  one  varied  between  10,000  and 
20,000  feet — and  three  large  rivers,  the  Swat,  Panjkora,  and 
Kunar,  as  well  as  many  smaller  streams,  had  to  be  crossed  ; 
that  the  route  could  nowhere  be  called  a  road  ;  that  the 
intervening  country  was  a  hotbed  of  fanaticism  ;  and  that 
the  tribes  would  almost  certainly  oppose  our  advance, 
whatever  their  subsequent  attitude  might  be. 

While  the  force  was  concentrating  at  Mardan  at  the 
end  of  March  the  intelligence  officers  were  directed  to 
obtain  as  much  information  as  possible  regarding  the  three 
passes  giving  access  to  the  Swat  valley — the  Mora,  Shakot, 
and  Malakand — so  as  to  enable  the  Commander  to  make 
his  plan.  By  skilful  dispositions  and  the  dissemination 
of  false  mtelligence  he  endeavoured  to  mislead  the  enemy 
as  to  which  of  the  three  passes,  about  seven  miles  apart, 
would  be  selected  for  attack,  and  he  communicated  the  true 
objective  to  only  the  more  senior  commanders  and  staff 
officers. 

I  was  not  let  into  the  secret,  and  on  the  afternoon  of 
the  2nd  April  the  Brigadier  of  the  ist  Brigade,  which  I 
had  been  ordered  to  accompany,  instructed  me  to  be 
prepared  to  show  the  way  next  morning  for  the  attack  on 
the  Shakot,  opposite  to  which  the  brigade  had  just  arrived. 
I  had  a  shrewd  suspicion  that  I  was  being  intentionally 
misinformed,  and  deemed  it  wise  to  be  prepared  not  only 
for  going  direct  to  the  Shakot  but  also  for  making  a  flank 


CAPTURE  OF  THE  MALAKAND  PASS  71 

march  across  country  to  the  Malakand,  which  I  thought 
would  be  the  real  point  of  attack.  I  laid  my  plans  accord- 
ingly, and  next  morning  when  the  brigade  was  about  to 
move  off,  and  I  was  ordered  to  conduct  it  to  the  Malakand 
and  not  to  the  Shakot,  I  greatly  enjoyed  seeing  the  look  of 
surprise  on  the  Brigadier's  face  at  the  readiness  with  which 
his  order  was  carried  out. 

The  enemy's  strength  at  the  Malakand  was  about  12,000 
men,  but  probably  not  more  than  half  that  number  had 
firearms,  and  of  these  only  a  comparatively  small  proportion 
were  rifles,  the  remainder  being  old  muzzle-loaders  which, 
in  some  cases,  were  almost  as  dangerous  to  the  owner  as  to 
his  adversary.  The  unarmed  men  were  employed  in  carrying 
away  the  killed  and  wounded,  and  in  hurling  down  boulders 
upon  the  assaulting  columns.  The  position  itself,  running 
along  the  crest  for  nearly  two  miles,  was  exceptionally 
strong,  and  was  defended  on  either  flank  and  down  the 
forward  spurs  by  a  number  of  "  sangars,"  or  stone 
breast-works. 

The  dispositions  for  the  attack  were :  2nd  Brigade  in 
advance,  two  battalions  turning  the  right  flank  while  the 
two  others  delivered  a  frontal  attack ;  ist  Brigade  in 
support ;  3rd  Brigade  in  reserve  ;  three  mountain  batteries 
of  artillery  to  co-operate  with  the  infantry.  As  the  fight 
progressed  the  battalions  of  the  ist  Brigade  were  pushed  up 
level  with  those  of  the  2nd,  and  just  before  the  crest  was 
reached  the  whole  line  paused  for  a  few  minutes  to  take 
breath.  All  being  ready,  the  bugles  sounded  the  advance, 
and,  with  a  great  shout,  Highlanders,  Riflemen,  Sikhs, 
Dogras,  Guides,  Bedfordshires,  Scottish  Borderers,  leaped 
forward  and  carried  the  position  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet, 
pursuing  the  enemy  down  the  further  side  of  the  hill  as  far 
as  the  village  of  the  Khar.  The  enemy's  total  loss  was 
estimated  at  about  1500  men,  while  ours  amounted  to 
seventy  killed  and  wounded. 

Some  of  the  enemy  displayed  the  most  reckless  bravery, 
individual  swordsmen  and  standard-bearers  charging  madly 
forward,  and  seeming  to  bear  a  charmed  Hfe  until  at  last  a 
bullet  found  its  mark.  Sometimes  a  dozen  or  more  would 
start  off  on  their  wild  career  simultaneously,  the  last  man 


72  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

left  alive,  undaunted  by  the  fate  of  his  comrades,  holding 
on  till  he  also  fell,  perhaps  within  a  few  yards  of  our  hne. 
I  remember  one  leader  in  particular  who,  sword  in  hand, 
urged  on  his  men  from  the  roof  of  a  hut.  Standing  out  very 
clearly  against  the  sky-line  he  drew  upon  himself  a  tremen- 
dous fusillade,  but  although  evidently  hit  several  times  it 
was  long  before  he  was  struck  down  never  to  rise  again. 

The  so-called  road  leading  up  the  pass  was  abominably 
bad  even  for  pack  animals,  and  many  of  the  troops  did  not 
receive  their  supplies  till  next  morning.  The  Brigade  Staff 
came  off  no  better,  and  we  lay  down  to  sleep  supperless. 
Unknown  to  me  till  daylight  appeared,  there  were  several 
of  the  enemy's  dead  within  a  few  feet  of  the  spot  where  I 
happened  to  lie — a  proof  of  the  haste  with  which  he  had 
fled,  as  his  custom  is  to  carry  his  dead  away. 

Next  day  the  ist  Brigade  took  the  lead,  and  after 
descending  from  the  pass  was  assailed  near  Khar  by  several 
thousand  tribesmen  streaming  past  its  right  flank  from  the 
Shakot  and  Mora  Passes.  We  had  a  stiff  little  fight,  which 
was  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  by  the  charge  of  a 
squadron  of  the  Guides  cavalry.  Coming  round  the  end  of 
a  spur,  the  squadron  suddenly  discovered  between  one  and 
two  thousand  of  the  enemy  in  the  open,  and  without  a 
moment's  hesitation  it  galloped  into  them,  driving  them 
back  helter-skelter  into  the  hills.  Next  morning  there  was 
no  sign  of  an  enemy  anywhere. 

SuppUes  again  failed  to  arrive  till  late  in  the  evening, 
although  another  road  up  the  Malakand  had  been  found. 
On  this  occasion  the  Brigadier  thought  that  better  arrange- 
ments for  dinner  ought  to  have  been  made  by  our  cook — 
a  native — and  he  was  accordingly  called  to  account  for  his 
neglect.  The  result  was  most  unfortunate,  for  during  the 
night  he  decamped  across  the  frontier,  and  next  morning 
we  found  ourselves  without  a  cook  of  any  kind.  What 
happened  afterwards  I  cannot  say,  as  the  same  day  I  was 
transferred  to  the  2nd  Brigade,  which  was  now  ordered  to 
resume  the  lead. 

Three  days  later  the  Swat  river,  half  a  mile  or  more  in 
width,  was  forced.  It  was  unbridgcd,  but  fordable  in  certain 
places.     The  enemy,  reinforced  by  a  contingent   sent  by 


CAVALRY  ACTION  73 

Umra  Khan,  had  so  disposed  his  5000  men  as  effectively 
to  command  the  ford  where  it  was  expected  the  passage 
would  be  attempted.  Seeing  this,  the  Brigadier — Waterfield 
—ordered  the  nth  Bengal  Lancers,  a  regiment  with  a 
deservedly  fine  reputation,  the  equally  fine  regiment  of 
Guides  cavalry,  and  the  15th  Sikhs  to  cross  by  a  ford  higher 
up.  After  what  had  happened  at  Khar,  the  prospect  of  the 
dreaded  cavalry  falling  upon  their  flank  and  rear  was  too 
much  for  the  defenders,  who  at  once  evacuated  their  position 
and  their  retirement  quickly  became  a  demoralised  flight, 
the  cavalry  pursuing  them  for  several  miles.  The  terrifying 
effect  produced  by  the  cavalry  in  the  actions  at  Khar  and 
the  Swat  was  quite  extraordinary  and  the  news  of  it  spread 
through  the  country-side  for  many  miles.  Unaccustomed 
for  the  most  part  to  horses,  and  having  exaggerated  notions 
as  to  the  power  of  mounted  troops,  the  enemy  never  really 
recovered  his  morale,  and  the  stubborn  resistance  he  offered 
at  the  Malakand  was  not  again  encountered. 

After  the  passage  of  the  Swat  I  was  sent  on  with  the 
Guides  cavalry  to  reconnoitre  the  route  leading  over  the 
Laram  Range  by  the  Katgola  Pass,  and  thence  to  Sado  on 
the  Panjkora  river.  This  was  the  greatest  obstacle  we  had 
yet  met,  though  it  was  fordable  by  all  arms  on  the  day  of 
my  arrival.  Two  days  later,  when  the  2nd  Brigade  had 
come  up,  I  was  directed  to  proceed  with  the  cavalry 
to  reconnoitre  the  Jandol  valley  towards  Umra  Khan's 
headquarters  near  Miankilai.  We  were  warmly  sniped  from 
the  neighbouring  hills,  and  as  there  was  evidence  to  show 
that  large  numbers  of  the  tribesmen  were  collecting  near 
Miankilai,  we  returned  to  Sado  after  completing  a  recon- 
naissance of  about  eight  miles  and  obtaining  the  required 
information  regarding  the  enemy's  movements  and  the 
practicability  of  the  route.  In  the  morning  we  had  forded 
the  Panjkora  fairly  easily,  but  when  we  returned  in  the 
evening  it  had  risen  considerably,  the  current  had  become 
very  swift,  and  several  horses  were  lost  in  recrossing. 

Next  morning  it  had  become  quite  unfordable  and  equally 
impracticable  for  swimming,  and  no  further  progress  was 
possible  pending  the  construction  of  a  bridge  or  the  discovery 
of  another  ford.    As  the  latter  could  not  be  found,  the  former 


74  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

had  to  be  taken  in  hand.  A  rough  footbridge  was  completed 
on  the  I2th,  and  the  Guides  infantry  were  sent  across  to  hold 
the  bridgehead,  but  during  the  night  the  river  again  rose, 
washing  the  bridge  away  and  leaving  the  Guides  cut  off 
from  the  remainder  of  the  force.  A  suspension  bridge  was 
then  commenced,  and  took  four  days  to  complete. 

Meanwhile,  on  the  13th,  the  Guides  went  beyond  the 
bridgehead  in  order  to  burn  certain  villages  which  had  been 
harbouring  "  snipers  "  engaged  in  firing  on  our  working 
parties,  and  when  about  to  return  the  battalion  was  attacked 
by  some  5000  tribesmen  who  had  collected  together  on 
hearing  of  its  isolated  position.  For  some  time  the  situation 
appeared  critical,  the  enemy  coming  on  in  the  most  deter- 
mined way,  but  the  Guides  splendidly  upheld  their  reputa- 
tion, and,  moving  as  steadily  as  if  on  parade,  slowly  fought 
their  way  back  to  their  entrenchments  and  there  came  under 
the  shelter  of  the  guns  and  troops  posted  on  the  left  bank 
of  the  river.  Unfortunately  the  battalion  lost  its  gallant 
commanding  officer,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Battye.  A  small 
reinforcement  was  sent  across  on  rafts,  as  it  was  expected 
that  the  enemy  would  renew  the  attack  during  the  night. 
It  later  transpired  that  this  was  his  intention,  but  the 
discharge  of  some  star  shells  by  a  mountain  battery  so 
alarmed  him  that  he  drew  off,  and  no  further  molestation 
was  attempted. 

While  waiting  for  the  bridge  to  be  completed  I  was  sent 
with  a  squadron  of  the  nth  Bengal  Lancers  and  half  a 
battaUon  of  the  Buffs  to  reconnoitre  the  left  bank  of  the 
Panjkora  up  to  Robat,  being  accompanied  by  that  fine 
soldier  and  splendid  horseman  Roddy  Owen.  When 
hostilities  first  broke  out  Roddy  was  stationed  at  Quetta, 
and  Uke  many  other  officers  he  at  once  applied  for  employ- 
ment. As  this  was  not  given  he  asked  for  and  obtained 
ten  days'  leave,  and  of  this  he  took  advantage  to  join  the 
Relief  Force  as  a  newspaper  correspondent.  When  his 
leave  expired  the  Simla  authorities  issued  instructions 
directing  him  to  return  to  India,  but  Roddy  contrived  on 
one  plea  or  another  to  stay  where  he  was,  and  at  last  Simla 
gave  up  the  contest.  He  remained  with  the  Force  till  the 
conclusion  of  the  campaign,  and  afterwards  made  a  journey 


CHITRAL  RELIEVED  75 

from  Chitral  to  the  Pamirs.  This  was  not  a  bad  performance 
on  the  basis  of  ten  days'  leave,  and  was  typical  of  Roddy's 
methods  of  getting  his  own  way. 

On  the  17th  the  cavalry  and  3rd  Brigade,  now  in  front, 
crossed  the  Panjkora,  dispersed  a  miscellaneous  gathering  of 
the  enemy  in  the  Jandol  valley,  and  on  arrival  at  Miankilai 
learnt  that  Umra  Khan  had  thrown  his  hand  in  and  fled  to 
Afghanistan.  A  day  or  two  later  the  unlucky  Sher  Afzul, 
with  1500  followers,  was  captured  by  our  ally  the  Khan  of 
Dir.     He  was  subsequently  sent  to  India. 

Pushing  on  from  Miankilai,  the  advanced  troops  crossed 
the  Janbatai  Pass  (7400  feet  high)  on  the  19th,  and  arrived 
at  Dir  on  the  21st,  where  news  was  received  that  the  siege 
of  Chitral  had  been  raised  three  days  before.  This  was  the 
natural  corollary  of  the  successful  advance  of  the  Relief 
Force,  and  the  main  object  of  the  campaign  had  thus  been 
achieved  within  about  a  month  of  the  date  on  which  the 
order  for  mobilisation  was  given.  From  the  first  the  enemy 
had  been  out-matched  by  our  superior  armament  and 
organisation,  but  we  had,  apart  from  him,  many  diffi- 
culties to  contend  against,  and  the  commander  and  his 
troops  well  deserved  the  high  praise  officially  bestowed 
upon  them. 

The  Gilgit  detachment,  which  reached  Chitral  on  the 
20th  April,  had  also  achieved  a  great  triumph.  Composed 
entirely  of  native  troops,  with  the  exception  of  a  handful 
of  British  officers,  it  had  marched  220  miles  through  the 
highest  mountain  system  in  the  world,  when  the  country 
was  inflamed  with  news  of  the  rebellion,  and  at  a  season 
when  the  weather  was  still  severe  and  the  passes  deep  in 
snow,  one  of  those  traversed  being  12,400  high. 

Finally,  neither  the  efforts  of  the  Relief  Force,  nor  those 
of  the  Gilgit  detachment,  could  have  availed  but  for  the 
gallantry  and  cheerful  endurance  displayed  by  the  invested 
garrison  in  holding  out  for  forty-seven  days  until  help 
arrived.  In  this  case,  again,  all  the  troops  were  natives 
except  a  few  British  officers,  and  the  siege  will  always  rank 
as  one  of  the  finest  episodes  in  the  annals  of  the  Indian 
Army.  As  to  its  intrepid  commander.  Captain  Townshend, 
I  imagine  that  he  learnt  many  things  which  proved  useful 


76  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

•to  him  twenty  years  later  in  the  still  more  famous  siege 
of  Kut-el-Amara. 

Chitral  being  relieved  and  the  enemy  having  dispersed, 
nothing  remained  for  the  Relief  Force  to  do  except  to  send 
on  from  Dir  sufficient  troops  to  consolidate  order  in  the 
country,  and  open  up  permanent  means  of  communication 
with  India.  The  route  followed  by  them  presented  extra- 
ordinary difficulties,  especially  at  the  Lowarai  Pass  (10,450 
feet  high  and  covered  with  snow),  and  required  extensive 
improvements  before  transport  animals  could  use  it. 

While  this  final  movement  was  taking  place  I  was  ordered 
to  report  on  the  practicabiUty  of  the  road  leading  from  Dir 
down  the  Panjkora  to  Robat,  the  place  to  which  I  had 
already  made  a  reconnaissance  up  the  same  river  from  Sado. 
A  company  of  the  4th  Gurkhas  was  given  me  as  escort,  and 
the  Khan  of  Dir  provided  two  guides,  who  were  said  to  be 
specially  trustworthy  men,  one  of  them  being  known  as  the 
"  Kazi."  For  the  first  two  marches  they  were  everything 
that  could  be  desired,  and  most  helpful  both  as  to  their 
knowledge  of  the  country  and  in  obtaining  local  supplies  of 
food,  but  later  they  were  not  so  satisfactory. 

I  was  suffering  from  dysentery  at  the  time,  and  on  the 
third  day's  march  gave  my  sword  to  the  "  Kazi  "  to  carry 
as  I  was  unable  to  bear  its  weight  round  my  waist.  Being 
mounted,  I  gradually  forged  ahead  of  the  escort,  and  was 
followed  by  the  two  guides  only.  Suddenly,  and  to  my 
utter  amazement,  I  was  twice  fired  at  from  behind,  and 
could  not  imagine  what  had  happened.  Looking  round  I 
saw  the  "  Kazi  "  rising  from  his  knee,  and  in  the  act  of 
throwing  aside  the  smoking  12-bore  breech-loader  which 
he  had  been  carrying  since  we  left  Dir,  preparatory  to 
achieving  with  his  sword — or  rather  jny  sword — what  he 
had  failed  to  accompUsh  with  his  gun,  for  although  he 
could  not  have  been  more  than  ten  yards  away  when  he 
fired  he  had  missed  me  with  both  barrels.  He  was  yelling 
with  the  fury  of  a  madman,  and  I  realised  that  he  had 
become  "  ghazi  " — a  religious  fanatic — not  an  uncommon 
occurrence  on  the  frontier.  The  goat-track  on  the  steep 
hillside  along  which  I  was  riding  would  not  permit  me  to 
move  to  the  right  or  left,  or  to  turn  the  pony  round  so  as 


AWARDED  THE  "  D.S.O."  77 

to  face  my  man,  and  the  only  alternative  was  to  dismount. 
In  doing  this  I  stumbled  and  fell,  the  result  being  that  I 
was  in  a  half -sitting  position  when  the  "  Kazi "  arrived  at 
close  quarters  and  proceeded  to  slash  wildly  at  me.  As 
there  was  neither  time  nor  opportunity  to  draw  my  revolver 
while  this  vigorous  sword  practice  was  taking  place,  I  could 
only  scramble  to  my  feet  and  floor  the  fellow  with  my  fist. 
Just  as  I  did  this  I  observed  that  the  other  so-called  guide, 
kneeling  on  one  knee  a  few  yards  away,  was  waiting  his 
opportunity  to  fire  the  moment  he  could  do  so  without 
hitting  his  companion.  Whilst  my  attention  was  distracted 
in  this  way  the  "  Kazi "  jumped  up  and  the  pair  of  them 
made  off.  Pulling  out  the  revolver  at  last,  I  brought  down 
the  "  Kazi  "  as  he  was  in  the  act  of  flying  up  the  hillside, 
and  then  I  remembered  no  more  till  the  Gurkhas  arrived, 
they  having  hastened  to  the  spot  on  hearing  the  sound 
of  firing.  They  picked  up  the  "  Kazi,"  who  had  been  hard 
hit  but  not  killed,  and  a  native  hospital  orderly  did  his 
best  temporarily  to  patch  up  my  wounds,  which  were  later 
officially  classed  as  "  severe  "  but  were  not  really  serious. 

We  then  commenced  the  return  march  to  Dir,  where  the 
"  Kazi,"  who  turned  out  to  be  an  adherent  of  Umra  Khan, 
in  whose  service  he  had  previously  been,  was  tried  by 
court-martial  and  sentenced  to  be  shot  and  his  body  burnt. 
The  sentence  was  carried  out  by  a  sergeant  and  six  men  of 
a  Highland  battalion — I  forget  which.  I  thought  at  the 
time,  and  still  think,  that  however  indifferent  a  marksman 
the  "  Kazi  "  may  have  been,  he  could  not  possibly  have 
missed  me  with  both  barrels  at  so  short  a  range  but  for 
the  direct  intervention  of  Providence. 

On  becoming  fit  to  travel  I  was  sent  back  to  India, 
and  my  connection  with  the  Chitral  Relief  Force  terminated. 
A  "  mention  in  despatches "  and  the  award  of  the 
Distinguished  Service  Order,  then  a  rather  rare  decoration, 
tended  to  alleviate,  but  did  not  entirely  dispel,  the  morti- 
fication I  felt  at  not  having  put  up  a  more  finished  fight 
and  accounted  for  both  my  assailants.  I  was  chaffed  a 
good  deal  at  the  time  for  having  been  cut  about  with  my 
own  sword,  and  for  not  acting  up  to  the  standard  displayed 
at  the  Rawal  Pindi  assault-at-arms.    I  deserved  to  be  chaffed. 


78  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

While  serving  with  the  Relief  Force  I  became  Captain 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  regimental  promotion,  and  was 
unusually  lucky  in  reaching  that  rank  in  less  than  seven 
years  after  being  commissioned. 

After  resuming  duty  in  the  Intelligence  Branch  at  the 
end  of  the  summer  of  1895  I  began  to  realise,  as  a  result 
of  a  talk  with  my  friend  Mason,  the  necessity  of  graduating 
at  the  Staff  College,  for  without  that  qualification  my 
future  professional  advancement  was  doubtful.  About 
thirty  officers  were  admitted  to  the  college  annually, 
three-fourths  of  this  number  by  open  competition  and 
the  remainder,  conditional  on  qualifying  at  the  entrance 
examination,  by  selection.  The  examination  was  not  very 
difficult,  but  it  embraced  many  subjects — mathematics, 
military  engineering,  military  topography,  tactics,  military 
history,  strategy,  military  geography,  military  administra- 
tion, military  law,  and  a  knowledge  of  two  foreign  languages, 
of  which  one  must  be  either  French  or  German. 

As  a  rule  competition  was  very  keen,  and  therefore 
prospective  candidates  usually  spent  several  weeks  and  even 
months  at  one  of  the  cramming  establishments  in  London 
which  specialised  in  this  branch  of  military  education.  As 
there  were  no  such  establishments  in  India,  officers  stationed 
in  that  country  invariably  took  leave  to  England  so  as  to 
obtain  the  help  they  needed.  I  could  not  get  leave,  nor  could 
I  afford  to  throw  up  my  staff  appointment  in  order  to  return 
home,  and  consequently  there  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  do 
without  expert  assistance. 

I  decided  to  take  Hindustani,  which  I  knew  fairly  well, 
as  one  of  the  two  languages  ;  knowing  nothing  of  German 
I  selected  French  as  the  second,  and,  knowing  very  little 
of  it,  I  enlisted  the  aid  of  a  Frenchwoman  who  happened 
to  be  employed  at  Simla.  My  wife  also  took  a  hand  in  this 
subject,  and  in  addition  showed  exemplary  patience  in 
hearing  me  recite  the  propositions  of  Euclid.  For  mathe- 
matics in  general  I  procured  the  help  of  a  local  schoolmaster  ; 
and,  lastly,  I  received  many  useful  hints  from  Lieutenant 
(now  Major-General)  Holman,  who  was  also  on  the  head- 
quarters staff  and  was  himself  working  for  the  examination 
preparatory  to  going  home  to  complete  his  studies.     For 


RETURN  TO  ENGLAND  79 

the  rest  I  had  to  rely  on  my  own  resources,  and  they  were 
rather  a  broken  reed,  for  such  meagre  knowledge  as  I  then 
possessed  about  some  of  the  subjects  was  entirely  self- 
acquired.  Ten  months  were  available  in  which  to  prepare 
for  the  examination,  and  I  was  oppressed  with  the  thought 
that  I  had  but  the  one  chance  of  getting  into  the  college, 
because  by  the  time  the  next  examination  came  round  I 
would  be  over  the  regulation  age  for  admission. 

It  will  be  understood  from  all  this  that  the  period  of 
preparation  was  neither  easy  nor  devoid  of  anxiety,  but 
by  rising  regularly  every  morning  between  four  and  five 
o'clock,  in  winter  as  in  summer,  I  was  able  to  get  through 
a  large  amount  of  spade  work,  crude  and  ill-directed  though 
it  might  be,  before  going  to  office  for  the  day.  Progress  was 
naturally  both  slow  and  doubtful,  for  having  no  one  to  guide 
me  I  approached  my  tasks  by  the  most  roundabout  way, 
and  when  completed  there  was  often  no  certainty  that  the 
results  were  correct. 

In  due  course  the  fateful  examination,  lasting  ten  days, 
arrived,  and  perseverance  then  had  its  reward.  I  qualified 
in  all  subjects,  and  as  I  just  missed  securing  one  of  the 
competitive  vacancies  Sir  George  White  came  to  the  rescue 
and  recommended  me  for  one  of  the  vacancies  to  be  filled 
by  selection.  Lord  Wolseley,  the  Commander-in-Chief  at 
home,  approved,  and  in  December  1896  I  started  with  my 
wife  and  five  months'  old  child  for  England.  The  voyage 
was  very  unpleasant,  rough  weather  prevailing  almost 
continuously.  The  nurse  was  the  worst  sailor  of  the  party, 
next  to  myself,  and  succumbed  as  soon  as  we  started,  and 
in  our  cabin  !  Fortunately  the  man-servant  of  the  officer 
occupying  the  adjoining  cabin  was  an  obliging  person,  and 
undertook  to  look  after  the  child  during  my  wife's  absence 
at  meals.     He  had  once  been  a  prize-fighter  ! 

My  eight  years'  experience  in  India  prompts  me  to  say 
that  a  certain  amount  of  service  in  this  great  dependency 
is  an  essential  part  of  the  education  of  every  young  officer. 
It  broadens  his  views  ;  brings  him  into  contact  with  the 
native  troops  of  the  Indian  army,  by  the  side  of  whom  he 
may  sooner  or  later  be  called  upon  to  fight ;  and  affords 
him  opportunities  for  seeing  training  conducted  under  more 


8o  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

practical  conditions  than  usually  prevail  in  England.  On 
the  other  hand,  if  it  is  unduly  prolonged  physical  energy 
may  deteriorate,  with  a  corresponding  loss  in  military 
capacity,  and  there  will  also  be  a  tendency  to  become 
antiquated  and  stereotyped  in  method,  owing  to  the  difficulty 
of  keeping  pace  with  the  development  of  military  ideas  in 
Europe.  Modem  means  of  communication  have  helped  to 
diminish  these  dangers,  but  they  have  not  entirely  removed 
them  and  never  can,  and  everything  possible  should  therefore 
be  done  by  those  in  authority  to  ensure  that  the  army  in 
India  maintains  close  touch  with  the  army  at  home.  In 
principle  this  is  now  generally  recognised,  but  in  practice 
the  recognition  is  not  so  apparent,  and  not  a  few  obstruct- 
ive prejudices  and  old-fashioned  notions  must  be  uprooted 
before  the  two  armies  can  be  brought  into  that  intimate 
relationship  which  Imperial  efficiency  demands. 


MAP  ILLUSTRATING  JOURNEY   TO 
AND    CHITRAL    EXPEDITIO 


Scale   1  Inch  =  45  Miles. 

40         30        20  10 


^        40         30        20  10         9 


50 

-+- 


Russian  Sphere  of  Influence  

British  Do...  Do 

Under  direct  administration  of  Government  of  Indie 


n/ 


700 


I 


''^i 


^ 


^■^ 


rm 


CHAPTER  VI 

STUDENT  AT  THE   STAFF   COLLEGE 

Colonel  Hildyard — His  views  on  the  education  of  officers — Nature  of  the 
Staff  College  course — Colonel  Henderson — Lord  Roberts'  apprecia- 
tion of  him — First  year's  work  at  the  college — Go  to  France  to  learn 
the  language — Second  year's  work — Visit  to  battlefields  of  1870  war 
— Visit  the  Meuse  Valley  and  Belgian  Ardennes — Umpire  at  army 
manoeuvres — Sir  H.  Brackenbury — Inspection  of  Staff  College  by 
Lord  Wolseley — Value  of  Staff  College  training. 

I  JOINED  the  Stafif  College  in  January  1897  and  was,  I 
believe,  the  first  officer  promoted  from  the  ranks  to  enter 
it  as  a  student,  though  others  have  done  so  since.  The 
Commandant  was  Colonel  (afterwards  Lieutenant-Genera] 
Sir)  H.  Hildyard,  Colonel  (now  Lieutenant-General  Sir) 
H.  Miles  succeeding  him  in  1898.  Up  to  1893,  when 
Hildyard  assumed  command,  too  much  importance  seems 
to  have  been  attached  to  the  mere  accumulation  of  know- 
ledge and  to  preparation  for  written  examinations,  and  the 
capacity  of  the  students  on  leaving  the  college  was  estimated 
mainly  by  the  number  of  marks  gained  in  these  examinations. 
Everybody  knows  that  the  best  performer  on  paper  is  not 
always — one  might  say  is  not  usually — the  most  proficient 
in  the  field,  and  as  Hildyard  held  strong  views  on  the 
impossibility  of  producing  or  discovering  the  best  officers 
by  means  of  written  examinations  alone  he  gave  the 
curriculum  a  more  practical  character.  In  order  to  test 
their  powers  of  application  the  students  were  constantly 
employed  in  the  study  of  concrete  questions  regarding 
organisation  and  administration,  and  in  solving  strategical 
and  tactical  problems  both  in  quarters  and  out  of  doors. 
Hildyard  proposed  the  entire  abolition  of  written  examina- 
tions by  outside  examiners,  and  although  this  was  not 
sanctioned  the   examinations  were  restricted  to   the   first 

81  G 


82  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

year.  Since  then  the  students  have  been  classified  at  the 
end  of  the  second  year  according  to  the  quality  of  their 
work  throughout  the  course,  and  to  the  opinion  formed  by 
the  Instructional  Staff  as  to  the  likelihood  of  their  becoming 
capable  leaders  and  staff  officers. 

There  were  five  military  instructors  or  "  professors," 
as  they  were  then  called — one  for  strategy  and  tactics,  one 
for  artillery  and  fortifications,  one  for  administrative  duties, 
and  two  for  topography,  as  well  as  two  for  languages — 
French  and  German.  Topography  was  the  subject  which 
the  students  Hked  least,  and  undoubtedly  a  good  deal  of 
time  and  temper  were  expended  in  making  intricate  "  scales  " 
which  would  never  be  required  on  service,  in  learning  to 
draw  the  conventional  signs  for  trees,  churches,  public- 
houses,  and  other  topographical  features,  according  to  scale, 
and  in  chasing  five-feet  contours  round  the  undulations  of 
ground  near  the  college,  none  of  which  were  more  than 
a  hundred  feet  above  the  general  level. 

This  seeming  waste  of  effort  was  not  without  excuse, 
for  some  officers  had  but  a  hazy  notion  of  how  to  make  or 
read  a  map,  and  were  not  much  surer  of  themselves  in  regard 
to  the  working  of  the  magnetic  compass.  All  this  has  been 
changed  by  having  a  better  system  of  military  education 
from  the  beginning,  and  the  cadets  at  Sandhurst  and 
Woolwich  are  now  as  proficient  as  were  many  of  the 
students  at  the  Staff  College  twenty-five  years  ago. 

The  professor  of  strategy  and  tactics  was  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  G.  F.  Henderson,  the  author  of  Stonewall  Jackson, 
Spicheren,  and  other  military  books  and  essays.  "  Hender," 
as  he  was  familiarly  known  to  us,  was  a  past-master  in  his 
work,  and  his  lovable  and  unselfish  companionship  was  of 
itself  a  moral  and  professional  education  of  hfe-long  benefit. 
He  was  devoted  to  his  pupils  and,  as  Hildyard  wrote  of 
him  some  years  later,  "  There  was  no  paper,  however  crude, 
wherein  he  did  not  notice  points  for  encouragement  towards 
renewed  effort  ;  so  there  was  no  paper,  however  complete, 
to  which  his  practical  and  well-thought-out  remarks  did 
not  add  value.  To  him  it  was  a  labour  of  love,  and  each 
memoir,  good  or  indifferent,  received  the  same  measure  of 
attention  from  him." 


LIEUT.-COLONEL  G.  F.  HENDERSON  83 

About  the  time  I  joined  the  college  Henderson  first 
became  the  intimate  friend  of  Lord  Roberts,  who  tells  us 
that  he  "  formed  a  very  high  opinion  of  his  abihties  "  and, 
like  many  others,  "  succumbed  to  the  spell  of  his  fascinating 
personality."  The  characteristically  warm-hearted  memoir 
which  the  Field-Marshal  wrote  in  after  years  as  a  fore- 
word to  the  posthumous  publication  of  Henderson's  Science 
of  War,  is  perhaps  the  best  appreciation  extant.  It  is 
much  too  long  to  reproduce  here,  but  I  may  quote  the 
following  : 

The  affectionate  tributes  to  Henderson's  memory  by  his 
many  friends  are  a  testimony  to  his  pure  and  stainless  character. 
Blessed  with  a  cheerful  temperament,  he  brightened  the  lives  of 
all  with  whom  he  was  associated,  and  his  letters  display  a  spirit 
of  playful  tenderness  towards  those  whom  he  loved,  which  is  most 
attractive.  Generous  and  thoughtful  for  others,  he  took  no 
thought  for  himself,  and  only  valued  money  for  what  it  might 
have  enabled  him  to  do  for  those  who  needed  his  help. 

The  influence  of  such  a  man  must  bear  good  fruit,  and  the 
more  widely  his  writings  are  read,  and  the  more  closely  his 
teachings  are  followed,  the  more  successful  will  be  our  would-be 
commanders,  and  the  better  it  will  be  for  England  when  again 
she  is  forced  to  go  to  war. 

That  the  prophecy  contained  in  the  last  sentence  was 
well  fulfilled,  the  reader  will,  I  think,  agree  when  I  say  that 
amongst  the  students  who  passed  through  Henderson's 
hands  between  1892  and  1899  were  Haig,  Allenby,  and 
scores  of  others  whose  names  became  household  words  in 
the  Great  War;  and  all  these  officers  would,  I  am  sure, 
readily  admit  that  such  successes  as  attended  their  leader- 
ship were  largely  due  to  the  sound  instruction  and  inspiring 
counsel  which  they  received  from  their  old  tutor  some 
twenty  years  or  so  before.  Of  the  different  causes  which 
are  alleged  to  have  given  us  the  victory  over  Germany, 
not  one  should  be  assigned  a  more  prominent  place  than 
the  influence  and  teaching  of  Henderson  at  the  Staff 
College. 

Having  passed  into  the  college  without  the  help  of  a 
crammer  I  was  anxious  as  to  how  my  work  there  would 
compare  with  that  of  the  other  officers,  and  so  I  told  the 


84  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

commandant  at  the  first  interview  I  had  with  him  after 
joining.  His  encouraging  reply  was  that  the  lack  of  this 
form  of  education  need  not  necessarily  be  a  handicap,  as 
"  We  do  not  want  any  cramming  here ;  we  want  officers  to 
absorb,  not  to  cram  "  ;  and  except  in  a  few  insignificant 
details,  which  I  soon  made  good,  I  never  felt  at  a  dis- 
advantage because  of  being  differently  equipped  at  the 
start  from  my  contemporaries. 

The  first  year's  work  was  mainly  of  an  elementary 
nature,  and  for  the  most  part — though  not  entirely — was 
interesting  and  practical,  and  it  formed  a  useful  foundation 
for  the  more  advanced  studies  of  the  second  year.  It  was 
compulsory  to  "  pass  "  in  either  French  or  German,  and  on 
the  advice  of  our  excellent  French  professor,  M.  Deshumbert, 
whom  we  all  adored,  I  spent  the  summer  vacation  of  two 
months  with  a  family  in  France,  French  being  the  language 
I  had  selected. 

On  crossing  over  to  France  I  left  Newhaven  at  midnight, 
intending  to  embark  on  the  boat  going  to  Caen,  where  it 
was  due  to  arrive  about  eight  o'clock  next  morning.  To 
my  surprise  I  woke  at  four  o'clock  to  find  that  the  boat  had 
already  reached  port,  and  then  discovered  that  I  had 
carelessly  gone  aboard  the  boat  for  Dieppe,  which  left 
Newhaven  at  the  same  hour  as  the  one  for  Caen,  where  my 
bicycle  and  luggage,  having  been  registered  in  London, 
had  of  course  gone. 

It  was  a  great  tax  on  my  limited  knowledge  of  French 
to  explain  to  the  ticket-collector  why,  having  a  ticket  for 
Caen,  I  had  come  to  Dieppe.  I  afterwards  spent  some  ten 
hours  in  travelling  across  country  by  a  very  indifferent 
railway  route,  changing  trains  no  fewer  than  six  times,  to 
the  port  where  my  belongings  had  gone  and  which  was 
quite  near  to  my  destination— the  small  provincial  town  of 
Vire.  I  learnt  more  French  that  day  than  at  any  time 
during  my  two  months  in  the  country,  as  the  "  Pasteur  " 
with  whom  I  stayed  and  studied  did  not  put  in  an  appear- 
ance until  dejeuner,  and  even  then  was  apt  to  be  drowsy 
except  when  roused  by  an  objectionable  habit  of  coughing. 
Another  thing  I  remember  about  the  visit  is  that  there  was 
no  bath  in  the  house,  and  it  was  only  after  diligent  search 


THE  BATTLEFIELDS  OF  1870  85 

in  the  town  that  one  was  at  last  procured  from  a  shop 
which  dealt  in  antiques  ! 

At  the  end  of  the  year  I  "  passed  "  in  French,  missing  the 
"  interpretership  "  by  six  marks  out  of  the  six  hundred  and 
twenty  required  to  quahfy.  For  this  I  had  to  wait  till 
the  following  year.  All  the  other  examinations  were 
successfully  negotiated,  as  indeed  they  ought  to  be,  for 
they  were  not  difificult.  Of  the  examiners  who  came  to 
the  college  on  this  occasion  was  an  officer  who  had  un- 
successfully competed  at  the  entrance  examination  the 
previous  year — an  incident  which  caused  us  much  amuse- 
ment, seeing  that  we,  who  had  succeeded  in  securing 
vacancies,  were  being  examined  by  one  who  had  failed  to  do 
so.  He  appreciated  the  humorous  side  of  the  matter  as 
much  as  we  did,  and  I  should  add  that  no  one  doubted  his 
competence  to  examine  us  in  the  particular  subject  for 
which  the  War  Office  had  appointed  him. 

Early  the  following  summer  the  senior  division — as  the 
officers  in  their  second  year  are  called — made  the  customary 
visit  to  the  principal  battlefields  of  the  1870  war — Woerth, 
Spicheren,  Vionville,  and  Gravelotte — under  the  guidance 
of  Henderson.  These  visits  enabled  us  to  picture  on  the 
ground  itself  the  operations  which  took  place,  and  to  grasp 
the  lessons  they  taught  far  better  than  could  be  done  by 
merely  reading  about  them. 

When  visiting  the  battlefield  of  Woerth  we  stayed  at 
Niederbronn,  a  small  spa  prettily  situated  in  the  Vosges. 
It  was  much  frequented  by  the  Germans  in  summer,  and 
by  German  officers  from  Bitche  and  other  neighbouring 
places.  The  hotel  proprietor,  now  dead,  was  a  French 
Alsatian.  He  told  us  much  about  the  French  retreat  from 
Woerth,  which  passed  through  Niederbronn,  and  was  far 
from  being  in  love  with  his  new  masters,  or  they  with  him. 
It  was  perhaps  deemed  politic  that  his  daughter  should 
marry  a  German,  but  the  arrangement  has  since  been  badly 
upset  by  the  reversion  of  Niederbronn  to  the  French,  and 
madame  gave  me  the  impression  that  she  was  painfully 
aware  of  the  fact  when  I  went  there  two  years  ago. 

In  company  with  Captain  (now  Lieut.-General  Sir)  G. 
Barrow  of  the  Indian  Cavalry  I  left  England  some  days  in 


86  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

advance,  in  order  to  see  certain  places  of  interest  before  join- 
ing the  main  party  at  Metz.  We  first  went  to  Waterloo  and 
Ligny,  and  afterwards  spent  a  few  days  in  the  Belgian 
Ardennes  and  Meuse  valley,  which  was  already  recognised 
as  a  probable  line  of  operations  in  the  event  of  war  between 
Germany  and  France.  The  forts  d'arret  at  Liege  and 
Namur — twelve  at  the  former  and  nine  at  the  latter — had 
been  constructed  some  years  before  with  the  object  of 
blocking,  or  at  any  rate  of  temporarily  checking,  an  advance 
by  this  line. 

One  night  we  stayed  at  Marche,  a  small  Belgian  town 
south  of  Huy,  where  we  experienced  some  difficulty  in 
finding  accommodation,  and  the  hotel  where  we  eventually 
found  quarters  could  only  produce  one  room.  What  was 
still  more  inconvenient,  the  room  contained  but  one  bed, 
which  the  landlady  wished  Barrow  and  myself  to  share, 
and  she  apparently  thought  we  were  making  an  unnecessary 
fuss  about  a  very  small  matter  when  we  insisted  upon  having 
a  bed  each.  To  add  to  our  troubles  during  this  day,  or 
rather  to  Barrow's,  he  lost  his  only  pipe,  which  in  the 
case  of  any  one  but  him  would  have  meant  the  loss  of 
temper  also. 

In  September  I  was  detailed  with  other  officers  of  the 
senior  division  for  employment  on  the  umpire  staff  at 
the  army  manoeuvres,  which  took  place  in  the  vicinity  of 
Salisbury  Plain.  The  opposing  forces  consisted  of  an  army 
corps  each,  respectively  commanded  by  the  Duke  of 
Connaught  and  Sir  Redvers  Buller,  this  being  the  first 
time  for  twenty-six  years  that  manoeuvres  had  been  held. 
At  the  end  of  the  first  day  I  was  sent  for  by  Sir  Henry 
Brackenbury,  who  was  chief  umpire  of  one  side,  and  with 
whom  I  had  become  acquainted  when  at  Simla.  He  told  me 
that  he  was  dissatisfied  with  the  way  in  which  the  umpire 
duties  were  being  performed,  as  he  was  unable  to  obtain 
from  the  cavalry  the  early  and  complete  reports  regarding  the 
operations  which  he  required  ;  and  he  directed  me  to  leave 
the  cavalry  regiment  to  which  I  was  then  attached  and  under- 
take the  duty  of  procuring  for  him  the  information  he  wanted. 
How  I  got  it  he  said  he  did  not  care,  but  that  he  "  must 
have  it,  and  have  it  in  time."     There  was  no  reason  why 


SIR  HENRY  BRACKENBURY  87 

he  should  not,  for  it  was  simply  a  question  of  organisation, 
and  of  putting  more  hfe  and  activity  into  certain  individuals 
on  the  umpire  staff,  who  were  incHned  to  look  upon  the 
manoeuvres  as  a  kind  of  glorified  picnic  in  which  they  could 
share  as  much  or  as  little  as  they  desired.  I  introduced 
the  necessary  organisation,  took  effective,  albeit  somewhat 
disagreeable,  steps  to  "  get  a  move  on  "  amongst  the  in- 
dividuals mentioned,  and  it  then  became  quite  easy  to 
meet  Brackenbury's  wishes. 

I  thought  no  more  of  the  matter  until  he  sent  for  me  on 
the  night  the  manoeuvres  terminated,  when,  taking  my  arm, 
he  walked  me  up  and  down  between  the  rows  of  tents  for 
about  half  an  hour,  making  in  the  course  of  our  conversation 
some  complimentary  remarks  about  the  assistance  I  had 
given  him,  and  finished  by  saying  that  if  at  any  time  I 
stood  in  need  of  help  he  would  gladly  give  it.  Some  years 
later  I  did  need  it,  and  he  was  then  as  good  as  his  word. 
Like  most  men  in  high  positions  he  had  his  detractors,  and 
was  thought  by  some  people  to  be  harsh  and  overbearing. 
It  is  true,  I  think,  that  he  did  not  suffer  fools  gladly,  but 
he  always  struck  me  as  being  genuinely  kind-hearted,  and 
he  was  rightly  regarded  as  one  of  the  most  capable  and 
progressive  soldiers  of  his  time. 

About  the  middle  of  December,  Lord  Wolseley  made  his 
usual  annual  inspection  of  the  college,  saying  a  few  en- 
couraging words  to  each  officer  in  turn,  and  expressing  his 
appreciation  of  their  work  as  reported  to  him  by  the  com- 
mandant. This  was  the  last  parade  for  those  of  us  who 
belonged  to  the  senior  division,  and  we  afterwards  dis- 
persed to  the  four  quarters  of  the  globe,  pleased  to  feel,  or 
rather  hoping,  that  we  had  gained  the  coveted  letters 
P.S.C.  (passed  Staff  College) — a  matter  that  would  not  be 
known  to  us  for  certain  till  a  few  weeks  later.  But  we  had 
also  a  feehng  of  regret,  for  we  had  invariably  received  the 
utmost  consideration  and  assistance  from  the  commandant 
and  his  staff,  while  the  students  with  whom  we  had  been 
associated  were,  as  always,  some  of  the  best  fellows  in  the 
service. 

We  had  been  worked  hard,  but  plenty  of  time  was 
allowed  for  recreation,  and,  Kke  all  Staff  College  graduates, 


88  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

had  many  happy  as  well  as  amusing  recollections  of  cricket, 
hockey,  and  especially  of  the  drag.  In  bidding  good-bye 
to  each  other  none  of  us  imagined  that  in  less  than  a  year 
we  would  again  be  working  together,  and  putting  into 
practice  on  the  South  African  veld  the  lessons  we  had  learned 
from  "  Hender "  and  the  other  professors  at  Camberley. 
Rightly  or  wrongly,  we  felt  ourselves  capable  of  competing 
with  whatever  task  the  future  might  have  in  store  for  us  ; 
and  the  same  self-confidence  would  not  have  been  lacking 
had  we  known  that  in  less  than  sixteen  years  some  of  us 
would  be  among  the  chief  actors  in  the  greatest  drama  the 
world  has  ever  seen — the  Great  War. 

This  good  opinion  of  ourselves  should  not  be  classed  as 
conceit,  for  no  soldier  possessing  an  atom  of  sense,  or  having 
the  remotest  conception  of  the  difficulties  and  uncertainties 
which  attend  the  conduct  of  war,  will  dare  to  boast,  even 
to  himself,  of  what  he  thinks  he  can  do.  It  was  merely  an 
illustration  of  the  saying  that  "  knowledge  is  power,"  and 
showed  that  the  training  received  by  the  Staff  College 
officer  gives  him  a  measure  of  self-rehance  which  he  probably 
did  not  possess  before,  and  which,  if  appropriately  used, 
should  be  of  great  value  to  him  in  the  future. 

The  Staff  College  does  not  aspire  to  make  wise  men  out 
of  fools,  or  to  achieve  any  other  impossibihties,  and,  like 
other  educational  institutions,  it  has  had  its  failures.  It 
can,  however,  and  does,  make  good  men  better,  broaden 
their  views,  strengthen  their  powers  of  reasoning,  improve 
their  judgment,  and  in  general  lay  the  foundations  of  a 
useful  military  career.  Further,  the  benefits  of  the  course 
are  by  no  means  confined  to  the  lectures  the  students  are 
given,  or  to  the  instructional  exercises  in  which  they  take 
part,  for  in  addition  there  is  a  smartening  friction  with 
other  brains,  and  officers  are  enabled  to  rub  shoulders  with 
others  of  their  own  standing  with  whom  they  may  have  to 
work  later  in  fife.  Haig,  AUenby,  Murray,  Milne,  Capper, 
Haking,  Barrow,  Forestier-Walker,  and  others  who  filled 
important  posts  in  the  Great  War  were  amongst  my  con- 
temporaries, and  this  personal  acquaintance  was  very  useful 
to  me,  as  no  doubt  it  was  to  them,  when  I  was  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff  in  France  in  1915,  and  still  more  so  when 


VALUE  OF  STAFF  COLLEGE  89 

Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  from  the  end  of  19 15  to 
the  beginning  of  1918. 

Again,  at  the  college  are  to  be  found  representatives  of 
practically  every  branch  of  the  British  and  Indian  armies 
and  the  forces  of  the  Overseas  Dominions.  There  are  few 
parts  of  the  Empire  that  have  not  been  visited  at  one  time 
or  another  by  some  member  of  the  staff  or  by  one  of  the 
students,  and  the  interchange  of  the  various  experiences 
acquired  is  most  valuable. 

Another  advantage  of  the  course  is  that  the  students 
are  taught  the  same  basic  principles  of  strategy  and  tactics, 
and  are  accustomed  to  employ  the  same  methods  of  adminis- 
tration. It  is  necessary  in  any  business  that  the  men 
responsible  for  its  administration  should  abide  by  the 
same  rules,  follow  the  same  procedure,  and  be  fully  ac- 
quainted with  the  best  means  for  ensuring  smoothness 
and  despatch ;  and  nowhere  is  the  necessity  greater  than 
in  the  business  of  war,  where  friction,  delay,  and  mis- 
apprehension are  fraught  with  so  many  possibihties  of 
mischief.  It  is  only  by  the  estabhshment  of  a  sound 
system  with  which  all  officers  are  thoroughly  famihar  that 
these  rocks  can  be  avoided.  As  an  illustration  of  the 
benefit  conferred  by  a  common  school  of  training,  I  may 
mention  that  from  the  time  Maude  took  over  the  chief 
command  in  Mesopotamia  to  the  day  of  his  death,  and 
although  all  communication  between  us  was  conducted 
by  telegraph,  the  local  situation  being  difficult,  precarious, 
and  changing,  not  a  single  misunderstanding  occurred 
between  him  as  Commander-in-Chief  and  myself  as  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  nor  did  we  ever  fear  that  one 
would  occur. 

The  same  good  results  were  obtained  in  similar  circum- 
stances in  my  deahngs  with  Milne  in  Macedonia,  Allenby  in 
Egypt,  and  Monro  in  India,  and  I  believe  these  officers  were 
as  satisfied  at  their  end  of  the  wire  as  I  was  at  mine.  In  the 
case  of  Haig  the  exchange  of  views  and  the  transmission  of 
the  War  Cabinet's  instructions  were  comparatively  easy, 
since  we  could  meet  at  frequent  intervals  and  discuss  matters 
verbally  ;  but  here,  also,  the  work  of  both  of  us  was  facili- 
tated by  our  Staff  College  training,  and,  as  with  all  the  other 


90  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

commanders  I  have  mentioned,  there  was  never,  so  far  as  I 
know,  any  material  difference  of  opinion  between  us  in 
regard  to  the  main  principles  to  be  observed  in  order  to 
win  the  war.  That  the  mutual  agreement  and  excellent 
comradeship  established  between  Staff  College  graduates 
during  the  twenty  years  previous  to  1914  were  of  inestimable 
value  to  the  Empire  throughout  the  Great  War  is,  in  my 
humble  belief,  beyond  contradiction. 

Lest  I  should  be  misunderstood  I  hasten  to  add  that  no 
one  more  fully  recognises  than  myself  that  there  are  many 
good  and  even  brilliant  soldiers  who  are  not  Staff  College 
graduates.  They  deserve,  indeed,  the  greater  credit  for 
what  they  have  achieved,  because  of  the  drawbacks  against 
which  they  have  had  to  contend.  I  know  that  they  have 
felt  the  weight  of  these  drawbacks,  for  they  have  told  me 
so,  and  regretted  that  they  had  not  enjoyed  the  benefit 
of  two  years'  study  at  the  college,  and  the  equally 
beneficial  exchange  of  ideas  with  men  who,  like  themselves, 
meant  to  rise  in  their  profession.  I  would  therefore  warn 
all  young  officers  who  wish  to  make  their  mark  and  serve 
their  country  well,  that  they  may  one  day  incur  a  consider- 
able handicap  if  they  fail  to  take  advantage  of  the  assistance 
which  is  afforded  by  the  Staff  College  course. 


CHAPTER  VII 

ON   THE   INTELLIGENCE   STAFF,    WAR   OFFICE 

Posted  to  the  Intelligence  Division,  War  Office — Sir  John  Ardagh — Status 
of  the  Division — Its  duties — Mr.  Stanhope's  memorandum  regard- 
ing military  policy — Hartington  Commission  recommends  appoint- 
ment of  a  Chief  of  the  Staff — Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman 
dissents — Recommendation  not  carried  out — Effect  of  this  in  South 
African  War — Colonial  Defence  Committees — Work  in  the  Russian 
Section — Appointed  Staff  Captain  in  the  Colonial  Section — Captain 
Altham — Description  of  Colonial  Empire — Work  in  the  Colonial 
Section — Effect  of  our  general  unreadiness  for  war  in  regard  to  the 
South  African  situation — War  declared  against  the  South  African 
Republics — Forecast  of  cost  of  war — Sir  George  White  sent  to 
command  in  Natal — Altham  goes  with  him  and  I  take  charge  of 
the  Colonial  Section — Early  developments  in  the  war — Dependence 
on  the  Press  for  information — Reverses  at  Stormberg,  Magersfontein, 
and  Colenso— BuUer  suggests  abandonment  of  attempt  to  relieve 
Ladysmith — Am  consulted  by  a  Cabinet  Minister  as  to  what  should 
be  done — Recommend  appointment  of  Commander-in-Chief  as 
distinct  from  the  Commander  in  Natal — Defence  Committee  of 
Cabinet  appoint  Lord  Roberts,  with  Lord  Kitchener  as  Chief  of 
Staff — Proceed  to  South  Africa  to  join  the  staff  of  Lord  Roberts. 

On  leaving  the  Staff  College  officers  usually  return  to  regi- 
mental duty  tor  at  least  a  year  before  being  employed  on  the 
staff,  so  that  they  may  again  be  brought  into  touch  with 
troops,  but  occasionally  the  rule  is  not  observed.  It  was 
not  in  my  case,  for  in  order  to  meet  the  temporary  want  of 
an  officer  with  staff  experience  in  India  I  was  sent  direct  to 
the  InteUigence  Branch  of  the  War  Office,  then  located  at 
29  Queen  Anne's  Gate,  and  presided  over  by  Major-General 
Sir  John  Ardagh. 

When  first  formed  in  1873  it  was  a  branch  of  the  Quarter- 
master-General's department ;  later  it  was  placed  under  the 
Adjutant- General ;  and  was,  when  I  joined  it,  more  or  less 
under  the  Commander-in-Chief,  Lord  Wolseley.  It  had  a 
staff  of  about  sixteen  officers  and,  with  the  "  Mobihsation 

91 


92  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Section  "  of  three  or  four  officers,  was  the  only  semblance 
of  a  General  Staff  then  in  existence.  The  Mobihsation 
Section  had  originally  been  under  the  Director  of  Military 
Intelligence,  was  aften\^ards  absorbed  by  the  Adjutant- 
General's  department,  and  then,  Uke  the  Intelligence  Branch, 
came  under  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Thus  it  will  be  seen 
that  the  two  branches  had  been  constantly  tossed  over 
from  one  high  official  to  another,  apparently  in  accordance 
with  the  predominant  view  or  personality  of  the  moment. 

The  Intelhgence  Branch  was  responsible  for  the  collection 
and  collation  of  military  information  regarding  foreign 
countries,  but  it  was  not  the  recognised  duty  of  the  branch, 
or  of  any  other,  scientifically  to  study  the  information  so 
collected  and  make  it  the  basis  of  our  own  requirements. 
This  basis  had  been  fixed  in  a  memorandum  by  Mr. 
Stanhope  of  the  ist  June  1888,  and  it  still  held  the  field. 
According  to  it  our  army  requirements  had  for  their  object 
the  support  of  the  civil  power  in  the  United  Kingdom,  the 
provision  of  men  for  the  garrison  of  India  and  our  fortresses 
and  coahng  stations  at  home  and  abroad,  and,  in  addition, 
the  ability  to  mobilise  for  home  defence  two  army  corps 
of  regular  troops,  one  army  corps  of  regulars  and  militia 
combined,  and  the  auxiliary  forces  not  allotted  to  these 
three  corps.  Subject  to  these  considerations,  and  their 
financial  obligations,  a  further  aim  was  to  be  able  to  send 
abroad,  in  case  of  necessity,  two  complete  army  corps,  but, 
said  the  memorandum,  "  It  will  be  distinctly  understood 
that  the  probabihty  of  the  employment  of  an  army  corps 
in  the  field  in  any  European  war  is  sufficiently  improbable 
to  make  it  the  primary  duty  of  the  miUtary  authorities 
to  organise  efficiently  for  the  defence  of  this  country,"  To 
Mr.  Stanhope's  instruction  regarding  the  "  improbable  prob- 
ability "  of  the  employment  of  even  one  army  corps  in  any 
European  war  may  therefore  fairly  be  attributed  the  fact 
that  our  mobilisation  arrangements  dealt  principally  with 
home  defence,  and  that  broad  military  plans  essential  for 
the  defence  of  the  Empire  as  a  whole  received  no  adequate 
treatment  in  the  War  Office  of  that  period. 

Two  years  after  the  date  of  Mr.  Stanhope's  memorandum, 
a  majority  of  the  Hartington  Commission  recommended  the 


SIR  H.  CAMPBELL-BANNERMAN  93 

creation  of  a  new  War  Office  department  under  a  "  Chief 
of  the  Staff,"  who  was  to  devote  himself  entirely  to  collecting 
information,  to  thinking  out  great  mihtary  problems,  and 
to  advising  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  on  matters  of 
"  general  military  policy."  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman, 
one  of  the  Commissioners  and  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
from  1892  to  1895,  dissented  from  the  recommendation, 
and  expressed  the  view  that  the  new  department  was 
"  unnecessary,"  and  that  although  it  existed  in  continental 
countries  "  those  countries  differ  fundamentally  from  Great 
Britain  "  in  that  they  were  "  concerned  in  watching  the 
military  conditions  of  their  neighbours,  in  detecting  points 
of  weakness  and  strength,  and  in  planning  possible  opera- 
tions in  possible  wars  against  them.  But  in  this  country 
there  is  in  truth  no  room  for  a  '  general  mihtary  poHcy  ' 
in  this  larger  and  more  ambitious  sense  of  the  phrase.  We 
have  no  designs  against  our  European  neighbours."  It 
seems  to  have  been  overlooked,  or  was  too  inconvenient  to 
be  admitted,  that  these  same  neighbours  might  have  designs 
agamst  us,  at  any  rate  in  the  future  even  if  they  had  none 
then,  and  that  the  security  of  the  Empire  demanded  that 
the  Government  should  be  furnished  with  considered 
mihtary  opinions  on  which  to  frame  their  plans  of  defence. 

Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman  was  at  a  loss  to  know 
where  the  new  department  "  could  find  an  adequate  field 
in  the  circumstances  of  this  country,"  and  was  "  afraid 
that  while  there  would  be  no  use  for  the  proposed  office 
there  might  be  in  it  some  danger  to  our  best  interests.  All 
that  is  in  fact  required  for  our  purposes  can  be  amply 
obtained  by  an  adequately-equipped  Intelhgence  Branch 
which,  under  the  direction  of  the  Adjutant-General,  could 
coUect  all  necessary  information,  and  place  it  at  the  disposal, 
not  of  one  officer  or  department  alone,  but  of  all  the  mihtary 
heads,  whose  duty  it  would  be  to  advise  the  Minister." 

The  above  references  to  the  Hartington  Commission  are 
not  made  for  the  purpose  of  condemning  Sir  Henry  Campbell- 
Bannerman,  but  rather  to  illustrate  the  views  then  held  by 
prominent  pubhc  men  in  regard  to  preparation  for  war. 
To  do  the  Hartington  Commissioners  justice  I  should  add 
that  all  of  them,  except  Sir  Henry  Campbell-Bannerman, 


94  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

agreed  with  the  recommendation  mentioned,  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  opinions  he  expressed  must  have  been  shared 
by  many  persons  in  both  political  parties,  for,  although  there 
was  a  change  of  Government  in  1895,  nothing  was  done 
to  introduce  the  system  recommended  until  the  necessity 
for  it  was  forced  upon  us  by  the  costly  experience  of  the 
South  African  war.  The  consequences  of  this  delay  were 
set  forth  in  the  "  Report  of  the  War  Ofhce  (Reconstitution) 
Committee,  1904,"  where  it  was  stated  that  "  if  the  recom- 
mendations of  the  majority  of  the  Hartington  Commission 
had  not  been  ignored,  the  country  would  have  been  saved 
the  loss  of  many  thousands  of  lives  and  of  many  millions 
of  pounds  subsequently  sacrificed  in  the  war." 

There  was,  moreover,  no  superior  authority  specially 
charged  with  the  co-ordination  of  the  different  State  depart- 
ments concerned  in  war  preparations,  and  in  this  connection 
it  was  stated  in  the  evidence  given  before  the  Hartington 
Commission  that  "  no  combined  plan  of  operations  for  the 
defence  of  the  Empire  in  any  given  contingency  has  ever 
been  worked  out  or  decided  upon  by  the  two  departments  " 
{i.e.,  War  Office  and  Admiralty).  The  nearest  approach  to 
a  superior  authority  of  the  kind  required  were  the  Defence 
Committee  of  the  Cabinet  and  the  Colonial  Defence 
Committee.  But  the  former,  to  the  best  of  my  knowledge, 
seldom  met  except  when  an  emergency  had  already  arisen  ; 
it  had  no  permanent  nucleus  and  therefore  had  little  or  no 
continuity  of  policy  or  action  ;  and  for  these  and  other 
reasons  it  could  not,  and  did  not,  properly  consider  the 
many  complex  military  problems  calling  for  solution. 

The  Colonial  Defence  Committee,  having  a  succession  of 
very  capable  secretaries,  including  the  present  Lord  Syden- 
ham, performed  an  extraordinary  amount  of  valuable  work 
— of  which  we  reaped  the  benefit  in  the  Great  War — but 
its  activities  were  mainly  confined  to  the  colonies,  and, 
being  composed  of  subordinate  officials,  it  had  no  power  to 
decide  the  questions  with  which  it  dealt.  It  could  only  make 
"  recommendations,"  which  were  afterwards  submitted  for 
the  approval  of  the  departmental  ministers  concerned,  and, 
as  might  be  expected,  this  was  not  always  given,  while  at 
best  it  took  days,  weeks,  or  even  months  to  obtain. 


SIR  EDWARD  ALTHAM  95 

The  danger  incurred  by  all  this  appalling  want  of  foresight 
was  the  more  serious  because  the  other  Great  Powers  were 
busily  engaged  in  improving  their  General  Staff  machinery, 
various  parts  of  Africa  and  China  were  in  process  of  annexa- 
tion or  exploitation,  several  international  boundaries  and 
treaties  affecting  our  military  interests  were  in  dispute,  and 
our  foreign  diplomatic  relations  were  in  more  than  one  case 
the  reverse  of  cordial.  Hence,  while  we  may  wish  that  the 
South  African  war  had  never  been  fought,  we  cannot  be 
too  thankful  that  its  exposure  of  our  defects  compelled  the 
adoption  in  1904  (see  page  136)  of  those  reforms  in  our 
military  system  which,  if  they  had  not  been  made  when 
they  were,  would  have  greatly  aggravated  the  disadvantages 
under  which  we  entered  upon  the  war  with  Germany  in  1914. 
It  is  perhaps  not  too  much  to  say  that  the  Empire  was  saved 
from  disaster  by  the  small  community  of  Boer  farmers  who, 
a  few  years  before,  had  fought  against  us. 

On  joining  the  Intelligence  Branch  I  was  posted  to  the 
section  dealing  with  Asia  and  Russia  in  Europe.  My  Simla 
experience  made  me  feel  at  home  with  Asiatic  affairs,  but 
I  was  strange  to  European  Russia  and  ignorant  of  its 
language,  for  although  before  leaving  the  Staff  College  I 
had  passed  the  French  interpretership  examination  and 
made  fair  progress  in  German,  Russian  was  a  sealed  book 
to  me  and  still  is.  Captain  (now  Brigadier-General)  Waters, 
the  head  of  the  section,  was  an  accomplished  Russian 
linguist,  and  being  personally  acquainted  with  the  country 
he  took  charge  of  it  himself,  consigning  to  me  the  care 
of  the  non-Russian  part  of  Asia. 

After  being  employed  in  this  manner  for  three  months 
my  "  temporary "  appointment  to  the  staff  was  made 
permanent,  and  I  was  posted  as  Staff  Captain  in  the  Colonial 
Section,  my  immediate  chief  in  this  case  being  Captain  (now 
Lieutenant-General  Sir)  E.  Altham.  From  him  I  learnt 
much  about  the  resources,  administration,  and  defence  of 
the  different  parts  of  the  Empire  of  which  I  knew  little  or 
nothing  before  and  which  was  valuable  to  me  in  after  years. 
In  many  respects  I  was  his  debtor,  but  his  handwriting 
was  amongst  the  worst  ever  seen,  except  my  own,  and  I 
frequently  had  to  summon  his  confidential  clerk  to  decipher 


96  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  hieroglyphics  which  in  the  course  of  business  he  inflicted 
upon  me. 

Our  Colonial  Empire  comprised  some  forty  distinct 
and  independent  governments,  and  in  addition  to  these 
organised  states  there  were  a  number  of  dependencies  under 
the  dominion  of  the  Sovereign  which  had  no  formed 
administrations,  as  well  as  large  territories  controlled  by 
certain  British  Companies,  and  the  protectorates,  such  as 
Somaliland  and  British  East  Africa,  under  the  supervision 
of  the  Foreign  Office.  All  military  questions  concerning 
these  possessions  found  their  way  into  my  section,  their 
number  being  exceeded  only  by  the  variety  of  their  character. 
They  included  the  training,  equipment,  administration, 
organisation,  and  emxployment  of  the  local  forces  so  far  as 
these  matters  were  referred  for  the  advice  or  decision  of  the 
Home  Government,  and  as  the  forces  were  still  in  a  rudi- 
mentary stage  such  references  were  far  more  common  than 
they  now  are. 

Complicated  questions  regarding  the  armament  and 
garrisons  of  coaling  stations  cropped  up  almost  daily, 
besides  a  host  of  others  relating  to  what  was  then  termed 
Colonial  Defence  and  is  now  known  as  Imperial  Defence. 
One  of  these  was  the  control  of  submarine  cables  in  time  of 
war,  practical  measures  for  which  were  then  being  worked 
out  and  have  since  proved  to  be  of  great  value.  The 
protectorates,  though  few  in  number,  absorbed  a  great  deal 
of  our  time,  as  they  were  invariably  the  scene  of  disturbances 
of  some  kind  or  other.  Between  1896  and  1899  there  must 
have  been  a  dozen  or  more  small  wars  in  these  territories, 
such  as  the  Uganda  mutiny  and  Sierra  Leone  rebellion,  and 
not  being  equipped  with  personnel  to  deal  with  them  the 
Foreign  Office  had  constantly  to  ask  the  Intelligence  Branch, 
as  representing  the  War  Office,  for  advice  or  information. 
This  was  not  always  easy  to  give,  because  so  little  was  known 
about  either  the  countries  themselves,  the  quality  and 
characteristics  of  the  troops  we  had  raised  in  them,  or  the 
power  for  mischief  possessed  by  the  hostile  tribes. 

The  heaviest  part  of  the  work  lay  in  South  Africa, 
where  trouble  with  the  Transvaal  had  been  brewing  for  some 
two  years  past  and  was  daily  becoming  more  acute.    Every 


SOUTH  AFRICAN  WAR  97 

Saturday  the  Cape  mail  brought  us  a  budget  of  correspond- 
ence, official  and  private,  which  had  to  be  sifted,  studied, 
and  distributed  ;  it  was  known  that  war-hke  stores  were 
gradually  being  accumulated  both  by  the  Transvaal  and 
Free  State,  and  it  was  our  duty  to  watch  these  as  closely  as 
conditions  would  allow  ;  special  reconnaissances  of  main 
routes  and  strategical  localities  had  to  be  initiated  ;  hand- 
books and  summaries  of  the  information  obtained  had  to  be 
prepared  with  a  view  to  active  operations  ;  the  Cabinet  had 
to  be  supplied  with  memoranda  bearing  on  the  military 
situation  ;  and  many  other  matters,  far  too  numerous  to 
specify,  called  for  urgent  attention.  Fortunately,  Altham 
had  a  good  knowledge  of  the  country  and  was  a  quick 
worker,  and  while  I  struggled  with  the  remainder  of  the 
Empire  for  which  we  were  responsible,  he  dealt  with  the 
important  and  pressing  business  of  South  Africa.  Consider- 
ing the  amount  to  be  got  through  he  achieved  marvels,  and 
this  was  recognised  by  the  Royal  Commission  on  the  South 
African  war,  who  pronounced  the  information  contained  in 
the  hand-books,  as  well  as  in  a  "  valuable  "  series  of 
memoranda,  to  be  in  many  respects  remarkably  accurate. 

As  everybody  knows,  the  war  lasted  much  longer  and 
required  far  more  troops  than  had  been  expected.  Of  the 
reasons  for  this  I  may  mention  two  :  the  first  was  Mr. 
Stanhope's  dictum  that  the  "  primary  "  duty  of  the  military 
authorities  was  home  defence ;  the  second,  largely  the 
corollary  of  the  first,  was  the  weakness  of  our  military 
position  as  compared  with  the  Boers  when  hostilities  com- 
menced. Throughout  the  long  negotiations  with  the  two 
Republics  this  disadvantage  was  keenly  felt  both  by  the 
local  authorities  and  the  War  Office,  but  it  was  difficult,  if 
not  impossible,  to  remedy  it,  since  to  send  out  reinforcements 
and  to  make  other  necessary  preparations  might  have 
destroyed  all  hopes  of  obtaining  that  peaceful  solution  which 
the  Government  desired.  The  position  was  therefore  still 
dangerously  weak  when  hostilities  broke  out  on  the  nth 
October,  and  in  consequence  we  were  penalised  with  the 
greatest  of  all  handicaps  in  war — a  bad  start. 

I  recall  the  disadvantages  which  prevailed  at  the 
beginning,  because   they,  more  than    anything   else,    were 

H 


98  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

answerable  for  the  prolonged  duration  of  the  war.  I  am 
aware  that  certain  people  claimed  in  later  years  to  have 
appreciated  the  situation  correctly,  and  to  have  forecast 
more  or  less  accurately  the  number  of  troops  that  would 
be  required  ;  but  I  am  afraid  that  these  claims  must  be 
regarded  as  instances  of  being  wise  after  the  event.  At  any 
rate  all  the  estimates  which  came  to  my  notice  at  the  War 
Office  before  the  war,  and  a  great  many  came,  proved  to 
be,  with  one  exception,  very  much  on  the  wrong  side. 

I  am  reminded  of  another  forecast  which  proved  to  be 
inaccurate.  At  one  of  the  many  Cabinet  discussions  of  the 
South  African  question  some  one  apparently  suggested  that 
it  would  be  a  wise  precaution  to  work  out  the  probable  cost 
involved  in  the  event  of  war,  and  it  fell  to  me  to  make  the 
arithmetical  calculation.  Being  furnished  with  the  figures 
representing  the  estimated  number  of  troops  required  and 
the  time  they  would  take  in  carrying  out  their  task,  I  had 
merely  to  apply  these  and  other  data  to  the  cost  of  previous 
British  campaigns  in  somewhat  similar  countries,  making 
of  course  due  allowance  for  any  difference  there  might  be 
in  the  conditions.  The  answer  to  my  sum  was  recorded 
on  half  a  sheet  of  foolscap,  and  if  it  found  its  way  to 
the  Cabinet,  as  I  suppose  it  did,  I  am  sure  it  received  a 
cordial  welcome.  WTiat  it  was  I  shall  not  say — though  I 
remer»ber  the  figure  well — and  I  would  wager  that  no  one 
would  guess  it  in  a  dozen  attempts,  though  it  was  perhaps 
as  accurate  as  the  estimate  of  the  cost  of  any  other  war  has 
ever  been. 

When  General  Sir  George  White  was  deputed  in 
September  1899  to  assume  command  of  the  troops  in 
Natal,  then  being  reinforced  by  certain  units  from  India, 
Altham  went  with  him  as  head  of  the  Intelligence  and  I 
was  placed  in  charge  of  the  Colonial  section.  Another 
officer  was  appointed  to  fill  the  post  I  vacated,  but  he  had 
not  been  with  me  more  than  a  fortnight  before  he  was 
ordered  to  join  his  battalion,  which  was  proceeding  to 
South  Africa,  and  no  sooner  had  he  been  followed  by  a  new 
man  than  a  further  change  was  made  for  the  same  reason. 
No  fewer  than  five  different  officers  were  given  to  me  in  this 
way  before  the  end  of  the  year,  and  it  was  under  these 


CIVILIAN  PROPOSALS  99 

conditions  that,  over  and  above  the  normal  work  of  the 
section,  I  had  to  grapple  with  a  multitude  of  questions  for 
the  proper  treatment  of  which  at  least  half  a  dozen  General 
Staff  Officers  were  required.  Consequently  I  could  but  try, 
with  the  help  of  my  ever-changing  assistant,  to  deal  with 
the  more  important  matters,  so  far  as  an  average  sixteen- 
hour  day  would  permit,  and  leave  the  remainder  to  look 
after  themselves. 

The  rapidit}/  with  which  the  Boers  proceeded  after  the 
outbreak  of  war  to  besiege  first  one  place  and  then  another, 
and  to  carry  their  offensive  into  adjacent  British  possessions, 
gave  rise  to  much  consternation  amongst  those  whose  private 
or  commercial  interests  were  affected.  This  brought  to  the 
War  Office  a  flood  of  proposals  from  all  classes  of  people, 
according  to  which,  it  was  claimed,  the  situation  could  be  at 
once  retrieved  and  the  aims  of  the  enemy  completely 
frustrated.  All  found  their  way  to  my  table  for  examination 
and  report,  and  as  many  of  them  were  produced  or  backed 
by  influential  persons,  a  great  deal  more  labour  had  to  be 
devoted  to  answering  them  than  they  deserved.  Practically 
all  of  them  suffered  from  the  defect  common  to  other  amateur 
prescriptions,  in  that  while  they  clearly  and  often  quite 
cleverly  showed  what  it  was  desirable  to  do — a  comparatively 
easy  task — they  failed  to  be  so  convincing  as  to  how  this 
could  be  done — which  is  never  easy,  especially  to  those 
responsible  for  doing  it.  The  burden  of  responsibility  makes 
an  important  difference  in  war,  as  it  does  in  all  other  business 
calling  for  important  decisions,  and  for  this  reason  advice 
unaccompanied  by  a  proper  share  of  responsibility  for 
execution  should  always  be  accepted  with  caution.  My 
task  in  dealing  with  these  proposals  was  made  the  harder 
because  Sir  John  Ardagh,  owing  to  indisposition,  was  not 
always  present  to  back  up  my  replies,  but  on  the  other  hand 
I  was  invariably  well  supported  by  both  Lord  Wolseley  and 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Lord  Lansdowne. 

Inventions  with  which  utterly  to  destroy  the  enemy 
without  loss  to  ourselves,  and  false  reports  of  various  devices 
on  his  part  for  destroying  us,  also  arrived  in  large  numbers, 
and  these  again,  being  sometimes  forwarded  by  prominent 
public  men,  or  having  in  them  some  particle  of  good,  had 


100        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

to  be  examined  and  answered  to  the  satisfaction  of  the 
authorities  to  whose  notice  they  had  been  brought. 

Another  task  which  occupied  much  of  my  time  was  the 
preparation  of  a  daily  summary  of  events  for  the  Queen, 
the  Cabinet,  and  various  departmental  heads,  showing  the 
dispositions  of  the  troops  and  the  reinforcements  in  course 
of  transit.  Information  as  to  these  dispositions  was  difficult 
to  obtain,  as  it  always  is  when  the  military  situation  is 
unfavourable,  for  the  local  authorities  themselves  may  not 
have  it,  and  such  as  they  have  may  be  doubtful  or 
unpalatable,  and  therefore  they  sometimes  hesitate  to 
forward  it  until  it  has  been  confirmed.  Again,  when  informa- 
tion reached  the  War  Office  from  the  front  it  had  to  pass 
through  rigidly  prescribed  channels,  as  in  time  of  peace,  and 
was  often  hours  and  sometimes  days  before  it  arrived  at  my 
table  in  Queen  Anne's  Gate,  on  the  opposite  side  of  St. 
James's  Park.  The  Intelligence  Branch  was  treated  as  a 
separate,  and  not  very  important,  part  of  the  War  Office 
organisation. 

The  consequence  was  that  I  had  to  rely  for  my  data 
largely  upon  the  reports  of  war  correspondents,  which 
would  often  appear  in  the  Press  before  the  same  informa- 
tion reached  me  officially,  and  sometimes  the  newspapers 
alone  supplied  the  particular  intelligence  I  wanted.  As 
might  be  expected,  the  reports  were  not  always  rehable, 
but  they  served  to  furnish  useful  indications  regarding 
events  at  the  front,  and  by  carefully  following  them  day 
by  day,  and  exercising  due  discretion  as  to  the  credibility 
of  individual  correspondents — which  I  was  soon  able  to 
appraise — the  summary  proved  to  be  remarkably  correct. 
As  it  was  the  only  document  of  its  kind  produced,  the 
demand  for  it  soon  rose  from  half  a  dozen  copies  to  five 
times  that  number.  The  accuracy  of  the  summary,  prepared 
in  the  manner  described,  is  an  illustration  of  the  useful 
intelligence  which  can  be  gleaned  by  an  enemy  from  a  close 
study  of  his  adversary's  press,  and  it  shows  that  the  censor- 
ship of  military  news  has  greater  justification  than  some 
people  imagine. 

December  1899  found  Mafeking,  Kimberley,  and  Lady- 
smith  still  besieged  and  parts  of  Cape  Colony  in  rebellion, 


SIR  REDVERS  BULLER  loi 

and  the  climax  was  reached  in  the  second  week  of 
the  month,  popularly  known  as  "  black  week,"  in  which 
occurred  the  three  reverses  of  Stormberg,  Magersfontein, 
and  Colenso.  Then  followed  the  despatch  of  Sir  Redvers 
Buller's  historic  telegram  on  the  evening  of  the  15th 
December,  in  which  he  expressed  the  view  that  he  "  ought 
to  let  Ladysmith  go,  occupy  good  positions  for  the  defence 
of  South  Natal,  and  let  time  help  us." 

The  first  I  knew  about  this  telegram  was  at  three 
o'clock  the  following  afternoon,  Saturday,  when  a  member 
of  the  Government  brought  it  in  his  pocket  to  the  Intelligence 
Branch  intending  to  discuss  it  with  Sir  John  Ardagh  before 
the  Defence  Committee  of  the  Cabinet  met  at  five  o'clock 
that  evening  to  consider  what  should  be  done.  As  Sir  John 
was  ill  in  bed  I  was  summoned,  the  telegram  was  read  over 
to  me,  and  I  was  asked  to  advise.  What  puzzled  the  minister 
was  that  there  should  be  any  such  great  obstacle  to  the  relief 
of  Ladysmith  as  that  implied  by  Buller's  proposal  to  abandon 
the  attempt.  In  his  view  the  advantages  of  position  seemed 
to  be  with  us,  seeing  that  Buller's  force  outside  and  White's 
force  inside  were  together  numerically  superior  to  the  Boer 
force  in  the  middle  ;  we  were  the  nutcrackers  and  the  Boers 
were  the  nut,  and  he  could  not  understand  why  they  should 
not  be  promptly  and  completely  crushed.  The  "  nut- 
crackers "  theory  offers  tempting  results  and  has  always 
been  attractive  to  the  layman,  as  well  as  to  not  a  few 
professionals,  but  it  happens  to  be  one  of  those  many 
operations  of  war  which  in  theory  seem  so  simple  and  in 
practice  are  so  hard.  Its  successful  application  demands  not 
only  considerable  superiority,  either  in  numbers  or  morale, 
but  also  perfect  timing,  good  intercommunication,  and  great 
determination  on  the  part  of  the  exterior  forces  and  their 
commanders,  and  these  are  the  very  essentials  which,  in  the 
given  circumstances,  are  the  most  difficult  to  ensure. 

I  did  my  best  to  explain  to  the  minister  why  this  was 
so,  but  I  could  see  that  he  was  not  altogether  convinced, 
and  when  I  told  him  that  as  the  besieged  force  had  only 
sixty  days'  supplies  when  first  shut  up  some  six  weeks 
earlier,  it  could  not  hold  out  long  after  the  end  of  the 
year  unless  the  ordinary  scale  of  rations  had  meanwhile 


102        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

been  reduced,  he  ruefully  observed  that  the  prospect  of 
the  country  having  a  happy  new  year  was  not  very  bright. 
I  could  not  deny  this,  nor  could  I  help  remarking  that  the 
principal  cause  of  all  the  trouble  was  the  bad  start  we  had 
made.  Buller  felt  this  as  much  as  any  one,  and  on  the 
20th  of  November  had  written  :  "  Ever  since  I  have  been 
here,  we  have  been  like  the  man  who,  with  a  long  day's 
work  before  him,  overslept  himself  and  so  was  late  for  every- 
thing all  day."  We  had,  in  fact,  as  Lord  Wolseley  had  said 
in  the  preceding  September,  "  committed  one  of  the  greatest 
blunders  in  war,  namely,  we  have  given  the  enemy  the 
initiative."  Having  made  this  mistake,  we  were  now  com- 
pelled to  dance  to  the  enemy's  tune,  and,  amongst  other 
things,  transfer  to  Natal  a  large  part  of  the  field  force 
originally  destined  to  advance  into  the  Free  State  from 
Cape  Colony. 

As  it  could  serve  no  useful  purpose  to  dwell  upon  reflec- 
tions of  this  kind,  I  proceeded  to  adopt  a  more  encouraging 
tone  by  sajdng  that,  notwithstanding  the  unsatisfactory 
outlook,  there  was  as  yet  no  sufficient  ground  for  accepting 
Buller's  suggestion  to  "  let  Ladysmith  go,"  for  it  would 
probably  be  found  that  the  garrison  could  hold  out  for  a 
considerably  longer  time  than  that  estimated  on  the  ration 
basis,  while  its  surrender  must  clearly  have  a  serious  military 
and  political  effect.  Turning  to  the  general  situation  I 
pointed  out  that  our  troops  were  dispersed  in  small  bodies 
over  a  vast  area  and  were  acting  upon  no  coherent  or  com- 
prehensive plan,  and  consequently  there  had  been  a  great 
lack  of  unified  effort  between  them.  Obviously,  the  most 
pressing  need  was  a  change  in  the  High  Command,  since  it 
was  impossible  for  Buller  properly  to  direct  operations  on 
a  front  extending  for  some  600  miles  from  Natal  to 
Kimberley,  to  say  nothing  of  the  operations,  in  progress 
or  contemplated,  on  the  west  and  north  sides  of  the  enemy 
countries,  and  in  addition  exercise  personal  command  over 
the  Ladysmith  Relief  Force.  The  remedy  was  either  to  direct 
Buller  to  hand  over  the  Natal  Command  to  another  officer, 
so  that  he  might  give  his  undivided  attention  to  the  opera- 
tions as  a  whole,  or  to  limit  his  sphere  to  Natal  and  replace 
him   by   another  officer  in   the   supreme   command.     The 


LORD  ROBERTS  COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF      103 

minister  seemed  to  appreciate  this  argument,  and  after 
further  conversation  he  started  off  for  the  Cabinet  meeting, 
with  the  determination — greatly  to  his  credit — of  seeing 
the  South  African  business  through  at  all  costs.  The 
minister  was  Mr.  Balfour. 

What  took  place  at  the  meeting  is  unknown  to  me,  but 
the  decision  of  the  Government  was  to  reject  the  proposed 
abandonment  of  Ladysmith,  to  provide  large  reinforce- 
ments, and  to  appoint  Lord  Roberts  Commander-in-Chief  of 
all  troops  in  South  Africa,  Lord  Kitchener  to  be  his  Chief 
of  the  Staff.  So  ended  a  somewhat  memorable  day  in  the 
annals  of  the  British  Empire. 

On  the  following  Monday  Henderson,  my  old  tutor  at 
the  Staff  College,  came  to  tell  me  that  he  was  joining  the 
headquarters  staff  of  Lord  Roberts  as  Director  of  Intelli- 
gence. We  spent  some  time  together  considering  alternative 
plans  of  campaign,  and  he  then  rejoiced  my  heart  by  saying 
that  he  intended  to  ask  for  me  to  go  out  as  his  assistant. 
Hearing  no  more  about  the  matter  before  Lord  Roberts  and 
his  staff  left  England  on  the  following  Saturday  I  sorrow- 
fully concluded  that  Henderson's  proposal  had  not  been 
sanctioned.  I  had  not  expected  that  it  would  be,  for  I 
was  the  only  ofhcer  at  the  War  Office  who  had  the  situation 
at  his  fingers'  ends,  and  could  not  hope  that  Ardagh  would 
allow  me  to  go  away.  However,  on  the  27th  of  December 
I  was  telegraphed  for  by  Lord  Roberts  from  Gibraltar, 
where  he  had  stopped  to  pick  up  Lord  Kitchener  coming 
from  Egypt,  and  as  the  order  had  gone  forth  that  he  was 
to  be  given  everything  and  everybody  he  asked  for  I  was 
duly  liberated.  Three  days  later  I  embarked  at  South- 
ampton on  the  transport  Aurania,  heartily  glad  to  escape 
from  the  depressing  and  uncongenial  atmosphere  common 
to  official  life  in  London  in  time  of  war. 


CHAPTER   VIII 

ON  THE   HEADQUARTERS   STAFF   IN   THE   SOUTH 
AFRICAN   WAR 

Situation  on  arrival  at  Cape  Town — Formation  of  mounted  infantry — 
Lord  Roberts'  plan  of  operations  and  measures  taken  to  preserve 
secrecy  —  Composition  of  Intelligence  Staff  at  Headquarters — 
Arrival  of  Headquarters  at  Modder  river — Lord  Roberts'  care  for 
his  troops — Mystifying  Cronje  as  to  the  proposed  line  of  advance — 
General  situation  at  this  time^ — Buller  asks  for  reinforcements — 
Lord  Roberts  adheres  to  his  plan — Cavalry  division  crosses  Free 
State  frontier  and  reheves  Kimberley — Pursuit  of  Cronje — Battle 
of  Paardeberg — Confusion  caused  by  bad  system  of  command — 
Investment  of  Cronje — Cronje  surrenders  and  is  brought  into  camp 
— He  is  sent  to  St.  Helena — Grierson  joins  Headquarters — His 
efforts  to  improve  defective  methods  of  staff  work — Lord  Roberts' 
instructions  in  regard  to  battle  of  Poplar  Grove^ — Imperfect  arrange- 
ments for  the  battle  enable  Boer  forces  to  make  good  their  retreat — 
Advance  continued  to  Bloemfontein- — Summary  of  events  to  date — 
Standard  of  staff  work  and  tactics  inferior  to  strategy — Strategy 
never  so  good  again — Some  reasons  lor  this — Henderson's  health 
breaks  down  and  he  returns  to  England — He  commences  to  write 
the  Official  History  of  the  War — His  death  in  Egypt  in  1903 — The 
soldier's  difficulties  in  writing  official  histories — The  advance  from 
Bloemfontein  to  Kroonstad  and  thence  to  Pretoria — Boer  guerilla 
warfare — Lord  Roberts'  plan — Hardships  of  march  and  fine  spirit 
of  the  men — Action  of  Diamond  Hill — The  advance  to  Middelburg 
— The  De  Wet  hunts — Recalled  to  the  War  Office — Reach  rank  of 
Major — Promoted  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  for  services  in  the 
war. 

On  arrival  at  Cape  Town  on  the  20th  of  Januar}-  I  found 
Lord  Roberts  and  the  headquarters  staff  engaged  in  making 
systematic  preparations  for  the  advance  into  the  Free 
State,  and  for  giving  the  troops  greater  mobiUty  than  they 
had  hitherto  possessed.  This  entailed  a  drastic  change  in 
the  normal  organisation  of  the  transport  service,  as  well 
as  the  provision  of  additional  bodies  of  mounted  men. 
The  latter  were  obtained  partly  by  raising  or  expanding 
local  corps,  and  partly  by  forming  mounted  infantry  bat- 
talions composed  of  companies  drawn  from  line  battalions. 

104 


MOUNTED  INFANTRY  105 

In  this  way  eight  additional  mounted  infantry  battahons 
were  made  up,  and  as  an  example  of  the  conditions  under 
which  some  of  them  were  formed  I  may  mention  that  the 
infantry  battaUon  on  board  the  ship  which  conveyed  me 
was  met  on  reaching  port  by  a  staff  officer  with  orders  to 
despatch  one  company  that  evening  to  De  Aar,  where  it 
would  find  horses  and  saddlery  and  thereupon  would  become 
a  mounted  infantry  company. 

Three  weeks  later  this  same  company,  with  others 
equally  untrained,  was  sent  forward  to  meet  the  enemy,  and 
as  something  went  wrong  with  the  orders  the  first  day's 
march  did  not  begin  till  seven  o'clock  in  the  evening.  Many 
of  the  men  crossed  a  horse  that  day  for  the  first  time  in 
their  lives,  and  in  the  darkness  of  the  night  the  horses 
often  stumbled,  many  of  the  riders  fell,  and  when  camp  was 
reached  at  daylight  next  morning  a  considerable  number 
were  absent,  having  been  left  lying  on  the  ground  while 
their  mounts  went  on  with  the  column.  Later  in  the  war 
the  mounted  infantry  performed  excellent  work,  but  at 
first  they  could  not  manoeuvre  under  fire,  and  by  their  bad 
riding  galled  both  their  horses  and  themselves.  The  need 
for  more  mounted  troops  was  obvious  enough,  but  a  mounted 
infantryman  who  can  neither  ride  nor  properly  look  after 
his  horse  is  not  of  much  fighting  value,  and  he  is  decidedly 
expensive  in  the  matter  of  horseflesh.  No  more  unfortunate 
animal  ever  lived  than  the  horse  of  the  mounted  infantryman 
during  the  early  period  of  the  march  from  the  Modder  to 
Pretoria. 

Lord  Roberts'  plan  was  to  concentrate  as  large  a  force 
as  possible  in  the  vicinity  of  Lord  Methuen's  camp  on  the 
Modder  near  Magersfontein,  pass  round  Cronje's  left  flank, 
then  wheel  north  and  get  astride  his  communications  with 
Kimberley,  and  after  the  rehef  of  that  place  operate  in  the 
direction  of  Bloemfontein,  so  as  to  render  the  Boer  positions 
south  of  the  Orange  river  untenable.  Lord  Roberts  was 
convinced,  moreover,  that  by  threatening  Bloemfontein  he 
would  oblige  the  enemy  to  relax  his  hold  on  Natal,  and 
would  thereby  effect  the  relief  of  Ladysmith. 

The  success  of  the  plan  depended  upon  keeping  the 
enemy  in  doubt  as  to  the  proposed  line  of  advance,  and  this 


io6        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  furthered  by  making  demonstrations  as  if  the  intention 
were  to  force  a  passage  at  Norval's  Pont,  some  150  miles  by 
rail  east  of  Magersfontein,  and  by  various  other  devices 
calculated  to  mislead.  As  the  Boers  had  recently  captured 
in  Natal  certain  intelligence  papers  disclosing  the  original 
plan  of  campaign,  which  contemplated  an  advance  into 
the  Free  State  by  Norval's  Pont,  they  were  the  more  easily 
imposed  upon  and  induced  to  believe  that  this  route  would 
be  the  one  followed.  The  real  plan  was  at  first  made 
known  to  no  one,  I  believe,  except  to  Lord  Kitchener, 
Sir  William  Nicholson  (the  military  secretary),  Henderson, 
and  a  few  officers  charged  with  making  the  necessary 
railway  arrangements.  It  was  not  disclosed  either  to 
Kelly-Kenny  or  French  (who  commanded  the  troops 
waiting  to  be  transferred  from  the  Norval's  Pont  locality 
to  the  Modder)  until  the  29th  of  January,  the  day  on  which 
the  transfer  began.  Other  troops  were  meanwhile  pushed 
up  the  western  line,  but  the  Boers  apparently  thought  that 
this  merely  indicated  a  renewed  but  local  attack  on  Magers- 
fontein. 

Henderson,  always  an  ardent  advocate  for  mystifying 
and  misleading  the  enemy,  was  especially  active,  and 
revelled  in  the  deceits  he  practised.  He  sent  out  fictitious 
telegrams  to  commanders  in  clear,  and  then  on  one  excuse 
or  another  countermanded  them  in  cipher  ;  circulated  false 
orders  implying  a  concentration  of  troops  at  Colesberg, 
in  the  Norval's  Pont  direction;  gave  "confidential"  tips 
to  people  eager  for  news  whom  he  knew  would  at  once 
divulge  them ;  and  in  numerous  ways  fostered  the  behef 
that  never  again  would  our  troops  hurl  themselves  against 
the  carefully  prepared  Boer  entrenchments  at  Magersfontein, 
and  that  Kimberley  could  and  must  look  after  itself  pending 
a  direct  advance  on  Bloemfontein  by  the  Norval's  Pont 
route.  One  of  his  tools  was  a  London  newspaper  corre- 
spondent to  whom  he  gave  a  particularly  "  confidential " 
piece  of  information,  with  strict  injunctions  to  keep  it  to 
himself.  As  Henderson  hoped,  it  quickly  appeared  in  the 
London  Press,  and  was  brought  to  our  notice  by  the  War 
Office  as  a  serious  indiscretion  on  the  part  of  some  of  the 
staff  !     A  few  days  later,  when  the  advance  was  begun  in 


LORD  ROBERTS  107 

a  direction  quite  different  from  that  which  had  been  told 
him,  the  correspondent  became  so  irate  and  was  so  lacking 
in  a  sense  of  humour  that  he  formally  complained  to 
Lord  Roberts  of  the  "  unfair  and  dishonest  treatment  "  he 
had  received.  On  the  whole  it  is  probable  that  no  military 
plan  was  ever  kept  better  concealed  from  either  friend  or 
foe,  and  certainly  the  Boers  did  not  discover  it  until  too 
late  to  rectify  their  error. 

In  addition  to  Henderson,  the  Intelligence  staff  at 
headquarters  consisted  of  four  officers,  including  myself, 
designated  Deputy  Assistant  Adjutant-Generals,  though  we 
had  nothing  whatever  to  do  with  the  Adjutant- General's 
department.  We  were  a  happy  party,  and,  having  all  been 
pupils  of  Henderson  at  the  Staff  College,  looked  forward 
with  keen  interest  to  the  apphcation  in  practice  of  the  lessons 
and  principles  he  had  taught  us  in  theory  a  few  years  before. 
The  discussions  we  had  with  him  in  the  small  mess  we 
formed,  and  which  he  joined,  regarding  the  problems 
to  be  solved  were  a  valuable  education  for  all  of  us, 
but  he  nevertheless  kept  from  us  almost  as  much  as  from 
the  Boers  the  secret  of  the  selected  line  of  advance.  By 
degrees,  however,  our  suspicions  were  aroused,  and  when 
headquarters  was  suddenly  ordered  to  entrain  at  Cape  Town 
for  the  front  we  were  not  surprised  to  learn  that  our  destina- 
tion was  Lord  Methuen's  camp  on  the  Modder. 

On  reaching  this  camp  on  the  8th  of  February  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief immediately  proceeded  to  visit  the  troops, 
and  by  his  cheery  smile  and  friendly  recognition  did  much 
to  revive  the  spirits  of  those  who  were  feeling  disheartened 
owing  to  previous  failures  and  disappointments.  Lord 
Roberts  possessed  an  attractive  personality,  took  infinite 
pains  to  secure  the  confidence  and  esteem  of  his  troops, 
and  to  show  them  that  their  interests  were  also  his — as 
they  undoubtedly  were.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  his 
example  is  not  more  frequently  followed  by  other  leaders, 
since  the  neglect  of  it  greatly  reduces  the  fighting  value 
of  the  troops  and  cannot  be  made  good  by  any  other 
qualities  of  leadership,  with  the  sole  exception,  perhaps, 
of  an  unbroken  string  of  victories,  and  this  rarely  falls  to 
the  lot  of  the  commander  of  whom  regimental  officers  and 


io8        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

men  know  and  see  little,  and  for  whom  they  consequently 
care  less. 

Good  relations  between  commanders  and  the  rank  and 
file  are  like  all  other  forms  of  friendship — if  they  are  to  be 
maintained  and  bear  fruit  they  must  be  nourished.  Soldiers 
are  human  beings — rather  more  human  than  other  people 
— and  they  will  never  respond  whole-heartedly  to  the 
commander  who  treats  them  as  mere  automata  to  be  used 
for  his  own  purpose  according  to  order,  and  without  any 
thought  being  given  to  them  as  ordinary  men.  On  the 
other  hand,  they  will  always  be  ready  to  offer  the  last  ounce 
of  their  strength  in  extricating  from  any  difficulty  into  which 
he  may  have  fallen  the  General  in  whom  they  have  con- 
fidence as  a  personal  friend.  Our  men  are  exceedingly 
accurate  judges  of  an  officer's  worth  and  character,  and 
whilst  they  intensely  dislike  the  officer  who  does  not  enter 
into  their  feelings  and  treats  them  as  if  they  had  none,  they 
have  unbounded  admiration  for  the  one  who  treats  them 
kindly  as  well  as  justly. 

The  matter  is  one  which  calls  for  special  attention  in 
these  modern  days,  when  armies  are  very  large  and  spread 
over  vast  areas,  and  when  senior  commanders  can  no  longer 
live  in  or  near  to  the  camps  and  bivouacs  of  their  troops, 
but  must  usually  have  their  headquarters  many  miles 
distant  from  them.  For  several  other  reasons  a  com- 
mander's opportunities ,  of  being  seen  by  his  men,  and  of 
becoming  personally  known  to  them,  are  much  fewer  than 
formerly,  and  therefore  there  is  the  more  need  that  he 
should  make  additional  efforts  to  meet  these  new  conditions, 
for  the  human  factor  remains  unchanged  and  the  men  are 
as  sensitive  as  ever  to  the  human  touch. 

The  daily  arrival  of  troops  near  Magersfontein  ought 
to  have  shown  to  Cronje  the  extreme  danger  of  his 
position,  but  he  still  clung  fast  to  the  belief  that  it  signi- 
fied no  more  than  a  direct  attack,  and  that  we  could  not 
operate  except  in  the  immediate  proximity  to  a  railway. 
It  was  desirable  to  confirm  him  in  these  false  impressions  if 
our  object  of  passing  round  his  left  flank  was  to  be  achieved, 
and  Intelligence  officers  and  agents  were  therefore  kept 
busy  reconnoitring  the  country  in  front  of   his  position  ; 


GENERAL  FRENCH  109 

information  regarding  water,  camping-places,  etc.,  alongside 
the  railway  was  sought  from  every  one  likely  to  acquaint  him 
with  our  enquiries  ;  telegrams  in  cipher,  easy  to  decipher, 
were  allowed  to  fall  into  his  hands  ;  and  all  the  other  usual 
means  of  deception  were  practised.  Lastly,  as  it  was 
important  that  we  should  be  informed  early  and  accurately 
of  his  movements  when  eventually  he  found  his  flank 
turned,  we  induced  certain  Dutch-speaking  men  to  join  his 
commandos,  with  a  promise  of  substantial  pecuniary  reward 
if  they  brought  us  the  information  we  required. 

The  situation  at  the  time  was  one  of  great  anxiety.  The 
siege  of  Kimberley  had  hitherto  been  a  kind  of  passive 
investment,  but  on  the  7th  of  February  the  Boers  opened 
fire  with  the  "  Long  Tom  "  (six-inch  gun)  which  they  had 
brought  round  from  Ladysmith,  and  this  so  alarmed  the 
inhabitants  that  two  days  later  Kekewich,  the  commander 
of  the  besieged  force,  felt  obliged  to  report  to  Lord  Roberts 
that  the  danger  of  surrender  was  imminent.  Other  dis- 
quieting news  was  received  from  Buller  as  to  his  inability 
to  reheve  Ladysmith,  and  on  the  9th  of  February  he 
reported  that  in  his  opinion  "  the  fate  of  Ladysmith  is 
only  a  question  of  days  unless  I  am  very  considerably 
reinforced." 

All  this  constituted  a  heavy  load,  and  Lord  Roberts 
carried  it  bravely  and  correctly.  He  could  not  possibly 
send  reinforcements  to  Buller  in  Natal  without  abandoning 
the  plan  he  had  so  carefully  considered  and  elaborated  for 
an  advance  into  the  Free  State,  and  in  which  he  beUeved 
to  lie  the  greatest  prospects  of  success.  Moreover,  its 
abandonment  would  entail  endless  confusion  and  delay. 
He  therefore  stuck  to  it  ;  gave  orders  for  the  troops  to 
cross  the  Free  State  frontier  on  the  nth  of  February  ; 
and  instructed  General  French,  commanding  the  cavalry 
division,  which  led  the  way,  to  reheve  Kimberley  "at  all 
costs."  By  skilful  manoeuvre  and  the  display  of  com- 
mendable audacity,  French  was  able  to  report  on  the  evening 
of  the  15th  that  his  mission  had  been  accomphshed  in  con- 
formity with  Lord  Roberts'  instructions. 

Cronje  having  meanwhile  obstinately  refused  to  budge 
from  his  trenches,  our  next  task  was  to  reap  the  fruits  of 


no        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  opportunity  created  by  the  cavalry,  which  had  not  only 
reheved  Kimberley  but  had  interposed  between  the  investing 
force  now  retreating  north  of  that  place  and  the  commandos 
at  Magersfontein  to  the  south,  and  had  thus  severed  Cronje's 
communications  with  the  Transvaal,  to  which  he,  a  Trans- 
vaaler,  attached  great  importance. 

Cronje  has  been  much  criticised  for  his  inaction,  and  it 
is  right  that  he  should  be  held  responsible  for  the  conse- 
quences of  it,  but  on  the  other  hand  it  is  only  fair  to  take 
into  account  the  circumstances  as  they  appeared  to  him 
at  the  time.  It  was  a  fact  that  the  British  troops  had  not 
previously  operated  at  any  great  distance  from  a  railway, 
and  Cronje  probably  thought,  and  quite  correctly,  that  to 
do  so  on  this  occasion  would  be  a  very  difficult  undertaking. 
February  is  the  hottest  month  of  the  South  African  summer  ; 
water  was  alarmingly  scarce  ;  no  rain  had  fallen  for  weeks 
past  and  the  sandy  plains  offered  but  little  food  for  the 
country-bred  animals  and  still  less  for  the  Enghsh  horses  ; 
the  Modder  and  the  Riet  were  formidable  obstacles,  passable 
only  at  widely  separated  drifts  ;  and  finally,  to  march  round 
the  flank  of  a  mobile  enemy  knowing  every  inch  of  the 
terrain,  while  we  knew  little  or  nothing  about  it,  was  to 
incur  such  risks  as  not  a  few  commanders  would  hesitate 
to  accept.  These  and  similar  considerations  could  not  fail 
to  have  a  great  influence  on  Cronje's  decision,  and  he  does 
not  deserve  to  be  dismissed  merely  as  a  stupid  and  sullen 
old  Boer  in  the  summary  and  superior  fashion  adopted  by 
some  of  his  critics  ;  and  to  do  this  is  to  belittle  what  un- 
doubtedly was  a  bold  conception  on  the  part  of  Lord  Roberts, 
and  an  arduous  performance  on  the  part  of  his  troops. 

Hearing  of  the  rehef  of  Kimberley  and  of  the  movement 
of  other  British  columns  round  his  left  flank,  Cronje  at 
last  realised  his  perilous  position,  and  about  ten  o'clock  on 
the  night  of  the  15th  he  commenced  to  retreat  up  the 
right  bank  of  the  Modder  so  as  to  regain  his  communica- 
tions with  Bloemfontein.  When  our  headquarters  reached 
Jacobsdal  early  the  following  morning  reports  and  rumours 
indicating  the  direction  of  his  retirement  began  to  come 
in,  but  tliey  were  so  vague  and  contradictory  that  it  was 
difficult  to  draw  any  reliable  inference  from  them.     This 


CRONJE  MOVES  iii 

may  seem  strange  in  these  more  modern  days,  seeing  that 
Cronje  was  moving  between  French's  cavalry  at  Kimberley 
and  Kelly-Kenny's  Division  at  Klip  Drift  on  the  Modder, 
the  distance  between  these  two  detachments  being  only 
about  15  miles  ;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  com- 
munications in  the  field  had  not  then  reached  their  present 
state  of  perfection,  and  that  there  were  no  aeroplanes  to 
spy  out  the  country  and  rapidly  bring  back  the  information 
which  we  now  expect  to  get  as  a  matter  of  routine. 

It  was  my  special  business  to  collect  and  study  the 
intelligence  received  concerning  the  Boer  movements,  and 
although  I  knew  that  Cronje  had  three  courses  open  to  him, 
it  was'  as  yet  impossible  to  say  which  of  the  three  he  would 
choose.  He  might  retreat  either  by  the  west  or  the  east  side 
of  Kimberley  and  unite  with  the  force  just  driven  back  by 
French,  or  he  might  try  to  escape  to  the  eastward  and  make 
for  Bloemfontein.  Strategically,  either  of  the  two  first 
would  have  been  the  safest,  but,  as  so  often  happens  in  war, 
the  least  likely  route — the  third — was  selected.  I  think 
it  was  Moltke  who  once  warned  his  students  that  when  an 
enemy  seems  to  have  three  courses  open  to  him,  the  chances 
are  that  he  will  find  a  fourth  and  adopt  it. 

By  mid-day  on  the  i6th  all  doubts  were  dispelled  by  the 
arrival  at  headquarters  of  one  of  the  men  whom  we  had 
previously  introduced  into  the  commandos  at  Magers- 
fontein.  His  account  of  Cronje's  movements  was  evidently 
reliable,  and  being  corroborated  by  the  information  we  had 
received  from  other  sources,  it  became  possible  to  form  a 
definite  opinion  upon  which  the  Commander-in-Chief  could 
safely  determine  his  future  action.  The  informant  received 
the  promised  reward  and  something  in  addition. 

French  was  immediately  ordered  back  from  Kimberley  to 
head  off  Cronje  at  Koodoos  Drift ;  the  6th  and  9th  Divisions 
were  told  to  retard  and  harass  the  retreating  commandos  ; 
and  other  troops  were  hastened  up  from  the  rear.  Owing 
to  defective  communications  French  did  not  receive  his  in- 
structions till  ten  o'clock  that  night,  but  his  squadrons  were 
set  in  motion  before  dawn  next  morning,  and  at  about 
eleven  o'clock,  having  covered  26  miles  since  leaving 
Kimberley,  his  horse  batteries  came  into  action  against  the 


112        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

main  body  of  Cronje's  convoy,  hampered  by  women,  children, 
and  dismounted  men,  just  as  it  was  beginning  to  descend 
to  Vendutie  Drift  in  order  to  gain  the  Bloemfontein  road 
on  the  left  bank.  Throughout  the  day  French  effectively 
frustrated  aU  the  enemy's  attempts  to  cross  the  river,  and 
his  retreat  having  thus  been  arrested,  Cronje's  surrender 
became  a  question  of  time. 

Headquarters  remained  at  Jacobsdal  during  the  17th 
and  i8th,  and  on  the  19th  moved  to  Paardeberg  Drift,  the 
scene  of  the  battle  of  Paardeberg  of  the  previous  day.  We 
found  considerable  disappointment  prevailing  because  the 
battle  had  not  ended  in  the  defeat  and  capture  of  Cronje's 
force,  and  one  of  the  reasons  given  for  this  was  the  faulty 
manner  in  which  the  chief  command  had  been  exercised. 
Kelly-Kenny  was  the  senior  officer  present  and  therefore 
ought  to  have  commanded,  but  Lord  Roberts  had  thought 
fit  to  appoint  Lord  Kitchener  to  give  orders  in  his  name, 
which  amounted  to  placing  him  over  Kelly-Kenny's  head. 
Lord  Kitchener  had  no  time  to  make  arrangements  with 
either  Kelly-Kenny  or  Colville,  respectively  commanding 
the  6th  and  9th  Divisions  as  to  the  way  in  which  he  would 
communicate  his  orders,  and,  except  for  his  aides-de-camp 
and  one  other  staff  officer,  he  possessed  no  machinery  for 
such  communication.  The  two  divisional  commanders  were 
therefore  frequently  at  a  loss  to  know  during  the  course 
of  the  battle  what  was  required  of  them,  and  owing  to  lack 
of  effective  control  over  the  force  as  a  whole  there  was  no 
adequate  co-operation  between  the  different  parts  of  it. 

Throughout  the  war  it  was  rather  a  favourite  custom 
of  Lord  Roberts  to  use  Lord  Kitchener  as  a  sort  of  second- 
in-command  rather  than  as  a  Chief  of  Staff,  and  to  depute 
him  to  take  command  of  operations  at  a  distance  which 
he  himself  could  not  superintend.  But  an  itinerant  com- 
mander cannot  have  the  same  grasp  of  local  conditions  as 
the  commander  on  the  spot,  and  if  the  latter  is  not  competent 
to  command  his  troops  in  action  he  ought  to  be  replaced 
by  some  one  who  is,  and  not  be  superseded  just  as  the 
fighting  begins.  Further,  if  the  Chief  of  Staff  is  con- 
stantly away  from  headquarters  for  days  or  even  weeks 
at  a  time — as  Lord  Kitchener  was — it  is  farcical  to  call 


CRONJE'S  SURRENDER  113 

him  by  that  name,  or  to  imagine  that  the  duties  of  the 
staff  can  be  properly  carried  out. 

During  the  investment  of  Cronje  we  were  sometimes 
very  short  of  food,  for,  in  addition  to  the  difficulties  ex- 
perienced in  bringing  up  the  supply  columns,  De  Wet  had  a 
few  days  before  swooped  down  upon  one  of  our  convoys 
at  Waterval  Drift  and  captured  about  180  wagon  loads 
of  supphes  as  well  as  some  500  slaughter  oxen.  On  the 
first  night  of  our  arrival  at  Paardeberg  our  mess  was 
without  food  of  any  kind  until  Lord  Roberts,  hearing  of 
our  phght,  and  with  his  characteristic  kindness,  sent  us 
the  remains  of  a  leg  of  mutton,  which  was  apparently  all 
that  his  own  mess  possessed.  In  the  darkness  I  clumsily 
allowed  my  share  of  it  to  fall  to  the  ground,  but  my  hunger 
was  much  too  keen  to  allow  me  to  be  "  put  off  "  by  the  sand 
and  other  disagreeable  and  unknown  things  with  which, 
when  I  retrieved  it,  and  resumed  my  meal,  I  found  the  bone 
to  be  covered.  We  had  no  bread,  and  for  several  days  were 
on  half  rations  of  biscuits,  while  we  were  not  much  better 
off  for  water.  The  Modder  was  certainly  close  at  hand,  but 
as  dead  animals  from  the  enemy's  laager  higher  up  stream 
were  constantly  to  be  seen,  and  smelt,  floating  down,  or 
caught  up  by  the  branches  overhanging  its  banks,  this 
means  of  quenching  one's  thirst  was  not  pleasant. 

We  found  plenty  to  do  while  at  Paardeberg,  as  numerous 
deserters  drifted  in  from  the  laager  and  had  to  be  ex- 
amined ;  we  had  to  watch  the  commandos  hovering  about 
in  the  vicinity  with  the  intention  of  lending  Cronje  a  hand 
to  break  out ;  and  there  were  many  reports  to  be  investi- 
gated of  Boer  reinforcements  being  sent  from  Cape  Colony 
and  Ladysmith.  An  interesting  occupation  was  to  arrive 
at  an  estimate  regarding  the  strength  of  the  force  Cronje 
had  with  him,  the  best  calculation  we  could  make  being 
5000  men  and  8  guns.  The  number  actually  amounted, 
when  the  surrender  took  place,  to  3919  fighting  men  and 
5  guns,  to  which  of  course  should  be  added  the  deserters 
who  had  meanwhile  given  themselves  up  or  had  escaped 
through  our  lines. 

The  Boers  hoisted  the  white  flag  soon  after  sunrise  on  the 
27th,  and  about  seven  o'clock  Cronje  was  brought  in  to 

I 


114        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

headquarters,  where  he  was  met  by  Lord  Roberts  and 
congratulated  on  the  gallant  defence  he  had  made.  The 
rugged  features  of  the  old  Boer  leader  showed  signs  of  the 
anxious  times  through  which  he  had  passed,  but  he  carried 
himself  bravely  and  like  a  man.  Whatever  mistakes  his 
indecision  had  caused  him  to  commit  earlier  in  the  operations, 
he  had  at  any  rate  displayed  a  fine  determination  in  com- 
pelling his  despondent  followers  to  hold  out  against  superior 
forces  for  ten  days  in  an  impossible  position,  and  he  was 
entitled  to  receive,  and  did  receive,  the  respectful  sympathy 
of  us  all.  Early  in  the  afternoon  he  left  with  his  wife  for 
Cape  Town  e7i  route  to  St.  Helena. 

We  had  a  welcome  addition  to  the  headquarters  staff 
about  this  time  in  the  person  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Grierson, 
who  arrived  hot-footed  from  Berlin,  where  he  had  been 
employed  as  military  attache.  He  had  his  first  meal  at  our 
frugal  and  impoverished  mess,  and  like  all  newcomers  to 
the  country  was  suffering  from  an  inordinate  thirst  which, 
quite  unknown  to  him  but  fully  realised  by  us,  was  slaked 
only  at  the  expense  of  our  last  "  sparklet  "  and  small  stock 
of  whisky.  It  had  been  intended  to  place  him  in  charge 
of  the  foreign  military  attaches  accompanying  headquarters, 
but  this  not  being  to  his  liking  he  so  arranged  matters  as 
to  become  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  with  the  special 
duty  of  dealing  with  the  movements  and  distribution  of  the 
troops — a  duty  which  hitherto  had  been  mainly  performed 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  through  the  medium  of  his 
aides-de-camp  and  other  officers  of  his  personal  staff. 

Grierson,  having  for  long  made  a  close  study  of  the 
methods  of  the  German  General  Staff,  was  alive  to  the  value 
of  clear  and  definite  orders,  and  at  once  set  about  introducing 
systematic  arrangements  for  their  issue.  But  his  task  was 
difficult  and  he  made  little  headway,  as  many  orders  still 
continued  to  be  sent  out  by  the  Commander-in-Chief  direct 
or  through  his  personal  staff,  and  sometimes  without  the 
knowledge  of  the  real  staff  and  the  administrative  services. 
Grierson  received  more  than  one  liint  to  go  easy  with  his 
new-fangled  ideas,  and  on  one  occasion  at  least  he  was 
told  that  he  need  issue  no  orders  as  the  Commander-in-Chief 
would  issue  them  himself.     The  battle  of  Paardeberg  had 


POPLAR  GROVE  115 

already  shown  the  disadvantages  incurred  by  the  absence 
of  clearly  expressed  operation  orders,  and  a  further  proof 
of  this  was  furnished  at  the  next  action  fought— Poplar 
Grove,  on  the  7th  of  March. 

Following  the  surrender  of  Cronje,  De  Wet  had  collected 
several  commandos  astride  the  Modder  facing  our  camp 
at  Osfontein,  their  maximum  strength  being  estimated 
at  14,000  men.  We  had  more  than  twice  that  number  and 
about  five  times  as  many  guns.  The  situation  of  De  Wet 
was  in  some  respects  not  unlike  that  of  Cronje  on  the  day 
before  the  battle  of  Paardeberg,  and  the  intention  of  Lord 
Roberts  was  to  turn  it  to  much  the  same  account.  The 
mounted  troops  under  French  were  to  make  a  detour  of 
17  miles  round  and  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  left  flank, 
and  so  cut  off  his  retreat  to  Bloemfontein  ;  when  these 
troops  had  been  planted  completely  in  rear  of  the  enemy's 
line,  Kelly-Kenny's  division  was  to  attack  his  left  and  drive 
him  north  towards  the  Modder  ;  the  7th  Division  was  to 
threaten  the  centre,  and  the  9th  Division  the  right.  To 
make  the  plan  a  success  it  was  necessary,  first  and  foremost, 
to  ensure  that  French  should  be  sufficiently  near  to  his 
destination  before  the  Boers  either  knew  of  the  turning 
movement  or  were  alarmed  by  the  advance  of  Kelly-Kenny 
against  their  left.  In  other  words,  accurate  timing  and 
perfect  co-ordination  were  the  predominant  factors. 

On  the  afternoon  of  the  6th  Lord  Roberts  assembled 
the  Commanding  Generals  at  headquarters  and  gave  to  each 
a  copy  of  the  instructions  he  had  himself  prepared.  These 
contained  a  very  clear  description  of  his  general  plan,  but 
nothing  about  the  time  at  which  the  different '  divisions 
were  to  start.  This  was  verbally  discussed  afterwards,  and 
apparently  French  left  the  conference  under  the  impression 
that  he  was  to  start  at  3  a.m.,  whereas  Kelly-Kenny,  who 
was  to  follow  him  for  part  of  the  way,  understood  that 
French  would  start  at  2  a.m.  In  addition  to  this  misunder- 
standing other  difficulties  arose  owing  to  the  absence  of 
good  staff  arrangements,  and,  to  cut  a  long  story  short, 
the  movement  of  Kelly-Kenny's  division  next  morning 
was  entirely  blocked  for  some  time  by  the  cavalry,  and  the 
cavalry  itself  was  not  able  to  move  nearly  so  fast  as  had 


ii6        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

been  expected.  The  result  was  that  long  before  French 
had  time  to  reach  their  rear  the  Boers  perceived  that  an 
enveloping  movement  was  in  progress  and  promptly  began 
to  fall  back  eastward,  thus  escaping,  with  practically  no 
loss,  from  the  toils  within  which  it  had  been  hoped  to  entrap 
them. 

The  method  adopted  by  Lord  Roberts  for  conveying  his 
intentions  to  his  Generals  is  one  that  is  often  necessary, 
as  it  helps  to  preserve  secrecy  and  enables  a  Commander-in- 
Chief  to  explain  his  plans  in  greater  detail  than  is  possible 
in  the  crystallised  paragraphs  of  operation  orders  ;  but 
it  should  never  be  made,  as  it  was  at  Poplar  Grove,  a 
substitute  for  those  orders.  Had  Lord  Roberts'  instructions 
been  afterwards  translated  into  concrete  operation  orders, 
and  march-tables  been  worked  out  by  the  staff,  definite 
hours  of  starting  for  each  division  would  have  been  laid 
down  in  writing  and  all  misunderstanding  prevented  or 
removed. 

The  failure  at  Poplar  Grove  was  the  more  unfortunate 
because  the  Boers  were  then  in  a  very  despondent  frame  of 
mind.  Cronje's  force  had  been  captured  a  few  days  before, 
Kimberley  and  Ladysmith  had  been  set  free,  and  if,  as  Lord 
Roberts  intended,  De  Wet  had  been  forced  into  the  bed  of 
the  Modder,  and  there  surrounded,  the  effect  of  this  further 
disaster  might  have  gone  far  to  end  the  war.  Whether 
better  staff  work  and  the  issue  of  proper  operation  orders 
would  have  made  success  certain  at  Poplar  Grove  and  so 
shortened  the  war  by  perhaps  as  much  as  two  years,  may 
be  a  debatable  point,  but  there  can  be  no  question  that 
success  could  not  be  expected  unless  these  conditions  were 
fulfilled. 

After  the  action  headquarters  moved  to  Poplar  Grove 
and  remained  tliere  till  the  loth.  The  army  then  again 
advanced,  the  left  column,  under  French  and  including 
Kelly-Kenny's  division,  fighting  a  sharp  engagement  on 
the  Driefontein  ridge,  of  which  we  had  a  good  view  from 
Dricfontein  Farm.  The  severe  punishment  which  the 
Boers  received  caused  them  to  beat  a  hurried  retreat,  and 
they  fell  back  that  night  in  disorder  towards  Bloemfontein. 

On  the  nth  we  reached  Assvogel  Kop,  Venter's  Vallei 


OCCUPATION  OF  BLOEMFONTEIN  117 

on  the  12th,  and  next  morning  the  Mayor  of  Bloemfontein 
and  three  of  the  leading  citizens  came  out  and  ceremoniously 
surrendered  the  town.  Shortly  afterwards  it  was  entered 
by  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  headquarters  staff, 
and  the  Union  Jack  was  hoisted  on  the  President's  house. 
The  troops  bivouacked  for  the  most  part  outside  the  town, 
as  Lord  Roberts  was  anxious  that  the  inhabitants,  whom 
it  was  hoped  would  soon  become  British  subjects,  should 
be  put  to  as  little  inconvenience  and  discomfort  as  possible. 

Thanks  to  sound  strategy  and  to  the  fortitude  and 
gallantry  of  the  troops,  the  thirty  days'  operations  which 
terminated  with  the  occupation  of  Bloemfontein  had 
changed  the  whole  aspect  of  the  war.  For  the  great  results 
achieved  the  principal  credit  must  of  course  be  accorded  to 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  since  upon  him  rested  the  responsi- 
bility for  the  consequences  of  the  strategical  decision  he 
took,  whether  they  proved  to  be  good  or  bad,  and  more- 
over the  success  was  largely  due  to  the  imphcit  confidence 
which  the  troops  placed  in  him.  To  what  extent,  if  any, 
Henderson's  counsels  contributed  to  the  strategy  adopted 
I  am  not  in  a  position  to  say,  and  he  was  far  too  modest  a 
man  to  talk  about  it.  But  one  cannot  help  being  struck  by 
the  fact  that,  after  he  had  left  headquarters,  the  operations 
were  unproductive  of  similar  marked  successes,  and  that 
there  was  a  strong  tendency  to  attach  too  much  importance 
to  the  occupation  of  towns  and  too  little  to  the  decisive 
defeat  of  the  enemy's  forces,  by  which  alone  complete 
victory  could  be  secured. 

If  the  standard  of  staff  work  and  tactics  in  the  march 
from  the  Modder  to  Bloemfontein  had  equalled  that  of 
strategy  the  results  might  have  been  even  greater  than  they 
were  ;  but  the  nature  and  value  of  staff  duties  were  not  yet 
properly  appreciated,  while  tactics  suffered  from  a  desire  on 
the  part  of  the  High  Command  to  avoid  casualties.  The 
reluctance  to  fight  what  were  termed  costly  battles  tended  to 
hamper  the  subordinate  commanders,  who,  not  unnaturally, 
felt  that  their  capacity  would  be  judged  mainly  by  the  number 
of  casualties  incurred.  This  feeling  was  apt  to  cause  them 
to  hesitate  when  they  should  have  displayed  determination 
and  boldness,  and  in  the  long  run  the  policy  was  hable  to 


ii8         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

defeat  its  own  end,  since  half-hearted  and  indecisive  fighting 
was  likely  to  make  the  war-aggregate  of  casualties  greater 
than  if  the  struggle  were  relentlessly  fought  out  from  the 
first  and  without  so  much  regard  to  immediate  losses. 

On  the  17th,  while  headquarters  was  still  at  Jacobsdal, 
Henderson's  health,  which  for  some  time  past  had  been 
indifferent,  completely  broke  down.  He  had  been  careless 
of  himself,  and  so  immersed  in  his  work  that  he  had  neglected 
to  fit  himself  out  with  the  ordinary  campaigning  require- 
ments, he  carried  no  food  for  use  in  emergency,  and  as  far  as 
I  remember  he  did  not  possess  even  a  water-bottle.  Added 
to  this,  the  heat  on  the  17th  was  intense,  the  only  water  we 
had  was  particularly  bad  and  had  a  most  offensive  smell, 
and  the  whole  of  the  transport  lagged  far  behind.  We  of 
the  staff  did  our  best  out  of  our  scanty  store  to  provide  for 
his  needs,  and  I  begged  him  to  rest  quietly  on  my  camp- 
bed,  but  he  was  not  to  be  persuaded.  Most  of  the  day 
he  worked  hard,  dressed  in  pyjamas,  studying  the  important 
events  which  were  happening,  discussing  with  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief the  action  to  be  taken,  and  generally  doing 
the  duty  of  a  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  the  real  Chief  of 
Staff,  Lord  Kitchener,  being  away  at  the  front  with  Kelly- 
Kenny's  division.  The  following  day  he  became  so  ill  that 
he  had  to  be  sent  back  to  Cape  Town.  We  parted  from  him 
with  sorrow,  and  he  of  course  was  grievously  disappointed 
to  relinquish  his  work  which  had  begun  with  such  remark- 
able success.  He  was  succeeded  as  Director  of  Intehigence 
by  Lieutenant  -  Colonel  (now  Major- General  Sir)  Colin 
Mackenzie,  a  contemporary  of  mine  at  the  Staff  College. 

From  Cape  Town  Henderson  was  sent  back  to  England, 
and  owing  to  continued  ill-health  took  no  further  part  in 
the  war.  Later,  he  was  appointed  to  write  the  official 
history  of  it,  which  he  commenced  with  an  account  of  the 
political  events  leading  up  to  hostilities  and  a  description 
of  the  military  resources  available  on  both  sides.  His  idea 
was  that  without  full  knowledge  of  these  conditions  the 
reader  would  not  be  able  properly  to  understand  many  of 
the  earlier  military  decisions  and  dispositions  which  were  to 
a  great  extent  necessarily  based  upon  them.  At  the  end  of 
1902  his  health  again  gave  way  and  he  was  ordered  to 


OFFICIAL  HISTORIES  119 

Egypt,  where  he  died  in  March  of  the  following  year,  leaving 
behind  him  a  gap  in  the  British  army  which  has  not  yet 
been  filled,  and  a  memory  which  is  held  in  sincere  affection 
by  all  who  had  the  privilege  to  know  him. 

The  Government  subsequently  decided  that  it  was  un- 
desirable to  publish  in  the  history  of  the  war  any  discussion 
of  the  questions  which  had  been  at  issue  between  them  and 
the  two  Republics  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities,  or  that 
had  been  the  subject  of  controversy  at  home,  and  therefore 
that  portion  of  it  which  Henderson  had  compiled  was  entirely 
recast. 

In  connection  with  this  decision  I  may  observe  that  for 
a  soldier  to  write  an  official  history  of  military  operations, 
which  shall  be  acceptable  to  the  Government  departments 
concerned,  is  invariably  a  ticklish  task.  On  the  one  hand, 
it  may  be  impossible  for  him  to  make  clear  the  reasons  for 
the  military  action  taken  unless  he  first  describes  the 
political  conditions  and  instructions  which,  to  a  greater  or 
less  degree,  governed  that  action  ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
a  cold,  comprehensive  review  of  the  proceedings  which 
led  up  to  those  conditions  and  instructions  does,  not,  in  the 
light  of  after  events,  always  afford  very  pleasant  reading  to 
those  who  took  part  in  them. 

I  remember  one  rather  striking  instance,  amongst  others 
within  my  experience,  of  an  officer  getting  into  trouble  on 
this  account.  He  was  compiling,  under  my  orders,  the 
official  report  on  certain  military  operations  which  had  been 
preceded  and  were  attended  by  particularly  complicated 
questions  of  international  policy,  and  knowing  that  undue 
reference  to  these  questions  would  be  resented,  I  gave  him 
directions  to  leave  them  severely  alone  except  in  so  far 
as  it  was  absolutely  essential  to  mention  them,  and  even 
then  he  was  to  take  his  facts  from  the  Blue  books — already 
available  to  the  public — and  rigidly  to  exclude  any  political 
information  of  a  secret  or  confidential  nature  that  we  might 
have  in  our  archives.  I  trusted  that  by  this  means  all 
objections  would  be  obviated,  and  I  know  that  '.le  officer  set 
about  his  work  with  the  intention  of  cres '  .ng  none,  and 
that  he  confined  his  political  researches  to  the  Blue  books. 
But  when  his  report  was  submitted  to  the  departmental 


120        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

authorities  in  Whitehall  for  approval,  before  being  printed 
off,  some  of  its  political  paragraphs  were  considerably- 
modified  or  expunged  altogether,  and  a  curt  letter  from 
the  objecting  department  invited  us  to  mind  our  own 
business  in  future. 

Before  continuing  the  advance  beyond  Bloemfontein  it 
was  necessary  to  refit  and  reorganise  the  army,  and  we  had 
also  to  cope  with  a  serious  outbreak  of  typhoid — an  epidemic 
which  in  those  days  was  accepted  as  almost  unpreventable 
in  time  of  war.  The  medical  services  were  not  organised 
adequately  to  deal  with  the  ever-increasing  number  of  sick  ; 
there  was  great  difficulty  in  providing  suitable  accommoda- 
tion for  the  patients  ;  eight  wagon  loads  of  medical  comforts 
had  been  lost  at  Waterval  Drift ;  and  the  result  of  all  this 
was  that  many  of  our  fever-stricken  men  died  whose  lives 
might  have  been  saved  had  better  treatment  and  properly 
equipped  accommodation  been  available.  The  efficiency  of 
the  medical  arrangements  for  the  care  of  the  sick  and 
wounded  has  since  been  improved  a  thousand-fold,  as  shown 
by  the  marvellous  work  done  in  the  Great  War,  and  in  this 
respect  as  in  many  others  the  South  African  war  was  of 
inestimable  benefit  to  us. 

The  system  of  guerilla  warfare  adopted  by  the  Boers  after 
the  occupation  of  Bloemfontein,  and  continued  throughout 
the  war,  made  InteUigence  duties  much  more  diflicult  than 
before.  The  enemy's  plan  now  was  to  act  aggressively 
against  different  points  on  our  line  of  communication,  and 
to  pick  up  elsewhere  any  helpless  or  unwary  detachment 
which  promised  to  be  an  easy  prey,  and  as  the  bodies  he 
employed  were  widely  dispersed,  moved  swiftly,  were  subject 
to  variable  combinations,  and  were  favoured  by  the  nature 
of  the  country,  it  was  impossible  to  place  or  number  them 
for  more  than  a  few  hours  at  a  time.  We  derived  much 
information  from  the  mail-bags  seized  at  various  places,  for 
the  Boers  wrote  very  freely  to  each  other,  but  as  a  rule  it 
came  to  hand  too  late  to  be  of  much  use  except  for  general 
purposes,  and  we  had  to  rely  mainly  upon  our  Intelligence 
Scouts.  These  scouts,  working  under  the  direction  of  Cap- 
tain (now  General  Sir)  G.  F.  Milne,  would  track  the  com- 
mandos from  place  to  place,  and  sometimes  lie  out  watching 


ADVANCE  ON  PRETORIA  121 

them  for  several  days  and  nights  in  succession,  bringing  or 
sending  back  most  valuable  intelligence.  Most  of  them 
were  recruited  from  South  Africa,  some  being  white  and 
some  coloured,  while  some  of  them  came  from  other  parts 
of  the  world.  One  of  the  latter  was  Mr.  F.  R.  Burnham, 
the  famous  American  scout.  He  was  a  great  acquisition, 
and  carried  out  many  hazardous  enterprises  with  skill  and 
success. 

The  army  being  at  last  more  or  less  reorganised  and  re- 
equipped,  we  set  out  for  Pretoria  on  the  3rd  May.  The 
general  plan  was  to  advance  on  a  front  extending  from 
Ladysmith  to  Kimberley,  Buller  on  the  right  with  about 
45,000  men,  Hunter  and  Methuen  on  the  left  with  10,000, 
the  columns  in  the  centre  directly  under  Lord  Roberts  being 
about  43,000  strong.  Brandfort  was  occupied  the  same 
day  with  the  loss  of  about  half  a  dozen  men  ;  the  passage 
of  the  Vet  river  was  forced  two  days  later  ;  the  Zand 
river,  the  next  obstacle,  was  crossed  on  the  loth,  with  the 
loss  of  about  a  hundred  men  ;  and  on  the  following  day 
Kroonstad  was  abandoned  and  President  Steyn  went  off  to 
Lindley,  proclaiming  that  place  to  be  the  new  capital  and 
seat  of  government  of  the  Free  State.  From  that  time 
onwards  organised  co-operation  between  the  two  Republics 
ceased,  the  Free  Staters  apparently  thinking  that  as  they 
had  borne  the  brunt  of  the  British  attack  for  nearly  three 
months  it  was  for  the  Transvaalers  and  not  for  them  to 
defend  the  Transvaal.  British  headquarters  entered  Kroon- 
stad on  the  1 2th  May  and  remained  there  for  ten  days,  so 
as  to  allow  the  railway  in  rear  to  be  repaired  and  the  army 
to  be  pulled  together  once  more. 

I  have  already  mentioned  that  Grierson  held  the  appoint- 
ment of  Assistant  Adjutant-General,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact 
he  was  charged  mth  duties  belonging  to  the  department 
of  the  Quartermaster-General,  a  curious  feature  in  the 
organisation  of  the  headquarters  staff  being  that  it  contained 
no  officer  designated  by  the  name  of  that  department.  It 
was  Grierson' s  business  to  allot  accommodation  for  the  troops, 
and  in  order  to  improve  upon  the  defective  arrangements 
made  at  Bloemfontein  for  the  disposal  of  the  sick  he  allocated 
the  church  and  other  pubhc  buildings  in  Kroonstad  for  the 


122        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

purpose,  telling  the  Landrost  to  provide  so  many  hundred 
mattresses  by  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  The  Landrost 
raised  many  objections,  and  said  that  there  was  nothing  like 
that  number  in  the  shops,  upon  which  Grierson  observed, 
in  rather  forcible  language,  that  he  was  not  thinking  merely 
of  what  the  shops  could  produce,  that  there  must  be  a  large 
number  of  mattresses  in  the  town,  and  that  the  full  number 
demanded  must  be  forthcoming  by  the  hour  named.  The 
Landrost  went  off  to  Lord  Roberts  to  complain  of  having 
been  harshly  treated  and  threatened  with  punishment  if  he 
did  not  comply  with  the  order,  and  Grierson  was  then  sent 
for  to  give  his  side  of  the  story.  He  admitted  that  in  his 
conversation  with  the  Landrost  he  had  freely  drawn  upon 
all  the  languages  with  which  he  was  acquainted,  including 
Scotch  and  Hindustani,  so  as  to  ensure  prompt  comphance 
with  his  order,  and  that  he  had  done  so  because  he  felt  that 
the  comfort  of  the  sick  should  have  priority  over  everything 
and  everybody.  He  was  quietly  requested  to  treat  the 
inhabitants  with  more  sympathy  and  consideration  in 
future,  and,  of  course,  he  received  the  admonition  with 
becoming  respect.  He  gained  his  object,  however,  and  in 
telling  us  of  the  incident  that  night  at  dinner  he  finished 
up  by  saying,  "  I  got  my  beds,  the  men  are  now  on  them, 
and  that,  after  all,  is  the  only  thing  that  matters." 

Somebody  present  at  dinner  reminded  us  of  the  old 
story  told  of  a  similar  incident  that  occurred  in  the 
Peninsula  war,  of  which  the  sequel  was  rather  different. 
General  Craufurd,  the  commander  of  the  famous  Light 
Division,  once  directed  the  head  man  of  a  Spanish  town 
to  collect  certain  supplies  for  the  troops,  at  a  given  time 
and  place,  otherwise  he  would  be  shot.  The  Spaniard 
complained  to  the  Duke  of  WelHngton  of  the  General's 
high-handed  conduct,  and  said  that  he  could  not  possibly 
carry  out  the  order.  "  Do  you  mean  to  tell  me,"  the  Duke 
asked,  "  that  General  Craufurd  threatened  to  shoot  you  ?  " 
"He  did,"  replied  the  Spaniard,  thinking  the  Duke  was 
taking  his  part.  The  answer  he  got  was  :  "  Well,  if  I  were 
in  your  place  I  would  produce  the  supplies  somehow,  for, 
believe  me,  General  Craufurd  is  a  man  of  his  word  and  will 
shoot  you  if  you  don't." 


HARDSHIPS  ON  THE  ADVANCE  123 

We  left  Kroonstad  on  the  22nd  May,  entered  the  Trans- 
vaal five  days  later,  and  Johannesburg  fell  on  the  30th  May. 
Next  day  it  was  formally  handed  over  to  us,  our  infantry 
marched  through  the  main  square,  and  the  Dutch  flags 
were  hauled  down  from  the  government  buildings  and 
replaced  by  the  Union  Jack.  A  similar  ceremony  took 
place  at  Pretoria  on  the  5th  June,  and  the  Transvaal  Govern- 
ment thus  became  vagabond  hke  that  of  the  sister  Republic. 

The  three  hundred  miles  march  from  Bloemfontein  to 
Pretoria  had  been  dull  and  irksome  to  a  degree,  and  I 
suppose  that  no  military  operations  were  ever  more  lacking 
in  interest  and  variety.  Throughout  the  march  the  Boers, 
greatly  inferior  to  us  in  numbers,  would  hold  the  river  lines 
and  other  defensible  positions,  covering  a  wide  front ;  our 
mounted  troops  were  then  sent  round  one  or  other  of  their 
flanks  with  the  object  of  enveloping  them  ;  and  when  this 
movement  had  proceeded  up  to  a  certain  point  the  Boers 
would  withdraw  out  of  harm's  way  to  take  up  a  similar 
position  farther  to  the  rear.  But  although  no  action  worth 
calling  a  battle  was  fought,  the  march  itself  was  attended 
by  many  hardships.  Day  after  day  our  troops  plodded 
silently  on  over  the  apparently  endless  prairies  ;  sometimes 
the  sun  was  blazing  hot,  at  others  there  was  a  bitterly 
cold  wind  against  which  no  clothing  seemed  proof ;  food 
was  scanty,  and  shelterless  bivouacs  formed  the  only 
resting-places  at  night.  In  fact  the  march  was  unrelieved 
by  any  redeeming  feature  except  hope,  and  our  splendid 
infantry  deserve  the  highest  credit  for  the  way  in  which 
they  doggedly  stuck  to  their  monotonous  daily  toil  until 
the  fall  of  Pretoria,  the  second  Boer  capital,  gave  them 
their  reward  and  brought  the  pacification  of  the  country 
definitely  within  sight. 

The  Boers  were  now  more  than  ever  convinced  that 
their  one  and  only  chance  of  salvation  lay  in  striking  the 
slender  line  of  communications  which  trailed  away  for 
hundreds  of  miles  in  rear  of  our  exhausted  troops.  De  Wet 
became  particularly  active,  capturing  considerable  numbers 
of  prisoners,  and  burning  and  destroying  large  and  invaluable 
quantities  of  food  and  stores.  Refusing  to  be  disturbed  by 
these  raids,  vexatious  and  inconvenient  though  they  were. 


124        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  Commander-in-Chief  set  in  motion  all  the  troops  he 
could  collect  to  attack  the  enemy,  some  6000  strong,  who 
had  taken  up  a  position  astride  the  railway  about  fifteen 
miles  east  of  Pretoria.  After  some  desultory  fighting  on 
the  nth  and  12th  of  June  the  Boers  disappeared  during 
the  night,  part  of  them  under  De  la  Rey  circling  round  to 
the  western  Transvaal,  and  the  remainder  under  Botha 
retiring  eastward.  This  engagement,  known  as  the  battle 
of  Diamond  Hill,  cost  us  less  than  180  casualties,  of  whom 
20  were  killed. 

Before  the  advance  could  be  resumed  it  was  again 
necessary  to  refit  the  army,  and  make  good  the  wear  and 
tear  amongst  the  men,  animals,  and  material  caused  by  the 
long  march  from  Bloemfontein.  This  took  about  six  weeks, 
and  on  the  23rd  of  July,  when  the  troops  again  moved 
forward,  the  Boers  at  once  evacuated  Balmoral,  which  had 
been  Botha's  headquarters  since  the  action  at  Diamond 
Hill,  and  two  days  later  they  retired  through  Middelburg, 
eighty  miles  east  of  Pretoria. 

On  the  night  of  the  25th  of  July,  the  date  of  our  occupa- 
tion of  Balmoral,  there  was  a  terrible  storm  of  wind  and 
rain — the  worst  of  the  many  bad  storms  we  had  encountered. 
The  troops  suffered  severely  from  exposure  in  their  bivouacs, 
and  next  morning  the  adjacent  hill-sides  were  covered  with 
dead  and  dying  transport  animals.  In  many  places  whole 
teams  of  dead  oxen  and  mules  lay  heaped  together. 

Much  of  this  loss  was  due  to  neglect  on  somebody's  part 
to  order  the  transport  columns  to  march  earlier  in  the  day. 
The  order  was  not  given  till  the  afternoon,  and  consequently 
the  columns  were  caught  in  the  hills  by  the  storm  and 
darkness  long  before  they  had  finished  their  march,  the 
tracks  became  slippery  and  impassable,  confusion  reigned 
everywhere,  a  great  part  of  the  columns  were  out  all  night, 
and  the  animals  perished  by  hundreds.  It  was  pitiable  to 
see  these  fine  beasts  in  their  death-throes  being  shot  by  the 
veterinary  surgeons,  who  went  about  amongst  them  and 
mercifully  put  out  of  their  agony  those  which  had  no  chance 
of  recovery. 

After  the  occupation  of  Middelburg  the  forward  move- 
ment was  again  suspended,  and  soon  afterwards  a  great  part 


RETURN  TO  ENGLAND  125 

of  the  troops  in  the  Transvaal  were  turned  on  to  pursue 
De  Wet,  who  had  crossed  the  Vaal  from  the  Free  State  on 
the  6th  of  August. 

Nine  columns  composed  of  about  30,000  men  were 
engaged  in  this  the  first  of  the  De  Wet  hunts,  Lord  Kitchener 
being  in  command  of  the  combined  operations.  De  Wet 
ov/ed  his  escape  on  this  occasion,  as  on  many  subsequent 
ones,  to  misunderstandings  on  the  part  of  his  pursuers,  and 
in  the  circumstances  it  was  practically  impossible  to  pre- 
vent misunderstanding.  Intercommunication  between  the 
different  British  columns  was  bad,  and  therefore  they  did 
not  always  know  what  each  other  had  done  or  would  do  ; 
the  enemy  could  always  get  the  best  possible  information, 
whereas  we  could  seldom  depend  upon  what  we  obtained  ; 
and  such  information  as  we  got  and  sent  to  the  columns 
often  arrived  too  late  to  be  of  use.  At  headquarters 
we  were  usually  able  to  trace  De  Wet's  movements.  The 
difficulty  was  to  inform  the  columns  within  useful  time. 

Headquarters  stayed  at  Pretoria  throughout  the  remain- 
ing period  of  Lord  Roberts'  command,  only  a  small  portion 
of  it  accompanying  him  when  the  advance  eastward  was 
resumed  on  August  the  26th.  I  was  one  of  those  left  behind, 
and  saw  no  more  of  the  operations.  Early  in  October  I  was 
ordered  back  for  duty  at  the  War  Office,  and  a  month  later 
took  up  the  same  appointment  of  Staff  Captain  in  the  Colonial 
Section  as  I  had  held  a  year  before.  Meanwhile  I  had  reached 
the  rank  of  Major  in  the  ordinary  course  of  regimental 
promotion. 

For  my  services  in  the  war  I  was  given  a  "  mention  in 
despatches,"  but  only  in  the  class  then  known  as  "  also 
ran,"  and  when  the  promotions  and  other  rewards  were 
pubHshed  my  name  did  not  appear  in  the  list.  I  had  hoped 
that  it  would,  but  whatever  chance  of  this  there  might  have 
been  was  destroyed  by  my  having  incurred  the  displeasure 
of  Lord  Roberts,  owing  to  a  misunderstanding  that  arose  in 
regard  to  certain  instructions  which  I  had  issued  to  an  officer 
just  before  I  left  South  Africa.  As  this  officer  was  on  the 
spot  when  the  mistake  came  to  light  and  could  give  his 
version  of  it  to  headquarters,  whilst  I  was  in  England 
and  had  no  opportunity  of   giving  mine   either  to  Lord 


126        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Roberts  or  any  one  else,  the  blame  for  it  rested  with  me. 
The  matter  was  later  put  right  by  some  of  my  friends,  and 
in  a  Supplementary  Gazette  published  in  November  1901  I 
was  promoted  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel.  As  the  brevet 
took  effect  from  the  date  of  the  first  Gazette,  November 
1900,  I  lost  nothing  by  the  delay. 


CHAPTER  IX 

HEAD   OF   THE   FOREIGN   INTELLIGENCE   SECTION, 
WAR   OFFICE 

Resume  work  in  Intelligence  Division — Lord  Roberts  returns  to  England 
and  becomes  Commander-in-Chief — Visit  defended  ports — Intelli- 
gence and  mobilisation  combined  under  the  charge  of  SirW.  Nicholson 
— Am  made  head  of  the  Foreign  Section  of  Intelhgence — Promoted 
Colonel  1904 — Selection  of  MiUtary  Attaches — Preparations  for  war 
hampered  by  lack  of  a  poUcy — Our  international  position — Defence 
of  India — Examination  of  it  and  Lord  Kitchener's  objections  to  our 
calculations — Esher  Committee — Reorganisation  of  War  Ofhce  and 
formation  of  General  Staff — Post  of  Commander-in-Chief  abohshed 
— Sir  N.  Lyttelton  becomes  first  Chief  of  the  General  Staff — Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence  estabUshed— War  preparations  now 
become  more  feasible — Bogy  of  Russian  attack  on  India  disappears 
and  contingency  of  war  with  Germany  begins  to  take  its  place — 
Agreements  made  with  France,  Russia,  and  Japan — Expeditionary 
Force  formed— Grierson  and  Huguet  largely  instrumental  in  this — 
Lord  Roberts  resigns  from  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence — First 
attempt  to  give  a  military  lecture — Visits  between  1 902-1 906  to 
Northern  Africa,  Canada,  America,  the  Balkans,  Belgium,  Portugal, 
Germany,  and  other  European  countries — Leave  War  Office  on 
expiration  of  appointment — Placed  on  half-pay,  1907. 

Lord  Roberts  returned  to  England  at  the  end  of  1900  and 
became  Commander-in-Chief  in  place  of  Lord  Wolseley, 
whose  departure  from  the  War  Office  was  greatly  regretted 
by  all  who  had  served  under  him.  He  had  given  many 
years  of  faithful  service  to  the  State,  and  the  ungenerous 
criticisms  levelled  against  him  in  ParHament,  concerning  his 
share  of  the  defects  exposed  by  the  South  African  war,  made 
a  very  unpleasant  impression  upon  those  who  were  aware 
of  the  numerous  obstructions  to  military  efficiency,  in  high 
as  well  as  in  low  places,  with  which  he  had  for  so  long  to 
contend,  not  only  when  Commander-in-Chief  but  before  he 
held  that  appointment.  It  is  doubtful  if,  in  face  of  these 
obstructions,  any  other  man  of  the  time  could  have  done 

127 


128        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

half  as  much  for  the  education  and  training  of  the  British 
Army  as  was  achieved  by  this  eminent  soldier. 

The  war  had  shown  the  necessity  for  having  a  more 
efficient  military  organisation,  both  for  foreign  service  and 
home  defence,  and  following  upon  the  appointment  of  Mr. 
Brodrick  (now  Earl  of  Midleton)  as  War  Secretary  various 
measures  for  improving  the  training,  equipment,  and  organ- 
isation of  the  forces  were  carried  out.  The  basis  of  them 
was,  in  addition  to  an  adequate  provision  for  home  defence, 
the  ability  to  send  three  army  corps  abroad.  The  un- 
necessarily large  garrisons  of  defended  ports  were  also 
brought  under  revision.  These,  consisting  mainly  of 
volunteers,  had  in  many  cases  been  recruited  more  in 
accordance  v/ith  the  local  supply  of  men  than  with  the 
needs  of  local  defence,  and  they  included  an  excessive 
number  of  garrison  artillery,  this  branch  being  more  popular 
than  the  infantry.  It  was  therefore  decided  to  bring  the 
numbers  into  line  with  actual  requirements,  and  for  this 
purpose  a  War  Office  committee  was  appointed  to  visit  the 
ports,  twenty-six  in  number,  and,  in  consultation  with  the 
local  authorities,  settle  the  garrison  of  each  on  the  spot.  I 
was  made  a  member  of  the  committee  and  so  derived  much 
useful  knowledge  of  coast  defence  matters,  which  stood  me 
in  good  stead  in  after  years  and  more  particularly  when  I 
was  in  command  of  the  forces  in  Great  Britain.  The  work 
of  the  committee  extended  over  a  period  of  about  five 
months. 

Several  other  useful  reforms  were  made,  both  in  the 
commands  and  at  the  War  Office,  but  I  shall  mention  only 
the  one  which  directly  concerned  myself — the  amalgama- 
tion of  the  Mobilisation  and  Intelligence  Divisions  under 
the  control  of  Sir  William  Nicholson,  whose  title  of  Director 
of  Military  Intelligence  was  altered  to  Director-General  of 
MobiUsation  and  Intelligence,  and  his  functions  were  corre- 
spondingly enlarged. 

The  Intelligence  Division  was  subdivided  into  three 
sections,  of  which  the  first,  or  Imperial,  Section  (practically 
the  old  Colonial  Section  under  another  name)  was  made 
responsible  for  the  preparation  of  plans  of  operations  for 
the  military  defence  of  the  Empire,  and  for  the  collection 


THE  INTELLIGENCE  DIVISION  129 

of  information  relating  to  its  military  geography  and 
resources,  the  United  Kingdom  and  India  being  excluded 
in  each  case.  The  second,  or  Foreign,  Section  was  made 
responsible  for  collecting  information  regarding  the  military 
resources,  geography,  and  armed  forces  of  all  foreign 
countries,  conducting  correspondence  with  military  attaches, 
and  examining  foreign  journals  and  literature.  The  third, 
or  Special,  Section  dealt  with  censorship,  preparation  of 
maps,  maintenance  of  libraries,  and  ofhce  routine  in  general. 
Each  of  the  three  sections  was  placed  under  an  Assistant 
Quartermaster-General,  and  divided  into  a  number  of  sub- 
sections each  headed  by  a  Deputy  Assistant  Quartermaster- 
General.  In  this  way  the  officers  of  the  Intelligence  Division 
once  more  took  their  designation  from  the  Quartermaster- 
General's  department,  although  they  had  no  more  connection 
with  that  department  than  they  had  had  with  the  Adjutant- 
General's  department,  the  designation  by  which  they  had 
been  known  for  some  years  previously. 

Altham  was  appointed  head  of  the  Imperial  Section ; 
Trotter,  who  had  been  Assistant  Adjutant-General  of  the 
old  Intelligence  Division,  remained  with  the  Special  Section  ; 
and  to  my  surprise  Nicholson  selected  me  for  the  Foreign 
Section.  Thus  at  one  bound  I  went  from  Staff  Captain  to 
Assistant  Quartermaster- General,  and  from  being  the  jxmior 
of  two  officers  in  the  Colonial  Section  I  became  the  chief  of 
a  section  having  a  staff  of  nine  officers.  This  advancement 
came  at  a  most  opportune  moment,  for  about  the  same  time 
my  promotion  to  Brevet  Lieutenant-Colonel  was  annoimced, 
and  according  to  the  regulations  of  the  period  the  appoint- 
ment of  Assistant  Quartermaster-General  automatically 
carried  with  it  promotion  to  Colonel  at  the  end  of  three 
years  in  the  brevet  rank  just  mentioned.  As  the  brevet 
dated  from  the  29th  November  1900,  it  followed  that  if 
I  continued  to  hold  the  new  post  till  the  29th  November 
1903,  I  would  then  become  Colonel.  This  happened,  and 
from  being  one  of  the  oldest  Lieutenants  in  the  army  in 
1895  I  became  in  less  than  nine  years  one  of  the  youngest 
Colonels. 

The  new  appointment  had  the  further  advantage  of 
extending  my  studies  to  countries  with  which  I  had  not 

K 


130        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

previously  been  officially  connected.  At  Simla  experience  had 
been  gained  in  the  affairs  of  India  and  the  adjoining  states  ; 
in  the  Colonial  Section  I  had  learnt  something  about  the 
remaining  British  possessions  oversea  ;  the  Foreign  Section, 
embracing  all  foreign  countries,  completed  the  circuit  of  the 
globe,  and  gave  me  a  valuable  insight  into  international 
questions  of  great  importance. 

On  taking  over  the  new  duties  I  found  that,  chiefly 
owing  to  an  inadequate  staff,  imperfect  organisation,  and 
the  lack  of  clear  direction,  there  was  not,  with  one  exception, 
which  shall  be  nameless,  a  single  up-to-date  statement  giving 
a  comprehensive  and  considered  estimate  of  the  military 
resources  of  any  foreign  country.  One  reason  for  this  was 
that  there  was  as  yet  no  General  Staff,  and  the  Intelligence 
Division,  which  strove  to  do  the  work  of  a  General  Staff, 
had  been  starved.  The  few  officers  employed  in  it  had 
worked  hard  and  done  their  best,  but  the  system  and  circum- 
stances were  all  against  them. 

There  were  in  the  Foreign  Section  some  small  non- 
confidential hand-books,  largely  compiled  from  newspapers 
and  other  unofficial  publications,  which  related  to  the 
strength  and  organisation  of  most  of  the  foreign  armies. 
These,  though  good  enough  in  their  way  as  an  elementary 
basis  to  work  upon,  did  not  contain,  and  did  not  pretend 
to  contain,  anything  of  much  value  in  regard  to  strategical 
questions,  strong  places,  or  the  general  military  resources 
of  the  countries  to  which  they  referred.  There  were  also 
various  memoranda  which  dealt  with  certain  operations 
that  we  might  have  to  undertake  in  the  event  of  war,  but 
these,  again,  though  useful  for  the  specific  purpose  they 
were  intended  to  serve,  did  not  give  a  complete  survey  of 
the  enemy's  resources  as  a  whole,  or  anything  like  it. 

After  ascertaining  how  matters  stood  I  discussed  them 
with  Nicholson  and  we  agreed  that  we  must  make  the  best 
tentative  arrangements  we  could,  and  try  to  reach  a  higher 
standard  later  on.  The  first  essential  was  to  obtain  more 
complete  information  than  we  then  had,  and  to  do  this 
more  funds  were  required  for  intelligence  work,  as  well  as 
a  better  method  of  appointing  military  attaches.  More 
funds  were  provided,  thanks  to  the  ready  co-operation  of 


MILITARY  ATTACHES  131 

the  Foreign  Office ;  more  proficient  military  attaches  were 
not,  in  all  cases. 

These  officers  were  for  the  most  part  underpaid,  and 
were  all  paid  at  the  same  rate,  irrespective  of  the  particular 
capital  to  which  they  were  accredited.  That  Paris  life  was 
infinitely  more  expensive  than  life  at  Peking,  and  that  the 
amount  of  information  procurable  by  a  mihtary  attache  was 
largely  governed  by  the  amount  of  money  he  could  spend 
in  entertaining  those  from  whom  he  might  hope  to  procure 
it,  were  facts  which  left  the  Treasury  mind  unmoved.  The 
result  was  that  these  important  posts  were  often  given  to 
officers  who  were  rich,  in  preference  to  officers  who  were 
not,  though  the  latter  might  be  professionally  much  better 
quahfied  to  fill  them. 

Other  influences  were  brought  to  bear  on  the  selection 
of  mihtary  attaches  (which  did  not  rest  solely  or  even  mainly 
with  the  War  Office),  and  it  was  not  uncommon  for  an 
officer  to  be  chosen  because  he  was  a  society  favourite,  or 
had  an  attractive  wife,  or  a  friend  in  the  Foreign  Office, 
or  for  some  equally  insufficient  reason.  I  have  known 
officers  to  be  selected  who,  besides  being  unsuitable  on 
mihtary  grounds,  had  no  knowledge  of  the  language  of  the 
country  to  which  they  were  sent,  or  of  any  other  except 
their  own. 

I  remember  a  military  attache  at  one  of  the  European 
capitals  who,  regarded  by  the  other  attaches  as  a  favourable 
target  for  their  practical  jokes,  sent  us  a  map,  under  every 
precaution  of  secrecy  in  the  way  of  seahng-wax,  red-tape,  and 
extra  envelopes,  showing  the  peace  distribution  of  the  armed 
forces  of  a  certain  country,  which  he  stated  had  been 
confidentially  given  to  him  by  a  friendly  coUeague.  In- 
credible as  it  may  seem,  the  price  of  the  map  and  the  name 
of  its  continental  pubhsher  were  printed  at  the  bottom,  the 
sender  either  not  having  observed  this  or  being  too  ignorant 
of  European  languages  to  be  able  to  read  it  !  In  the  case 
of  more  than  one  military  attache  the  lack  of  a  reasonable 
knowledge  of  the  language  of  the  country  was  responsible  for 
many  ludicrous  as  weU  as  alarming  reports  being  sent  to  us, 
and  it  was  no  doubt  equally  answerable  for  our  not  receiving 
much  information  that  ought  to  have  been  sent.     I  tried 


132        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

to  ensure  that  only  properly  qualified  officers  should  be 
selected,  but  the  exterior  influences  mentioned  sometimes 
proved  to  be  too  strong  for  me. 

Another  improvement  needed  was  to  give  my  subordin- 
ates greater  facilities  for  visiting  the  countries  with  which 
they  had  to  deal,  so  that  they  might  acquire  a  personal 
knowledge  of  them  and  not  be  entirely  dependent,  as  some 
of  them  were,  upon  what  they  read  or  were  told.  The  time 
and  money  expended  upon  these  visits,  which  I  sanctioned 
as  frequently  as  possible,  were  more  than  justified.  I  was 
fortunate  in  having  some  very  hard-working  and  capable 
assistants  during  the  five  years  I  was  in  charge  of 
the  Foreign  Section.  They  included  Lawrence  of  the  17th 
Lancers;  Macbean,  Forestier-Walker,  Crowe,  Fasson,  Milne, 
and  Thwaites  of  the  artillery;  Edmonds  and  Williams  of  the 
engineers ;  Romer,  Malcolm,  and  Lynden  Bell  of  the  infantry ; 
Holman  and  Black  of  the  Indian  army.  Nearly  all  held 
high  positions  in  the  Great  War.  Milne  commanded  the 
British  army  in  Macedonia  from  May  19 16  onwards,  and 
Lawrence  became  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  on  the  West 
Front  in  January  1918. 

Since  it  is  not  possible,  and  should  never  be  necessary  to 
try,  to  prepare  at  one  and  the  same  time  for  half-a-dozen 
different  wars,  soldiers  charged  with  the  duty  of  preparation 
aim  at  making  ready  for  the  greatest  and  the  most  probable 
war  in  which  their  army  may  become  engaged.  I  set  out 
with  this  purpose  in  view,  and  was  immediately  confronted 
with  the  difficulty  of  deciding  what  particular  war  ought  to 
be  regarded  as  the  most  probable,  as  this  depended  upon 
the  policy  of  the  Government,  and  upon  that  question  I  was 
not  in  possession  of  any  definite  pronouncement.  I  therefore 
took  steps  to  obtain  one,  beginning  with  the  examination  of 
some  old  papers  which  dealt  with  our  military  obligations 
under  various  treaties  and  agreements,  and  I  found  thar 
whilst  the  necessity  for  fulfilling  some  of  these  obligations 
was  unlikely  ever  to  arise,  others  were  of  great  importance 
and  in  the  near  future  might  possibly  make  heavy  demands 
upon  us.  I  prepared  a  memorandum  in  which  I  reviewed 
the  whole  of  them  from  a  miUtary  standpoint,  taking  each 
one  separately,  and  after  discussing  the  responsibilities  they 


THE  INTERNATIONAL  POSITION  133 

involved  I  asked  for  instructions  as  to  whether  it  was 
desired  that  the  army  should  be  prepared  to  carry  them 
out.  My  object  was  twofold  :  first,  to  take  steps  for  pro- 
curing the  information  required  for  those  operations  which, 
in  pursuance  of  the  pohcy  of  the  Government,  might  one 
day  have  to  be  undertaken  ;  and,  secondly,  to  avoid  waste 
of  time  over  those  which  in  all  probability  would  never 
be  undertaken. 

After  being  approved  by  my  military  superiors,  the 
memorandum  proceeded  on  its  way  to  the  ministers  con- 
cerned, and  I  hoped  to  receive  such  a  reply  from  them  as 
would  enable  me  to  direct  the  work  of  my  officers  into  the 
most  profitable  channels.  One  ministerial  minute  was,  to 
the  best  of  my  memory,  something  like  this  :  "  I  do  not 
know  what  benefit  you  expect  to  derive  from  meditations 
of  this  kind.  At  any  rate,  I  can  contribute  nothing  useful. 
The  policy  to  be  adopted  in  the  contingency  you  mention 
must  necessarily  be  decided  by  the  Government  of  the  day, 
when  the  time  comes,  and  it  cannot  be  decided  now."  I 
quite  realised  that  a  definite  decision  could  not  then  be 
reached  in  respect  of  a  situation  which  might  not  arise  for 
several  years,  if  ever,  since  the  attendant  circumstances 
might  change  in  the  meantime  ;  but  I  had  hoped,  neverthe- 
less, that  my  cherished  memorandum  would  elicit  somewhat 
better  guidance  than  was  furnished  by  the  minute  just 
quoted,  and  that  I  would  not  have  to  continue  to  rely 
entirely  on  my  own  judgment  as  to  the  preparations  that 
should  be  made.     I  became  wiser  as  I  grew  older. 

Our  international  position  was  not  altogether  satisfactory 
at  this  period,  and  there  were  outstanding  questions  with 
more  than  one  of  the  Great  Powers  which  might  any  day 
give  rise  to  trouble.  For  example,  France  was  feeling  sore 
over  the  Fashoda  incident ;  her  colonial  party  were,  we 
thought,  unduly  aggressive  ;  and,  in  general,  it  had  become 
the  fashion  for  the  two  nations  to  look  upon  each  other  as 
possible  future  enemies.  There  was  never  any  good  reason 
why  they  should  have  drifted  into  this  regrettable  frame 
of  mind,  but  Germany  may  have  been  answerable  for  it  to 
some  extent.  Russia,  as  for  years  past,  was  considered  to 
be  another  country  with  whom  we  might  come  into  conflict. 


134        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  it  was  a  common  argument  that  her  proceedings  in  the 
Middle  East  and  Central  Asia  could  best  be  countered  by 
our  forming  an  alliance  with  Germany. 

I  had  not  been  a  year  in  my  new  post,  however,  before 
I  became  convinced,  and  stated  so  officially,  that  instead 
of  regarding  Germany  as  a  suitable  ally  we  ought  to  look 
upon  her  as  our  most  formidable  rival,  and  that  the  con- 
tingency of  war  with  her  ought  to  set  the  standard  of  our 
military  requirements.  Either  because  of  the  disbelief  that 
such  a  war  would  ever  come,  or  because  of  the  idea  that 
if  it  came  we  would  not  fight  it  out  on  the  Continent,  this 
opinion  was  not  yet  shared  by  those  responsible  for  laying 
down  policy,  and  they  decided  that  the  defence  of  India 
as  against  Russia  should  be  the  first  problem  examined. 
The  Commander-in-Chief,  Lord  Roberts,  having  passed 
most  of  his  life  in  India,  was  also  inclined  to  give  that 
country  priority  of  treatment,  and  for  several  months  I 
was  kept  busy  in  preparing  for  the  Defence  Committee  of 
the  Cabinet  a  series  of  papers  on  the  subject.  Thanks 
to  my  four  years'  apprenticeship  in  the  Intelligence  Branch 
at  Simla,  and  to  the  knowledge  of  the  North- West  Frontier 
which  I  had  acquired  on  the  spot,  I  was  fairly  well 
acquainted  with  the  conditions  which  govern  military 
operations  in  this  part  of  the  world,  but  some  of  the  questions 
propounded  were  nevertheless  beyond  my  power  to  answer. 

I  remember  once  being  asked  to  prepare  a  statement 
showing  the  monthly  progress  likely  to  be  made  by  the 
opposing  forces,  during  the  first  six  months  of  war,  in  the 
event  of  a  Russian  advance  on  India  through  Afghanistan. 
The  situation  in  all  wars  is  apt  to  develop  in  a  totally  un- 
expected manner,  and  this  particular  problem  was  beset  with 
numerous  uncertainties  peculiarly  its  own  :  for  instance,  the 
attitude  of  the  Afghans,  who  were  constantly  fighting  amongst 
themselves  and  about  whom  the  only  sure  thing  was  that  they 
would  pillage  and  murder  both  belligerents  indiscriminately 
whenever  occasion  offered  ;  the  feasibility  of  our  collect- 
ing within  given  periods  of  time  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
camels  for  transport  purposes,  for  which  no  reliable  arrange- 
ments had  been  made  or  could  be  made,  and  which  depended 
partly  upon  the  season  of  the  year  ;   and  the  rate  at  which 


DEFENCE  OF  INDIA  135 

roads  and  railways  could  be  constructed  across  the  500 
miles  of  mountainous  country  lying  between  the  Russian 
and  British  frontiers. 

These  and  similar  calculations  could  be  nothing  more 
than  mere  guess-work,  different  people  making  different 
guesses,  and  this  was  especially  so  as  regards  railways, 
because  no  survey  for  them  had  ever  been  made  except  for 
the  stretch  between  Quetta  and  Kandahar  at  the  end  of  the 
last  Afghan  war,  and  even  it  had  since  been  lost  !  How- 
ever, assisted  by  Holman,  who  was  in  charge  of  the  Indian 
sub-section,  I  produced  the  required  statement,  with  maps, 
showing  what  the  dispositions  of  the  British  and  Russian 
armies  might  be  at  the  end  of  each  month,  and,  in  order 
that  there  should  be  no  misapprehension  about  it,  I  added 
that  it  was  practically  worthless,  and  for  the  reasons  once 
given  by  Moltke,  who  had  said  : 

"  It  is  a  delusion  to  imagine  that  a  plan  of  campaign 
can  be  laid  down  far  ahead  and  fulfilled  with  exactitude. 
The  colUsion  with  the  enemy  creates  a  new  situation  in 
accordance  with  its  result.  Some  things  intended  will 
have  become  impracticable  ;  others,  which  originally  seemed 
impossible,  become  feasible.  All  that  the  leader  of  an  army 
can  do  is  to  form  a  correct  estimate  of  the  circumstances, 
decide  for  the  best  for  the  moment,  and  carry  out  his  purpose 
unflinchingly." 

When  our  calculations  were  communicated  to  India  they 
did  not  at  all  meet  with  the  approval  of  Lord  Kitchener, 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  who  was  then  pressing  the  home 
authorities  to  sanction  certain  reforms  in  the  Indian  army, 
including  considerable  additions  to  its  strength.  In  order 
to  show  how  utterly  wrong  the  calculations  were,  he  caused 
a  "  war  game  "  to  be  played  at  Simla  illustrating  the  danger 
to  which  India  would  be  exposed  if  attacked  by  Russia,  and 
he  sent  the  "  proceedings  "  of  it  to  the  India  Office. 

It  is  always  wise  when  studying  problems  of  this  kind 
to  take,  within  reason,  the  circumstances  least  favourable 
to  oneself,  and  as  there  were  many  important  matters  con- 
nected with  the  Indian  army  which  then  urgently  needed 
improvement  Lord  Kitchener  may  be  excused  for  making 
his  own  case  appear  as  bad  as  he  possibly  could.     But  he 


136        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

"  protested  "  a  little  too  much  in  his  war  game.  He 
assumed,  amongst  other  things,  that  Russia  would  be  able 
to  transfer  large  numbers  of  troops  from  Europe  to  Central 
Asia,  and  collect  there  hundreds  of  thousands  of  camels  and 
other  transport  animals,  ready  to  jump  across  the  Oxus — 
a  formidable  river — and  enter  Afghanistan,  almost  if  not 
quite  before  we  knew  anything  about  what  she  was  doing. 
The  result  of  this  invaluable  start  and  other  exaggerations 
was  that,  in  the  imaginary  advance  which  followed,  the 
Russian  troops  bounded  from  one  success  to  another  with 
the  most  astonishing  rapidity,  and  to  the  complete  over- 
throw of  the  existing  arrangements  for  Indian  defence. 

The  arrival  of  the  "  proceedings  "  created  some  excite- 
ment in  Whitehall,  where  they  were  apparently  regarded 
as  affording  infallible  proof  of  what  Russia  could  actually 
do,  and  undeniable  evidence  that  we  had  been  terribly  out 
in  the  calculations  we  had  made.  They  found  their  way 
to  me  for  examination,  and  I  had  to  explain  that  a  war 
game  was  by  no  means  the  same  thing  as  war,  and  that 
some  of  the  assumptions  made  in  the  game  were  quite  un- 
tenable. A  lengthy  correspondence  with  India  ensued,  and 
officers  were  sent  home  to  prove  that  the  Indian  calcula- 
tions were  right  and  ours  were  wrong.  They  failed  to 
carry  their  point,  but  the  game  probably  went  a  long  way 
towards  fulfilling  Lord  Kitchener's  real  purpose,  which 
was  to  obtain  early  sanction  for  the  reforms  he  was 
advocating. 

In  1903  the  Esher  Committee,  consisting  of  Lord  Esher, 
Sir  John  (afterwards  Lord)  Fisher,  and  Sir  George  Clarke 
(now  Lord  Sydenham),  was  appointed  to  advise  the  Govern- 
ment as  to  the  reorganisation  of  the  War  Office.  It  recom- 
mended that  the  old  constitution  should  be  replaced  by  an 
Army  Council  on  lines  similar  to  the  Board  of  Admiralty, 
the  post  of  Commander-in-Chief  being  abolished,  and,  most 
important  of  all,  that  a  General  Staff  should  be  created. 
This  system  was  introduced  in  February  1904.  Lord  Roberts 
left  the  War  Office,  becoming  a  member  of  the  new  Com- 
mittee of  Imperial  Defence,  and  the  heads  of  the  principal 
departments  were  superseded  by  other  officers,  as  the  new 
measures  were  held  to  require  the  services  of  new  men. 


THE  ESHER  COMMITTEE  137 

That  may  have  been  so,  but  the  scant  courtesy  with  which 
the  changes  were  made  was  the  cause  of  much  adverse 
comment,  and  not  without  reason,  as  it  showed  but  Httle 
consideration  for  the  feehngs  of  the  officers  who  were 
suddenly  removed  from  their  posts,  after  having  served 
their  country  with  distinction  for  a  long  period  of  years. 

Nicholson  was  one  of  those  to  go,  much  to  his  surprise, 
for  he  had  been  frequently  consulted  by  the  committee 
with  respect  to  the  most  suitable  organisation  to  be  estab- 
hshed,  and  he  apparently  had  hoped  to  become  the  first  Chief 
of  the  newly-formed  General  Staff.  He  was  quite  stunned 
by  his  abrupt  and  unexpected  dismissal,  and  although  he 
became  Quartermaster-General  a  year  or  two  later,  and 
subsequently  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  he  was 
never  quite  the  same  man  again.  He  seemed  to  have  been 
robbed  of  some  of  his  old  military  zeal ;  and  being  hurt  at 
the  treatment  he  had  received,  his  habit  of  appearing  some- 
what cynical  in  manner — though  in  reality  a  kind-hearted 
man — became  rather  more  pronounced  than  before. 

The  General  Staff  was  organised  in  three  directorates — 
Military  operations.  Staff  duties,  and  Military  training — 
and  the  post  of  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  was  entrusted 
to  Lieutenant-General  Sir  Neville  Lyttelton.  The  Mihtary 
operations  directorate  was  practically  the  existing  Intelli- 
gence Division  under  another  name,  the  head  of  it  being 
my  old  friend  Grierson,  and  his  three  immediate  subordinates 
were  styled  Assistant  Directors.  The  Foreign  Section  of 
the  directorate,  of  which  I  remained  in  charge,  was  expanded 
from  four  to  eight  subdivisions,  the  number  of  officers  in 
it  being  increased  from  nine  to  twenty. 

The  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  also  constituted 
on  the  recommendation  of  the  Esher  Committee,  absorbed 
the  functions  of  the  Defence  Committee  of  the  Cabinet 
and  of  the  Colonial  Defence  Committee.  These  measures, 
together  with  the  long-overdue  formation  of  a  General 
Staff,  went  far  to  remedy  the  hopeless  methods  by  which 
matters  concerning  the  defence  of  the  Empire  had  pre- 
viously been  conducted.  For  the  first  time  naval  and 
military  questions  now  began  to  be  seriously  investigated, 
and  the  activities   of  the  different  State  departments  to 


138        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

be  intelligently  co-ordinated.  Appreciable  progress  in  the 
preparation  for  war  became  possible,  and  plans  of  opera- 
tions for  use  in  case  of  need  were  worked  out  between 
my  section  and  the  Imperial  Section  presided  over  by 
Altham,  who  was  later  succeeded  by  Callwell.  Taking  as 
a  pattern  the  valuable  report  we  had  on  one  country — 
which  I  have  previously  mentioned  as  being  the  only  one 
of  its  kind  in  our  possession — the  miUtary  resources  of  every 
country  in  the  world  in  which  our  troops  might  conceivably 
be  employed  were  surveyed,  and  by  the  end  of  1906  reasoned 
conclusions  thereon  had  been  reached.  In  the  nature  of 
things  this  survey  could  only  be  provisional  in  the  first 
instance,  but  it  constituted  a  systematic  beginning  which 
could  be  and  was  subsequently  developed  and  improved  as 
facilities  permitted. 

We  were  also  able,  being  at  last  organised  as  a  General 
Staff,  to  furnish  the  Foreign  Office  and  the  Committee  of 
Imperial  Defence  with  considered  military  advice  in  regard 
to  several  international  questions  which  had  to  be  dealt 
with  at  this  time.  Amongst  them  our  relations  with 
France  took  a  prominent  place,  for  besides  the  Fashoda 
sore  there  were  disputes  connected  with  Morocco,  Egypt, 
Siam,  Madagascar,  New  Hebrides,  various  Colonial 
boundaries  in  West  and  Central  Africa,  and  the  fishing 
rights  off  Newfoundland,  the  latter  wrangle  dating  back 
to  the  time  of  the  old  French  ascendancy  in  North  America. 
Owing  to  the  clear  vision  of  King  Edward,  who  paid  his  first 
ofiicial  visit  to  Paris  in  May  1903,  to  the  efforts  of  the  two 
Foreign  Ministers,  Lord  Lansdowne  and  M.  Delcasse,  and 
to  the  goodwill  shown  by  the  two  nations  in  general,  these 
causes  of  friction  were  satisfactorily  removed  by  the  Anglo- 
French  Agreement  of  1904,  and  this,  under  stress  of  events, 
quickly  developed  into  the  "  Entente  "  which  was  destined 
to  prove  so  valuable  to  both  countries  ten  years  later. 

The  Entente  with  France  led  to  a  reconsideration  of  our 
long  and  dangerous  rivalry  with  Russia,  the  chief  bones  of 
contention  in  this  case  being  Afghanistan,  Persia,  and 
Tibet.  The  negotiations  were  very  prolonged — India  and 
the  India  Office  as  well  as  the  Foreign  Office  taking  part  in 
them — and  they  were  still  going  on  when  I  left  the  War 


THE  GERMAN  MENACE  139 

Office  at  the  beginning  of  1907.  In  August  of  that  year, 
however,  an  agreement  was  signed,  for  which  Sir  Edward 
(now  Lord)  Grey  deserves  great  credit,  and  the  triple 
entente,  as  confronting  the  triple  alliance,  was  thus  brought 
into  being. 

Another  important  question  upon  which  the  General 
Staff  was  asked  to  advise  was  the  renewal  and  amendment 
of  the  Anglo- Japanese  treaty  signed  in  1902.  It  had  been 
concluded  for  a  term  of  five  years,  but  in  1905,  while  the 
Russo-Japanese  war  was  still  in  progress,  it  was  replaced 
by  a  new  treaty  of  wider  scope  and  covering  a  period  of 
ten  years. 

A  special  advantage  derived  from  these  and  similar 
investigations  was  that  the  bogy  of  a  Russian  attack  on 
India,  over  which  so  much  labour  had  been  wasted  in  1901 
and  1902,  was  relegated  to  the  background  ;  and  more  time 
and  thought  could  be  devoted  to  the  real  enemy,  Germany, 
who,  in  the  eyes  of  all  but  the  wilfully  blind,  was  pursuing 
a  policy  that  was  bound  to  bring  her,  sooner  or  later,  into 
conflict  with  us.  It  is  strange  that  so  many  people  should 
have  refused  to  accept  this  view.  I  remember  that  as  late 
as  1912  a  Cabinet  Minister  once  said  to  me,  in  reply  to  my 
remark  that  war  with  Germany  was  inevitable  :  "  No, 
General,  I  would  not  say  inevitable,  but  conceivable." 
His  way  of  stating  the  case  may  have  been  more  technically 
correct  than  mine,  for  no  war  can,  strictly  speaking,  be 
classed  as  inevitable  till  it  has  begun,  but  mine  seemed  to 
me  the  simpler  and  safer  basis  to  work  upon,  and  it  did  not 
prove  to  be  inaccurate. 

Grierson  was  as  convinced  as  myself  that  the  only 
policy  consistent  with  the  interests  of  the  Empire  was  an 
active  alliance  with  France  and  Belgium,  and  although  no 
such  alliance  was  made  arrangements  were  unofficially 
put  in  train  for  ensuring  mutual  military  assistance  in  case 
of  war.  I  had  some  capital  officers  in  my  German  and 
French  sections  whose  business  it  was  to  work  out  the 
details,  and  as  a  matter  of  interest  I  may  add  that  our 
prophecy  at  the  time  was  that  the  Great  War  would  come 
in  1915,  the  year  in  which,  according  to  what  has  since  trans- 
pired, the  enemy  apparently  intended  that  it  should  come. 


140        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

In  combination  with  Colonel  Huguet,  the  French 
military  attache  in  London,  Grierson  did  more  than  any 
other  officer  of  his  time  to  establish  good  relations  between 
the  French  and  British  armies,  and  it  is  true  to  say  that 
the  success  which  attended  the  despatch  of  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force  in  1914  was  due  first  and  foremost  to  his 
initiative  and  foresight  when  Director  of  MiHtary  Operations 
in  1904-1906.  During  1905  we  visited  in  company  portions 
of  the  Franco-Belgian  frontier  on  which  much  of  the  fighting 
in  1914  took  place,  and  the  forecast  he  then  made  of  the 
course  of  events  proved  to  be  in  many  respects  singularly 
accurate,  though  I  confess  that  neither  of  us  foresaw  the 
four  years'  struggle  against  entrenched  positions  extending 
from  the  North  Sea  to  Switzerland. 

Grierson  was  a  great  favourite  with  all  officers  in  the 
directorate,  and  indeed  was  one  of  the  most  popular  men 
in  the  army,  particularly  so  with  the  rank  and  file.  He 
had  an  unrivalled  knowledge  of  all  foreign  armies,  more 
especially  of  the  German  army,  and  his  sudden  death  from 
heart  failure,  when  travelling  by  train  through  France 
on  the  i8th  of  August  1914  as  Commander  of  the  Second 
Army  Corps,  was  one  of  the  tragedies  of  the  war. 

The  Expeditionary  Force  was  formed  after  Mr.  (now 
Lord)  Haldane  became  Secretary  of  State  for  War  in  1905. 
At  the  same  time  the  militia  was  converted  into  the  Special 
Reserve,  with  the  duty  of  providing  drafts  for  the  regular 
battalions  at  the  front  ;  and  the  volunteers  became  the 
Territorial  Force  of  fourteen  divisions  for  home  defence. 
This  organisation  was  a  great  improvement  on  the  old  one, 
but  it  nevertheless  suffered  from  serious  defects.  The 
Expeditionary  Force  was  obviously  not  strong  enough  to 
intervene  effectively  in  a  Franco-German  war — judging 
from  the  extensive  preparations  for  war  then  being  made 
by  Germany  ;  the  Special  Reserve  could  not  be  kept  up 
to  strength  and  never  was  ;  while,  owing  to  inadequate 
training  and  other  reasons,  a  considerable  portion  of  the 
Territorial  Force  could  not  be  made  efficient,  and  by  the 
terms  of  its  engagement  it  was  not  available  for  service 
outside  the  United  Kingdom. 

The  fact  was,  as  so  often  before  in  our  history,  that  the 


THE  COMMITTEE  OF  IMPERIAL  DEFENCE     141 

strength  and  organisation  of  our  army  were  not  determined 
by  the  requirements  of  our  habilities,  but  by  what  our 
existing  methods  of  recruiting  could  produce  within  the 
financial  hmits  imposed  by  such  annual  estimates  as  it 
was  politically  expedient  to  lay  before  parliament.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  measures  taken  to  ensure  the  efficiency 
of  the  Expeditionary  Force — such  as  it  was — and  to  admit  of 
its  rapid  despatch  oversea  were  far  in  advance  of  anything 
previously  attempted,  while  all  the  world  knows  that  in  the 
Great  War  the  Territorial  Force  covered  itself  with  glory 
in  many  a  hard-fought  battle,  and  provided  an  invaluable 
first  reinforcement  to  the  regular  army  in  France  and 
elsewhere.  For  these  results — at  the  most  critical  period 
of  the  war — Lord  Haldane  is  entitled  to  more  gratitude 
than  is  usually  accorded  to  him. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  1905  Lord  Roberts  resigned 
his  seat  on  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  as  he  was 
anxious  to  warn  his  countrymen  of  the  danger  in  which 
they  stood,  and  felt  that  he  could  not  appropriately  do  this 
while  a  member  of  the  committee.  It  so  happened  that  I 
was  present  at  the  meeting  at  which  he  announced  his 
decision  and  gave  his  reasons  for  it.  In  the  discussion 
which  ensued  the  veteran  Field-Marshal  was  of  course 
hopelessly  outclassed  by  the  professional  debaters  on  the 
committee,  his  manner  of  expression  being  characterised 
rather  by  blunt  honesty  than  dialectical  skill,  but  he 
remained  impervious  to  all  arguments  and  in  a  plain  and 
simple  way  stuck  to  his  guns,  being  convinced  that  his 
first  duty  was  to  his  country,  which  he  believed — and 
rightly  so — to  be  living  in  a  fool's  paradise.  He  has 
sometimes  been  taunted  for  not  speaking  out  and  getting 
more  done  when  Commander-in-Chief,  but  I  doubt  if  he 
himself  fully  reaUsed  the  position  until  1905.  Having  once 
reaUsed  it,  nothing  could  turn  him  away  from  the  object 
he  had  in  view.  England  owes  much  to  Lord  Roberts,  and 
the  loss  of  many  fives  and  much  suffering  might  have  been 
averted  had  his  advice  been  accepted  and  acted  upon 
by  those  responsible — soldiers  as  well  as  civilians — for  the 
welfare  of  the  Empire. 

It  was  whilst  serving  as  Assistant  Director  of  Military 


142        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Operations  that  I  acquired  my  initial  experience  as  a 
military  lecturer,  the  occasion  being  when  I  addressed  the 
Royal  Mihtary  Society  at  Dublin  in  1905.  At  the  time 
there  was  rather  a  mania  for  lectures  on  the  part  of  the 
authorities,  and  those  who  had  to  make  the  local  arrange- 
ments were  often  at  a  loss  to  find  any  one  who  had  some- 
thing useful  to  say,  and  was  capable  of  saying  it.  This  was 
perhaps  the  reason  why  Lord  Grenfell,  then  commanding 
in  Ireland,  asked  me  to  give  a  lecture  on  the  North- West 
Frontier  of  India,  and  although  I  knew  a  good  deal  about 
that  country  I  was  terrified  at  the  prospect  of  having  to 
stand  up  and  talk  about  it  before  an  audience  of  some 
two  or  three  hundred  officers.  I  was  even  more  scared 
when  the  moment  arrived  to  begin,  but  by  degrees  my 
shaking  limbs  were  brought  under  control  and  I  managed 
to  tell  the  story,  previously  committed  to  memory,  without 
entirely  losing  my  wits.  In  fact  the  performance  was  a 
mild  success,  judging  from  what  Lord  Grenfell  was  good 
enough  to  tell  me,  and  afterwards  I  received  several  requests 
to  speak  at  other  mihtary  centres.  I  complied  with  as 
many  as  my  duties  would  permit,  as  they  gave  me  an 
opportunity  of  mixing  with  officers  employed  with  troops, 
and  incidentally  the  experience  proved  helpful  when  I 
later  became  Commandant  of  the  Staff  College. 

As  so  often  happens  in  the  army,  this  form  of  imparting 
instruction  was  carried  to  excess,  and  officers  and  men 
became  rather  "fed  up  "  with  it  both  as  regards  quantity 
and  quality.  There  is  no  more  determined  passive-resister 
in  the  world  than  Tommy,  when  compulsorily  present  at 
a  lecture  or  a  sermon  which  is  not  to  his  liking.  He  simply 
refuses  to  listen,  and  is  invariably  seized  with  an  infectious 
cough  which  rapidly  spreads  throughout  the  audience  or 
congregation,  to  the  utter  discomfiture  of  the  speaker. 

A  similar  craze  for  lectures  broke  out  after  the  Great 
War — the  idea,  a  perfectly  good  one,  being  to  enlarge  the 
scope  of  the  soldier's  education  and  so  fit  him  for  work 
when  he  left  the  army.  Many  lecturers,  supposed  to  be 
experts  in  their  particular  Hne,  were  sent  out  for  this  pur- 
pose to  the  Rhine  when  I  commanded  there  in  1919-20,  and 
while  some  of  them  gave  interesting  and  useful  instruction. 


ON  LEAVE  143 

others  did  not,  and  in  the  aggregate  they  were  too  numerous. 
I  had  to  ask  the  War  Office  to  hmit  the  number,  and  also 
to  exercise  more  discretion  in  the  selection  of  subjects.  I 
explained  that,  for  example,  the  proposed  lectures  on 
"  Pond  life  "  and  "  The  anatomy  of  the  rabbit  "  would 
scarcely  appeal  to  those  men  who  had  already  lived  in  the 
mud  of  Flanders  for  about  four  years,  or  to  those  who, 
hating  rabbits  at  all  times,  had  been  consistently  given  them 
as  rations  on  two  or  three  days  of  the  week  while  serving 
at  home. 

I  utiHsed  most  of  my  annual  leave  between  1902  and  1906 
in  travelUng  abroad,  making  journeys  to  Northern  Africa, 
Canada,  the  United  States,  and  various  countries  in  Europe, 
including  France,  Germany,  Norway,  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Belgium,  Holland,  Luxemburg,  Spain,  Portugal,  and  the 
Balkan  Peninsula. 

On  one  occasion  when  visiting  the  environs  of  Metz  I 
barely  escaped  being  locked  up  as  a  spy.  The  German 
authorities  were  suspicious  of  all  foreigners,  and  an  order  had 
been  issued,  of  which  I  was  ignorant,  which  forbade  the  latter 
being  in  the  vicinity  of  the  Metz  forts  without  a  special  permit 
signed  by  the  garrison  commander.  I  was  not  at  all  desirous 
of  obtaining  information  regarding  the  forts,  as  they  were 
already  sufficiently  known  to  me.  I  was  merely  re-studying 
the  battle  of  Gravelotte,  and,  when  near  St.  Privat,  a 
detective  in  plain  clothes  appeared  on  the  scene  and  enquired 
in  French  whether  I  was  a  French  officer.  I  gave  him  rather 
an  abrupt  reply  in  English,  thinking  he  was  one  of  the  many 
so-called  guides  who  frequent  the  battlefield,  and  he  then, 
speaking  in  good  Enghsh,  told  me  who  he  was  and  demanded 
my  passport.  As  I  could  not  produce  it,  having  left  it  at 
the  hotel  at  Metz,  he  took  me  by  the  arm  and  said  he  must 
detain  me  in  the  village  police  station,  pending  investiga- 
tion. I  was  careful  to  be  civil  to  him,  and  when  I  expressed 
regret  at  having  broken  the  rules,  and  informed  him  that 
I  was  an  English  colonel,  he  immediately  apologised  and  we 
parted  on  good  terms. 

British  officers  travelling  abroad  sometimes  make  the 
mistake  of  being  too  off-hand  in  their  dealings  with  foreign 
officials,  with  the  result  that  they  may  be  put  to  consider- 


144        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

able  inconvenience  and  even  be  kept  under  arrest,  in  un- 
pleasant and  unsanitary  conditions,  while  a  lengthy  corre- 
spondence is  conducted  between  the  governments  concerned 
before  they  are  released.  More  than  one  such  instance  came 
to  my  knowledge  when  I  was  at  the  War  Office. 

After  parting  company  with  the  detective,  my  wife,  who 
was  with  me,  and  I  cycled  our  hardest  back  to  our  hotel 
and,  suspecting  that  further  enquiries  would  be  instituted, 
packed  our  boxes  and  started  off  for  Niederbronn,  whence  I 
wished  to  visit  the  battlefield  of  Woerth.  I  was  the  more 
anxious  to  get  away  from  Metz  because  my  passport  showed 
that  I  was  Assistant  Director  of  Military  Operations,  and 
had  this  become  known  there  is  little  doubt  after  what  had 
passed  that  I  would  have  been  detained. 

One  of  the  sights  at  Metz  which  attracts  the  attention 
of  all  visitors  is  a  figure  at  the  main  entrance  to  the  cathedral, 
which  bears  a  striking  hkeness  of  the  ex-Kaiser.  Some 
years  ago  the  figure  of  the  prophet  Daniel,  draped  in  Eastern 
costume,  was  about  to  be  placed  there,  and  according  to 
the  local  story  the  order  went  forth  for  the  prophet  to  be 
given  the  ex-Kaiser's  features.  After  the  town  was  occupied 
by  the  French  at  the  end  of  1918  handcuffs  were  placed  on 
the  figure,  and  on  them  was  hung  a  card  inscribed  in  large 
letters,  "  Sic  transit  gloria  mundi !  "  They  were  still 
there  when  I  visited  Metz  in  June  1919. 

I  made  several  journeys  to  the  Belgian  Ardennes,  Namur, 
Liege,  and  the  Meuse  valley  between  these  two  towns. 
They  were  of  special  interest  because  of  the  possibihty  of 
Germany  \dolating  Belgian  neutrality  in  the  event  of  her 
going  to  war  with  France,  and  it  had  become  quite  evident, 
from  her  railway  extensions  alone,  that  she  meant  to  enter 
Belgium.  Before  her  intentions  became  so  obvious,  opinions 
varied  a  good  deal  as  to  what  she  would  do,  as  there  was 
much  to  be  said  both  for  and  against  the  operation  ;  but 
on  balance  it  always  seemed  to  me,  and  so  I  officially  stated, 
that  it  would  be  attempted,  notwithstanding  the  elaborate 
Liege  and  Namur  defences  which  had  been  constructed  at 
great  cost  in  order  to  close  this  line  of  advance. 

When  visiting  the  Peninsula  battlefields  I  first  pro- 
ceeded from  Lisbon  to  the  famous  lines  of  Torres  Vedras, 


THE  PENINSULA  BATTLEFIELDS  145 

which  proved  to  be  a  harder  nut  than  Massena  could  crack 
when  he  stumbled  up  against  them  in  following  Welhngton 
after  the  battle  of  Busaco.  The  passage  of  the  Douro  at 
Oporto,  the  next  place  I  visited,  would  in  these  days  be 
regarded  as  a  minor  operation,  the  French  casualties  being 
estimated  at  five  hundred  killed  and  wounded,  while  the 
British  were  only  slightly  over  a  hundred.  But  it  was 
nevertheless  a  fine  performance.  The  river  at  Oporto  is 
some  three  hundred  yards  wide,  the  current  is  rapid  and 
the  banks  are  precipitous  and  rocky,  and  to  attempt 
to  cross  such  an  obstacle  in  presence  of  the  enemy,  and 
without  a  bridging  train,  was  an  extremely  perilous  and 
daring  undertaking.  Had  Soult  and  his  staff  taken  reason- 
able precautions  the  attempt  ought  not  to  have  succeeded. 

There  is  a  good  club  at  Oporto,  estabUshed  many  years 
ago  by  the  Enghsh  colony  engaged  in  the  port  wine  trade, 
and  as  the  hotels  are  of  a  poor  and  unsanitary  type  I  was 
glad  to  accept  the  privilege  of  its  hospitality.  The  club 
was  used  by  Soult  and  his  staff  before  they  were  so  suddenly 
expelled  from  the  town,  and  their  signatures  are  to  be  seen 
in  the  visitors'  book.  On  the  same  page  are  the  names  of 
Wellington  and  his  staff,  who  it  will  be  remembered  ate 
the  dinner  that  had  been  prepared  for  Soult  and  his  officers. 

The  plateau  of  Busaco  affords  a  magnificent  view  of  the 
surrounding  country,  and  on  it  now  stands  a  large  and 
comfortable  hotel,  originally  intended,  I  believe,  as  a  palace 
for  the  King  of  Portugal.     Tennis,  golf,  and  other  games 
are  played  on  the  ground  where  the  battle  was  fought  on 
the  27th  of  September  1810.      The  battle  ought  to  have 
taken  place  on  the  25th  of  the  month,  before  the  allies  were 
in  position.     Ney  asked  permission  to  attack  on  that  day, 
but  Massena,  hke  other  French  generals  of  his  time,  under- 
rated   Wellington,    and    after    keeping    Ney's    messenger 
waiting  several  hours  he  replied  that  all  action  should  be 
deferred  until  he  arrived  at  the  front.     He  leisurely  appeared 
about  noon  on  the  following  day,  and  then  fixed  the  battle 
for  the  27th  of  September.     By  that  time  the  allies  had 
completed  their  arrangements  for  defence,   and  after  in- 
flicting  some   4500   casualties   on   the   French   and   losing 
about  1500  men  themselves  they  were  able  to  withdraw 

L 


146        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

unmolested,  "  according  to  plan  "  as  we  would  say  in  these 
days,  to  the  lines  of  Torres  Vedras. 

For  the  journey  to  Canada  and  the  United  States  I  could 
not  spare  more  than  about  two  months,  and  therefore  it 
was  not  possible  to  see  much  of  these  two  wonderful  countries. 
The  voyage  from  Liverpool  was  made  under  most  comfort- 
able conditions,  thanks  to  the  kindness  of  the  officials  of 
the  Allan  Line. 

From  Quebec  the  steamer  proceeded  to  Montreal,  where 
I  spent  a  few  days,  and  then  went  on  to  Ottawa.  From 
there  I  continued  the  journey  to  Sault  Ste  Marie,  which 
was  the  farthest  point  west  I  had  time  to  go.  The  amount 
of  shipping  which  passes  through  the  Sault  Ste  Marie,  or 
"  Soo,"  canals  can  be  judged  from  the  fact  that  although 
the  passage  is  closed  for  some  months  in  winter,  the  annual 
amount  of  tonnage  fifteen  years  ago  was  more  than  twice 
that  which  passed  through  the  Suez  Canal.  Since  then  the 
amount  has  become  much  greater.  Wheat,  timber,  iron  ore, 
and  other  minerals  are  the  principal  cargoes.  From  the  Soo 
I  descended  Lake  Huron  to  Detroit,  and  thence  went  to 
Toronto,  the  Niagara  frontier,  and  Buffalo. 

Although  I  saw  but  little  of  Canada,  what  I  did  see 
came  to  me  as  a  great  surprise.  The  large  towns,  with 
their  fine  thoroughfares  and  magnificent  buildings,  have 
an  air  of  business  and  grandeur  of  which  most  people  in 
England  have  little  or  no  conception,  and  the  rate  and 
scale  at  which  the  Dominion  has  been  developed  must  be 
seen  to  be  correctly  appreciated.  I  venture  to  say  that  a 
personal  visit  to  our  Overseas  Dominions  is  an  essential 
part  of  the  education  of  all  high  officials  at  home  whose 
duties  are  in  any  way  connected  with  them,  for  without 
some  such  knowledge  gained  on  the  spot  their  work  will 
probably  be  not  only  valueless  but  may  be  exceedingly 
mischievous. 

From  Buffalo  I  went  to  the  Adirondacks,  an  in- 
teresting country  with  a  delightful  summer  climate,  and 
there,  at  Lake  Placid,  I  struck  my  first  "  dry  "  town  in  the 
States.  For  some  reason  or  other  no  one  seemed  to  pay 
much  attention  to  the  embargo,  and  at  the  hotel  where  I 
stayed  there  was  no  difficulty  in  obtaining  such  wines  as 


A  VISIT  TO  AMERICA  147 

I  required.  The  following  day,  after  a  stage-coach  drive 
of  about  forty  miles,  I  arrived  at  another  town  where  the 
sale  of  alcohol  was  prohibited,  and  there  my  experience 
was  different.  Remembering  my  good  fortune  of  the  day 
before,  I  asked  the  waitress  at  dinner  to  bring  me  a  whisky 
and  soda,  and  she  reminded  me  that  it  was  a  "  dry  "  town. 
Ignoring  her  answer  I  rather  brusquely  repeated  the  request, 
to  which  she  repHed  that  I  could  have  nothing  to  drink 
there,  and  asked  who  I  was  "  trying  to  get  at."  Having 
acquired  a  particularly  bad  thirst  during  the  hot  and  dusty 
drive  I  interviewed  the  manager,  but  for  a  long  time  he, 
too,  was  obdurate.  Finally  he  relented,  took  me  to  his 
wife's  bedroom,  and  told  me  to  wait  there  and  see  what 
happened.  Shortly  afterwards  a  waiter  brought  in  a  bottle 
of  whisky,  soda  water,  and  a  box  of  cigars,  and  told  me 
that,  by  the  orders  of  the  "  boss,"  I  was  to  take  what  I 
wanted,  be  quick  about  it,  and  then  clear  out.  I  carried 
out  all  his  instructions. 

Every  one  has  at  different  times  discovered  how  small 
a  place  the  world  is,  and  a  rather  curious  instance  of  this 
occurred  during  my  drive  through  the  Adirondacks.  A 
fellow-passenger,  an  American,  told  me  in  the  course  of 
conversation  that  a  few  months  before  he  had  given  to 
the  British  Consul  at  Batum  an  account  of  what  he  had  seen 
of  the  Russian  troops  in  Central  Asia,  through  which  he 
had  recently  travelled.  I  remembered  having  received  this 
information  at  the  War  Office,  for  at  the  time  we  were  in 
doubt  regarding  certain  matters  which  the  report  very 
opportunely  cleared  up.  I  did  not  tell  this  to  my  companion 
as  it  was  not  desirable  he  should  know  where  I  was  employed, 
but  it  struck  me  as  being  a  remarkable  coincidence  that 
while  traveUing  by  stage-coach  in  America  I  should  meet 
the  unknown  author  of  the  information  received  from 
Central  Asia. 

The  visit  to  the  Balkans  in  the  autumn  of  1906  was 
perhaps  the  most  instructive  and  interesting  of  all  my 
journeys,  for  I  had  already  made  a  close  study  of  the 
literature  regarding  this  complicated  part  of  the  world  and 
required  some  local  knowledge  in  order  to  complete  it.  The 
visit  was  rendered  the  more  pleasant  and  useful  by  the 


148        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

assistance  and  hospitality  I  received  from  our  official 
representatives  at  each  place  where  I  stayed — with  one 
exception.  Journeying  from  Calais  I  first  went  to  Berhn 
and  then  to  Vienna,  staying  a  few  days  at  each  place,  and 
afterwards  continued  the  journey  to  Bucharest,  or  the 
"  Paris  of  the  East."  Here  I  was  the  guest  of  the  British 
Minister,  Sir  Conyngham  Greene,  who  kindly  arranged  with 
the  authorities  for  me  to  see  some  Rumanian  troops,  barracks, 
hospitals,  and  other  mihtary  estabhshments. 

From  Bucharest  I  crossed  the  Danube  at  Rutschuk,  and 
then  proceeded  via  Plevna  to  Sofia,  where  different  branches 
of  the  Bulgarian  army  were  paraded  for  inspection.  I 
was  much  impressed  with  the  physique  of  the  men  and  their 
smartness  at  drill,  and  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the 
military  education  of  both  officers  and  men  was  of  a  higher 
standard  than  most  people  imagined.  Less  than  forty 
years  before  the  Bulgars  were  still  in  slavery  to  Turkey, 
and  the  progress  the  country  had  since  made  was  pheno- 
menal. Sofia,  from  being  a  collection  of  mud-hovels,  had 
become  a  modern  town  with  many  fine  and  substantial 
buildings,  education  had  advanced  rapidly,  pubUc  works 
had  been  instituted  on  a  large  scale,  and  the  country  in 
general  had  become  one  of  the  most  efficient  of  all  the 
Balkan  States. 

From  Sofia  I  went  via  Adrianople  to  Constantinople, 
which  from  being  amongst  the  most  progressive,  had  be- 
come, under  Turkish  rule,  the  dirtiest  and  most  retrograde 
capital  in  Europe.  At  the  time  of  my  visit  the  streets 
were  still  scavenged  by  tens  of  thousands  of  repulsive- 
looking  dogs,  who  Uved  together  in  batches  of  a  dozen  or 
so,  each  batch  on  its  own  pitch,  and  if  a  strange  dog  ven- 
tured to  intrude  he  was  immediately  attacked  bj^  the 
rightful  owners.  These  unfortunate  animals  were  subse- 
quently deported  wholesale  to  an  island  in  the  Sea  of 
Marmora,  and  in  true  Turkish  fashion  were  there  left  to 
die  of  hunger  and  thirst.  The  streets  of  Constantinople 
were  mostly  unpaved  and  badly  Hghted,  the  installation  of 
electric  light  was  forbidden  except — for  a  consideration — 
in  a  few  favoured  cases,  and  the  same  remark  applies  to 
telephones,   of   which   there   were   then   but   few.     Indeed 


CONSTANTINOPLE  149 

everything  possible  seemed  to  be  done  to  prevent  the  intro- 
duction of  modern  improvements,  the  object  apparently 
being  to  keep  Europeans  out  of  the  town. 

I  attended,  as  most  tourists  do,  the  ceremony  of  the 
Salamlik,  and  there  noticed  that  I  was  being  closely  followed 
by  a  detective — as  all  foreigners  were  on  these  occasions. 
The  Sultan  was  insane  on  the  subject  of  espionage.  He 
insisted  upon  being  kept  fully  informed  of  the  movements 
of  strangers,  and  all  classes,  in  order  to  curry  favour  with 
him,  played  up  to  his  idiosyncrasy.  The  result  was  that 
over  and  above  an  army  of  professional  spies  there  was  a 
host  of  unpaid  amateurs  who  were  constantly  on  the  look- 
out for  some  plot,  real  or  imaginary,  which  they  could 
report.  The  only  way  in  which  one  could  move  about,  or 
indeed  do  anything  with  reasonable  convenience,  was  by 
a  hberal  employment  of  bribes.  At  this  period,  too,  all 
power,  civil  and  military,  was  centred  in  the  hands  of  the 
Sultan,  and  he  was  chief  spiritual  ruler  as  well.  He  was 
therefore  emperor  and  pope  rolled  into  one. 

I  noticed  that  the  German  Embassy  presented  a  parti- 
cularly clean  and  prosperous  appearance.  The  employees 
were  smartly  dressed,  the  grounds  and  buildings  were  well 
kept,  and  in  general  it  was  by  far  the  most  prosperous- 
looking  of  all  the  embassies,  not  excluding  our  own. 
Germany  was  then  forging  ahead  in  Turkey,  and  was 
careful  to  impress  the  Eastern  mind  with  her  power  and 
prosperity,  while  we,  who  had  once  been  predominant, 
were  fast  falling  behind  and,  like  Gallio,  cared  for  none  of 
these  things. 

After  making  a  trip  to  the  Black  Sea  through  the  Bos- 
phorus,  which  somewhat  resembles  a  v/inding  river  of 
three-quarters  of  a  mile  or  less  in  width,  I  was  glad  to  get 
away  from  Constantinople  and  its  abominable  smells,  hideous 
noises,  dirty  streets,  and  official  obstructions.  Salonika  by 
rail,  via  Dede  Agach,  was  my  next  halting-place,  and  from 
there  I  made  several  journeys  into  that  ethnological  museum 
known  as  Macedonia.  The  mountainous  nature  of  the 
interior  has  always  made  the  country  difficult  to  conquer, 
and  the  various  invaders  were  never  able  to  absorb  the 
people  whom  they  found  in  it ;    the  large  towns  and  sea- 


150        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ports  attracted  men  of  all  races  for  purposes  of  business  ; 
and  in  these  and  other  ways  it  came  about  that  for  centuries 
the  country  was  a  sort  of  dumping-ground  for  many  different 
nations.  Again,  in  addition  to  the  Turks,  there  were  four 
Christian  sects  in  the  country,  Greeks,  Bulgarians,  Serbs, 
and  Rumanians,  each  with  its  own  special  propaganda 
and  aiming  at  making  as  many  converts  as  possible.  No 
corner  of  the  world  presented  such  a  conflict  of  ambitions 
and  interests,  and  it  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  that  the 
Macedonian  question  seemed  for  so  long  to  be  insoluble. 

From  Salonika  I  went  north  through  Uskub  to  Nish, 
and  thence  to  Belgrade  and  Buda-Pesth,  spending  a  few 
days  at  each  place  before  returning  to  England.  A  good 
deal  has  happened  in  the  Balkans  since  1906,  and  it  is  not 
unlikely  that  much  more  will  happen  before  a  definite 
settlement  is  made  of  that  "  Eastern  question  "  which  has 
been  in  existence  ever  since  Turkish  rule  was  established  in 
Europe  some  470  years  ago. 

According  to  the  regulations  of  the  time,  the  tenure  of 
my  appointment  as  head  of  the  Foreign  Section  should 
have  expired  in  October  1905,  but  for  certain  reasons  it 
was  extended  to  the  end  of  January  1907.  My  rapid 
promotion  to  the  substantive  rank  of  Colonel  in  November 
1903,  though  fortunate  in  some  respects,  had  the  disadvan- 
tage of  involving  my  removal  from  the  regimental  list,  and 
therefore  when  I  left  the  War  Office  I  was  placed  on  "  half- 
pay."  This  term  might  be  supposed  to  have  some  con- 
nection with  full-pay,  but  in  fact  it  has  none  at  all.  For 
example,  the  usual  full-pay  of  a  major-general  was  then 
£1500  a  year,  whereas  the  emoluments  of  an  officer  of  that 
rank  while  on  half-pay  were  only  £500  a  year.  A  similar 
anomaly,  not  to  say  hardship,  obtained  in  the  case  of  officers 
of  other  ranks.  Another  disadvantage  of  being  on  the  half- 
pay  list  was  that  as  there  was  no  certainty  whether  or  when 
fresh  employment  would  be  given,  no  settled  plans  for  the 
future  could  be  made.  In  my  case  the  prospect  was  brighter, 
as  I  was  authoritatively  informed  before  leaving  the  War 
Office  that  I  would  shortly  be  appointed  Chief  Staff  Officer 
in  one  of  the  home  commands.  This  was  the  kind  of 
appointment   I   most  desired  to  have,   and   I   accordingly 


HALF-PAY  151 

entered  upon  my  period  of  enforced  idleness  with  compara- 
tively little  anxiety. 

This  system  of  half-pay,  which  renders  an  officer  useless 
to  his  profession  and  country  when  in  the  prime  of  life, 
and  at  a  time  when  his  experience  and  accelerated  promotion 
would  seem  to  demand  that  his  services  should  be  fully 
utilised,  is  not  one  which  strikes  the  ordinary  man  as  being 
in  the  best  interest  of  the  State.  I  have  always  thought 
that  there  should  be  no  insuperable  difficulty  in  devising 
a  more  profitable  system,  given  a  less  bureaucratic  Treasury 
and  more  logical  methods  in  the  promotion  of  officers  whose 
retention  in  the  army  is  considered  to  be  desirable. 


CHAPTER  X 

BRIGADIER-GENERAL,    GENERAL   STAFF,   ALDERSHOT 

Translate  German  regulations  regarding  heavy  artillery  —  Assistant 
Quartermaster-General,  Aldershot,  1907 — Become  Chief  of  General 
Staff  there  six  months  later — Smith-Dorrien — Officers  on  the  Aider- 
shot  Staff — Comparison  of  soldier's  life  in  1907  with  that  in  1877 — 
Similar  comparison  in  regard  to  training — Smith-Dorrien's  methods 
— Weakness  of  units — Innovations  in  organisation  and  improve- 
ments in  training — System  of  obtaining  ground  for  manoeuvres — 
False  teaching  of  manoeuvres — Smith-Dorrien's  practical  views — 
Staff  tours — Visits  of  King  Edward— Visits  of  King  George  and 
Queen  Mary — Aeroplanes — Balloons — ^The  Caterpillar — Ordered  to 
take  up  post  of  Commandant,  Staff  College. 

In  order  to  fill  up  the  time  and  improve  my  knowledge  of 
German  I  midertook  while  on  half-pay  to  translate  for  the 
War  Office  certain  German  and  Austrian  military  publica- 
tions, and  with  the  assistance  of  my  wife — a  good  German 
linguist — the  results  were,  I  hope,  fairly  good,  notwithstand- 
ing the  many  technical  terms  to  be  unravelled.  Amongst 
these  publications  were  the  German  official  "  Regulations 
for  the  employment  of  heavy  artillery  in  the  field,"  from 
which  it  was  manifest  that  heavy  artillery  would  play  a 
prominent  part  in  Germany's  next  war  in  Europe,  This 
was  not  the  only  information  of  the  kind  which  came  to 
our  notice,  but  we  made  no  effort  worth  mentioning  to 
provide  ourselves  with  similar  artillery,  or  with  the  means 
for  producing  either  it  or  its  ammunition  when  required, 
and  there  was  the  same  indifference  with  regard  to  machine- 
guns.  Years  before  1914  Germany  was  known  to  be  paying 
special  attention  to  machine-gun  organisation,  and  to  have 
raised  a  considerable  number  of  well-trained  machine-gun 
units,  whereas  we  began  the  war  with  no  such  units,  and 
our  battalions  had  but  two  machine-guns  each. 

As  the  date  of  my  promised  re-employment  approached, 

152 


ALDERSHOT  AGAIN  I53 

I  was  disappointed  one  day  to  receive  a  letter  from  the  War 
Office  telling  me  that  I  would  not  be  given  the  post  which 
I  had  been  led  to  believe  a  few  weeks  before  would  fall  to 
me.  Fortunately  Sir  William  Nicholson,  who  was  then 
Quartermaster-General,  offered  me  the  post  of  Assistant 
Quartermaster-General  at  Aldershot,  and  advised  me  not  to 
refuse  it  as  something  better  might  come  along  shortly.  I 
took  his  advice,  although  the  post  was  no  better  than  the 
one  I  had  already  held  for  more  than  five  years,  while  from 
a  financial  standpoint  it  was  inferior  to  it.  On  the  other 
hand,  it  afforded  a  means  of  learning  the  duties  of  a  branch 
of  the  staff  in  which  I  had  hitherto  not  been  employed,  and 
this  experience  later  proved  very  useful,  especially  when  I 
was  Quartermaster-General  of  the  army  sent  to  France  in 
1914.     I  took  up  my  new  duties  in  May  1907. 

There  were  then  about  thirty  thousand  troops  in  the 
Aldershot  command,  the  principal  formations  being  the  ist 
and  2nd  Divisions  under  Major-Generals  Grierson  and 
Stephenson  respectively,  and  the  ist  Cavalry  Brigade.  Sir 
John  French  was  in  chief  command.  Sir  Archibald  Murray 
was  his  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and  the  Major-General 
in  charge  of  Administration,  my  immediate  chief,  was  at 
first  Major-General  Heath  and  later  Major-General  (now 
Sir)  H.  Lawson,  both  being  helpful  and  considerate  masters. 

In  December  1907  Sir  John  French  was  succeeded  by 
Sir  Horace  Smith-Dorrien,  and  at  the  same  time  Murray 
went  to  the  War  Office  as  Director  of  Military  Training. 
Sir  WiUiam  Nicholson,  who  had  recently  become  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff,  gave  me  the  vacancy  left  by 
Murray — a  far  better  post  than  the  one  I  had  expected  to 
receive  earUer  in  the  year,  and  in  fact  it  was  the  best  of  its 
kind.  Once  more,  therefore,  fortune  had  favoured  me,  and 
the  advancement  was  the  more  gratifying  because  it  occurred 
at  Aldershot  where,  on  a  miserable  November  night  thirty 
years  before,  I  had  entered  the  cavahy  barracks  as  a  recruit 
— a  lonely  and,  for  all  practical  purposes,  a  seemingly 
friendless  lad.  I  would  often,  when  passing  in  that  direc- 
tion as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  gaze  at  the  old  barrack- 
room  where  I  first  hved,  and  at  its  neighbour  the  guard- 
room of  evil  memory,  and  wonder  how  it  had  come  about 


154        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

that  I  was  now  a  General  Officer  and  the  right-hand  man 
of  the  Commander-in-Chief. 

Murray  left  everything  connected  with  General  Staff 
work  in  good  order,  and  it  was  easy  to  take  over  from  him 
the  threads  of  peace  training.  My  two  assistants  on  the 
General  Staff  were  Major  Kerr  of  the  Gordon  Highlanders 
and  Captain  Nicholl  of  the  Bedfordshire  Regiment,  both 
hard-working  and  capable  officers.  "  Freddie  "  Kerr  was  a 
born  soldier,  possessed  of  sound  miUtary  instinct,  and  popular 
with  all  who  knew  him.  The  army  suffered  a  great  loss 
when  he  was  killed  near  Ypres  in  1914.  Colonel  "  Freddie  " 
Wing,  the  staff  officer  for  artillery  duties,  was  a  splendid 
horseman,  keen  and  active,  and  in  character  as  fine  a  type 
of  man  as  could  be  met.  He  was  killed  at  the  battle  of 
Loos  in  October  1915  when  in  command  of  a  division. 
Brigadier-General  "  Peter  "  Buston  was  the  Chief  Engineer, 
and  Major  McMahon  was  in  charge  of  the  musketry.  Colonel 
Kerr  Montgomery  and  Colonel  Alec  Godley  were  respectively 
the  senior  General  Staff  Officers  of  the  ist  and  2nd  Divisions. 
Godley  was  later  employed  with  the  New  Zealand  Forces, 
being  succeeded  by  Colonel  De  Lisle,  and  both  of  them 
commanded  army  corps  during  the  Great  War.  The  ad- 
ministrative services  came  under  the  charge  of  Major- 
General  Robb  when  Lawson  succeeded  Stephenson  in  the 
command  of  the  2nd  Division,  while  Kerr  was  succeeded 
on  the  General  Staff  by  Lieut. -Col.  (now  Major-Gen.  Sir) 
W.  Campbell. 

On  the  personal  staff  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  were 
Major  Clive  Wigram,  assistant  military  secretary,  and  now 
assistant  personal  secretary  to  His  Majesty,  and  Captain 
Way,  the  aide-de-camp.  Captain  Arthur  Wood,  a  son  of 
Sir  Evelyn,  and  Lieutenant  Boscawen,  a  son  of  Lord 
Falmouth,  were  also  aides-de-camp  at  different  times. 
Boscawen,  a  charming  boy  and  a  most  promising  officer, 
won  the  D.S.O.  and  rose  to  the  rank  of  Major  in  the  Great 
War,  meeting  his  death  in  the  summer  of  19 18.  This  com- 
pletes the  list  of  staff  officers  with  whom  I  was  most  fre- 
quently brought  into  contact.  I  always  thought  we  were 
a  happy  family,  and  I  hope  the  others  were  of  the  same 
opinion. 


A  SOLDIER'S  LIFE  155 

Having  had  the  opportunity  of  seeing  both  sides  of  life 
in  the  army  during  the  thirty  years  that  had  elapsed  since 
I  first  went  to  Aldershot  in  1877,  it  may  be  of  interest  to 
the  reader  if  I  compare  some  of  the  conditions  under  which 
a  soldier  then  Hved  and  worked  with  those  which  prevailed 
when  I  joined  the  Aldershot  staff  in  1907. 

In  my  early  days  the  soldier  when  off  parade  had  the 
choice  of  three  places  in  which  to  pass  his  time — the  barrack- 
room,  the  library  (a  fusty,  ill-kept  place  without  a  book  or 
a  newspaper  worth  reading) ,  and  the  canteen,  where  besides 
bread  and  cheese  Httle  could  be  bought  except  beer.  Inside 
the  barracks  these  were  the  only  facilities  afforded  for  his 
recreation  and  self-improvement  ;  outside  the  barracks,  in 
Aldershot,  the  "  Soldier's  Home,"  maintained  by  kind- 
hearted  benefactors,  was  almost  his  only  alternative  to 
women  and  beer-shops,  both  of  the  lowest  type  ;  and 
beyond  an  occasional  cricket  match  he  was  not  encouraged 
to  play  any  outdoor  game.  In  not  a  few  regiments 
his  officers  saw  little  or  nothing  of  him  except  when 
on  parade  or  at  stables  ;  they  showed  no  interest  in  his 
personal  concerns,  and  sometimes  did  not  even  know 
his  name,  although  he  might  have  been  under  their 
command  for  weeks.  It  was  realised  by  some  inspecting 
officers  that  this  state  of  affairs  was  not  what  it  should  be, 
from  the  professional  standpoint  alone,  and  I  have  heard 
the  most  absurd  replies  given  when  troop  officers  have  been 
asked  to  tell  them  a  man's  name,  or  what  length  of  service 
he  had.  The  great  thing  was  to  give  an  answer  of  some  sort 
and  give  it  quickly,  whether  it  might  be  the  right  one  or  not. 

By  1907  aU  this  had  been  changed.  Officers  were  now 
expected  to  know  all  about  their  men,  to  look  after  their 
minds  as  weU  as  their  bodies,  and  generally  to  identify 
themselves  in  peace  with  those  upon  whom  they  would 
have  to  depend  in  war.  To  this  new  demand  they  readily 
responded — as  British  officers  always  will  once  they  know 
what  is  required  of  them — and  much  keenness  and  rivalry 
were  displayed  by  regiments  in  making  physical  exercises 
more  interesting,  and  in  organising  cross-country  races  and 
other  useful  forms  of  sport  such  as  football,  hockey,  and 
boxing.     By  Smith-Dorrien's  directions  a  number  of  first- 


156        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

class  recreation  grounds  were  later  provided  sufficient  to 
meet  all  requirements. 

A  vast  improvement  was  also  noticeable  in  regard  to  the 
men's  food,  though  it  varied  a  good  deal  in  different  units. 
Formerly  the  rations  had  not  only  been  inadequate  and,  for 
want  of  proper  supervision,  often  of  inferior  quality,  but 
there  had  been  much  waste  and  some  corruption  in  their 
disposal,  while  the  cooks  were  selected  without  reference  to 
their  culinary  knowledge  and  were  sometimes  notoriously 
the  dirtiest  men  m  the  regiment.  Better  rations  were  now 
suppUed,  economical  use  was  made  of  them,  and  the 
cooks  were  taught  their  trade  and  made  to  understand 
that  cleanhness  is  the  first  requisite  of  a  good  cook-house. 

Again,  in  the  old  days  the  men  dined  in  the  same  room 
where  they  lived  and  slept,  and  ate  their  meals  off  the  same 
table  on  which  they  pipeclayed  their  accoutrements,  the 
table  itself  being  rarely  cleaned  more  than  once  a  day,  and 
then  perhaps  only  with  the  broom  used  for  sweeping  the 
floor.  These  objectionable  customs  had  largely  disappeared. 
Separate  dining-rooms,  wherever  possible,  were  now  allotted, 
the  supply  of  crockery  was  improved,  tablecloths  were 
provided,  and  the  meals  were  served  up  in  a  more  palatable 
and  decent  form.  With  the  estabhshment  of  what  are 
called  regimental  institutes  the  soldier  also  had  at  his 
disposal  various  rooms  —  corporals'  room,  concert-room, 
writing-room,  coffee-room,  all  reasonably  furnished — where 
he  could  spend  a  comfortable  hour  when  off  duty,  and 
with  no  temptation  to  get  drunk. 

The  methods  of  giving  instruction  in  riding,  foot- drill, 
musketry,  and  other  elementary  forms  of  training  had 
been  improved  out  of  all  recognition  since  1877,  and  the 
whole  system  of  training  in  its  more  advanced  stages  had 
been  changed  for  the  better.  Lord  Wolseley,  Sir  Evelyn 
Wood,  and  other  mihtary  reformers  had  insisted  on  going 
far  beyond  the  antiquated  instructions  contained  in  the 
"  drill  books  "  of  the  period,  and  before  the  South  African 
war  the  preparation  of  training  manuals  was  taken  in  hand. 
That  campaign  delayed  their  completion,  but  on  its  termina- 
tion the  excellent  book  known  as  "  Combined  Training  "  was 
issued.     It  was  followed,  when  the  General  Staff  was  formed 


GENERAL  SMITH-DORRIEN  i57 

in  1904,  by  the  publication  of  "  Field  Service  Regulations" 
and  "Training  Manuals"  for  each  arm.  These  covered 
the  entire  field  of  individual  and  tactical  training,  and  it  is 
universally  admitted  that  the  principles  they  enunciated 
well  stood  the  test  to  which  they  were  put  in  the  Great  War. 

To  sum  up,  the  soldier  was  no  longer  treated,  as  he  used 
to  be,  as  a  being  without  intelligence  and  without  the 
remotest  chance  of  ever  developing  any,  down  whose  throat 
it  was  the  business  of  the  non-commissioned  officer  to  force 
as  much  parrot-like  drill  as  possible  but  never  to  attempt 
to  draw  anything  out.  "  Why  did  you  do  that  ?  "  the 
unfortunate  man  would  be  asked  when  accused  of  making 
a  slip,  and  when  he  explained  that  he  had  done  it  because 
he  thought  it  was  the  proper  thing  to  do  in  the  circum- 
stances, the  reply  would  be  :  "  You  have  no  right  to  think, 
do  as  you  are  told,  and  don't  think  again."  This  stupid 
attitude  was  going  out  of  fashion.  A  man  was  taught  to 
use  his  wits  and  act  with  initiative  and  responsibihty, 
individual  instruction  was  superseding  squad  drill,  and  a 
clear  distinction  was  drawn  between  drill  pure  and  simple 
and  field  training. 

It  must  not  be  thought  that  perfection  had  been  reached 
in  any  of  these  matters.  Much  remained  to  be  done,  and 
Smith-Dorrien  was  the  man  to  do  it.  Full  of  energy  him- 
self, he  expected  every  one  in  his  command  to  be  equally 
zealous  and  to  take  his  profession  seriously.  He  held 
strongly  that  the  utmost  should  be  done  for  the  welfare  of 
the  men  and  their  families,  and  that  they  should  be  trusted 
not  to  abuse  the  increased  privileges  granted  to  them.  In 
carrying  out  these  objects  he  was  well  supported  by  Grierson, 
Stephenson,  Lawson,  and  his  other  immediate  subordinates, 
and  the  aim  of  all  was  to  try  and  bring  out  what  was  best 
in  the  men  and  not  everlastingly  be  thinking  of  the  worst. 

We  had  learned  many  useful  lessons  in  the  South  African 
war,  both  as  to  what  to  do  and  what  not  to  do,  more 
especially  as  to  the  use  of  ground,  and  we  also  had  some 
surprises  in  the  Russo-Japanese  war.  But  there  was  still 
much  difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  extent  to  which  these 
lessons  ought  to  modify  previously  -  accepted  methods. 
British  officers,  Hke  other  mortals,  are  not  infallible,  and  their 


158         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ideas  are  apt  either  to  move  too  slowly  and  in  strictly 
defined  grooves,  or  to  fly  off  to  the  opposite  extreme.  It 
was  for  the  senior  commanders  and  General  Staff  to  steer  a 
correct  course  between  excessive  regard  for  regularity  and 
rule  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  desire  to  throw  all  previous 
experience  to  the  winds  on  the  other — to  see,  in  short,  that 
methods  of  training  kept  pace  with  changing  conditions  but 
did  not  madly  overrun  them.  Having  shared  in  much 
fighting  in  past  wars  Smith-Dorrien  was  well  qualified  to 
judge  of  the  probable  characteristics  of  future  wars,  and 
the  importance  he  attached,  when  commanding  at  Alder- 
shot,  to  the  right  use  of  ground,  the  effect  of  rifle  and 
machine-gun  fire,  and  the  necessity  for  carefully  training 
section  and  other  subordinate  leaders  proved,  in  the  light  of 
the  Great  War,  that  his  appreciation  was  singularly  accurate. 

"  Modern  war,"  ran  one  of  his  training  instructions, 
"  demands  that  individual  intelligence  should  be  on  a  high 
plane.  Battlefields  now  cover  such  extensive  areas  that 
control  by  officers  is  very  difficult,  consequently  non-com- 
missioned officers  and  even  private  soldiers  very  often  find 
themselves  left  to  their  own  resources  :  and  it  is  only  by 
being  accustomed  in  peace  training  to  use  their  common 
sense  and  intelligence  that  they  are  likely  to  be  equal  to 
their  duties  in  war." 

Another  instruction  laid  down  that  "  troops  should  be 
continually  practised  in  improvising  existing  cover  in  every 
possible  piece  of  ground  gained  which  it  is  important  to 
hold.  Officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  should  be 
trained  to  sight  and  trace  trenches  after  dark  as  well  as 
by  day.  Artillery,  too,  is  very  dependent  on  the  hours  of 
darkness  in  getting  into  position,  and  although  it  may  as  a 
rule  be  possible  to  select  positions  during  the  day,  it  must 
frequently  happen  that  the  actual  digging  of  gun-pits  and 
moving  guns  into  them  must  take  place  at  night." 

Smith-Dorrien  was  particularly  insistent  during  field 
training  that  individual  officers  and  men  should  not 
unnecessarily  expose  themselves  to  view  or  fire,  and  would 
sometimes  emphasise  this  in  very  downright  terms.  The 
admonition  was  not  without  good  reason,  and  it  was  not 
forgotten  by  those  to  whom  it  was  addressed. 


TRAINING  159 

Work  was  fairly  strenuous  all  the  year  round,  the  normal 
stages  of  field  training  being  squadron,  battery,  and  company 
in  March  and  April ;  regimental  and  battalion  in  May  and 
June  ;  brigade,  divisional,  and  command  from  July  to  the 
middle  of  September  ;  individual  training  throughout  the 
winter. 

As  at  all  other  stations,  training  suffered  from  the  two 
defects  inherent  to  our  army  system — weakness  of  the 
battalions  and  inequality  in  the  proficiency  of  the  men 
under  instruction,  whose  army  service  varied  between  one 
day  and  about  twenty  years.  This  complication  was  due 
to  recruits  dribbling  in  at  all  periods  of  the  year — the  result 
of  voluntary  enlistment  as  compared  with  universal  service, 
which  enables  the  whole  of  the  recruits  for  one  year  to  be 
received  on  the  same  day,  and  to  be  put  through  a  systematic 
and  progressive  course  of  training. 

These  disadvantages  were  specially  felt  in  regard  to 
the  training  of  the  officers,  for  as  battalions  always  con- 
tained a  large  percentage  of  recruits  who  had  not  completed 
their  drill  in  barracks,  and  who  therefore  were  not  available 
for  training  in  the  field,  the  officers  had  no  opportunity 
of  commanding  their  units  at  full  strength,  and  in  some  ways 
this  destroyed  the  whole  value  of  the  training.  To  get 
over  the  difficulty  two  units  would  be  put  into  one,  but 
this  brought  in  men  who  were  strangers  to  the  commander, 
and  who  regarded  the  work  as  a  bore  and  of  no  benefit 
to  themselves.  Another  expedient  was  to  give  the  officers 
theoretical  schemes  to  work  out,  the  troops  being  imaginary  ; 
but  this  again  was  a  poor  substitute  for  the  real  thing,  for 
only  few  instructors  are  capable  of  making  it  useful  to  the 
instructed,  and  also  it  was  unpopular. 

Training  was,  in  fact,  largely  a  case  of  trying  to 
make  bricks  without  straw,  and  there  was  much  truth 
in  what  a  distinguished  General  once  said  to  me  : 
"  Never  forget,  Robertson,  that  we  have  two  armies — the 
War  Office  army  and  the  Aldershot  army.  The  first  is 
always  up  to  strength,  and  is  organised,  reorganised,  and 
disorganised  almost  daily.  The  second  is  never  up  to 
strength,  knows  nothing  whatever  about  the  first,  and 
remains  unaffected  by  any  of  these  organising  activities. 


i6o         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

It  just  cleans  its  rifle  and  falls  in  on  parade."  The  army 
of  no  other  European  country  laboured  under  the  same 
disadvantages  as  we  did,  and  it  is  to  their  undying  credit 
that  our  officers  stuck  to  their  work  in  such  discouraging 
circumstances,  and  in  the  Great  War  proved  themselves  to 
be  such  fine  commanders. 

Of  the  other  training  problems  which  engaged  attention 
at  Aldershot  it  may  be  added  that  the  cavalry  were  issued 
with  a  new-pattern  sword,  the  old  custom  of  cutting  and 
hacking  at  one's  opponent  giving  place  to  the  more  lightning- 
like thrust.  Definite  efforts  were  made  for  the  first  time  to 
provide  the  troops  with  travelling-kitchens  [i.e.  vehicles  in 
which  the  food  can  be  cooked  whilst  on  the  move  and  so 
be  ready  whenever  wanted)  ;  and  mechanical  transport  was 
worked  out  on  a  practical  basis,  thus  solving  some  of  the 
difficulties  attaching  to  the  supply  of  food  and  ammunition 
in  the  field.  In  the  summer  of  1909  the  ist  Division  was 
mobilised  as  an  experiment,  the  necessary  additional  men, 
horses,  vehicles,  etc.,  being  taken  from  other  units  at 
Aldershot  and  elsewhere.  This  was  the  first  time  any  one 
had  ever  seen  a  British  division  at  war  strength,  and  it  was 
the  last  till  August  1914.  The  experience  gained  was  valu- 
able, and  upon  it  were  based  many  of  the  decisions  for  the 
movement  and  handling  of  large  formations  which  were 
successfully  practised  in  the  Great  War, 

One  of  the  most  important  innovations  of  all  was  the 
organisation  of  "  communication  companies."  It  can  be 
understood  that  in  the  employment  of  large  forces  spread 
over  wide  areas  a  multitude  of  messages,  orders,  and 
instructions  regarding  fighting,  feeding,  moving,  and  many 
other  matters  have  to  be  conveyed  between  commanders, 
staff,  and  troops,  and  that  unless  they  are  conveyed 
accurately  and  promptly  serious  consequences  may  ensue. 
Heretofore  the  arrangements  for  this  service  had  been  of 
the  most  sketchy  and  unsatisfactory  kind.  For  use  amongst 
themselves  and  with  their  brigade  headquarters,  the 
regiments,  battalions,  and  batteries  had  each  had  their  quota 
of  "  signallers,"  equipped  with  flags,  lamps,  heliographs, 
and  other  appliances  for  visual  signalling,  as  well  as  a 
varying  number  of  mounted  orderlies  and  cyclists  ;  between 


COMMUNICATION  COMPANIES  i6i 

brigades  and  divisions  were  telegraph  companies  working 
with  cables  conveyed  on  waggons,  these  units  belonging  to 
divisions  ;  and  behind  them  were  similar  telegraph  com- 
panies working  with  cable-waggons  and  the  ordinary  land 
lines  of  telegraph,  these  belonging  to  other  formations  or 
directly  under  army  headquarters.  This  system  was  both 
unreliable  and  uneconomical,  and  was  replaced  first  by 
"  communication  companies  "  and  then  by  a  "  signal  ser- 
vice "  embracing  all  the  different  elements.  A  number  of 
despatch  riders  and  other  necessary  personnel  and  material 
were  added  to  them,  the  whole  being  placed  under  one 
general  control  and  without  unduly  interfering  with  details. 
The  Russo-Japanese  war  had  exemplified  the  importance 
of  good  means  of  communication,  and  before  I  went  to 
Aldershot  a  temporary  organisation  for  the  purpose  had 
been  started.  When  Murray  became  Director  of  Military 
Training  he  placed  it,  with  the  approval  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  on  a  permanent  basis,  and  its  development 
rapidly  followed.  I  shall  show  in  a  later  chapter  how 
exceedingly  weU  it  answered  in  the  Great  War. 

The  foregoing  account  of  training  must  not  be  understood 
to  imply  that  Aldershot  alone  was  identified  with  laying  the 
foundations  of  the  original  "  Expeditionary  Force."  That 
was  not  the  case.  I  have  already  referred  to  the  training 
manuals  published  by  the  General  Staff  at  the  War  Office, 
and  upon  these  the  training  in  general  was  based.  We 
frequently  received  other  forms  of  assistance  from  the 
Training  Directorate  and  the  individual  officers  serving  in 
it.  The  object  of  both  staffs  was  to  work  closely  and 
helpfully  together,  and  this  I  think  was  achieved.  If  it  was 
not  it  was  not  the  fault  of  the  War  Office  staff. 

Moreover,  the  Southern,  Irish,  and  other  commands 
played  their  part  in  training-duties,  although  it  was  on  a 
much  smaller  scale,  Aldershot  being  the  largest  military 
station  in  the  United  Kingdom,  and  the  only  one  where  a 
reasonable  number  of  troops  and  a  fair  amount  of  suitable 
training-ground  were  available  throughout  the  year.  It 
also  contained  many  military  establishments  not  to  be 
found  elsewhere,  such  as  the  signalling  school,  army 
gymnastic  school,  school  of  cookery,  aeroplane  and  balloon 

M 


i62        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

factories    and    schools,  and   a  large  mechanical   transport 
depot. 

As  the  Aldershot  area  was  much  too  restricted  in 
size,  as  well  as  too  familiar,  for  the  advanced  training 
of  the  higher  formations,  and  as  we  had  no  legal  powers 
by  which  ground  elsewhere  could  be  acquired,  reliance 
had  to  be  placed  on  the  good-will  of  landowners  and 
tenants.  As  a  rule  these  met  us  in  a  most  generous 
spirit,  though  there  were  some  notable  and  tiresome 
exceptions.  I  remember  one  large  landowner  who  declined 
to  allow  us  the  use  of  some  "  common  "  land  which  came 
under  his  control  as  lord  of  the  manor,  although  he  was  a 
prominent  member  of  the  National  Service  League  !  Another 
wealthy  proprietor  once  refused,  in  spite  of  many  entreaties, 
to  grant  the  use  of  quite  a  small,  though  to  us  a  very 
important,  area  which  happened  to  be  in  the  centre  of  a 
tract  of  country  already  conceded  to  us  by  other  owners, 
and  without  which  the  contemplated  operations  would  to 
a  great  extent  become  unreal. 

A  similar  difficulty  threatened  on  another  occasion,  but 
was  overcome  by  the  patriotism  and  good  sense  of  the  owner. 
Smith-Dorrien  had  decided  that  the  operations  should  include 
the  crossing  of  the  Thames  by  a  division  during  darkness,  and 
there  was  only  one  locality  available  where  an  improvised 
bridge  could  be  constructed  and  the  passage  made  so  as  to 
fit  suitably  into  the  project  as  a  whole.  The  ground  on  one 
side  of  the  river  had  been  obtained,  but  the  owner  of  the 
fields  on  the  opposite  bank  at  first  met  our  request  with  a 
blank  refusal,  and  the  position  seemed  hopeless.  He  had 
good  reason  for  refusing,  for  he  had  recently  received  in 
connection  with  another  matter  very  shabby  and  exasperat- 
ing treatment  at  the  hands  of  the  superior  military 
authorities.  After  a  lengthy  correspondence  I  succeeded 
in  gaining  a  personal  interview  with  him,  when  he  proved 
to  be  quite  amenable,  and  gave  his  full  consent  for  us  to 
do  as  we  wished. 

The  system  of  obtaining  ground  for  manoeuvres  only 
from  those  who  were  sufficiently  patriotic  to  lend  it  was 
fundamentally  bad  and  pleased  nobody.  Separate  arrange- 
ments had  to  be  made  with  all  the  owners,  tenants,  and 


MANOEUVRES  163 

sub -tenants  concerned,  and  these  would  amount  to 
some  hundreds  in  number,  and  when,  after  months  of 
correspondence  and  many  personal  interviews,  consent  had 
at  last  been  obtained,  it  was  always  liable  to  be  withdrawn 
or  curtailed  at  the  last  moment.  Further,  some  owners  and 
tenants  objected  to  being  asked  to  do  that  which  others 
were  known  to  have  refused  to  do,  and  they  frequently  told 
me  that  the  only  satisfactory  system  was  for  the  Govern- 
ment to  exercise  legal  powers,  take  what  they  wanted  from 
all  and  sundry  alike,  and  not  trade  upon  the  patriotism  of 
those  who  did  not  like  to  refuse.  It  was  really  part  and 
parcel  of  the  old  question  of  voluntary  versus  national 
service.  In  later  years  legal  powers  were  taken,  to  the 
satisfaction  of  everybody  worth  counting. 

The  benefit  troops  derive  from  manoeuvres  depends 
almost  entirely  upon  the  way  in  which  they  are  conducted. 
They  are  by  no  means  the  same  thing  as  war,  and  cannot 
be  made  so  because  of  the  absence  of  bullets.  Up  to  a 
point  they  can  be  rendered  exceedingly  valuable,  but  un- 
less properly  conducted  they  may  be  not  only  useless  but 
highly  mischievous  because  of  the.  false  teaching  they  give. 
At  the  period  of  which  I  write  they  were  often  accompanied 
by  a  considerable  element  of  "  eye-wash,"  and  measures 
were  not  always  taken  to  ensure  that  opposing  com- 
manders would  be  compelled  to  come  to  their  decisions 
in  an  atmosphere  resembling  as  far  as  possible  the  fog  of 
war  which  prevails  on  the  battlefield.  For  example,  it  was 
not  uncommon  for  the  supervising  General  to  command 
one  of  the  opposing  sides  himself,  and,  after  issuing  the 
orders  to  his  own  troops,  cross  over  to  the  enemy's  position 
and  from  there  observe,  and  afterwards  criticise,  the  action 
of  both  forces.  Having  himself  set  the  problem,  and 
knowing  all  that  was  happening  on  both  sides  during  its 
solution,  he  obviously  could  not  derive  much  instruction 
from  it,  or  make  an  impartial  criticism  of  the  action  of  his 
opponent. 

It  was,  in  short,  the  custom  for  manoeuvres  to  take  the 
form  of  a  series  of  "  field-days  "  rather  than  of  continuous 
operations  in  face  of  an  enemy,  and  between  the  movements 
of  each  day  there  would  be  a  close  time  when  neither  side 


i64        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

need  anticipate  danger  from  the  other.  Conducted  in  this 
manner  the  so-called  manoeuvres  did  not  give  a  true  picture 
of  what  occurs  in  war,  or  anything  like  it,  and  might  more 
appropriately  have  been  called  battle-drill ;  and  as  we  were 
expected  by  our  seniors  to  believe  that  they  were  a  close 
approximation  to  the  real  thing,  whereas  they  were  nothing 
of  the  kind,  they  belonged  to  that  class  which,  as  I  have 
explained,  is  more  dangerous  than  useful.  Thorough 
elementary  instruction  must  of  course  be  given  before 
troops  proceed  to  training  of  an  advanced  nature,  and 
military  commanders,  like  other  people,  must  learn  to  walk 
before  they  attempt  to  run,  but  they  will  never  become 
expert  runners  if  their  training  is  always  restricted  to 
walking. 

Once  when  acting  as  director  of  some  manoeuvres,  a 
year  or  two  after  leaving  Aldershot,  I  was  asked  by  a 
senior  officer  of  the  umpire  staff  at  what  time  the  troops 
might  have  their  dinners.  It  was  then  about  2  p.m.  on  a 
Thursday.  I  replied  that  they  could  have  them  when- 
ever they  chose.  "  But,"  said  he,  "  won't  you  sound 
'  stand-fast '  or  something,  so  that  both  sides  can  dine  at 
the  same  time  and  without  the  risk  of  being  interfered 
with  by  each  other  ?  "  He  gave  me  up  as  a  hopeless 
lunatic,  I  think,  when  I  answered :  "  '  Stand-fast '  will  be 
sounded  on  Saturday  afternoon  when  the  operations  are 
due  to  finish.  Meanwhile  everybody,  umpires  included, 
should  make  their  own  arrangements  for  eating,  as  on 
active  service." 

The  chief  reason  why  manoeuvres  were  not  more  prac- 
tical was  that  those  who  supervised  them  dare  not  give 
the  opposing  commanders  a  sufficiently  free  hand  for  fear 
the  operations  might  get  out  of  control.  Granted  the 
necessary  imagination,  there  need  have  been  no  difficulty 
in  preparing  such  schemes  as  would  permit  commanders  to 
go  all-out  in  their  own  way,  and  still  compel  them  to  keep 
within  the  limits  imposed  by  conditions  attaching  to  peace- 
training — such  as  time,  money,  and  ground. 

Smith-Dorrien  determined  that  his  manoeuvres  should, 
as  far  as  possible,  be  carried  out  as  in  war  ;  and  as  an  example 
of  this  I  may  mention  an  incident  which  occurred  in  the 


STAFF  TOURS  165 

first  mancEUvres  he  held  in  September  1908,  on  the  Downs 
near  Winchester.  At  the  end  of  the  first  day's  operations 
the  cavalry  brigade  of  one  side  went  comfortably  into 
bivouac,  taking  little  or  no  precautions  for  security  during 
the  night,  and  being  unaware  that  within  a  mile  or  two 
was  the  bivouac  of  one  of  the  enemy's  infantry  brigades. 
Later  on  a  battahon  of  this  brigade  discovered  the  presence 
of  the  cavalry,  and  at  dawn  next  morning  surrounded  and 
took  the  whole  of  them  prisoners.  An  umpire  came  to 
headquarters  to  ask  for  a  decision  as  to  what  should  be 
done,  and  was  promptly  told  by  the  Commander-in-Chief 
that  the  cavalry  must  be  placed  out  of  action  until  the 
operations  terminated.  The  lesson  thus  driven  home  was 
not  likely  to  be  forgotten,  and  outweighed  the  disadvantage 
of  depriving  the  captured  brigade  of  an  additional  day's 
training. 

"  Staff  tours,"  which  were  much  in  favour  with  the  War 
Office  authorities  when  I  was  at  Aldershot,  are  also  fraught 
with  danger  unless  properly  managed.  A  "  staff  tour," 
I  may  explain  for  the  benefit  of  the  layman,  is  a  form 
of  training  intended  to  give  senior  commanders  and 
their  staffs  theoretical  instruction  in  working  out  on 
the  ground  problems  of  strategy,  tactics,  marches,  and 
the  administration  of  an  army  in  the  field.  No  troops 
are  employed,  but  the  directing  staff  decide,  according  to 
the  orders  given  and  other  measures  taken  by  the  officers 
under  instruction,  what  the  imaginary  troops  would 
accomplish. 

One  tour  held  whilst  I  was  at  Aldershot  had  rather  a 
significant  ending.  Instructions  had  been  issued  shortly 
before  by  the  War  Office  defining  the  action  required 
in  the  event  of  invasion,  and  Smith-Dorrien  decided  to 
adopt  them  as  the  basis  of  his  staff  tour  scheme,  thinking 
that  the  officers  would  thereby  derive  useful  practice  in  an 
operation  which  presumably  they  might  one  day  be 
called  upon  to  carry  out  in  reality.  During  the  tour 
certain  defects  were  exposed  which  seemed  to  merit  the 
attention  of  the  authorities,  and  these  were  duly  brought 
to  notice  when,  according  to  custom,  the  proceedings  were 
forwarded  to  the  War  Office.     Smith-Dorrien  received  little 


i66        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

thanks  for  his  pains,  and  was  told  that  his  scheme  had 
been  based  on  conditions  which  were  not  hkely  to  arise  ; 
that  if  exercises  of  this  particular  kind  became  known 
diplomatic  complications  might  ensue ;  and  that  for  the 
future  they  should  be  left  alone.  Whether  invasion  was 
a  possible  contingency  or  not  was  a  matter  upon  which 
opinions  had  for  long  been  divided,  but  as  instructions  for 
meeting  it  had  been  authoritatively  issued,  Smith-Dorrien 
was  doing  no  more  than  his  duty  in  giving  his  officers  an 
opportunity  of  studying  it. 

King  Edward  paid  his  usual  annual  visit  to  Aldershot  in 
May  1907,  and  also  in  1908  and  1909.  His  custom  was  to 
arrive  at  11.30  a.m.  and  leave  about  4  o'clock  the  same  day. 
As  he  did  not  ride,  and  as  it  was  necessary  that  he  should 
see  as  many  of  the  troops  as  possible,  the  "  scheme  "  had  to 
be  so  arranged  as  to  bring  the  troops  near  to  places  where 
his  motor  could  be  taken,  and  whence  he  could  observe  the 
operations.  It  was  not  an  easy  matter  to  achieve  this 
and  at  the  same  time  ensure  that  the  various  movements 
were  properly  connected  and  did  not  develop  into  unreal 
situations.  One  year  the  operations  terminated  with  an 
infantry  assault  on  the  enemy's  position,  on  the  crest  of 
which  His  Majesty  had  just  arrived.  Two  battalions  of 
the  Guards  made  the  assault  at  this  point,  and  shortly 
afterwards,  the  "  cease  fire  "  having  sounded,  Grierson,  the 
commander  of  the  attacking  side,  arrived  breathless  near 
where  the  King  stood.  "  Well,  General,"  asked  the  King, 
"  did  you  succeed  in  defeating  the  enemy  ?  "  "  Sir,"  said 
Grierson,  with  his  usual  diplomacy,  "  I  threw  into  the 
assault  all  the  troops  at  my  disposal,  including  Your 
Majesty's  Guards,  and  if  they  could  not  take  the  position 
no  troops  in  Europe  could  !  "  "  Very  good,  very  good," 
answered  the  King,  with  a  broad  smile  on  his  face. 

The  last  time  King  Edward  saw  the  Aldershot  troops  at 
work  was  in  1909  at  Emperor's  Hill  on  the  Chobham  Ridges. 
In  May  the  following  year  preparations  were  well  advanced 
for  another  visit,  but  his  death  occurred  a  few  days  before 
the  date  on  which  he  was  due  to  arrive. 

King  George  visited  Aldershot  several  times  when  Prince 
of  Wales,  and  has  since  regularly  paid  visits  lasting  for  a 


<  = 


K  H  5 

p  !?  p 

■^  z  « 

w  o  V 


KING  GEORGE  167 

week  or  ten  days.  In  his  practical  way  His  Majesty  made 
it  quite  clear  to  everybody  that  he  wished  to  see  the  troops 
at  their  ordinary  everyday  work,  and  would  have  no  change 
made  in  the  normal  training  programme.  He  abhorred 
everything  of  the  nature  of  a  "  set-piece,"  was  quick  to 
detect  the  intention  to  foist  one  upon  him  as  the  genuine 
article,  and  would  roundly  condemn  any  attempt  to  do,  or 
to  allow  to  be  done,  anything  that  would  be  impracticable 
in  war.  His  visits  were  the  more  valuable  to  us  because  on 
return  to  London  he  would  be  instrumental  in  compelHng 
the  War  Office  to  settle  tiresome  questions  regarding  which 
we  had  perhaps  carried  on  a  fruitless  correspondence  for 
months  past. 

With  the  same  object  in  view  His  Majesty  usually  asked 
the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  to  be  present  during 
at  least  a  part  of  his  visit.  Once  when  Sir  WilUam  Nicholson 
was  attending  in  this  capacity  the  King  led  us  a  long  morning 
ride  in  the  hot  sun,  and  as  Nicholson  neither  liked  nor  was 
accustomed  to  horse-exercise  he  returned  to  the  Royal 
Pavilion  feehng  rather  stiff  and  sore,  both  in  mind  and  body. 
During  luncheon  he  had  to  submit  to  a  certain  amount  of 
chaff  on  the  subject,  the  King  humorously  condoHng  with 
him  on  the  sufferings  of  the  morning.  Nicholson,  who  was 
fond  of  quoting  scripture,  replied,  "  Thank  you,  Sir,  but 
I  trust  that  I  bear  my  trials  with  appropriate  patience, 
for  I  know  that  whom  the  Lord  loveth  He  chasteneth." 

His  Majesty  was  invariably  accompanied  by  the  Queen, 
and  both  of  them  would  be  employed  for  the  greater  part 
of  the  day  in  seeing  the  troops  at  work,  visiting  the  various 
mihtary  estabhshments,  enquiring  into  matters  concerning 
the  welfare  of  the  soldiers  and  their  families,  and  in  inform- 
ing themselves  generally  of  the  conditions  of  Aldershot  Ufe. 
Their  Majesties  always  gave  us  the  impression  that  they 
thoroughly  enjoyed  being  amongst  the  troops,  while  we 
were  delighted  to  welcome  them  and  to  render  their  visits 
pleasant. 

The  aeroplane,  still  in  its  infancy,  was  a  feature  of 
special  interest  at  Aldershot  during  this  period,  the  renowned 
Cody  being  amongst  the  bravest  and  most  persevering  of 
the  pioneers  engaged  on  this  perilous  work,  as  it  then  was. 


i68        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Under  every  disadvantage  as  regards  money  and  material, 
he  laboured  for  months  and  even  years  on  Laffan's  Plain, 
assisted  by  his  son,  to  construct  a  machine  that  would 
consent  to  leave  the  ground,  remain  a  reasonable  time  in 
the  air,  and  then  return  to  earth  without  smashing  itself 
to  pieces.  Eventually  he  succeeded  in  accomplishing,  for 
the  times  in  which  he  Lived,  some  remarkable  flights,  but 
later  he  met  the  same  fate  as  many  other  aviators  of  those 
early  days.     The  country  owes  much  to  Cody. 

Kites  and  dirigible  balloons  were  also  still  in  the  element- 
ary stage,  and  like  all  other  aeronautical  duties  were  under 
the  supervision  of  Colonel  (now  Major-General  Sir)  J.  Capper. 

The  tank  was  not  yet  in  being,  but  its  prototype,  the 
"  caterpillar,"  was,  and  was  thought  to  have  a  great  future 
as  a  tractor  for  dragging  heavy  guns  and  vehicles  across 
broken  ground.  Universal  sympathy  was  extended  to  the 
drivers,  who,  in  consequence  of  the  caterpillar's  violent 
up-and-down  motions,  experienced  all  the  sensations  of 
acute  sea-sickness,  and  looked  it. 

In  June  1910,  while  engaged  on  a  staff  tour  in  Leicester- 
shire, I  received  a  letter  from  Sir  William  Nicholson  offering 
me  the  post  of  Commandant  of  the  Staff  College.  This 
unexpected  offer,  though  flattering  to  me  personally  and 
possessing  many  attractive  possibilities,  had  the  drawback 
common  to  other  army  appointments  in  that  the  post 
was  greatly  underpaid.  However,  I  determined  not  to  be 
baulked  of  a  promising  opening  on  that  account,  but  to 
have  a  try  at  filling  what  was  one  of  the  most  important 
positions  which  an  officer  of  my  standing  could  in  peace 
time  be  called  upon  to  hold.  At  the  end  of  July  I  bade 
farewell  to  Aldershot,  where  I  had  made  many  friends  and 
had  learned  much  of  the  practical  side  of  my  profession 
from  the  officers  with  whom  I  had  been  associated. 


CHAPTER  XI 

COMMANDANT   OF  THE   STAFF   COLLEGE 

History  of  college  —  Students  and  staff  —  Promoted  Major-General — 
Subjects  of  study — Nature  of  staff  tours— System  of  classifying 
the  students — Defects  in  instruction  —  Points  on  which  special 
emphasis  was  laid — Importance  of  considering  defensive  as  well  as 
offensive  warfare — Warning  given  to  students  about  war  with 
Germany — Naval  War  College — Admirals  Jackson  and  Colville — 
Visits  to  the  Loire  and  Amiens  battlefields  of  1870  war — My  first 
speech  in  French — General  Picquart — With  the  King's  suite  in 
army  manoeuvres  —  Adventures  with  Oxley  while  motoring — 
Trinity  College — Created  Knight  of  the  Victorian  Order — Leave 
the  Staff  College  to  become  Director  of  MiUtary  Training. 

While  at  Aldershot  I  had  been  nominated  to  act  as  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff  to  Sir  Herbert  Plumer,  who  was  to 
command  one  of  the  opposing  sides  at  the  army  manoeuvres 
to  be  held  in  September,  but  my  transfer  to  Camberley 
necessarily  entailed  the  appointment  of  another  officer, 
and  as  the  Staff  College  was  closed  during  August  and  Sep- 
tember for  the  summer  vacation  I  utihsed  these  two  months 
in  thinking  over  my  new  duties  and  deciding  how  best  to 
carry  them  out.  This  was  not  a  matter  to  be  settled  without 
careful  consideration,  for  there  is  no  position  in  the  army 
where  greater  influence  for  good  or  for  evil  can  be  exerted 
over  the  rising  generation  of  officers  than  that  of  Command- 
ant of  the  Staff  College. 

The  history  of  the  college  dates  back  to  1799,  when  an 
institution  for  educating  officers  for  staff  employment  was 
estabhshed  at  High  Wycombe,  the  superintendent  being, 
for  some  reason  unknown  to  me,  a  retired  French  officer, 
by  name  General  Jarry.  In  1802  this  institution  was 
given  the  designation  of  "  Senior  Department  of  the  Royal 
MiUtary  College,"  and  a  Junior  Department  for  educating 
cadets  was   added   to   it.     Eleven   years  later  the  Senior 

169 


170        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Department  was  moved  to  Farnham  and  in  1821  to  Sand- 
hurst, and  there  the  two  branches  continued  to  be  known 
as  the  "  Royal  Mihtary  College."  In  1862  the  present 
Staff  College  was  built,  but  both  colleges  remained  under 
the  same  Governor  until  1870,  when  the  Staff  College  was 
separated  from  the  Royal  Military  College  for  purposes  of 
instruction,  though  it  continued  to  be  under  it  for  adminis- 
tration. This  s^^stem  was  most  inconvenient,  and  while 
I  was  Commandant  I  induced  the  War  Office  to  separate 
the  two  colleges  for  all  purposes  and  so  allow  each  to  look 
after  itself.  The  number  of  students  in  the  early  days 
was  very  small  and,  as  I  have  said  in  a  previous  chapter, 
amounted  in  1897  to  about  sixty.  Shortly  before  I  became 
Commandant  this  number  had  grown  to  a  hundred  and 
twenty,  and  the  instructional  staff  to  fifteen. 

There  was  no  adjutant  or  other  administrative  officer 
at  the  college,  and  many  petty  and  tiresome  details  had 
therefore  to  be  dealt  with  by  me,  whereas  my  whole  time 
ought  to  have  been  devoted  to  instruction.  Up  to  about 
thirty  years  before  there  had  been  an  adjutant,  and  the 
story  was  that  he  had  been  abolished  on  the  recommendation 
of  the  Commandant,  who,  having  a  large  family,  was  desirous 
of  appropriating  the  adjoining  quarters  occupied  by  the 
adjutant,  also  a  married  man.  The  War  Office  approved 
my  proposal  to  revert  to  the  appointment  of  an  adjutant, 
and  I  avoided  the  difficulty  as  to  quarters  by  asking  for 
a  bachelor  so  that  he  might  Uve  in  the  college  with  the 
other  of&cers.  I  was  fortunate  in  securing  for  the  post 
a  very  excellent  officer — Captain  Brewis  of  the  Warwickshire 
Regiment — who  was  invaluable  to  me  and  a  great  favourite 
with  staff  and  students  alike.  To  the  deep  regret  of  all 
who  knew  him,  "  Bobbie  "  Brewis  was  killed  in  the  Great 
War. 

The  object  of  the  Staff  College  being  to  train  officers 
not  only  for  staff  work  but  also  for  the  duties  of  command, 
the  name  is  rather  a  misnomer,  and  I  have  always  thought 
that  "  War  School  "  would  be  more  appropriate.  I  tried 
to  get  this  designation  adopted,  but  without  effect.  I  tried, 
too,  to  get  the  pay  of  the  Commandant  increased,  but  for 
a  long  time  failed  in  this  also.     I  set  to  work  rather  subtly, 


THE  STAFF  COLLEGE  171 

so  I  thought,  a  few  weeks  after  I  had  been  promoted  Major- 
General  in  1912.  I  pointed  out  to  the  authorities  that  I 
was  still  being  shown  in  the  Army  List  as  a  Brigadier- 
General  of  the  General  Staff,  whereas  I  was  in  fact  a  Major- 
General,  and  that  I  could  not  understand  why  I  should 
be  given  a  title  inferior  to  that  conferred  upon  me  by  the 
King.  They  were  at  first  puzzled  to  know  what  to  do,  as 
Major-General  of  the  General  Staff  was  not  a  recognised 
appointment,  but  eventually  the  higher  title  was  accorded 
me,  and  having  extracted  this  concession  I  then  claimed  to 
be  paid  at  a  rate  consistent  with  the  title.  This  was  refused, 
no  good  reasons  being  given,  but  when  Sir  John  French 
became  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  he  saw  the 
justice  of  the  case  and  a  higher  scale  of  pa}^  was  sanctioned — 
the  same  day  that  I  ceased  to  be  Commandant  ! 

I  have  already  referred  to  the  improvement  made  in  the 
curriculum  after  Hildyard  became  Commandant  in  1893, 
and  when  he  left  in  1897  the  course  was  more  exclusively 
practical  than  at  any  other  college  in  Europe.  Before 
and  after  the  South  African  war  his  system  was  continued 
by  Miles,  and  other  useful  reforms  were  later  introduced 
by  the  present  Lord  Rawlinson,  especially  in  the  substi- 
tution of  work  on  the  ground  for  the  less  practical  form  of 
work  on  paper.  Summarised,  the  main  subjects  were  as 
follows  : 

Military  history  and  geography,  strategy,  and  tactics,  with 
special  reference  to  modem  campaigns,  though  older  ones  were 
also  studied. 

Principles  of  Imperial  Defence,  defence  of  frontiers,  plans  of 
concentration,  naval  strategy  and  bases,  defended  ports,  food- 
supplies  of  United  Kingdom,  British  and  foreign  submarine 
cables,  staff  duties  at  home  and  in  the  field,  organisation  of 
the  British  and  principal  foreign  armies,  landings  on  an  enemy's 
coast,  oversea  expeditions  in  general. 

System  of  transport  and  supply,  economic  geography,  com- 
mercial law. 

Medical  and  ordnance  services  as  affecting  commanders  and 
staff  officers. 

Staff  tours,  as  time  and  funds  permitted. 

There  were  many  other  subjects,  but  the  above  will 
suffice  to  show  the  variety  of  the  work  done. 


172         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Speaking  generally,  the  first  year  was  devoted  to  the 
acquisition  of  knowledge,  and  the  second  to  its  application. 
The  solving  of  problems  dealing  with  tactical  situations, 
billeting,  camping,  and  other  duties  which  lend  themselves 
to  this  method  of  treatment,  was  a  special  feature  of 
the  second  year's  work,  as  also  was  the  guiding  of  troops 
(imaginary)  across  roadless  and  unknown  country  by  night. 

Staff  tours,  whose  nature  has  already  been  explained, 
usually  lasted  three  or  four  days,  and  I  tried  to  conduct 
them  in  such  a  way  as  would  test  the  students'  tempers  and 
physical  powers  as  well  as  their  knowledge.  Information 
about  the  (imaginary)  enemy  would  be  given  out  at  all 
hours  of  the  day  and  night  and  emanate  from  all  sources — 
newspapers,  secret  agents,  prisoners,  inhabitants,  and  aero- 
planes— some  of  the  news  being  rehable,  some  doubtful, 
some  contradictory,  and  it  was  for  the  students  to  sift  and 
piece  together  the  different  items,  thus  obtaining  approxi- 
mately the  same  amount  of  information  as  they  might 
be  expected  to  get  in  war  before  they  could  regulate  the 
action  of  their  troops.  This  meant  that  they  occasionally 
had  no  opportunity  of  going  to  bed  at  night,  or  only  for  a 
short  time,  notwithstanding  that  they  had  been  hard  at 
work  during  the  day,  and  had  another  similar  day  in  pros- 
pect. They  took  it  all  in  good  part,  and  it  served  to  bring 
home  to  them  that  staff  employment  in  war  is  not,  as  some 
people  think,  all  beer  and  skittles. 

One  staff  tour  was  held  annually  in  the  Welsh  mountains, 
so  as  to  represent  Indian  frontier  warfare,  and  on  it  the 
inexperienced  students  discovered  what  it  means  to  make 
long  mountain  climbs  on  foot,  and  learnt  how  to  protect 
camps  at  night  in  savage  countries,  capture  passes  crowned 
with  sangars,  arrange  for  the  movement  of  long  strings 
of  pack  animals  following  narrow  tracks,  and  finally  how  to 
withdraw  a  force,  sniped  by  hostile  tribesmen  from  the 
adjacent  hillsides,  down  the  nalas  to  the  frontier — at  Bangor 
or  Criccieth. 

The  benefit  students  derive  from  the  Staff  College  course 
naturally  depends  upon  the  quality  of  the  instruction,  and 
good  instructors,  or  directing  staff  as  they  are  called,  are 
not  too  easily  come  by.     As  a  rule  they  are  well  up  in  the 


COMMANDANT  OF  STAFF  COLLEGE  173 

subjects  with  which  they  have  to  deal,  or  soon  become  so 
after  joining  the  college,  and  there  is  no  question  as  to  their 
keenness  to  do  their  best  for  those  under  their  charge.  Not 
all,  however,  possess  the  gift  of  imparting  in  an  interesting 
and  intelligible  manner  the  knowledge  they  have  been  at 
such  pains  to  acquire  ;  some  have  a  tendency  to  ride  a 
particular  theory  to  death ;  and  others  to  attach  so  much 
importance  to  regulations  as  to  convey  the  idea  that  a 
knowledge  of  them  is  in  itself  a  proof  of  military  proficiency. 

In  order  to  keep  myself  acquainted  with  the  kind  of 
instruction  given,  and  to  correct  what  I  thought  to  be 
wrong,  I  used  to  visit  the  lecture  rooms  at  uncertain  hours, 
and  once  caused  some  anxiety  to  the  lecturer  as  well  as 
amusement  to  the  students,  though  I  did  not  know  this  at 
the  time.  The  lecturer  had  apparently  intended  to  restrict 
the  lecture  to  about  twenty  minutes,  the  orthodox  duration 
being  about  fifty,  and  as  I  arrived  on  the  scene  just  as  he 
was  coming  to  an  end  he  proceeded  to  repeat  the  whole 
story  again,  so  I  discovered  afterwards,  the  students  loyally 
playing  up  to  him  by  showing  rapt  attention  in  listening 
to  what  they  had  already  heard  only  a  few  minutes  before. 

I  had,  as  all  Commandants  have  had,  some  good  in- 
structors and  some  who  were  not  so  good,  but  on  the  whole 
I  was  very  well  served  and  especially  by  the  two  senior 
assistants — Perceval  of  the  Gunners  and  Johnny  Gough 
of  the  Rifle  Brigade — who  were  respectively  in  charge  of 
the  two  divisions  into  which  the  students  were  formed. 
Gough  had  a  high  reputation  as  a  brilliant  and  accomplished 
soldier,  and  it  was  a  heavy  loss  to  the  army  when,  as  Chief 
of  the  General  Staff  of  the  ist  Army,  he  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a  stray  bullet  in  Flanders  in  February  19 15, 
when  going  to  visit  his  battalion  in  the  trenches.  He  came 
of  a  renowned  fighting  family,  and  was  the  brother  of  Hubert 
Gough,  who  rose  in  the  Great  War  from  Brigadier  to  the 
command  of  the  5th  Army,  which  fought  so  gallantly 
against  overwhelming  odds  when  the  Germans  made  their 
great,  but  unsuccessful,  bid  for  victory  in  March  igi8. 

Amongst  the  other  officers  employed  on  the  directing  staff 
were  Furse,  Barrow,  Ross  and  Ballard  (contemporaries  of 
mine  when  a  student),  Howell  (a  rising  soldier,  killed  in 


174        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  Great  War),  Foster  and  Hull  (since  dead),  Stewart  (who 
had  distinguished  himself  in  Kelly's  march  from  Gilgit  to 
Chitral),  Harper,  Hoskins,  Davidson,  and  Percival. 

At  the  end  of  each  term — there  were  three  terms  in  the 
year — the  directing  staff  of  each  of  the  two  divisions  met 
in  conference  to  discuss  the  work  done  by  the  students  and 
to  classify  them  according  to  the  ability  they  had  shown. 
This  classification  underwent  considerable  alteration  during 
the  first  year  of  the  course,  as  the  progress  made  by  some 
of  the  officers  was  much  greater  than  that  made  by  others  ; 
but  in  the  second  year  it  remained  fairly  constant,  and  by 
the  end  of  that  year  it  was  perhaps  as  good  an  estimate  of 
the  students'  capacity  as  could  be  made.  There  was  no 
danger  of  favouritism,  for  if  any  one  of  the  staff  showed  an 
undue  leaning  towards  a  student  the  others  could  be  relied 
upon  to  see  that  impartiality  was  maintained.  As  pre- 
viously mentioned,  this  method  of  deciding  upon  the 
students'  qualifications  was  adopted  while  Hildyard  was 
Commandant,  in  preference  to  the  system  hitherto  in  vogue 
by  which  they  were  placed  in  order  of  merit  mainly  accord- 
ing to  the  number  of  marks  gained  in  paper  examinations 
at  the  end  of  the  course.  It  answered  well,  and  this  I  think 
is  proved  by  the  fact  that  of  the  i8o  officers  who  graduated 
during  my  regime  very  few  failed  in  the  Great  War  to  come 
up  to  the  expectation  formed  of  them,  and  fewer  still 
exceeded  it. 

The  students  are  liable  to  be  sent  away  from  the  college 
for  misconduct,  or  if  they  show  themselves  unlikely  to 
become  proficient  staff  officers  or  commanders.  It  fell  to 
my  lot  to  dismiss  two  only.  One  was  a  young  man  from 
the  Overseas  Dominions  who,  both  by  ordinary  education 
and  natural  ability,  ought  not  to  have  been  sent  to  the 
college,  for  he  could  never  hope  to  be  equal  to  a  position 
of  responsibility. 

The  other  was  a  clever  and  gallant  officer  who  foolishly 
persisted  in  refusing  to  grow  a  moustache,  thus  contravening 
the  King's  Regulations  of  the  time,  which  directed  that  the 
upper  lip  should  not  be  shaved.  Many  of  the  young  men 
of  the  period  were  in  the  habit  of  shaving,  and  as  strict 
orders  had  been  issued  by  the  War  Office  forbidding  the 


METHOD  OF  INSTRUCTION  175 

practice,  and  telling  General  Officers  to  put  a  stop  to  it,  the 
offender  was  duly  warned  by  the  directing  staff  of  his 
division.  As  this  had  no  effect  he  was  brought  before  me, 
and  when  I  asked  him  why  he  continued  to  break  the 
regulations  he  repHed  that  they  merely  forbade  shaving, 
and  that  he  did  not  shave,  but  only  made  use  of  the  scissors 
to  cut  off  such  few  hairs  as  would  grow,  and  which  looked 
very  ugly  when  allowed  to  grow.  No  one  would  be  so 
idiotic  as  to  think  that  an  officer  is  any  better  for  wearing 
a  moustache  than  he  is  for  shaving  or  clipping  it  off,  and 
the  regulation  has  since  been  abohshed,  but  staff  officers 
are  expected  to  set  an  example  of  obeying  the  King's 
Regulations,  and  I  had  no  alternative  but  to  report  the 
matter.  The  officer  was  ordered  to  leave  the  college,  and 
I  am  sorry  to  add  that  he  was  killed  in  the  Great  War. 

On  taking  over  command  of  the  college  the  flaw  in 
instruction  which  struck  me  most  was  one  which  is  not 
uncommonly  seen  in  other  educational  establishments — that 
is,  the  aptitude  to  dwell  too  much  upon  the  theoretical 
aspect  of  a  problem  and  the  neglect  to  reahse  the  difficulties 
which  beset  its  solution  in  practice.  Details,  so-called, 
were  thought  to  be  petty  and  beneath  the  notice  of  the 
big-minded  man,  and  yet  they  are  the  very  things  which 
nine  hundred  and  ninety  times  out  of  a  thousand  make  just 
the  difference  in  war  between  success  and  failure.  What- 
ever may  be  the  case  in  peace  time  there  are  few  or  no  small 
things  in  war,  though  some  are  of  greater  importance  than 
others,  and  those  who,  hke  myself,  attended  the  meetings 
of  the  War  Cabinet  for  more  than  two  years  during  the 
Great  War  will  bear  out  this  statement. 

Another  objectionable  habit  I  noticed  was  the  craving  to 
employ  high-sounding  phrases  such  as  "  pivot  of  manoeuvre," 
"  interior  lines,"  "  offensive-defensive,"  and  so  on,  all  of 
which  were  right  enough  in  their  way,  on  paper,  but  in 
actual  war  do  not  greatly  assist  the  ordinary  commander  in 
the  thing  that  really  matters,  the  defeat  of  the  enemy. 
There  is  only  one  road  to  victory,  given  a  capable  opponent, 
and  that  is  the  road  of  hard  fighting,  of  which  there  is  usually 
a  great  deal.  I  was  very  insistent  on  this  point,  and  in  the 
solution  of  problems,  whether  on  paper  or  on  the  ground. 


176        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

I  would  always  lead  the  student  up  to  it  and  from  it  judge 
whether  his  solution  was  or  was  not  sound.  War,  I  would 
impress  upon  him,  is  largely  a  contest  between  the  brains 
and  grit  of  the  opposing  commanders,  in  which  each  en- 
deavours to  outwit,  outlast,  and  beat  the  other. 

In  the  course  of  my  final  address  to  the  students  who 
left  the  college  at  the  end  of  1912  I  said  : 

It  will  further  assist  you  to  keep  on  the  right  lines  if  at  all 
times  you  remember  to  study  with  the  definite  aim  of  obtaining 
guidance  for  future  use  in  war,  and  not  merely  for  the  sake  of 
amassing  a  store  of  information.  Not  one  of  us  could  compare 
perhaps  with  certain  military  historians  who  might  be  mentioned, 
as  far  as  mere  knowledge  of  past  wars  is  concerned,  and  yet  we 
do  not  admit  that  they  would  prove  to  be  our  best  commanders. 
Why  ?  Simply  because  they  do  not  study  military  history,  we 
think,  in  the  way  that  we  do  or  ought  to  do,  namely  with  the 
object  of  making  actual  use  in  war  of  the  knowledge  acquired. 
If  we  conduct  our  investigations  from  this  standpoint  we  shall 
not  be  likely  to  waste  time  in  fascinating,  but  valueless,  hair- 
splitting dialectics  ;  we  will  not  make  too  frequent  use  of  stereo- 
typed phrases  which  may  mean  one  of  several  things  or  even 
nothing  at  all  ;  we  shall  not  burden  our  minds  with  too  many 
historical  parallels  ;  and  will  not  be  so  apt  to  form  conclusions 
which,  however  attractive  they  may  appear  on  paper,  have  little 
or  no  connection  with  the  rough  and  bloody  work  of  masses  of 
men  tr5ring  to  kill  each  other. 

The  question  of  giving  more  instruction  in  duties  con- 
nected with  a  retreat  also  called  for  attention.  The  training 
regulations  dwelt  with  great  persistence  on  the  importance 
of  the  offensive,  and  the  idea  of  fighting  on  the  defensive 
was  thought  to  be  so  obnoxious  to  the  minds  of  the 
authorities  that,  for  some  time  past,  it  had  been  deemed 
politic  to  leave  defensive  training  severely  alone.  There 
was  the  greater  inclination  to  leave  it  alone  because  of  the 
impossibility  of  reproducing  in  peace  some  of  the  conditions 
— and  the  most  important  of  them — which  attach  to  a 
retreat  in  war.  Still  it  was  necessary  to  do  a''  that  could 
be  done,  for  however  valuable  offensive  action  may  be,  and 
undoubtedly  is,  there  could  be  no  certainty  that  a  defensive 
policy  would  not  one  day  be  imposed  upon  us,  and  for  that 
contingency  we  ought  to  be  prepared.     I  therefore  made  it 


MEASURES  FOR  RETREAT  177 

an  almost  invariable  practice  at  all  staff  tours  and  other 
exercises  on  the  ground  to  create  a  situation  that  entailed 
taking  measures  for  retreat,  and  the  following  extract  from 
the  final  address  referred  to  above  bears  on  the  same 
subject  : 

Of  all  forms  of  making  war  the  one  that  demands  most 
careful  study  is  that  of  fighting  a  superior  and  well-trained  force. 
Every  soldier  feels,  and  ought  to  feel,  a  great  aversion  from  retiring 
from  before  the  enemy  without  a  trial  of  strength,  and  yet  if  the 
enemy  is  found  to  be  superior  (I  do  not  refer  merely  to  numbers), 
and  is  concentrated,  there  may  be  nothing  for  it  but  to  fall  back 
and  await  a  better  opportunity,  as  many  a  good  general  has  had 
to  do  in  the  past.  For  example,  Moore  to  Corunna  ;  Wellington 
in  1810  and  again  in  1812  ;  Napoleon  to  Leipzig  in  1813  and  to 
Paris  in  18 14  ;  and  Jackson  and  Lee  in  the  American  Civil  War. 
The  great  difficulty  attaching  to  operations  of  this  nature  is  to 
reconcile  two  conflicting  aims — the  husbanding  of  one's  own 
forces  and  the  infliction  of  loss  upon  the  enemy — and  it  can  only 
be  overcome  if  the  commander  possesses  sound  judgment  and  a 
powerful  iron  will ;  if  the  staff  are  accurate  in  their  calculations 
and  untiring  in  their  efforts  ;  and  if  the  troops  possess  great 
mobility,  high  morale,  confidence  in  their  leaders,  and  good 
fighting  capacity  in  general.  Remember,  too,  that  the  larger  the 
force  the  more  difficult  does  the  operation  become.  Our  regula- 
tions justly  lay  stress  on  the  value  of  the  offensive  ;  but  if  this 
teaching  alone  is  given,  think  what  may  be  the  effect  on  the  troops 
when  they  are  ordered  to  retire  instead  of  to  go  forward — that 
is,  to  abandon  that  method  of  making  war  by  which  alone, 
according  to  the  training  they  have  previously  received,  decisive 
victory  can  be  achieved.  Think,  too,  of  the  disintegration  and 
demoralisation  which  nearly  always  accompany  retrograde  move- 
ments, even  when  an  army  has  not  been  previously  defeated.  It 
seems  to  me  that  there  is  practically  no  chance  of  successfully 
carrying  out  this  operation  in  war  unless  we  thoroughly  study  and 
practice  it  beforehand  during  peace.  If  we  have  this  practice, 
the  operation  will  then  not  come  as  a  surprise  to  the  troops  in 
war  ;  they  will  understand  better  what  they  are  expected  to  do  ; 
and  they  will  recognise  it  as  being  a  form  of  war  which  may  have 
to  be  adopted  by  any  army,  and  can  be  adopted,  not  only  without 
failure,  but  with  a  certain  measure,  ultimately,  of  success.  You 
will  do  well  to  study  the  methods  of  Wellington  in  the  Peninsula, 
and  the  teaching  furnished  by  the  American  Civil  war  on  this 
important  subject. 

I  have  reason  to  believe  that  this  advice,  published  in 

N 


178        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  Army  Review  by  the  order  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  Lord  Haldane,  caused  other  and  more  senior  officers 
to  give  increased  attention  to  defensive  fighting,  and  thereby 
was  indirectly  of  some  help  to  them  in  the  historic  retreat 
from  Mons. 

Emphasis  was  also  laid,  day  in  and  day  out,  on  the 
importance  of  the  staff  cultivating  close  and  friendly  relations 
with  the  regimental  officers,  and  of  preventing  the  erection 
of  the  barrier  which  at  one  period  separated  the  two  with 
such  pernicious  effect.  This  advice,  too,  I  believe,  bore 
fruit  in  the  Great  War,  as  did  also  the  injunction  not  to  be 
content  with  merely  giving  orders,  but,  by  watching  and 
helping  before  matters  had  time  to  go  wrong,  ensure  that 
they  were  carried  out  as  the  commander  desired. 

Another  warning  persistently  rubbed  in  was  the  prob- 
ability of  war  with  Germany,  and  the  responsibilities  it 
would  cast  upon  Staff  College  officers  in  particular.  In  this 
connection,  and  at  the  risk  of  being  accused  of  imduly  blow- 
ing my  own  trumpet,  I  shall  quote  from  the  final  address 
I  made  to  the  students  who  left  at  the  end  of  191 1  : 

So  far  as  one  can  judge  from  the  present  state  of  the  world, 
you  may  any  day  find  yourselves  taking  part  in  a  war  than 
which  there  has  been  no  greater  for  the  last  hundred  years  or  so, 
and  it  may  be  upon  you  to  whom  I  am  now  speaking  that  to  a 
great  extent  will  depend  how  we  emerge  from  that  war.  We  are 
too  apt  to  go  on  day  by  day  discussing  the  probability  and  conse- 
quences of  certain  wars,  without  ever  really  recognising  our  own 
individual  responsibility,  and  remember  that  officers  who  have 
been  through  the  Staff  College  have  the  greater  responsibility. 
You  do  not  come  here  for  the  sake  of  passing  examinations  at 
the  end  of  the  first  year,  and  of  obtaining  a  P.S.C.  at  the  end  of 
the  second.  You  come  here  in  order  that  you  may  leave  the 
college  better  and  more  efficient  members  of  the  military  com- 
munity. You  should  endeavour  to  increase  the  knowledge  you 
have  acquired,  disseminate  it  amongst  others,  and,  as  I  have 
often  told  you,  direct  your  studies  and  peace  preparations  in  general 
to  a  special  and  definite  end — that  of  fighting  the  most  probable  and 
most  formidable  adversary  for  the  time  being. 

Finally,  remember  that  when  the  day  for  fighting  comes,  the 
qualifications  demanded  of  you,  whether  on  the  staff  or  in 
command,  will  include,  in  addition  to  a  good  theoretical  know- 
ledge of  your  professional  duties,  the  possession  of  a  quick  eye, 


SIR  HENRY  JACKSON  179 

a  good  digestion,  an  untiring  activity,  a  determination  to  close 
with  your  enemy,  and  a  firm  resolution  not  to  take  counsel  of 
your  fears. 

It  was  well  understood  between  me  and  the  students 
who  "  the  most  probable  and  most  formidable  adversary  " 
was.  We  had  often  discussed  him,  and  there  was  no  need 
to  mention  him  by  name.  That  was  seldom  done,  as  the 
hint  had  long  since  been  received  from  London  that  we  were 
not  in  any  way  to  meddle  with  questions  which  might,  if 
they  became  known,  give  offence  to  a  friendly  (!)  Power,  and 
possibly  lead  to  "  diplomatic  complications."  "  Mum  "  was 
the  word,  therefore,  in  regard  to  all  work — and  there  was 
a  great  deal — which  was  designed  to  assist  the  students  in 
studying  the  conflict  which  threatened  us,  and  which  we 
had  in  fact  to  meet  within  less  than  three  years  of  the  time 
when  the  above  words  were  spoken. 

Shortly  before  I  became  Commandant  the  Admiralty  had 
estabhshed  a  War  College  at  Portsmouth,  with  the  object 
of  giving  instruction  to  naval  officers  somewhat  similar  to 
that  given  at  the  Staff  College.  The  course  was,  however, 
much  shorter,  and  in  other  respects  was  not  regarded  as 
being  of  quite  the  same  importance,  but  I  should  imagine 
that  it  did  a  great  deal  of  good,  and  it  undoubtedly 
helped  to  bring  the  two  services  closer  together.  Two  or 
three  naval  officers  attended  the  Staff  College  for  a  few 
months  as  students,  and  military  officers  were  sent  to  the 
Naval  College  ;  the  students  of  both  colleges,  with  their 
instructors,  occasionally  took  part  in  combined  naval  and 
military  exercises,  in  which  there  was  a  useful  exchange  of 
ideas  ;  and  in  many  ways  the  officers  of  the  two  colleges 
were  able  to  learn  much  from  and  about  each  other. 
Amongst  the  naval  friends  I  had  the  good  fortune  to  make 
in  this  way  was  Sir  Henry  Jackson,  then  Commandant  of 
the  Naval  College.  He  very  kindly  arranged  for  me  to 
spend  a  week  at  sea  with  the  ist  Battle  Squadron,  com- 
manded by  Admiral  Sir  Stanley  Colville.  The  work  of  the 
squadron  was  full  of  interest  for  me,  especially  the  "  battle 
practice,"  and  I  was  most  hospitably  treated  by  the  Admiral 
and  the  officers  of  his  fine  flagship  the  Collingwood. 


i8o        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Besides  making  the  usual  trips  to  the  more  classical 
battlefields  of  1870-71 — Spicheren,  Woerth,  and  Gravelotte 
— I  revived  the  custom  which  had  lapsed  in  recent  years  of 
taking  the  students  to  the  battlefields  near  Amiens,  Orleans, 
and  Le  Mans.  I  did  so  because  these  battles  had  a  special 
value  of  their  own,  as  they  were  fought  by  partially-trained 
and  hastily-raised  French  troops,  and  I  always  felt  that  one 
day  we  ourselves  might  have  to  fight  with  the  same  kind  of 
troops,  as  indeed  we  had  to  do  in  the  Great  War.  I  think 
I  am  justified  in  saying  that  the  discussions  which  ensued 
and  the  knowledge  that  was  acquired  during  these  visits 
were  of  benefit  to  the  students  when  employed  with  the 
troops  of  which  our  New  Armies  were  composed. 

During  one  of  the  visits  to  Orleans,  the  headquarters  of 
a  French  army  corps,  I  had  an  interesting  conversation 
with  the  corps  commander,  who,  as  a  young  man,  had  fought 
in  the  French  cavalry  during  the  war.  He  had  been  present 
at  the  famous  cavalry  charge  at  Morsbronn,  and  then  went 
with  the  remains  of  MacMahon's  army  to  Sedan,  where  he 
took  part  in  the  cavalry  charge  which  preceded  the  invest- 
ment of  that  place,  his  regiment  being  one  of  the  few  to 
break  through  the  German  lines  before  the  French  forces 
were  entirely  surrounded.  He  was  then  sent  south  to  the 
Loire,  being  present  at  the  various  battles  near  Orleans,  and 
he  was  therefore  able  to  give  much  information  in  regard  to 
them. 

One  day  he  invited  me  to  bring  my  fifty  odd  students 
after  dinner  to  meet  some  of  his  officers  at  the  military  club. 
We  were  given  a  most  cordial  reception,  and  after  the 
national  anthem  had  been  played  by  a  large  band  outside 
the  club,  which  was  brilliantly  illuminated,  we  were  con- 
ducted inside.  We  entered  a  room  profusely  decorated  with 
flowers  and  flags,  and  sat  down  to  enjoy  dessert,  wine, 
coffee,  and  smokes.  To  my  surprise  our  host  got  on  his 
feet  towards  the  end  of  the  evening,  and  made  a  very 
eulogistic  speech  respecting  the  British  army,  and  its  past 
and  present  relations  with  the  French  army.  One  of  his 
staff  then  read  the  English  translation  of  the  speech,  which 
had  evidently  been  prepared  with  much  care,  and  it  then 
remained  for  me  to  reply. 


SPEECH-MAKING  i8i 

Having  been  taken  unawares,  and  being  at  all  times 
incapable  of  making  a  public  speech  on  the  spur  of  the 
moment,  I  felt  that  the  only  thing  to  do  was  to  put  on  a 
bold  front  and  try  to  score  by  replpng  in  French.  I  knew 
that  my  vocabulary  was  very  limited,  and  that  my  French 
pronunciation  was  execrably  bad,  but  there  seemed  nothing 
for  it  but  to  do  or  die.  After  talking  for  the  space  of  some 
ten  minutes,  and  having  tried  the  effect  of  a  few  jokes — 
which  apparently  were  not  understood  and  certainly  did 
not  amuse — the  proceedings  became  distinctly  flat,  and  as 
a  total  collapse  seemed  to  be  imminent  I  made  a  last 
despairing  effort  not  to  be  beaten.  I  apologised  for  my 
ignorance  of  the  French  language,  regretted  I  could  not  say 
half  what  I  wished  to  say,  and  added  that,  being  unable  to 
speak  further,  I  would  call  on  my  officers  to  sing  a  ditty 
commonly  heard  at  similar  reunions  in  England.  I  then 
proposed  the  health  of  the  corps  commander  and  asked 
the  officers  to  sing  "  For  he's  a  jolly  good  fellow."  They 
responded  with  even  more  than  the  usual  amount  of  noise 
and  discord,  and  all  that  the  French  officers  could  grasp  of 
the  performance  was  a  repetition  of  the  same  words.  Next 
morning  I  bought  the  local  newspaper  in  order  to  see  what 
kind  of  account  was  given  of  the  entertainment.  The  corps 
commander's  speech,  a  very  good  one,  was  reported  verbatim. 
Mine  was  not.  I  did  not  expect  that  it  would  be.  But  the 
reporter  credited  me  with  a  far  better  speech  than  the  one 
I  had  actually  delivered,  and  added  that,  at  the  end  of  it,  I 
called  upon  my  officers  to  sing  the  well-known  English  song 
of  which  the  chorus  was,  "  For  thou  art  a  very  good  man  !  " 

On  another  occasion,  in  1913,  we  were  invited  by  General 
Picquart  to  meet  the  officers  of  the  army  corps  at  Amiens. 
Not  to  be  again  caught  napping  I  took  the  precaution  to 
ask  Maurice — one  of  my  staff  and  an  excellent  French 
scholar — to  prepare  a  speech  for  me  beforehand.  It  was 
well  that  I  did  so,  for  I  had  to  reply  to  a  most  flattering 
welcome,  and  can  claim  (thanks  to  Maurice)  to  have  come 
out  of  the  ordeal  with  flying  colours.  I  had  a  long  talk 
with  the  General  before  we  parted.  He  was  a  native  of 
Strasburg,  and  as  a  boy  of  about  ten  years  of  age  was  in 
the  city  when  the  Germans  besieged  it  in  1870.     He  de- 


182 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


scribed  to  me,  with  some  emotion,  how  his  family  had  lost 
all  their  property  and  treasures,  and  he  evidently  looked 
forward  to  the  day  of  reckoning,  and  hoped  that  when  it 
arrived  we  would  be  on  his  side.  A  few  months  afterwards 
he  was  thrown  from  his  horse  and  killed. 

So  as  not  to  lose  all  touch  with  the  practical  side  of 
soldiering  I  used  to  attend  the  annual  divisional  and  brigade 
trainings  as  far  as  college  duties  would  allow.  One  year  I 
was  asked  to  prepare  a  scheme  for  the  inter-divisional 
manoeuvres  of  two  of  the  commands  in  England,  and  to 
draft  it  in  such  a  way  as  to  test  the  leadership  of  two 
brigadiers  who  were  shortly  to  be  considered  by  the  Selection 
Board  for  promotion  to  Major-General.  I  therefore  so 
arranged  matters  that  at  the  commencement  of  the  opera- 
tions the  two  officers  found  themselves  opposing  each  other, 
each  being  in  command  of  a  detachment  which  was  unhkely 
to  be  reinforced  for  a  period  of  at  least  twelve  hours,  and 
I  left  them  as  free  a  hand  as  possible  in  dealing  with  the 
situation  thus  created,  so  that  they  might  show  what  they 
could  do.  How  they  emerged  from  the  test  it  was  no  part 
of  my  business  as  chief  umpire  to  say,  and  I  do  not  pretend 
to  know  what  opinion  was  formed  of  them  by  the  two 
General  Officers  under  whom  they  were  serving,  and  who 
exercised  chief  supervision  over  the  operations  ;  but  I  do 
know  that  they  were  not  promoted  when  their  turn  came, 
and  yet  both  of  them  rose  to  positions  of  high  command  in 
the  Great  War.  Manoeuvres  afford  the  best  means  in  time 
of  peace  for  testing  the  capacity  of  an  officer  to  command 
troops  in  war,  but  they  are  not  always  a  reliable  guide  of 
a  commander's  merit ;  they  are  very  different  from  the 
real  thing. 

In  1912  I  was  ordered  to  accompany  the  King  during 
the  army  manoeuvres  in  Cambridgeshire,  and  wishing  to 
make  myself  acquainted  with  the  country  over  which  they 
were  to  take  place,  I  motored  through  it  a  few  days  previous 
to  the  commencement  of  operations,  being  accompanied  by 
Colonel  Oxley,  who  was  then  on  the  directing  staff  of  the 
college.  One  morning  a  powerful  car  suddenly  emerged  at 
full  speed  from  a  blind  corner  at  some  cross-roads  we  were 
passing,  striking  our  lighter  car — an  open  one— full  broad- 


MOTOR  ACCIDENTS  183 

side  and  turning  it  completely  round  and  upside  down. 
Oxley,  I,  and  the  chauffeur  were  shot  clean  out  of  it,  for- 
tunately landing  on  a  patch  of  grass,  for  a  distance,  as  we 
afterwards  ascertained,  of  twelve  yards.  On  picking  our- 
selves up  we  were  surprised  to  find  that  we  were  quite 
unhurt  beyond  a  few  bruises,  and  I  still  held  in  my  hands 
the  map  and  magnifying  glass  I  had  been  using  at  the 
moment  the  collision  occurred.  The  car  was  practically  a 
wreck. 

Oxley  was  wont  to  be  a  Jonah  in  his  motor  drives.  Two 
or  three  days  later  his  car  was  again  struck  by  one  coming 
from  a  side  road,  though  he  once  more  escaped  with  a 
shaking ;  and  one  day,  when  motoring  with  me  along  the 
foot  of  the  South  Downs,  there  was  further  trouble.  We 
met  a  ramshackle  country  cart  being  driven  by  a  boy,  in 
which  were  two  large  casks  probably  containing  pigwash  or 
some  such  mixture.  As  the  road  was  narrow  we  slowed 
down  almost  to  a  halt,  the  boy  directing  his  cart  off  the 
road  and  up  the  rather  steep  hill-side  so  as  to  pass  us.  This 
brought  the  full  load  of  the  cart  to  bear  on  the  wheel  next 
to  us,  and  just  as  we  were  passing  the  axle  gave  way  and 
the  boy  and  the  contents  of  his  casks  were  flung  into  our 
car.  Oxley  was  fairly  well  drenched,  but,  to  his  intense 
relief,  it  transpired  that  the  casks  held  nothing  worse  than 
drinking  water,  and  the  total  damage  done,  over  and  above 
the  broken  axle,  was  hmited  to  barking  the  boy's  shins. 
We  gave  him  2s.  6d.  as  compensation,  and  then  proceeded 
on  our  journey. 

During  the  manoeuvres  the  King  and  his  suite  were 
accommodated  in  Trinity  College,  everything  possible  being 
done  by  the  college  officials  to  render  the  visit  pleasant  to 
all  of  us.  At  the  end  of  the  manoeuvres  the  usual  conference, 
or  "  pow-wow,"  was  held  in  the  hall  of  the  college,  some  of 
the  Fellows  attending  to  hear  how  the  soldiers  acquitted 
themselves  in  the  talking  line.  The  time  of  day,  immediately 
after  luncheon,  was  not  conducive  to  alert  attention,  and 
for  the  first  hour  or  so  the  proceedings  dragged  on  in  a  dull 
and  dreary  manner,  with  little  or  no  prospect  of  ever  coming 
to  an  end.  This  depressing  circumstance,  plus  the  lunch, 
was  too  much  for  some  of  the  audience,  and  the  Master  in 


i84        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

particular  had  to  struggle  very  hard  to  prevent  his  nodding 
head  from  coming  into  contact  with  the  table  at  which  he 
sat  at  the  top  of  the  hall. 

The  following  year  the  manoeuvres  were  held  in 
Northamptonshire.  I  was  again  attached  to  the  King's 
suite,  all  of  whom  were  the  guests  of  Lord  Spencer  at 
Althorp,  The  party  numbered  about  twenty,  and  included 
the  Queen,  the  Duke  of  Connaught,  and  Prince  Arthur  of 
Connaught.  Lord  Spencer  was  a  deUghtful  host,  surpassed 
in  kindness,  if  at  all,  only  by  his  daughter  Lady  Deha,  who 
acted  as  hostess.  By  his  invitation  I  went  to  Althorp  a  few 
days  before  the  manoeuvres  commenced  so  as  to  talk  over 
and  arrange  certain  matters  with  him  previous  to  Their 
Majesties'  arrival,  and  I  have  the  most  pleasant  recollection 
of  the  hospitalit}^  received. 

On  the  day  the  manoeuvres  terminated  I  was  informed 
by  CHve  Wigram,  one  of  the  equerries,  that  the  King  wished 
to  see  me.  I  found  His  Majesty  with  the  Queen,  Lord 
Spencer,  and  a  few  members  of  the  suite  in  the  famous 
picture  gallery,  and  was  then  told  by  the  King  that  in 
return  for  the  services  I  had  rendered  during  the  last  few 
years  he  proposed  to  make  me  a  Knight  Commander  of  the 
Victorian  Order,  I  was  more  than  surprised,  somewhat 
nervous,  and  quite  ignorant  as  to  what  I  was  expected  to 
do,  but  Wigram  came  to  the  rescue,  drew  the  sword  he  was 
wearing,  handed  it  to  the  King,  and  told  me  to  kneel  down. 
Having  duly  knighted  me  the  King  put  out  his  hand,  and  not 
knowing  what  else  to  do  I  shook  it,  rising  to  my  feet  at  the 
same  time.  I  ought  to  have  kissed  it,  of  course,  as  a  sign  of 
homage,  but  the  King  was  probably  quite  as  pleased  to  see 
me  shake  it.  The  incident  brought  a  broad  smile  over  the 
faces  of  the  onlookers,  and  I  beat  as  hasty  a  retreat  as  I 
respectfully  could.  I  have  always  felt  far  more  gratified 
with  the  honour  thus  simply  and  spontaneously  conferred 
upon  me  as  a  mark  of  His  Majesty's  personal  esteem,  than 
with  any  of  the  rewards  since  received  on  the  recommenda- 
tion of  ministers  or  my  military  superiors. 

In  the  summer  of  1913  I  was  told  by  Sir  John  French 
that  he  wished  me  to  go  to  the  War  Office  as  Director  of 
Military  Training.     This  was  much  against  my  inclination, 


LEAVING  THE  STAFF  COLLEGE  185 

as  I  have  always  disliked  life  in  London,  more  especially 
official  life,  and  I  was  anxious  to  be  given  active  command 
of  troops.  However,  the  Field-Marshal  was  good  enough  to 
make  his  request  more  palatable  by  promising  me  the 
command  of  the  ist  Division  at  Aldershot  when  it  became 
vacant  in  the  summer  of  the  following  year. 

The  night  before  leaving  the  Staff  College,  in  October 
1913,  I  was  entertained  by  the  staff  and  students  at  dinner, 
and  I  am  not  ashamed  to  say  that  in  the  short  farewell 
speech  I  made  to  them  my  heart  was  fairly  in  my  mouth. 
Black  sheep  are  to  be  found  in  nearly  ever}^  flock,  but  there 
are  an  unusual  small  proportion  of  them  at  the  Staff  College. 
Both  staff  and  students  are  of  the  most  attractive  character, 
hard  workers,  lovable  companions  whether  at  work  or  play, 
and  really  good  fellows  in  every  sense  of  the  word.  I  grieve 
to  think  that  over  one  hundred  and  fifty  of  the  officers 
who  had  graduated  at  Camberley  met  their  death  in  the 
Great  War, 

The  next  time  I  dined  with  a  party  of  Staff  College 
officers  was  at  Cologne  in  1919,  when  in  command  of  the 
Army  of  the  Rhine.  Dillon,  my  private  secretary,  collected 
all  the  P.S.C.  officers  then  serving  under  my  orders  (I  am 
afraid  one  was  unintentionally  left  out),  and  we  spent  a 
pleasant  evening  together  at  my  house  overlooking  the 
river,  discussing  the  old  Camberley  days  and  the  great 
events  which  had  since  taken  place. 


CHAPTER  XII 

DIRECTOR   OF   MILITARY   TRAINING 

Duties — Unsatisfactory  responsibility  for  training — Arrangements  for 
command  at  home  in  time  of  war — "  Staff  "  cannot  "  command  " — 
Question  of  invasion — Invasion  ruled  out  as  impracticable  and 
replaced  by  theory  of  raids — Reversion  to  invasion  theory — 
Question  mainly  one  for  the  Admiralty — Constant  discussions 
finally  settled  in  August  1914 — Policy  as  to  invasion  during  the 
Great  War — Economy  exercised  to  the  detriment  of  training — 
"  Curragh  incident  "  and  its  effect  on  army  officers — "  Joe  "  Maude 
— Collapse  of  the  proposed  coercion  of  Ulster  and  resignation  of  the 
Secretary  of  State  for  War,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
and  the  Adjutant-General — Sir  Charles  Douglas — Army  manoeuvres 
arranged  for  191 4 — War  with  Germany  declared — Am  appointed 
Quartermaster-General  of  the  Expeditionary  Force. 

I  JOINED  the  staff  at  the  War  Office  for  the  third  time  on 
the  9th  October  1913.  As  Director  of  Mihtar}^  Training  I 
was  responsible  to  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff 
for  the  training  of  all  troops  at  home,  for  the  education  of 
officers  (including  the  Cadets  at  Woolwich  and  Sandhurst 
and  the  Officers  Training  Corps),  and  for  questions  connected 
with  home  defence.  The  directorate  was  in  good  working 
order,  thanks  to  the  efforts  of  Murray  while  in  charge  of 
it  from  September  1907  to  June  1912,  excellent  training 
manuals  had  been  prepared,  and  I  had  Uttle  to  do  except 
ensure  that  the  appUcation  of  the  principles  they  contained 
kept  pace  with  changing  conditions. 

There  was,  however,  an  objectionable  flaw  in  the  chain 
of  responsibility  for  training,  in  that  all  training  instructions 
were  prepared  under  the  orders  of  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  while  the  troops  were  inspected,  not  by  him; 
or  his  staff,  but  by  a  separate  body  of  Inspectors  located  at 
the  Horse  Guards  under  an  Inspector-General,  the  latter 
reporting  the  results  of  the  inspections  to  the  Army  Council. 

186 


DIRECTOR  OF  MILITARY  TRAINING         187 

The  position  therefore  was  that  while  the  General  Staff 
drafted  the  training  instructions  they  had  no  opportunity 
— except  by  arranging  occasionally  to  accompany  the 
Inspector- General — of  seeing  and  hearing  for  themselves 
how  they  worked  in  practice  ;  and  on  the  other  hand  the 
Inspector- General's  Staff  had  this  opportunity  but  were 
without  the  authority  to  change  the  instructions  if  found 
to  be  unsuitable. 

The  system  had  been  introduced  by  the  Esher  Committee 
ten  years  before,  the  idea  of  having  a  separate  inspecting 
branch  having  probably  been  taken  from  the  large  con- 
tinental armies,  in  which  it  was  necessary  to  have  Inspectors 
constantly  moving  about  between  one  command  and 
another  so  as  to  ensure  uniformity.  With  our  comparatively 
small  army  there  was  not  nearly  the  same  necessity  for  them, 
as  uniformity  could  have  been  safeguarded,  and  at  far  less 
expense,  by  inspections  carried  out  b}^  the  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff  and  his  subordinates,  and,  moreover, 
the  latter  would  have  had  the  benefit  of  maintaining  closer 
touch  with  the  troops  for  whose  training  they  were  primarily 
responsible.  Even  if  a  separate  inspecting  staff  were  required 
it  should  have  been  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff,  as  in  foreign  armies,  and  not 
made,  as  it  was,  independent  of  him. 

This  illogical  system,  which  might  have  proved  very 
mischievous  had  not  the  General  Staff  and  Inspecting  Staff 
been  careful  to  work  closely  together,  came  to  an  end  when 
a  Commander-in-Chief  of  all  troops  in  the  United  Kingdom 
was  appointed  in  December  1915,  as  the  Inspecting  Staff 
was  then  made  part  of  his  headquarters  and  its  independent 
status  thus  disappeared.  Both  he  and  the  Inspecting  Staff 
were  abohshed  early  in  1920. 

The  arrangements  for  the  supreme  command  at  home 
in  time  of  war  were  also  not  as  satisfactory  as  could  be 
desired.  The  scheme  for  home  defence  contemplated  the 
employment  of  a  large  number  of  troops ;  these  were 
located  in  peace  time  in  seven  different  commands,  and 
thus  served  under  the  orders  of  seven  different  Com- 
manders -  in  -  Chief  ;  and  when  required  for  home  defence 
duties   they   would   differ  materially  in   composition   and 


i88        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

efficiency  according  to  the  conditions  of  the  moment.  In 
these  circumstances,  and  on  the  accepted  assumption  that 
the  greatest  danger  of  an  overseas  attack  would  be  in  the 
earhest  stage  of  the  war,  the  exercise  of  supreme  command 
was  bound  to  be  difficult  and  complicated,  and  therefore 
it  was  desirable  that  this  duty  should  be  definitely  assigned 
to  an  officer  selected  during  peace,  so  that  he  might,  subject 
to  the  instructions  of  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff, 
draw  up  his  plan  and  make  himself  acquainted  beforehand 
with  the  many  details  which  would  affect  its  execution.  No 
such  officer  was,  however,  in  existence,  nor  was  it  intended 
to  have  one  in  war.  As  I  have  just  said,  the  Director  of 
Mihtary  Training  was  responsible  in  peace  that  suitable 
measures  were  taken  for  home  defence,  and  although  some 
additional  senior  commanders  were  to  be  appointed  in  war, 
the  supreme  control  of  all  military  operations  in  the  United 
Kingdom  was  to  be  exercised  by  the  War  Office,  that  is,  by 
the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff. 

This  was  not  a  sound  arrangement,  and  it  showed  a 
strange  forgetfulness  of  the  elementary  principles  of  mihtary 
organisation.  A  staff  officer  cannot  command  troops  and  is 
not  meant  to  do  so  ;  while  in  any  war  which  would  render 
us  liable  to  invasion  it  was  practically  certain  that  the  Chief 
of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  would  have  far  too  much  to 
engage  his  attention  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  and  in  the 
raising  and  training  of  additional  troops,  to  admit  of  his 
being  able  to  carry  direct  responsibility  for  the  security  of 
the  home  front,  nor  ought  he  to  be  troubled  with  every 
petty  hostile  raid  by  sea  or  air  that  might  be  attempted. 

Had  we  been  subjected  in  the  Great  War  to  any  serious 
attack  from  oversea  the  truth  of  these  remarks  might  have 
been  established  in  a  rather  unpleasant  manner.  As  it  was, 
the  system  proved  to  be  defective  both  as  regards  efficiency  of 
defence  and  economy  of  personnel,  and,  like  that  of  training, 
had  to  be  remedied  by  the  appointment  of  a  Commander-in- 
Chief  in  1915 — the  only  way  in  which  it  could  be  remedied. 
Whatever  may  be  said  for  or  against  the  appointment  of  a 
Commander-in-Chief  of  the  home  forces  in  time  of  peace, 
there  is  no  doubt  that  one  is  required  when  we  have  a  great 
war  on  our  hands.    I  shall  refer  to  this  question  again  in  the 


HOME  DEFENCE  189 

chapter  dealing  with  my  experiences  as  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff. 

For  years  before  I  became  Director  of  MiUtary  Training 
there  had  been  a  constant  difference  of  official  opinion  as 
to  the  necessity  of  maintaining  a  home  defence  force.  As 
mentioned  in  Chapter  VII.,  it  had  been  decided  in  1888  that 
the  provision  of  this  force  was  the  "  primary  duty"  of  the 
mihtary  authorities,  and,  notwithstanding  the  differences 
of  opinion,  this  policy  may  be  said  to  have  held  good 
till  1905,  when  it  was  replaced  by  one  of  an  entirely  opposite 
character,  the  Prime  Minister,  Mr.  Balfour,  then  laying 
down  that  "  the  serious  invasion  of  these  islands  is  not  a 
possibility  that  we  need  consider."  A  distinction  was  drawn 
at  about  the  same  time  between  invasion  and  raids,  the 
feasibility  of  the  latter  being  admitted,  and  the  question 
then  arose  :  \^^en  is  a  raid  not  a  raid  ?  The  answer 
eventually  given  was  that  an  attack  by  a  force  not  exceeding 
10,000  men  should  be  classed  as  a  raid  :  if  by  more  than 
that  number  the  attack  became  invasion  and  therefore  could 
be  ruled  out  as  impracticable. 

Later  it  was  discovered  that  two  separate  raids  of  10,000 
men  each  might  be  attempted  simultaneously,  so  as  to  give 
one  of  them  a  better  chance  of  succeeding;  it  was  also 
admitted  that  raids  on  a  smaller  scale — from  500  to  2000 
men  eaeh — against  any  one  of  several  possible,  though  less 
important,  objectives  might  be  attempted  ;  and,  finally,  it 
was  agreed  that,  as  a  raid  would  be  a  matter  of,  say,  forty- 
eight  hours  only,  and  might  be  made  without  any  warning, 
there  would  not  be  time  to  transfer  troops  from  one  vulner- 
able point  in  order  to  repel  an  attack  on  another.  Provision 
had  accordingly  to  be  made  to  meet  these  conclusions,  and 
the  general  result  of  accepting  the  policy  as  to  raids  and 
rejecting  that  of  invasion  was  to  add  complications  to  a 
problem  which  was  already  loaded  with  complexity,  and 
to  make  little  if  any  reduction  in  the  total  number  of 
troops  required  to  give  security. 

The  doctrine  of  no-invasion  was  replaced  in  1909  by  the 
original  policy,  Mr.  Asquith,  who  was  then  Prime  Minister, 
announcing  in  the  House  of  Commons  that  it  was  "  the 
business  of  the  War  Office  to  see  that  we  have  in  aU  circum- 


igo        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

stances  a  properly  organised  and  properly  equipped  force 
capable  of  dealing  effectively  with  a  possible  invading  force 
of  seventy  thousand  men."  This  figure  held  the  field  when 
I  became  Director  of  Military  Training,  and  I  had  not  been 
long  in  the  post  before  the  eternal  question  was  again  brought 
forward  for  consideration. 

In  the  many  discussions  which  followed  at  the  meetings 
of  the  Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  the  "  blue-water 
school,"  or  anti-invasionists,  would  at  one  time  be  on  top, 
at  another  it  was  the  "  bolt  from  the  blue  "  party,  or  pro- 
invasionists,  who  scored.  Exactly  which  came  out  best 
depended  chiefly  upon  the  comparative  debating  skill  of 
the  representative  spokesmen,  and  words  continued  to 
obscure  and  confuse  the  main  issue  until  the  question  was 
definitely  settled  by  the  breaking  out  of  war  in  August  1914. 

This  diversity  of  views  was  not  conducive  either  to 
economy  or  to  a  good  system  of  military  organisation,  and, 
as  the  responsible  staff  officer  for  home  defence,  I  would 
often  have  been  far  more  anxious  than  I  was  had  there 
been  no  Territorial  Force.  Invasion  or  no  invasion,  this 
Force  was,  at  any  rate,  a  substantial  military  asset  to  have 
to  fall  back  upon,  and  the  services  it  rendered  in  many  parts 
of  the  world  during  the  Great  War  were  a  proof  that  there 
was  more  value  in  the  volunteer  movement  than  many 
people  supposed. 

To  my  mind,  the  possibility  of  invasion  was  essentially  a 
question  to  be  answered  by  the  Admiralty,  granted  that  the 
enemy,  as  in  the  case  of  Germany,  had  ample  troops  at  his 
disposal,  good  communications  between  his  garrison  towns 
and  ports  of  embarkation,  and  was  prepared  to  risk  losing  his 
sea-communications  in  return  for  the  prospective  advantages 
to  be  gained  once  a  landing  was  effected.  More  than  a 
century  had  elapsed  since  our  fleet  had  fought  a  really 
formidable  enemy  ;  many  new  inventions  had  meanwhile 
been  introduced  ;  naval  operations  are  notoriously  Uable 
to  the  uncertainties  of  war  ;  and  it  was  for  the  Admiralty 
to  say  whether,  having  regard  to  these  considerations  and 
to  the  strength  of  the  enemy's  fleet,  they  could  undertake 
to  prevent  a  landing.  I  always  repUed,  therefore,  to  those 
who  argued  against  the  practicabiUty  of  invasion  that  it 


RESPONSIBILITY  OF  THE  NAVY  191 

was  for  the  Admiralty  to  give  a  reasonable — not  necessarily 
an  absolute — guarantee,  which  would  be  acceptable  to  the 
Government,  that  they  could  in  all  circumstances  prevent 
a  hostile  landing  ;  that  if  no  such  assurance  could  be  given, 
we  ought  to  be  prepared  to  deal  with  a  landing  by  military 
means  ;  and  that,  irrespective  of  the  feasibility  of  the 
operation,  it  was  conceivable  that,  owing  to  the  mere  threat 
of  attack  on  our  coast-towns,  the  Government  might,  in  the 
event  of  war  with  Germany,  be  compelled  by  public  opinion 
to  retain  at  home  a  considerable  number  of  troops  urgently 
needed  on  the  continent.  It  was,  in  fact,  to  meet  this 
threat  rather  than  to  meet  actual  invasion  or  raids  that 
suitable  preparations  for  home  defence  were  required. 

During  the  time  that  I  was  Director  of  Mihtary  Training 
I  do  not  remember  that  the  Admiralty  ever  saw  their  way 
definitely  to  give  the  guarantee — and  their  hesitation  was  easy 
to  understand — but  there  were  those  in  high  places  who 
continued  to  argue  that  the  navy  alone  afforded  sufficient 
security,  and  who  scoffed  at  the  idea  that  Germany  might 
seek  to  spring  a  surprise  upon  us  by  secretly  preparing  and 
despatching  a  raiding  or  invading  force  without  a  previous 
declaration  of  war.  "  Why,"  it  was  asked,  "  should  it  be 
contemplated  for  a  moment  that  a  civilised  country  like 
Germany  will  be  guilty  of  such  atrocious  conduct  as  to 
make  a  deliberate  attack  upon  a  nation  with  whom  she  is 
stiU  at  peace  ?  No,  a  bolt  from  the  blue,  or  invasion  of 
any  kind,  is  a  preposterous  theory,  and  even  assuming  it 
were  attempted  it  could  never  succeed." 

I  have  listened  to  the  reiteration  of  these  and  similar 
arguments  for  hours  at  a  time,  but  they  do  not  seem  to 
have  been  quite  so  much  to  the  fore  when  war  came  along 
in  1914.  Only  four  of  our  six  regular  divisions  were  at 
first  allowed  to  proceed  to  France  ;  for  a  great  part  of  the 
war  the  standard  of  70,000  possible  invaders  was  not  only 
retained  but  increased ;  and  a  considerable  number  of 
troops  were  for  long  kept  back  in  this  country.  It  was 
not  until  the  war  was  nearly  three  years  old  that  the 
reinforcement  of  the  divisions  abroad  was  allowed  to  take 
unquestioned  precedence  over  the  estimated  requirements 
for  the  home  front,  and  I  have  yet  to  learn  that  this  policy 


192        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  ever  really  opposed  by  those  who,  with  great  courage 
and  still  greater  eloquence,  had  been  so  eager  before  the 
war  to  pour  ridicule  upon  those  who  advocated  the  adoption 
of  reasonable  home  defence  measures.  The  truth  is,  that 
however  bravely  one  may  talk  in  time  of  peace,  when 
brought  up  in  war  against  the  grim  proposition  of  an  enemy 
having  at  his  disposal  millions  of  soldiers,  an  undefeated 
fleet,  and  abundant  transports,  wdthin  a  few  hours  steaming 
of  our  coast,  no  government  dare  rely,  or  would  be  allowed 
to  do  so  by  public  opinion,  solely  upon  the  navy  for  the 
security  of  England — the  nerve-centre  of  the  whole  Empire. 

To  revert  to  the  question  of  training,  I  may  recall  the 
fact  that  reduction  of  expenditure  on  army  services  was 
constantly  being  pressed  in  the  years  immediately  before 
the  Great  War ;  "  estimates  "  had  to  be  cut  down  to  their 
lowest  limit  ;  and  there  was,  for  practical  purposes,  but  little 
additional  preparation  for  the  conflict  so  soon  to  burst  upon 
us.  I  am  reminded  of  one  particular  instance  of  this.  It 
had  been  suggested  to  me  that,  in  view  of  the  experiences 
of  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  we  ought  to  train  the  infantry 
in  throwing  hand-grenades,  or  bombs  as  we  now  call  them. 
For  this  purpose  I  asked  for  the  troops  to  be  supplied  with 
dummy-bombs,  costing  about  twopence  each,  and  also  with 
a  certain  number  of  live  grenades  for  purposes  of  demon- 
stration. Sanction  was  obtained  for  a  small  number  of  the 
twopenny  bombs,  at  a  total  cost  of  perhaps  not  more  than 
thirty  or  forty  pounds,  while  as  regards  the  live  grenades  it 
was  decided  that  they  were  too  dangerous  as  well  as  too 
expensive  to  be  issued.  (They  certainly  did  cost  a  great 
deal — I  believe  nearly  £i  each.)  The  decision  was  toned  down 
by  giving  permission  for  battalions  to  send  a  few  selected 
men  to  see  live  grenades  thrown  by  expert  sappers  !  I  should 
think  that  some  scores  of  millions  were  thrown  by  our  men 
in  the  Great  War,  costing  about  sixpence  apiece. 

The  War  Minister  of  the  day  was  not  to  be  blamed  for 
the  scarcity  of  funds.  His  business  was,  as  it  always  is, 
to  show  a  saving  on  the  estimates  of  the  preceding  year. 
Our  policy  was  a  policy  of  peace,  and  war  on  a  great  scale 
on  the  continent  was  hardly  allowed  in  the  picture  at  all 
so  far  as  the  army  was  concerned.     The  accepted  plan  was 


THE  CURRAGH  INCIDENT  193 

that,  in  certain  eventualities,  we  should  send  oversea  an  Ex- 
peditionary Force  of  one  cavalry  and  six  infantry  divisions, 
that  the  Territorial  Force  would  be  employed  for  home 
defence,  and  that  the  Special  Reserve  would  supply  the 
Expeditionary  Force  with  drafts.  Beyond  these  limits  the 
Gernian  danger  was  disregarded,  and  the  people  as  a  whole 
cared  little  or  nothing  for  the  army  so  long  as  there  was  a 
strong  navy,  and,  uninformed  by  their  leaders,  they  were 
not  encouraged  to  care  anything  for  it.  They  were  more 
concerned  with  internal  pohtics,  social  reforms,  and  the 
enjoyment  of  agreeable  week-ends. 

In  March  19 14  occurred  the  unfortunate  "  Curragh 
incident,"  which  arose,  it  will  be  remembered,  in  con- 
nection with  the  proposal  to  use  troops  for  the  coercion  of 
Ulster,  then  busy  arming  and  drilling  with  the  intention  of 
opposing  the  introduction  of  Home  Rule.  The  members  of 
the  Government  responsible  for  the  proposal  appear  to  have 
given  no  thought  to  its  practical  side  as  a  military  question, 
and  were  completely  taken  aback  when  certain  officers  at 
the  Curragh,  whose  regiments  were  to  be  employed,  sent 
in  their  resignations  and  declined  to  serve.  Soldiers  cannot 
be  treated  as  if  they  had  neither  souls  nor  consciences,  and 
to  expect  them  to  undertake  a  duty  which  may  lead  to 
shooting  down  those  with  whose  ideals  and  religion  they  are 
in  sympathy  is  to  expect  a  great  deal. 

While  the  crisis  lasted  I  was  besieged  by  excited  officers 
in  the  War  Office  and  from  elsewhere  asking  my  advice  as 
to  what  they  should  do,  for  they  were  determined,  they 
said,  to  stand  by  their  comrades  who  had  declined  to  obey 
an  order  which  they  considered  to  be  both  unjust  and  illegal. 
I  had  no  hesitation  in  telling  them  to  go  away,  make  their 
minds  easy,  and  get  on  with  their  work,  as  I  felt  sure  that 
in  the  long  run  any  intention  there  might  be  of  employing 
troops  against  the  Ulster  men  would  be  abandoned. 

One  of  the  officers  who  came  to  see  me  was  "  Joe  " 
Maude,  the  head  of  the  training  branch  of  my  directorate, 
and  afterwards  the  commander  of  the  forces  in  Mesopotamia 
in  the  Great  War.  I  had  brought  him  only  a  short  time 
before  from  the  Curragh,  where  he  had  been  on  the  General 
Staff   and   had   made   many   friends   amongst   the   officers 

o 


194        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

implicated.  He  told  me  that  he  felt  it  to  be  his  duty  to 
resign  his  commission,  as  they  had  done,  and  it  was  with 
some  difficulty  that  I  persuaded  him  to  take  my  advice 
and  sit  tight. 

I  had  no  knowledge,  nor  had  any  other  director  in  the 
General  Staff  I  think,  of  the  proposal  to  use  troops  in  the 
manner  mentioned  until  it  had  been  more  or  less  decided 
to  use  them,  and  when  officially  informed  of  it  my  first 
question  was  :  "  Which  directorate  will  be  responsible 
for  making  the  necessary  arrangements  and  issuing  the 
orders  ?  "  The  responsibility  for  operations  outside  the 
United  Kingdom  rested  with  the  Director  of  Military 
Operations  ;  that  for  operations  inside,  but  only  as  against 
oversea  attack,  rested  with  me — the  Director  of  Military 
Training  ;  and  the  Adjutant-General  dealt  with  the  use  of 
troops  in  aid  of  the  civil  power.  The  case  of  Ulster  did  not 
faU  within  any  one  of  these  three  spheres,  and  not  wishing 
to  have  anything  to  do  with  it  each  of  us  argued  that  it 
was  not  his  business.  In  the  end  it  was  settled  that  if 
troops  had  to  be  employed  the  duty  would  come  under  the 
heading  of  home  defence,  and  the  arrangements  to  be  made 
would  accordingly  fall  upon  me. 

I  then  asked  a  few  further  questions  :  "  Are  we  supposed 
to  be  going  to  war  with  Ulster  ;  that  is,  will  the  troops  be 
on  '  active  service  '  ?  If  we  are  not  going  to  war  what  are 
we  going  to  do,  as  the  case  is  obviousl}^  not  one  of  suppressing 
civil  disorder  because  there  is  no  disorder  at  present  ?  If 
we  are  going  to  war,  is  mobilisation  to  be  ordered,  and  what 
ammunition,  supplies,  and  transport  are  the  troops  to  take  ? 
What  instructions  are  to  be  given  to  the  General  in  command 
regarding  the  nature  and  object  of  his  mission  ?  " 

Coupled  with  the  Curragh  resignations,  these  questions 
brought  matters  to  a  head,  for  there  was  no  answer  to  some 
of  them,  and  when  the  light  had  thus  been  turned  on  the 
affair  became  one  of  heated  discussions,  alleged  misunder- 
standings, impatient  explanations,  and  a  general  running 
to  and  fro  between  the  different  offices  and  departments  in 
Whitehall.  In  the  course  of  two  or  three  days  the  whole 
proposal  deservedly  came  to  an  inglorious  end,  and  we  were 
exceedingly  glad  to  hear  the  last  of  it  and  be  allowed  to 


SIR  CHARLES  DOUGLAS  195 

get  on  with  more  sensible  work.  The  Secretary  of  State  for 
War,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  and  the 
Adjutant-General  resigned  their  appointments,  and  Mr. 
Asquith  took  charge  of  the  War  Ofhce  in  addition  to  his 
duties  of  Prime  Minister. 

The  new  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  was  Sir 
Charles  Douglas,  a  very  conscientious  officer  who  would 
insist  upon  working  more  hours  a  day  than  his  state  of 
health  justified,  and  it  was  largely  due  to  this  habit  that  he 
died  a  few  weeks  after  the  Great  War  broke  out.  He  had 
quite  a  unique  knowledge  of  the  details  of  all  army  matters, 
and  although  he  had  the  reputation  of  being  somewhat 
abrupt  and  overbearing  in  manner  I  always  found  him  to 
be  a  very  considerate  chief  as  well  as  a  good  friend. 

For  the  manoeuvres  of  1914  I  had,  subject  to  his  approval, 
selected  an  area  in  the  west  of  England,  and  together  we 
spent  several  days  going  over  the  ground  and  considering 
how  my  suggested  scheme  of  operations  would  work  out. 
It  involved  the  passage  of  the  Severn  by  a  force  retiring 
before  an  enemy  of  superior  strength,  and  Douglas  was  at 
first  rather  afraid  that  the  operations  might  get  out  of 
control  and  end  in  a  fiasco,  but  later  he  accepted  the  scheme. 
As  I  have  already  said,  manoeuvre  schemes  in  the  past  had 
usually  led  up  to  and  finished  with  a  pitched  battle,  into 
which  both  sides  threw  themselves  headlong  and  hoped  for 
the  best.  Douglas  agreed  with  me  that  a  change  was  desir- 
able, and  that  as  our  army  might  one  day  find  itself  being 
driven  back  in  war  by  a  superior  force  it  would  be  well 
to  give  it  some  practice  beforehand.  The  manoeuvres  were 
due  to  take  place  in  September,  but  before  then  we  were  en- 
gaged in  the  real  thing  in  France,  and  were  being  driven  back 
by  overwhelming  masses  of  Germans.  The  study  of  the 
manoeuvres  we  had  planned  was  most  helpful  to  me  during 
the  first  few  weeks  of  the  war,  when  I  was  hard  put  to  it 
to  keep  the  troops  supplied  with  what  they  needed. 

As  the  Director  of  Mihtary  Training  became,  in  war, 
Chief  General  Staff  Officer  of  the  home  defence  force, 
there  seemed  to  be  no  chance  when  war  broke  out  of  my 
going  to  France.  At  the  last  moment,  however,  Grierson, 
who  had  been  originally  nominated  Chief  of  the  General 


196        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Staff  of  the  Expeditionary  Force,  was  given  the  command 
of  the  Second  Army  Corps,  and  Murray,  originally  intended 
to  be  Quartermaster-General  of  the  Force,  was  selected  to 
succeed  him.  The  appointment  of  Quartermaster- General 
thus  became  vacant  and  Douglas  was  good  enough  to  give 
it  to  me.  Within  forty-eight  hours  I  once  again  left  the 
War  Office,  and  joined  the  headquarters  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  then  mobilising  at  the  Metropole  Hotel  in  North- 
umberland Avenue. 


CHAPTER   XIII 

QUARTERMASTER-GENERAL,   BRITISH   EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE 

Organisation  and  duties  of  G.H.Q. — System  of  supply  and  maintenance — 
The  I.G.C. — His  duties  are  curtailed— The  "  Directors  " — My  Staff 
— Arrive  at  Paris  with  the  Commander-in-Chief — Stay  at  the  Hotel 
Crillon — Visit  Joffre  at  Vitry-le-Fran9ois — Reach  G.H.Q.  at  Le 
Cateau — Concentration  of  the  Force — Various  situations  to  be 
thought  out — Discuss  change  of  base  with  I.G.C. — Commander-in- 
Chief's  conference  before  battle  of  Mons — The  retreat  from  Mons — 
Replacement  of  clothing  and  equipment  lost  in  the  retreat — -Con- 
fusion caused  by  change  of  base — Control  of  railways  in  French 
hands — Difficulty  of  knowing  where  troops  were — PUght  of  refugees 
— WilUng  spirit  shown  by  all  ranks  to  help  each  other — Despatch 
riders — G.H.Q.  move  successively  to  St.  Quentin,  Noyon,  Com- 
pi^gne,  Dammartin,  Lagny,  Melun — The  move  from  Dammartin  to 
Lagny — Force  becomes  part  of  Paris  garrison  under  GalUeni — 
Battle  of  the  Marne — Brutalities  of  German  troops — G.H.Q.  at 
Coulommiers  and  Fere-en-Tardenois — Want  of  heavy  artillery  on 
the  Aisne — Move  round  to  Flanders — First  battle  of  Ypres — State 
of  trenches — Cross  the  Channel  with  Lord  Roberts — His  death  at 
St.  Omer — Succeed  Murray  as  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  at  G.H.Q. 

The  staff  of  an  army,  according  to  the  British  system,  is 
composed  of  three  branches — General  Staff,  Adjutant- 
General's  Staff,  and  Quartermaster- General's  Staff.  The 
General  Staff  deals  with  training,  operations,  intelligence, 
and  general  military  policy  ;  the  Adjutant-General  with 
recruiting,  mobihsation,  disciphne,  medical  services,  and 
the  chaplains'  department ;  the  Quartermaster-General 
with  supplies  and  transport,  and  the  issue  of  all  military 
stores.  Stated  in  a  simpler  form,  the  Adjutant-General 
recruits  the  men  with  which  to  fight,  tends  to  their  spiritual 
needs,  tries  them  by  court-martial  when  accused  of  breaking 
the  regulations,  takes  care  of  them  when  sick  or  wounded, 
and  buries  them  when  they  die.  The  Quartermaster-General 
clothes,  arms,  feeds,  and  houses  them,  and  supphes  them 
with  all  they  need  with  which  to  fight,  viz.  horses,  motors, 

197 


igS        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

lorries,  bicycles,  ammunition,  guns,  entrenching-tools,  barbed 
wire,  bombs,  and  a  thousand  other  things.  He  also  moves 
them,  according  to  the  direction  of  the  General  Staff,  by 
rail  and  sea.  The  staffs  of  the  Adjutant-General  and  Quarter- 
master-General thus  put  and  maintain  the  army  in  the  field 
ready  for  use  by  the  General  Staff,  who  arrange,  according 
to  the  instructions  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  all  matters 
connected  with  the  actual  fighting. 

The  welfare  of  the  army  and  the  success  attending  the 
operations  largely  depend  upon  the  way  in  which  the  three 
branches  work  together  and  upon  the  personality  of  the 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  who  is  the  recognised  head  of 
the  whole  staff  and  the  principal  confidant  and  adviser  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  staff  of  the  Expeditionary 
Force  were  fortunate  in  this  respect,  for  Murray  was  a  help- 
ful colleague  to  do  business  with,  and  possessed  a  thorough 
knowledge  of  staff  duties  in  general.  The  same  may  be 
said  of  the  Adjutant -General,  Sir  Nevil  Macready,  \nth 
whom  I  worked  from  the  commencement  of  the  war  until  a 
few  months  before  he  became  Commissioner  of  the  Metro- 
politan Police  in  the  summer  of  1918. 

The  system  by  which  the  immense  volume  of  food, 
ammunition,  clothing  and  other  war  material  is  conveyed 
to  the  troops  may  now  be  explained,  and  for  the  information 
of  the  non-military  reader  I  may  first  observe  that  an 
"  army  "  consists  of  two  or  more  army  corps  ;  an  "  army 
corps  "  of  two  or  more  divisions  ;  a  "  division  "  of  three  or 
four  infantry  and  artillery  brigades  respectively  and  certain 
other  troops  ;  a  "  brigade  "  of  infantry  of  three  or  four 
battalions,  and  a  "  brigade  "  of  artillery  of  three  or  four 
batteries. 

When  an  expeditionary  force  is  sent  abroad,  "  bases  " 
are  established  at  selected  oversea  ports,  and  there  large 
depots  of  food,  stores,  men,  animals,  etc.,  are  formed,  and 
from  these  the  supplies  are  sent  up  by  rail  to  a  "  regulating 
station."  From  this  place  trains,  each  carrying  the  right 
proportion  of  each  kind  of  article  required,  are  despatched 
to  "  railheads,"  i.e.  the  stations  nearest  to  the  front-hne 
troops  to  which  it  is  feasible  to  work  the  railway.  Each 
railhead  may  serve  one  or  more  army  corps  according  to 


SUPPLY  AND  MAINTENANCE  199 

circumstances,  and  at  it  the  supplies  are  loaded  on  convoys 
of  motor  lorries  called  "  supply  columns."  Each  column 
then  conveys  the  supplies  of  its  division  or  other  formation 
to  which  it  belongs  to  previously  selected  rendezvous  called 
"  refilling  points,"  where  they  are  met  at  an  appointed 
hour  by  horsed  wagons  of  the  "  regimental  train."  These, 
having  been  loaded  with  their  proper  quota  of  suppHes, 
carry  them  to  the  units  to  which  they  belong.  The  distances 
traversed  by  the  supply  columns  may  be  as  much  as  forty 
miles  between  railhead  and  refilling  point,  and  the  horsed 
wagons  may  cover  six  or  seven  miles  each  way.  Ammuni- 
tion and  other  stores  are  distributed  from  railheads  in  much 
the  same  manner  as  food,  the  ammunition  convoy  being 
known  as  the  "  ammunition  park."  This  explanation  is 
very  crude,  but  it  will  suffice  to  give  a  rough  idea  of  the 
system  in  force  at  the  commencement  of  the  Great  War. 

It  wiU  be  understood  that,  owing  to  the  movement  of 
the  troops  or  to  interference  by  the  enemy,  changes  of 
railheads  and  refilling  points  may  have  to  be  made  at  very 
short  notice.  These  changes,  unless  properly  and  promptly 
notified,  may  dislocate  the  entire  proceedings,  and,  in  the 
case  of  a  retreat,  cause  roads  to  become  blocked  with  trans- 
port and  so  jeopardise  the  safety  of  the  whole  army. 

The  arrangements  for  carrying  out  this  delicate  system 
were,  according  to  the  regulations,  mainly  vested  in  a 
General  Officer  known  as  the  "Inspector-General  of  Com- 
munications," or  I.G.C.,  who  occupied  a  position  second  in 
importance  only  to  that  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  himself. 
His  headquarters  were  at  the  base,  distant  perhaps  a  hundred 
miles  or  more  from  the  front  hne,  or  at  some  place  between 
the  two.  By  the  nature  of  his  duties  he  was  something 
like  the  managing  directors  of  Harrods'  Stores  and  Carter 
Paterson  rolled  into  one,  it  being  his  business  to  see  that 
ample  stocks  of  food  and  war  material  were  maintained  at 
the  bases,  and  thence  conveyed,  in  the  manner  just  described, 
in  sufficient  quantity  and  to  such  places  at  the  front  as 
directed  by  the  Quartermaster-General  in  furtherance  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief's  plans.  It  will  thus  be  seen  that 
the  Quartermaster-General  was  not  responsible  for  the  actual 
performance  of  the  duties  enumerated  at  the  beginning  of 


200        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

this  chapter,  and  only  in  a  hmited  degree  for  prescribing 
the  method  of  their  execution.  He  was  answerable  for 
seeing  that  they  were  not  left  undone  rather  than  for  doing 
them. 

Before  the  war  I  was  convinced  that  the  system  would 
not  work  in  practice.  Telegraphic  communication  between 
the  front  and  the  I.G.C.,  upon  the  efficiency  of  which  every- 
thing hinged,  was  Hable  to  be  interrupted  or  blocked  ;  and 
in  any  case  notification  by  him  or  to  him  regarding  alteration 
of  railheads  or  refilling  points,  consequent  on  a  change  in 
the  tactical  situation,  was  bound  to  be  slow  and  uncertain. 
It  followed  from  this  that  orders  issued  by  the  I.G.C.  on 
these  matters  might  well  become  impossible  of  execution 
hours  before  they  left  his  office.  They  did  so  from  the  day 
fighting  began,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  I  swept  away  the  regulations,  and  so  far  as  the  dis- 
tribution of  food  and  ammunition  was  concerned  the  respon- 
sibihty  of  the  I.G.C.  was  made  to  end  at  the  railheads,  to 
be  selected  by  me,  the  onward  transport  then  becoming  a 
matter  for  my  staff  and  not  for  his.  Later,  his  duties  at 
the  front  were  further  restricted,  and  it  was  recognised  that, 
instead  of  retaining  the  almost  complete  freedom  of  action 
assigned  to  him  by  the  regulations,  he  must  be  guided  by 
the  instructions  of  the  Quartermaster-General.  This  officer 
is  the  mouthpiece  of  the  Commander-in-Chief  for  purposes 
of  supply,  and  is  much  better  placed  for  knowing  his  wishes 
than  an  I.G.C.  can  possibly  be.  Major-General  Robb,  who 
first  held  the  post,  and  his  successor,  Major-General  Maxwell, 
at  once  fell  in  with  these  views,  and  the  change  of  system 
worked  quite  smoothly. 

As  the  army  grew  in  strength,  more  decentralisation  and 
elasticity  had  to  be  introduced,  and  it  is  not  unlikely  that 
the  I.G.C.  may  disappear  altogether  from  future  regulations. 
If  he  does  I  shall  think  that  we  have  gone  too  far  in  the 
opposite  direction,  and  burdened  General  Headquarters, 
whose  chief  business  is  fighting,  with  work  that  can  be  done 
more  suitably  and  economically  by  an  organisation  in  rear. 

To  complete  this  account  of  the  method  of  supplying  an 
army  in  the  field  I  should  add  that  under  the  Adjutant- 
General,  Quartermaster-General,  and    I.G.C,   respectively. 


SIR  JOHN  COWANS  201 

according  to  the  duties  to  be  performed,  are  the  "  Directors  " 
of  the  different  administrative  services— ^.g.  medical,  veter- 
inary, remounts,  supply,  transport,  ordnance — who  with 
their  assistant  directors,  deputy  assistant  directors,  and  other 
officers  are  responsible  for  actually  issuing  to  the  troops 
what  they  require.  These  officers  are  not  uncommonly 
regarded  by  the  general  public  as  belonging  to  the  staff, 
but  this  is  not  the  case.  Their  duties  and  status  are  quite 
different.  The  staff,  properly  so-called,  are  the  assistants  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  they  may  take  action  in  his  name, 
and  they  are  the  medium  through  which  he  communicates 
his  orders  ;  the  administrative  officers  are  responsible,  each 
in  his  own  sphere,  for  making  such  administrative  arrange- 
ments as  will  enable  these  orders  to  be  carried  out. 

The  officers  at  first  employed  on  the  Quartermaster- 
General's  staff  were  :  Colonel  Dawkins,  Assistant  Quarter- 
master-General, with  Major  Jebb  of  the  Bedfordshire 
Regiment  and  Captain  Percival  of  the  army  service  corps 
as  Deputy  Assistant  Quartermaster  -  Generals.  Captain 
Woodroffe  of  the  horse  artillery  was  my  aide-de-camp.  I 
can  never  be  too  grateful  to  these  four  officers  for  the 
assistance  they  rendered,  especially  in  the  retreat  from  Mons, 
when  the  supply  of  the  army  was  a  matter  of  extraordinary 
difficulty.  Day  and  night  they  toiled  like  slaves  with  never 
a  thought  for  their  own  comfort  or  interest.  I  was  also 
greatly  assisted  at  this  period,  and  in  fact  during  the  whole 
time  I  was  Quartermaster- General,  by  Sir  John  Cowans, 
under  whose  direction  the  initial  arrangements  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  army  were  made  by  the  Quartermaster- 
General's  department  of  the  War  Office. 

As  soon  as  the  troops  began  to  cross  the  Channel  I  sent 
Dawkins  off  to  France,  with  Jebb  and  Percival  to  help  him, 
to  arrange  for  the  reception  of  the  troops  at  the  front  and 
generally  to  get  the  department  into  working  order.  I 
remained  behind  in  England  with  the  Commander-in-Chief 
and  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  as  it  was  necessary  to 
keep  in  close  touch  with  them  and  be  ready  to  advise  upon 
matters  under  my  charge. 

We  left  London  on  the  afternoon  of  the  14th  August, 
crossed  the  Channel  from  Dover  on  H.M.'s  Cruiser  Sentinel, 


202         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  reached  Boulogne  about  5.30  p.m.  The  streets  seemed 
to  be  full  of  British  soldiers  waiting  to  be  sent  to  the  front, 
and  a  very  cordial  welcome  was  extended  to  them  by  our 
French  allies.  After  visiting  some  of  the  rest  camps,  where 
we  found  the  troops  cheery  and  full  of  enthusiasm,  we  left 
at  7.20  P.M.  for  Amiens,  the  headquarters  of  our  line  of  com- 
munication, and  there  spent  the  night.  Next  morning  we 
proceeded  to  Paris,  which  was  reached  shortly  after  noon. 
The  Commander-in-Chief  and  some  of  the  staff  stayed 
at  the  British  Embassy,  whilst  I  and  some  others  put  up  at 
the  Hotel  Crillon,  where  the  manager,  M.  Decquis,  placed 
the  best  rooms  at  our  disposal,  and  gave  us  what  I  have 
always  thought  to  be  the  best  dinner  I  ever  had.  He 
produced  an  equally  good  English  breakfast  at  five  o'clock 
next  morning,  and  when  I  asked  him  on  leaving  for  the 
bill  he  replied  that  he  would  send  it  to  me  at  Berlin,  and 
that  for  the  present  he  would  accept  nothing,  feeling  only 
too  pleased  to  have  been  of  service  to  us.  I  went  to  Berlin 
after  the  war,  but  I  have  not  yet  received  the  bill.  The 
incident  was  a  standing  joke  between  us  on  the  many 
occasions  I  stayed  at  the  Crillon  when  called  to  Paris  on 
duty  during  the  war,  and  I  must  add  that  M.  Decquis  never 
relaxed  his  efforts  to  make  these  visits  as  comfortable  as 
the  first  one  was. 

We  left  Paris  by  motor  early  on  Sunday  morning,  i6th 
August,  to  see  General  Joffre  at  his  headquarters  at  Vitry- 
le-Frangois.  He  was  in  excellent  spirits  and  with  much 
pride  showed  us  a  German  standard  which  had  been  captured 
a  day  or  two  before  in  some  small  engagement  on  the  southern 
flank.  After  we  had  taken  lunch  with  him  and  his  staff, 
and  business  had  been  concluded,  we  proceeded  to  Rheims, 
passed  the  night  there,  and  next  day  joined  our  own  head- 
quarters at  Le  Cateau,  the  offices  of  which  were  located  in  a 
large  school  in  the  centre  of  the  town. 

I  and  the  four  officers  of  my  staff  were  billeted  in  a 
small  house  close  by,  the  owner  being  a  kind-hearted  old 
lady  who  occupied  the  adjoining  house.  Woodroffe  quickly 
got  our  small  mess  into  working  order,  and  saw  that  nothing 
was  lacking  in  the  way  of  either  food  or  drink.  Our  soldier- 
cook — still  a  dark  horse — played  up  well,  and  was  assisted 


THE  BRITISH  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE      203 

by  the  woman  cook  of  our  landlady,  though  by  what  means 
they  were  able  to  understand  each  other's  language  was  a 
mystery. 

This  difficulty  once  led  to  a  rather  noisy  altercation, 
which  called  for  the  intervention  of  Woodroffe.  Hearing 
heated  arguments  taking  place  in  the  kitchen,  in  the  most 
extraordinary  mixture  of  French  and  English,  he  proceeded 
there  to  enquire  what  was  the  matter,  and  found  the  two 
cooks  engaged  in  a  tug  of  war  at  opposite  sides  of  a  frying- 
pan  of  potatoes  which  were  to  be  cooked  for  breakfast.  It 
transpired  that  the  kitchen  fire  had  refused  to  burn  properly, 
and  that  the  French  cook  was  trying  to  explain  to  ours 
that  she  had  a  good  fire  next  door  and  would  take  the 
potatoes  there  to  cook,  while  our  man  was  under  the 
impression  that  she  wished  to  appropriate  them  for  herself, 
and  he  was  determined  not  to  let  them  go  at  any  price. 
Woodroffe  restored  peace,  and  we  got  our  potatoes  by  the 
required  time. 

About  a  week  later,  when  the  German  troops  were 
nearing  the  town,  I  was  able  to  repay  the  hospitality  of 
our  landlady  by  sending  her  off  in  a  motor  in  the  direction 
of  Paris,  as  she  had  no  other  means  of  getting  away.  On 
passing  through  Le  Cateau  in  19 19  I  found  that  both  her 
houses  had  been  destroyed — like  many  others  in  the  town. 

The  British  Expeditionary  Force,  composed  of  six 
divisions  and  a  cavalry  division,  had  a  total  strength  of, 
roughly,  160,000  men,  60,000  horses,  490  guns,  and  7000 
vehicles.  That  part  of  it  sent  out  in  the  first  instance 
numbered  only  about  100,000  men,  and  consisted  of  a 
cavalry  division  and  two  army  corps  each  of  two  divisions. 
Of  the  remaining  two  divisions  one  did  not  begin  to  arrive 
till  after  the  battle  of  Mons  had  been  fought,  and  the  other, 
for  reasons  unknown  to  me,  did  not  reach  us  for  several 
days  later.  Had  there  been  less  delay  in  our  coming  to 
a  decision  to  join  France  more  time  would,  of  course, 
have  been  available  for  the  whole  six  to  arrive,  and  had 
they  been  present  at  the  battle  the  course  of  the  war  might 
have  been  different. 

The  Force,  as  at  first  sent  out,  completed  its  concentra- 
tion just  south  of  Maubeuge  on  the  20th  August,  and  on 


204        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  following  day  commenced  to  move  forward.  On  the 
22nd  it  reached  positions  in  the  vicinity  of  Mons,  its  right 
being  in  touch  with  the  left  of  the  5th  French  army  near 
Thuin,  south-west  of  Charleroi.  It  is  interesting  to  recall 
that  Mons  was  occupied  by  a  detachment  of  Welhngton's 
army  at  the  beginning  of  Napoleon's  last  campaign  about 
a  hundred  years  earlier. 

Whilst  G.H.Q.  remained  at  Le  Cateau  I  devoted  all  my 
spare  time  to  visiting  the  areas  through  which  the  troops 
were  moving.  Some  fifty  per  cent  of  the  infantry  was 
composed  of  reservists  just  called  up,  and  as  most  of  them 
were  not  in  hard  condition  the  blazing  August  sun  and  long 
stretches  of  white  dusty  roads  made  marching  and  the 
carrying  of  some  60  lbs.  of  kit  and  equipment  a  heavy 
burden.  All  the  more  reason,  therefore,  why  the  Quarter- 
master-General's staff  should  be  active,  and  personally  see 
to  it  that  there  was  no  shortage  of  food  or  water,  that  the 
billets  and  bivouacs  were  as  good  as  could  be  found,  and 
that  the  transport  conveying  the  requirements  of  the  troops 
should  reach  its  destination  in  good  time.  It  was  my  purpose 
to  ensure  that  this  was  done. 

I  had  also  to  think  out  the  different  situations  which 
my  department  might  have  to  meet  during  the  next  few 
days.  The  strength  and  direction  of  the  enemy's  main 
advance  had  not  yet  been  clearly  disclosed,  but  the  view 
held  at  French  G.H.Q.,  as  late  as  the  22nd  August,  was  that 
the  Germans  were  not  sufficiently  strong  to  secure  them- 
selves against  a  determined  attack  in  the  Ardennes — for 
which  General  Joffre  had  made  preparations — and  at  the 
same  time  launch  a  great  attack  against  the  Allied  left. 
On  the  contrary,  it  was  deemed  possible  for  the  British 
army  and  5th  French  army  to  envelop  the  German  right, 
and  it  was  in  pursuance  of  this  plan  that  the  British  army 
marched  to  Mons.  But  there  was  no  certainty  that  the 
French  view  would  prove  to  be  right.  The  enemy  was  well 
known  to  have  an  intense  craving  for  enveloping  methods, 
and  there  were  rumours  that  he  had  larger  forces  north  of 
the  Meuse  than  the  French  seemed  to  think,  and  if,  instead 
of  our  enveloping  his  right,  he  should  succeed  in  envelop- 
ing our  left  our  hne  of  communication  would  be  seriously 


"  BE  PREPARED  "  205 

endangered,  and  we  might  in  consequence  be  compelled  to 
abandon  our  sea-bases  at  Havre  and  Boulogne  and  establish 
others  further  to  the  south.  Moreover,  I  knew  before 
leaving  England  that  Lord  Kitchener  was  of  opinion  that 
we  were  concentrating  too  far  forward,  and  events  since  then 
tended  to  show  that  he  was  right. 

Be  these  things  as  they  might  it  was  my  business  to  be 
prepared  for  the  worst  that  might  happen  as  well  as  for  the 
best.  He  is  merely  a  fool  who,  holding  a  high  position  in 
war,  refuses  to  contemplate  anything  but  success.  "  J'ai 
I'habitude,"  said  Napoleon,  "  de  penser  trois  ou  quatre  mois 
d'avance  a  ce  que  je  dois  faire,  et  je  calcule  sur  le  pire." 
Confidence  is  an  essential  element  in  war,  and  in  public 
should  always  be  seen  on  the  faces  of  all  leaders  and  staff 
officers,  while  any  who  are  not  endowed  with  a  reasonable 
sense  of  humour  should  make  room  for  others  who  are. 

But  confidence  and  cheeriness  do  not  mean  that  one 
should  be  cocksure  of  everything  going  as  one  would  wish, 
especially  at  the  beginning  of  a  war  when  the  unexpected 
is  so  apt  to  be  the  rule.  It  was  necessary  that  the  Quarter- 
master-General's staff  should  examine  the  situation  from 
every  point  of  view,  and  introduce  such  elasticity  into  the 
supply  arrangements  as  would  promptly  afford  the  Com- 
mander-in-Chief the  greatest  possible  choice  of  action.  In 
short,  it  should  be  prepared  to  meet  any  and  every  reasonable 
contingency,  for  no  matter  how  skilful  the  plans  of  the 
Commander-in-Chief  might  be,  they  would  almost  certainly 
fail  in  execution  if  the  troops  were  not  properly  fed  and 
quartered,  and  kept  supplied  with  ammunition.  Assuming 
that  the  Allies'  plan  of  operations  proved  successful,  these 
demands  could  be  met  with  comparative  ease  ;  but  on  the 
other  hand  it  might  be  very  difficult  to  meet  them  if,  in 
spite  of  the  confidence  which  prevailed,  we  were  opposed 
by  very  superior  numbers  and  compelled  to  fall  back  from 
the  positions  taken  up. 

I  therefore  decided  to  summon  the  I.G.C.,  Major-General 
Robb,  to  G.H.Q.  and  discuss  possible  developments  with 
him,  as  it  was  essential  that  there  should  be  a  clear  under- 
standmg  between  us  as  to  what  it  might  become  necessary 
to  do.    He  arrived  on  the  22nd  August — the  day  before  the 


2o6        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

battle  of  Mons — and  before  he  left  we  had  settled  the  main 
principles  upon  which  we  would  act  in  the  event  of  the  sea- 
bases  having  to  be  replaced  by  others.  On  return  to  his 
headquarters  at  Amiens  he  made  such  preliminary  arrange- 
ments as  he  could  for  effecting  the  change. 

There  are  not  many  other  instances  in  military  history 
I  imagine,  if  any,  of  measures  having  been  taken  before  the 
first  battle  of  a  campaign  to  change  the  base  of  an  army 
which  has  been  deliberately  selected  after  long  and  careful 
consideration.  It  was  fortunate  that  they  were  taken  on 
this  occasion,  for  within  a  week  the  German  advance  had 
progressed  to  such  a  point  that  the  Commander-in-Chief 
gave  me  orders  to  change  the  bases  to  St.  Nazaire,  with  an 
advanced  base  at  Le  Mans.  Amiens,  the  advanced  base, 
had  then  already  been  evacuated  by  us,  and  the  Germans 
occupied  it  on  the  31st  August.  This  change  of  base  to  the 
Loire,  at  a  very  critical  period,  was  a  striking  example  of 
the  value  of  sea-power,  and  of  itself  was  a  sufficient  return 
for  the  money  we  had  expended  in  maintaining  our  naval 
supremacy. 

At  5  A.M.  on  Sunday  the  23rd  August  the  Commander- 
in-Chief,  accompanied  by  the  heads  of  his  staff,  met  the 
commanders  of  the  I.  and  II.  Corps  and  Cavalry  Division 
at  Sars-la-Bruyere,  a  few  miles  south  of  Mons,  to  explain 
the  situation.  From  information  received  from  French 
G.H.Q.  he  imderstood  that  little  more  than  one,  or  at  the 
most  two,  of  the  enemy's  army  corps,  with  perhaps  one 
cavalry  division,  were  in  front  of  our  positions,  and  he  was 
aware  of  no  out-flanking  movement  by  the  enemy.  There 
were,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  four  army  corps  and  three  cavalry 
divisions,  or  about  160,000  combatants,  within  striking 
distance  of  the  British  army  of  less  than  half  that  fighting 
strength,  and  at  10.30  a.m.  our  first  battle  in  the  Great  War 
opened  in  earnest. 

The  subsequent  retreat  from  Mons,  which  terminated 
south  of  the  Marne  on  the  3rd  September,  will  for  all  time 
be  regarded  as  one  of  the  finest  performances  of  the  British 
army.  Hopelessly  outnumbered  from  the  start,  and  fight- 
ing on  a  length  of  front  far  exceeding  their  powers  to 
hold,  there  was  no  way  by  which  our  troops  could  avoid 


THE  RETREAT  FROM  MONS  207 

retreat,  and  by  all  the  rules  of  war  they  ought  to  have 
suffered  not  only  defeat  but  annihilation.  They  would 
admit  neither,  rules  of  war  notwithstanding.  Composed  of 
the  finest  British  personnel,  well-trained,  excellent  shots, 
and  led  by  that  incomparable  commander  the  British 
regimental  officer,  they  time  and  again  turned  on  the 
pursuing  enemy  and  made  him  pay  a  heayy  price  for  his 
boastful  claim  to  invincibihty.  Bruised,  battered,  and 
sometimes  beaten  to  their  knees,  they  were  never  beaten 
in  spirit,  and  even  in  the  darkest  hour  it  never  seemed  to 
cross  their  minds  that  they  were  or  could  be  beaten.  They 
knew  they  were  being  forced  back  by  an  enemy  far  stronger 
numerically  than  themselves  ;  they  were  sometimes  hungry, 
often  thirsty,  and  many  were  too  tired  to  keep  awake  even 
when  marching  ;  but  they  continued  to  fight  grimly  on  with 
a  determination  which  has  never  been  surpassed  and  never 
will  be.  Officers  and  men  of  the  regular  army,  as  we  knew 
them  in  those  days,  were  seen  at  their  best,  and  it  is  an 
unforgettable  privilege  to  have  been  associated  with  them. 
By  the  time  the  vicinity  of  Le  Cateau  was  reached  the 
4th  Division  (the  fifth  in  number  to  be  despatched  from 
home)  began  to  come  up  and  supplied  a  welcome  reinforce- 
ment, but  it  was  far  from  being  sufficient  effectively  to 
arrest  the  onward  march  of  the  enemy's  masses. 

Since  the  war  ended  we  have  been  asked  to  believe  that 
the  Allies  owe  their  victory  to  the  foresight  and  energy 
of  some  pohtical  leader  or  other,  to  the  employment  of 
certain  mechanical  contrivances,  to  the  enormous  output 
of  munitions,  to  unity  of  command,  to  the  rottenness  of 
autocratic  government,  and  so  on,  according  to  the  taste 
or  interest  of  those  who  expressed  or  inspired  these  state- 
ments. Perhaps  the  statements  were  not  meant  to  be  taken 
literally,  for  no  man  of  sense  would  attribute  our  victory 
to  any  one  cause,  especially  as  all  classes  combined  so 
loyally  to  secure  it.  Still,  they  were  rather  frequently  made, 
and  therefore  it  is  well  to  remind  ourselves  occasionally  of 
the  endurance  and  heroism  displayed  by  the  fighting  men, 
notably  in  the  retreat  from  Mons,  in  the  three  battles  of 
Ypres,  on  the  Somme,  and  in  the  desperate  struggles 
of   1918.     I  sometimes  think  that  the  French  set  us  an 


2o8         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

example  in  this  respect,  for  they  invariably  award  chief 
credit  for  success  to  their  armies  alone,  and  are  careful  not 
to  detract  from  it  by  the  advancement  of  other  claims.  It 
is  significant  of  their  point  of  view  that  at  the  official  dinner 
at  the  Elysee  on  the  day  of  the  victory  march  through 
Paris  in  1919,  to  which  I  had  the  honour  of  being  invited, 
some  ten  or  twelve  non-commissioned  officers  and  men  were 
included  among  the  hundred  and  twenty  guests  present. 

In  the  retreat  a  large  amount  of  clothing  (caps,  jackets, 
great-coats,  etc.),  and  equipment  (shovels,  rifles,  vahses, 
wagons,  guns,  machine-guns,  etc.),  were  either  lost, 
captured,  or  thrown  away  because  they  could  not  be  carried, 
and  it  was  my  duty  to  see  that  they  were  immediately 
replaced.  The  ordnance  regulations  were  of  the  most 
stringent  red-tape  description,  and  before  stores  were 
allowed  to  be  issued  commanding  officers  had  to  render, 
sometimes  in  triplicate,  elaborate  "  army  forms  "  setting  out 
their  demands  and  giving  fuU  reasons  for  them.  It  was 
absurd  to  suppose  that  this  procedure  could  be  adhered  to 
when  the  troops  were  constantly  at  close  grips  with  a 
pursuing  enemy ;  when  the  wretched  forms,  with  all  other 
army  stationery,  had,  perhaps,  been  left  behind  or  thrown 
away  ;  and  when  the  commanding  officers,  killed,  wounded, 
taken  prisoner,  or  for  some  other  reason  could  not  readily 
be  found.  There  was  no  authority  at  all,  to  the  best 
of  my  memory,  for  the  free  issue  of  clothing  to  officers. 
They  were  expected  to  get  it,  I  imagine,  as  in  peace, 
from  Savile  Row  or  other  places  inhabited  by  the  military 
tailors  of  London. 

The  senior  ordnance  officer  at  G.H.Q.  was  at  first  terribly 
perplexed  to  know  what  to  do,  for,  owing  to  the  strict 
financial  control  exercised  over  the  smallest  details,  and 
which  had  its  origin  in  the  Treasury,  his  professional  capacity 
was  mainly  estimated  by  the  way  in  which  he  kept  his 
accounts,  and  produced  innumerable  "  vouchers  "  for  the 
action  he  took.  He  must  often  have  thought  me  most 
irrational  and  unsympathetic,  for  I  would  listen  to  nothing 
about  his  regulations  so  long  as  officers  and  men  were  going 
about  bareheaded  for  want  of  a  cap,  or  had  their  backs 
exposed  to  drenching  rain  for  lack  of  a  coat.     I  insisted  that 


THE  SEA-BASES  209 

the  missing  articles  must  be  replaced  at  once,  whatever 
the  regulations  might  or  might  not  be,  and  said  that  the 
entire  responsibihty  would  be  mine  if  he  got  into  trouble. 
The  officer  in  question,  Colonel  (now  Major-General  Sir 
Charles)  Mathew,  played  up  well,  and  the  army  owed  him 
much  for  the  efforts  he  made  to  replenish  it  with  the  thousand 
and  one  things  included  in  the  term  "  ordnance  stores  "  of 
which  it  was  short. 

The  matter  was  further  complicated  because  the  sea- 
bases,  from  which  the  different  articles  had  to  be  obtained, 
were,  as  already  stated,  in  process  of  being  moved  from 
Havre  and  Boulogne  to  St.  Nazaire.  Even  when  the  move 
had  been  completed,  many  days,  and  in  some  cases  weeks, 
elapsed  before  the  required  articles  became  available.  In  the 
hurry  and  confusion  attending  evacuation  of  the  original 
bases,  the  ships  had  been  loaded  on  no  system  except  that  of 
getting  out  of  the  place  as  rapidly  as  possible,  the  Germans 
then  being  at  Amiens  and  their  advance  parties  pushed 
forward  in  the  direction  of  Rouen.  Different  kinds  of  stores 
were  inextricably  mixed ;  machine-guns  were  on  one  ship 
and  their  tripods  on  another,  while  the  articles  wanted  first 
were,  as  often  as  not,  at  the  bottom  of  the  ship,  below  sacks 
of  oats  and  bales  of  hay,  and  therefore  were  the  last  that 
could  be  got  out.  Moreover,  the  estabhshment  of  a  new 
base,  even  at  a  good  port,  is  a  matter  which  demands  con- 
siderable time  and  previous  preparation,  and  in  many 
respects  St.  Nazaire  happened  to  be  particularly  inconvenient 
and  deficient  of  the  facilities  required. 

Another  factor  which  mihtated  against  the  prompt 
supply  of  food  and  stores  was  that  we  did  not  control  the 
railways  we  used,  and  could  not  expect  to  do  so.  Trains 
were  allotted  to  us  daily  by  the  French  authorities,  they 
were  necessarily  restricted  in  number,  and  the  time  and 
place  of  their  arrival  were  very  uncertain,  as  in  the  circum- 
stances they  were  bound  to  be.  The  trouble  was  aggravated 
when  they  could  no  longer  pass  through  Amiens  and  had  to 
proceed  to  the  front  via  Paris,  for  besides  the  exodus  of 
people  from  that  city  which  was  then  taking  place,  Joffre 
was  transferring  masses  of  troops  from  his  right  to  his  left, 
and   for   these  and  other  reasons  there  was  a  widespread 

p 


210        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

congestion  and  dislocation  of  all  railway  traffic.  I  found 
that  the  only  sure  way  of  getting  trains  up  by  the  time  they 
were  wanted  was  to  send  the  indefatigable  Percival  down 
to  Paris  by  motor,  and  for  him  to  board  the  train  and  compel 
the  station-master  to  send  it  forward.  Many  a  time  he  did 
this,  and  was  instrumental  in  producing  food  for  the  troops 
which  but  for  his  efforts  they  would  not  have  received. 

The  distribution  of  supplies  after  they  reached  railheads 
was  another  difficulty,  as  the  ever-changing  situation  and 
frequent  interruption  of  communication  made  it  impossible 
to  know  where  particular  units  might  be  at  any  given  time. 
I  could  only  guess  as  to  the  place  where  they  might  be, 
send  their  food  to  it,  and  a  further  supply  to  other  probable 
places,  in  the  hope  that  if  the  first  consignment  did  not 
reach  them  the  second  would.  The  expedient  was  also 
adopted  of  dumping  supplies — ffitches  of  bacon,  sides  of 
beef,  cheese,  boxes  of  biscuits — alongside  the  roads  so  that 
the  troops  might  help  themselves  as  they  passed.  Much  of 
the  food  thus  deposited  had  to  be  left  where  it  was  put, 
either  because  it  was  not  found  in  the  darkness,  or  from 
want  of  time  to  use  it  or  of  means  to  carry  it  away,  but 
on  the  whole  the  object  of  ensuring  that  plenty  of  food 
should  be  obtainable  when  and  where  wanted  was  fairly 
well  achieved.  Compliance  with  routine  regulations,  and 
the  extra  expense  incurred  by  issuing  double  or  treble  the 
normal  allowance  of  rations,  were  not  considerations  to  be 
taken  into  account. 

Distribution  was  further  hampered  by  the  endless  stream 
of  refugees  fleeing  before  the  advancing  enemy,  and  it  was 
not  until  steps  had  been  taken  to  shepherd  them  into  batches, 
under  proper  supervision,  that  either  troops  or  transport 
could  move  along  the  roads  with  some  semblance  of  regu- 
larity. The  flight  of  these  fugitives  was  a  strange  mixture 
of  tragedy  and  comedy.  All  the  men  were  old  or  very 
young ;  the  children,  some  laughing,  some  crying,  went 
by  in  droves  ;  and  tired  mothers,  carrying  their  infants 
on  their  backs,  crawled  along  the  hot  and  dusty  roads 
with  fear  and  despair  depicted  on  their  terror-stricken 
faces.  Two,  three,  and  even  four  generations  of  a  family 
could  sometimes  be  seen  making  their  way  together  to  the 


DESPATCH  RIDERS  211 

rear,  some  on  foot,  others  riding  in  farm-carts,  donkey- 
carts,  ox-wagons,  on  bicycles,  in  perambulators,  according 
to  age  and  circumstances,  whilst  the  household  effects  and 
farm  stock  with  which  they  were  accompanied  were  of  the 
most  varied  description.  Cows,  sheep,  goats,  pigs,  fowls, 
geese,  ducks,  cats,  and  dogs,  carried  or  driven,  were  amongst 
the  number,  and  vehicles  of  every  kind,  from  a  wagon  to 
a  wheelbarrow,  were  brought  into  use  and  laden  with 
every  imaginable  article  from  beds  to  bird-cages.  As  if  to 
intensify  the  distress  and  misery  of  the  scene,  the  distant 
sky  was  black  with  smoke  rising  in  dense  clouds  from 
the  burning  villages  which  had  been  set  on  fire  either 
deliberately  or  by  the  enemy's  shells,  these  same  villages 
having  been  but  a  few  hours  before  and  for  many  years 
previously  the  homes  of  those  who  were  now  fleeing  from 
them,  knowing  and  caring  not  where,  so  long  as  they  were 
safe  from  the  Hun. 

Having  said  so  much  about  the  difficulties  to  be  over- 
come, I  ought  to  add  that  my  duties,  like  those  of  all  other 
senior  officers,  were  greatly  lightened  by  the  splendid  manner 
in  which  all  ranks,  forgetful  of  self,  were  animated  by  the 
sole  desire  to  help  each  other.  In  numberless  ways  the 
retreat  brought  out,  and  in  quarters  where  least  expected, 
the  best  qualities  of  man,  and  showed  how  much  good  there 
is  even  in  what  appear  to  be  the  most  forbidding  and  un- 
responsive natures. 

I  have  already  mentioned  the  assistance  rendered  by  the 
members  of  my  staff,  and  I  was  equally  indebted  to  the 
administrative  officers  who  worked  with  me,  especially  to 
Colonels  Gilpin,  King,  and  Ford,  and  Major  Crof ton- Atkins 
of  the  army  service  corps,  who  superintended  the  transport 
and  food  arrangements.  The  despatch  riders,  too,  per- 
formed invaluable  service  in  carrying  messages  to  and  from 
the  troops  and  the  various  supply  and  ammunition  columns. 
The  work  of  a  despatch  rider  at  the  time  was  very  different 
from  what  it  was  after  trench  warfare  set  in.  Headquarters 
of  brigades  and  divisions  were  constantly  moving  from  one 
place  to  another,  and  the  despatch  rider  had  to  find  them 
— in  a  strange  country  and  perhaps  at  night — as  best  he 
could.      As  often  as   not  he  would  arrive  near  the  place 


212         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

where  he  had  hoped  or  guessed  they  would  be,  only  to 
discover  that  it  was  occupied  by  the  enemy.  Most  of  our 
despatch  riders  were  boys  under  twenty  years  of  age  who 
had  joined  on  the  outbreak  of  war,  many  of  them  from 
the  universities,  and  the  manner  in  which  they  carried  out 
their  duties  in  the  face  of  great  hardships  and  dangers 
confirmed  me  in  the  opinion  that  the  English  boy  has 
no  superior.  I  am  prepared  to  go  further  and  say  that 
he  has  no  equal. 

During  the  retreat  G.H.Q.  moved  successively  to  St. 
Quentin,  Noyon,  Compiegne,  Dammartin,  Lagny,  and  Melun. 
Dammartin  is  only  fifteen  miles  from  Paris,  and  on  our 
arrival  there  the  Force  became  for  the  time  being  a  part  of 
the  Paris  garrison  commanded  by  General  Gallieni.  This 
was  not  a  pleasant  duty  to  contemplate — the  defence  of  the 
French  capital — and  had  an  ominous  look  about  it.  Luckily 
it  did  not  last  long. 

As  can  be  imagined  our  personal  feeding  arrangements 
were  rather  sketchy  and  uncertain  during  the  hurry  of  the 
retreat,  but  at  Dammartin  we  hoped  for  better  things  and 
were  looking  forward  to  the  enjoyment  of  a  roast  leg  of 
mutton  for  dinner.  Suddenly,  however,  the  order  was  given 
to  move  to  Lagny,  and  as  it  was  then  seven  o'clock  we  had 
to  go  off  without  any  dinner  at  all,  the  leg  of  mutton,  just 
ready  for  eating,  being  packed  up  in  a  newspaper  and 
taken  away  on  the  floor  of  a  motor  lorry.  It  was  none  the 
worse  next  day,  except  for  being  cold. 

On  this  occasion  Dawkins  and  I  travelled  together,  and 
as  we  were  inside  the  Paris  perimeter  and  the  night  was 
dark,  we  had  rather  an  exciting  journey.  German  officers, 
disguised  as  English  staff  officers,  were  reported  to  be  going 
about  in  motors  within  the  lines,  and  the  French  Territorial 
troops  on  picquet,  of  whom  we  encountered  several,  were 
menacingly  inquisitive  as  to  who  we  were,  addressing  their 
enquiries  over  the  sights  of  their  rifles  or  at  the  point  of  the 
bayonet. 

At  last  we  reached  Lagny,  about  midnight,  and  as  it  was 
impossible  to  secure  a  billet  at  that  hour  we  tried  to  persuade 
the  proprietor  of  a  small  cafe  to  make  us  an  omelette  by 
way  of  dinner,  preparatory  to  passing  the  night  in  the  car. 


THE  BATTLE  OF  THE  MARNE  213 

Whilst  discussing  the  omelette,  which  there  seemed  little 
prospect  of  our  getting,  a  woman  entered  the  cafe  and  offered 
us  the  use  of  two  rooms  in  her  house  close  by,  and  after- 
wards gave  us  supper.  Next  morning  she  cooked  us  an 
excellent  breakfast,  and  I  later  discovered  that  in  order 
to  accommodate  us  she  and  her  husband  had  sat  up  all  night. 
This  is  the  sort  of  kindness  that  really  counts,  and  on  the 
first  opportunity  I  intend  to  revisit  Lagny  and,  if  I  can 
find  them,  once  more  thank  my  host  and  hostess  for  their 
hospitality.  At  Melun  we  were  equally  well  treated,  the 
owner  of  the  house  at  which  we  stayed  placing  everything 
he  had  at  our  disposal. 

The  advance  from  the  Marne  to  the  Aisne,  immediately 
after  a  retreat  of  170  miles  before  a  numerically  superior 
enemy  flushed  with  success,  is  no  less  a  glorious  page  in 
the  history  of  the  British  army  than  that  of  the  retreat 
itself.  The  battle  of  the  Marne,  as  it  is  called,  or  Joffre's 
great  counter-stroke  which  changed  the  whole  course  of  the 
campaign,  commenced  on  the  6th  of  September  and  con- 
tinued, so  far  as  we  were  concerned,  till  the  loth  of  September. 
G.H.Q.  meanwhile  moved  first  to  Coulommiers  and  then 
to  Fere-en-Tardenois. 

In  passing  through  the  country  from  which  the  Germans 
had  just  been  expelled,  it  was  interesting  to  compare  the 
behaviour  of  their  troops  in  retreat — the  severest  test  which 
war  can  bring — with  that  of  our  own  men  in  similar  circum- 
stances, and  there  is  no  doubt  that  our  type  of  discipline, 
based  chiefly  upon  good  relations  between  officers  and  men, 
stood  the  test  far  better  than  the  boasted  iron  discipline  of 
the  German  army.  Everywhere  was  wanton  and  wicked 
destruction — shops  gutted,  fields  and  streets  httered  with 
empty  wine-bottles,  household  goods  deliberately  destroyed, 
and  filthy  deeds  committed  too  abominable  to  mention. 
Some  of  the  troops,  perhaps  many,  had  behaved  well,  accord- 
ing to  what  we  heard,  but  others  were  accused  of  the  most 
brutal  acts.  How  thankful  England  should  be  that  she  was 
spared  from  the  unspeakable  miseries  and  horrors  of  invasion  ! 

Shortly  after  our  arrival  on  the  Aisne  the  enemy  brought 
up  more  heavy  artillery  from  Maubeuge,  which  had  just 
fallen,  and  the  period  of  trench  warfare  destined  to  last  for 


214        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

nearly  four  years  set  in.  With  it  arose  demands  for  heavy 
artillery  on  our  side,  more  gun  ammunition,  more  machine- 
guns,  bombs,  barbed  wire,  and  other  artillery  and  enguieer- 
ing  stores,  none  of  which  could  be  even  approximately  met, 
so  defective  had  been  our  war  preparations.  When  first 
sent  out,  the  Expeditionary  Force  had,  as  already  mentioned, 
only  two  machine-guns  per  battalion  or  about  a  hundred 
and  fifty  in  all,  while  of  the  490  pieces  of  artillery  twenty- 
four  only  were  of  "  medium  "  type,  the  remainder  being  the 
ordinary  "  light "  field-guns  or  field- howitzers.  There  was 
no  "  heavy  "  artillery.  These  twenty-four  medium  guns  were 
supplemented  on  the  Aisne  by  sixteen  6-inch  howitzers  of  an 
inferior  kind,  and  some  rather  old  guns  of  4.7-inch  calibre. 
How  utterly  insufficient  these  numbers  were,  can  be  under- 
stood when  I  say  that  on  Armistice  Day  we  had  in  France 
alone  well  over  40,000  machine-guns  and  close  on  6500 
guns  and  howitzers,  of  which  over  2200  were  of  medium  and 
heavy  calibre. 

As  regards  artillery  ammunition,  no  one,  either  before 
the  war  or  in  the  early  part  of  it,  dreamt  that  the  demand 
would  reach  the  colossal  figure  it  eventually  did  reach.  At 
any  rate  no  adequate  provision  was  made  by  the  responsible 
authorities  to  meet  it,  and  to  the  best  of  my  memory  we 
began  the  war  with  a  reserve  of  considerably  less  than  a 
million  rounds,  whereas  at  one  time  during  the  war  we 
had  in  France  alone  a  reserve  of  twenty  million  rounds,  to 
say  nothing  of  other  theatres  and  the  enormous  stocks  in 
England.  It  was  the  same  story  with  respect  to  the  special 
requirements  of  trench  warfare,  although  the  Russo-Japanese 
war  had  furnished  much  valuable  guidance  in  the  matter. 
Hand  grenades,  for  instance,  or  bombs,  were  practically  non- 
existent before  the  war,  and  at  first  had  to  be  improvised 
by  filling  jam-tins  and  similar  receptacles  with  the  necessary 
explosives.  The  number  of  bombs  expended  during  the 
war  must  have  run  into  scores  of  millions,  and  a  reserve  of 
five  or  six  millions  at  the  front  was  quite  an  ordinary 
number. 

To  cope  with  the  ever-increasing  duties  of  my  department 
sanction  was  given  while  we  were  on  the  Aisne  for  an  addi- 
tional  Assistant    Quartermaster-General   and   one   Deputy 


FROM  THE  AISNE  TO  FLANDERS  215 

Assistant  Quartermaster-General.  The  former  appointment 
was  filled  by  Colonel  Lynden  Bell,  and  the  latter  by  my 
aide-de-camp,  Woodroffe,  his  place  being  taken  by  Captain 
Lucas,  another  Horse  Gunner. 

On  the  3rd  of  October  the  British  army  commenced  to 
move  round  to  Flanders  so  as  to  frustrate  the  enemy's 
attempt  to  reach  the  Channel  ports.     The  cavalry  went  by 
road  and  the  divisions  by  rail,  the  arrangements  for  the 
journey  devolving  on  the  staff  of  the  Quartermaster-General. 
It  was  desired,  as  in  all  such  cases,  to  detram  as  near  to  the 
enemy  as  possible  so  as  to  avoid  unnecessary  marching,  and 
sufficiently  far  away  from  him  that  the  operation  could  be 
completed  without  interruption.     His  cavalry  was  appar- 
ently being  pushed  well  forward  in   the   direction  of   the 
ports,  and  as  only  vague  information  was  forthcoming  as 
to  what  was  behind  it,  the  detraining  stations  had  to  be 
decided  upon,  in  consultation  with  the  General  Staff,  whilst 
the  transfer  was  taking  place.     For  example,  one  division 
was  at  first  sent  to  Boulogne,  and  afterwards  ordered  to 
detrain  much  farther  east.     It  will  be  understood  that  this 
uncertainty   not   only  caused   inconvenience   and   discom- 
fort to  the  troops,  but  rendered  future  arrangements  for 
their  supply  difficult  to  make.     As  the  war  went  on  and 
experience  was  gained,  the  transfer  of  masses  of  men  from 
one  part  of  the  line  to  another  became  a  comparatively 
easy  matter,  but  seeing  that  the  transfer  from  the  Aisne 
to  Flanders  was  the  first  to  be  undertaken,  and  that  the 
enemy  was   not  stationary  but   on  the  move,  the  troops 
may  be  credited  with  having  accomplished  a  fairly  good 
performance. 

G.H.Q.  reached  Abbeville  on  the  8th  of  October  and 
shortly  afterwards  moved  to  St.  Omer,  where  they  remained 
for  many  months.  About  this  time  the  7th  Division  and 
some  of  the  other  troops  which  had  been  sent  to  assist  the 
Belgians  in  saving  Antwerp  were  absorbed  in  the  Expedi- 
tionary Force,  having  previously  been  controlled  by  the 
authorities  in  London.  It  took  us  some  days  properly  to 
get  hold  of  these  contingents,  find  out  where  they  were, 
who  they  were,  and  what  they  had  got  with  them.  They 
had  been  hurriedly  put  together  in  the  first  instance,  both 


2i6         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Admiralty  and  War  Office  taking  a  hand,  and  as  they  had 
had  a  trying  time  since  disembarkation  many  confused 
matters  connected  with  them  had  to  be  adjusted.  For 
example,  some  of  the  mechanical  transport  drivers  had 
been  engaged  by  the  Admiralty  at  a  much  higher  rate  of 
pay  than  that  given  to  those  engaged  by  the  War  Office, 
and  obviously  we  could  not  pay  different  rates  to  different 
men  for  doing  the  same  army  work.  I  think  we  settled 
the  question  by  giving  the  Admiralty  men  the  choice  between 
voluntarily  joining  the  army  and  going  home.  On  another 
occasion  I  was  asked  to  sanction  the  payment  of  £1700 
which  had  been  expended  by  a  naval  officer  in  mounting 
certain  guns  on  railway  trucks.  On  asking  for  further 
details  regarding  the  ownership  of  the  trucks  and  the 
origin  of  the  guns,  I  was  told  that  the  trucks  had  been 
"  taken  "  and  the  guns  "  found." 

Hard  fighting  commenced  as  soon  as  we  arrived  in 
Flanders,  and  it  became  a  near  thing  which  side  would 
win  ;  but  despite  the  shortage  of  artillery,  machine-guns, 
ammunition,  and  reinforcements,  and  the  overwhelming 
numerical  superiority  of  the  enemy,  who  poured  in  corps 
after  corps  at  Ypres,  hoping  to  finish  off  our  attenuated 
army  once  and  for  all,  the  matchless  pluck  of  the  British 
soldier  won  the  day. 

As  a  theatre  of  war  Flanders  has  always  had  an  evil 
reputation,  and  it  never  deserved  it  more  than  in  the  winter 
of  1914-15.  The  desperate  fighting  of  the  first  battle  of 
Ypres  had  barely  been  concluded  when  the  troops  were 
called  upon  to  face  the  most  atrocious  weather,  long  periods 
of  continuous  rain  alternating  with  gales  of  wind,  snow  and 
frost,  and  although  every  measure  that  could  be  suggested 
was  taken  to  compete  with  these  conditions,  it  was  impossible 
to  keep  the  water-logged  trenches  either  dry  or  in  a  reason- 
able state  of  repair.  The  men  often  had  to  stand  waist- 
high  in  bitterly  cold  water ;  the  communications  between 
the  first-line  trenches  and  the  rear  were  as  bad  as  they 
could  be ;  and  the  sufferings  endured  were  almost,  if  not 
quite,  without  parallel.  Life  in  the  trenches  came  all  the 
harder  because  the  troops  were  new  to  the  work,  many 
being  fresh  from  the  tropics,  and  some  twenty  thousand 


LORD  ROBERTS'S  DEATH  217 

men  were  invalided  during  the  winter  on  account  of  "  trench 
feet  "  alone. 

To  make  matters  worse,  the  Germans  had  the  advantage 
of  higher,  drier,  and  generally  much  more  favourable  ground, 
from  which  they  looked  down  into  our  miserable,  muddy 
hues,  and  were  able  to  bombard  them,  with  their  superior 
artillery,  in  a  manner  that  would  have  broken  the  hearts  of 
any  ordinary  troops.  To  this  treatment  we  could  give  no 
adequate  reply  owing  to  the  lack  of  heavy  artillery  and  of 
ammunition  for  such  guns  as  we  had.  I  remember  that  at 
one  time  I  had,  with  the  Commander-in-Chief's  approval, 
to  issue  orders  restricting  the  expenditure  to  two  rounds  per 
gun  a  day,  so  depleted  were  our  stocks  and  precarious  our 
prospects  of  replenishing  them.  I  claim  to  have  as  good  a 
knowledge  as  any  one  of  the  British  soldier,  but  to  this  day 
it  is  a  marvel  to  me  how  he  continued  to  hold  on  during 
that  first  terrible  winter  in  Flanders. 

By  the  end  of  19 14  the  Expeditionary  Force  had  reached 
a  strength  of  five  cavalry  divisions  and  eleven  infantry 
divisions,  of  which  two  in  each  case  were  Anglo-Indian.  In 
addition  a  considerable  number  of  Territorial  battaUons  and 
Yeomanry  regiments  had  been  sent  out  from  home.  The 
New  Armies  were  in  course  of  formation  and  training,  and 
were  not  yet  ready  to  be  put  in  the  field. 

Early  in  November  the  Commander-in-Chief  sent  me  to 
England  to  represent  to  the  War  Office  the  urgency  of  the 
ammunition  position,  and  to  press  for  an  increased  supply. 
On  return  to  France  Lord  Roberts  crossed  the  Channel  on 
the  same  boat  as  myself,  and  we  had  a  long  conversation 
on  the  war  and  our  neglect  to  prepare  for  it.  Notwith- 
standing his  great  age,  his  clear  mihtary  instinct  was  as 
prominent  as  ever,  but  it  occurred  to  me  that  for  a  man 
of  his  years  he  was  trying  himself  too  highly  in  attempt- 
ing the  journey,  and  this  unfortunately  proved  to  be 
the  case.  He  arrived  at  St.  Omer  on  the  nth  November, 
was  suddenly  taken  ill  on  the  13th,  and  died  at  8  p.m.  on 
the  following  day.  Previous  to  the  despatch  of  his  body  to 
England  a  short,  simple  service  was  held  at  the  Mairie  on 
the  17th,  at  which  I  had  the  mournful  honour  of  being  one 
of  the  pall-bearers.     Contingents  of   British,  Indian,  and 


2i8         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

French  troops,  and  many  foreign  officers  attended  to  do 
homage  to  the  veteran  Field-Marshal,  and  as  the  body  left 
the  Mairie  on  its  homeward  journey,  the  day  being  gloomy 
and  dispiriting,  the  sun  burst  forth  and  threw  a  brilliant 
rainbow  over  the  town,  thus  making  a  fitting  termination  to 
one  of  the  most  impressive  ceremonies  I  have  ever  witnessed. 

In  January  1915  the  Commander-in-Chief  asked  me  to 
become  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  in  place  of  Murray,  who 
was  about  to  return  to  England.  The  offer  was  a  tempting 
one,  as  it  meant  an  increase  of  pay  as  well  as  of  position,  but 
I  did  not  wish  to  accept  it.  I  had  become  interested  in  my 
work,  I  knew  that  the  Commander-in-Chief  had  previously 
asked  for  another  officer  to  succeed  Murray,  which  was 
sufficient  proof  that  I  was  not  his  first  choice,  and  although 
he  had  appeared  quite  satisfied  with  me  as  Quartermaster- 
General,  there  was  no  certainty  that  either  of  us  would  be 
equally  happy  if  I  became  his  Chief  of  the  General  Staff. 
I  therefore  asked  to  be  allowed  to  stay  where  I  was,  and 
after  further  discussion  a  final  decision  was,  by  my  request, 
deferred  for  a  day  or  two.  In  the  end  I  realised  that  it 
was  my  duty  to  put  personal  considerations  aside,  and  on 
the  25th  of  January  I  took  up  the  new  post,  being  succeeded 
as  Quartermaster-General  by  Major-General  Maxwell. 

I  was  extremely  sorry  to  separate  from  my  old  staff,  who 
had  served  me  so  loyally  during  a  time  of  stress  and  anxiety, 
and  I  would  pay  a  special  tribute  to  my  friend  Dawkins, 
now  dead.  He  had  a  high  sense  of  duty,  not  a  crooked 
element  in  his  character,  great  capacity  for  work,  and  was 
beloved  by  all  of  us.  "  The  Deputy,"  as  he  was  familiarly 
called,  had  a  bad  habit  of  sitting  up  late  at  night  to  work 
or  read  the  newspapers,  of  which  neither  my  reproof  nor 
the  chaff  of  the  other  officers  could  cure  him.  In  honour 
of  the  season,  and  to  the  amusement  of  the  mess,  I  gave 
him  permission  on  Christmas  night  to  sit  up  for  an  hour 
later  than  he  usually  did  ! 


CHAPTER  XIV 

CHIEF  OF  THE  GENERAL  STAFF,  BRITISH  EXPEDITIONARY  FORCE 

Duties — Arrangements  for  training — Reorganisation  of  the  General  Staff 
— My  principal  assistants — Signal  communications — Flying  Corps 
— Life  at  G.H.Q. — Relations  with  units  at  the  front — Liaison 
officers — Situation  on  West  Front  at  beginning  of  1915 — Position  of 
British  Commander-in-Chief — Results  of  unreadiness  for  war — 
Uncertainty  as  to  reinforcements  and  war  material — Neuve  Chapelle 
— Second  battle  of  Ypres — Withdrawal  from  part  of  the  saUent — 
Festubert — Loos — Allies  short  of  war  material — Jofire's  first  con- 
ference of  AUied  Representatives — My  views  on  the  general  situation 
and  conduct  of  the  war — Decide  to  send  them  to  the  C.I.G.S.  at  the 
War  Office — He  forwards  them  to  the  Cabinet — Lord  Kitchener 
asks  me  to  become  C.I.G.S. — I  send  him  my  views  as  to  the  status 
and  duties  of  the  General  Staff — He  cannot  agree  with  some  of  them 
and  proposes  to  resign — Meet  him  at  Calais  and  discuss  his  objections 
— They  are  satisfactorily  removed — I  leave  G.H.Q.  for  the  War 
Ofi&ce. 

In  my  new  capacity  I  became,  according  to  official  phraseo- 
logy, the  Commander-in-Chief's  "  responsible  adviser  on  all 
matters  affecting  military  operations,  through  whom  he 
exercises  his  functions  of  command,  and  by  whom  all  orders 
issued  by  him  will  be  signed."  The  regulations  further  laid 
down  that  the  General  Staff  duties  comprised  the  study  of 
proposed  operations  ;  framing,  issue,  and  despatch  of  opera- 
tion orders  ;  plans  for  movements  to  the  points  of  con- 
centration ;  measures  of  security ;  inter-communication  ; 
reconnaissances  ;  provision  and  distribution  of  maps  ;  and 
the  supply  of  information  to  the  Adjutant-General  and 
Quartermaster-General  regarding  the  situation  and  the 
probable  requirements  of  the  troops. 

There  was  much  more  than  this  to  be  done,  and  as  a 
first  step  I  obtained  the  Commander-in-Chief's  consent  to 
make  certain  changes  in  the  personnel  and  organisation  of 
the  General  Staff  itself.     Of  the  two  branches  into  which  it 

219 


220         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  divided,  Operations  and  Intelligence,  the  former  was 
inclined  to  regard  the  latter  as  its  own  particular  hand- 
maid— which  was  wrong — and  it  also  included  a  small  sub- 
section known  as  "  O  (&),"  which  had  been  designed  mainly 
to  conduct  telegraphic  correspondence  with  formations 
at /the  front.  In  this  way  the  whole  of  the  work  had  a 
tendency  to  filter  through  the  Operations  branch  to  the 
sub-chief,  from  him  to  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  and 
then  to  the  Commander-in-Chief.  Bottle-necks  are  notorious 
for  making  nothing  and  obstructing  everything,  and  this 
one  was  the  more  objectionable  because  of  the  increasing 
amount  of  work  to  be  done.  The  Expeditionary  Force  upon 
which  the  existing  system  had  been  based  was  already 
double  its  original  strength,  many  more  divisions  would 
shortly  arrive,  and  therefore  it  was  necessary  that  greater 
decentralisation  of  staff  work  should  be  initiated. 

Moreover,  units,  large  and  small,  were  coming  out  from 
home  indifferently  trained  in  their  common  military  duties, 
and  knowing  next  to  nothing  about  the  conditions  attaching 
to  trench  warfare.  The  war  of  trenches  had  brought  up  new 
problems  for  which  our  accepted  methods  of  instruction 
made  httle  provision,  and  the  New  Armies,  as  well  as  the 
drafts,  were  still  being  trained  on  much  the  same  lines  as 
the  old  regular  army  had  been.  It  was  essential  to  set  up 
machinery  for  giving  these  new  arrivals  the  requisite  addi- 
tional training  before  they  went  into  the  trenches,  the 
machinery  to  include  schools  of  instruction  manned  by 
officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  who  were  speciaHsts 
in  their  business  ;  to  make  similar  arrangements  for  the 
training  of  drafts  at  the  bases  ;  bring  formations  at  the 
front  in  closer  relation  with  these  drafts  and  cause  them  to 
take  a  greater  interest  in  them  ;  and  inaugurate  systematic 
instruction  for  regimental  ofhcers  and  non-commissioned 
officers,  whose  professional  standard  had  fallen  to  a  low 
level  owing  to  the  number  of  casualties  we  had  suffered. 

Lastly,  special  means  had  to  be  provided  for  dealing 
with  questions  regarding  new  units  such  as  mining  com- 
panies, new  inventions  such  as  trench-mortars,  and  a  host  of 
others  relating  to  new  methods  of  making  war  in  general 
and  trench  war  in  particular. 


SIR  FREDERICK  MAURICE  221 

I  decided  to  form  three  separate  branches,  Operations, 
IntelHgence,  and  General  Staff  duties  {i.e.  training  and  all 
other  duties  not  included  in  the  two  first-named  branches). 
In  the  Operations  branch  was  one  officer  charged  solely 
with  keeping  the  artillery  ammunition  account,  and  with 
advising  me  how  we  could  best  use  the  small  amounts  then 
being  received.  Every  single  round  had  to  be  jealously 
guarded,  for  consignments  of  ammunition  did  not  then 
come  out  as  later  in  the  war  by  hundreds  of  tons  at  a 
time  in  special  ships  and  barges,  but  in  driblets  of  thirty 
or  forty  rounds,  much  in  the  same  way  as  if  despatched  by 
parcel  post. 

The  head  of  each  branch  was  made  responsible  to  me  per- 
sonally, aU  three  being  expected  to  keep  in  touch  with  each 
other  and  not  to  shut  themselves  up  in  water-tight  com- 
partments. Colonel  (now  Major-General)  E.  Perceval  took 
charge,  as  sub-chief  of  the  General  Staff,  of  Staff  duties, 
and  acted  for  me  in  my  temporary  absence  ;  Colonel  (now 
Major-General  Sir)  F.  Maurice  became  head  of  the  Operations 
branch,  and  Colonel  (now  Lieutenant-General  Sir)  G. 
Macdonogh  remained  as  head  of  the  Intelligence. 

Perceval,  as  mentioned  in  a  previous  chapter,  had  served 
under  me  at  the  Staff  College,  and  his  professional  knowledge 
and  untiring  energy  were  as  valuable  to  me  in  France  as 
they  had  been  at  Camberley.  He  was  given  command  of 
a  division  in  July  1915,  being  succeeded  as  sub-chief  by 
Colonel  (now  Major-General  Sir)  R.  Whigham,  another  of 
my  Staff  College  assistants.  Maurice,  who  had  also  been 
with  me  at  the  Staff  College,  was,  like  his  father  the  late 
Sir  Frederick  Maurice,  possessed  of  quite  exceptional  talents. 
He  was  particularly  well  read  in  military  history,  had  a 
thorough  grasp  of  the  principles  of  strategy  and  tactics,  and, 
what  was  more  to  the  point,  held  sound  views  regarding 
their  practical  application.  He  could  express  himself 
temperately  and  clearly  both  verbally  and  on  paper,  and  he 
devoted  every  spare  minute  of  the  day  and  night  to  thinking 
out  how  best  to  beat  the  formidable  enemy  in  front  of  us. 
There  was,  I  may  remind  the  reader,  a  great  deal  of  thinking 
of  this  nature  to  be  done  at  the  time,  for  not  much  daylight 
was  yet  visible. 


222         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Most  of  the  junior  officers  in  the  three  branches  had 
been  trained  under  me  at  the  Staff  College,  and  were  as 
capable  and  loyal  a  body  of  assistants  as  any  man  could 
wish  to  have.  They  included,  at  different  times,  Radcliffe, 
Bartholomew,  Montgomery,  and  Tandy  (artillery),  Hutchison 
(cavalry),  Elles  and  Cox  (engineers),  Deedes  (infantry),  and 
Wigram  (Indian  army). 

Being  a  believer  in  having  small  messes  on  service,  the 
only  member's  of  the  one  I  formed  were  the  sub-chief, 
Maurice,  and  my  two  aides-de-camp — Lucas  and  Montagu 
Stopford,  the  son  of  Lionel  Stopford,  one  of  my  contem- 
poraries when  a  student  at  the  Staff  College.  My  pre- 
decessor had  lived  with  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  had 
no  separate  mess  of  his  own,  and  although  this  arrangement 
had  its  advantages  it  also  had  its  drawbacks.  The  General 
Staff  office  and  the  principal  General  Staff  officers  were 
always  liable  to  be  located  some  distance  away  from  the 
quarters  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  it  seemed  best 
that  I  should  be  near  them.  Moreover,  it  is  just  as  well 
that  the  Commander-in-Chief  and  the  Chief  of  his  Staff 
should  occasionally  have  a  close  time  of  their  own,  for, 
unless  they  possess  more  angelic  tempers  than  ordinary 
mortals  can  hope  to  have,  the  constant  mental  strain  to 
which  they  are  subjected  by  the  stress  of  war  may  cause 
them  to  get  on  each  other's  nerves.  If  that  happens  there 
will  be  trouble,  and  the  effect  of  it  may  be  felt  by  the  whole 
army. 

Outside  the  General  Staff,  and  omitting  my  two  helpful 
colleagues  the  Adjutant-General  and  Quartermaster-General, 
the  senior  officers  upon  whom  I  had  chiefly  to  rely  for 
assistance  were  Du  Cane  the  ArtiUery  Adviser,  Fowke  the 
Engineer-in-Chief,  and  Fowler  the  Director  of  the  Signal 
Service.  The  nature  and  amount  of  guns  and  ammunition 
we  required,  the  best  use  to  make  of  such  material  as  we 
had  and  hoped  to  have  in  the  future,  and  the  most  suitable 
system  of  artillery  organisation  in  general,  were  all  questions 
regarding  which  much  difference  of  opinion  still  existed  at 
the  beginning  of  1915,  and  it  was  largely  owing  to  Du  Cane's 
judgment  and  foresight  that  the  right  course  was  steered 
and  the  foundations  of  our  artillery  supremacy  were  cor- 


THE  SIGNAL  SERVICE  223 

rectly  laid.  He  was  afterwards  employed  in  the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  for  the  greater  part  of  1916  ;  he  then  com- 
manded an  army  corps  on  the  West  Front  for  about  one 
and  a  half  years,  and  was  the  senior  British  miUtary  repre- 
sentative at  the  headquarters  of  the  allied  armies  from 
April  to  November  1918. 

Fowke  had  to  deal  with  and  advise  on  matters  con- 
nected with  trench  warfare,  the  supply  of  engineering 
material,  and  new  methods  of  solving  the  most  difficult 
problems  with  which  the  Royal  Engineers  had  ever  been 
confronted.  He  became  Adjutant-General  in  France  in 
February  1916,  and  continued  to  hold  that  post  until  the 
end  of  the  war. 

Fowler  was  in  charge  of  the  Signal  Service  from  the  first 
day  of  the  war  until  the  last,  and  superintended  its  expansion 
from  a  strength  of  about  1600  in  1914  to  one  of  over  70,000 
in  1918.  I  had  first  met  him  twenty  years  before  when 
travelling  through  Kashmir  ;  he  had  served  on  my  staff  at 
the  Staff  College  ;  and  in  pre-war  days  we  had  often  taken 
part  together  in  staff  tours  designed  to  afford  instruction 
in  the  working  of  signal  communications  with  an  army  in 
the  field.  During  the  retreat  from  Mons  he  had  accom- 
plished marvels  in  keeping  up  connection  between  G.H.Q. 
and  the  troops,  and  he  was  indispensable  to  me  whilst  I  was 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff  in  1915. 

In  Chapter  X.  I  have  described  the  original  formation 
of  "  Commimication  Companies."  These  had  later  become 
the  "Signal  Service";  and  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  are 
unacquainted  with  the  duties  of  this  service  I  may  say  that 
upon  the  efficiency  with  which  they  are  performed  the 
power  of  a  commander  to  handle  his  troops  greatly  depends. 
Just  as  in  a  human  body  the  nerves  convey  the  information 
obtained  by  the  senses  to  the  brain,  and  the  orders  from 
the  brain  to  the  muscles,  so  the  signal  communications  of 
an  army  convey  the  information  obtained  from  all  sources 
to  the  commander,  and  orders  from  the  commander  to  his 
troops.  Loss  of  efficiency  or  sluggishness  of  the  nerves 
'  results  in  partial  paralysis  of  the  body,  and  a  corresponding 
paralysis  of  the  army  results  from  the  failure  of  its  signal 
communications. 


224        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  maintenance  of  communication  on  the  West  Front, 
particularly  in  the  forward  area,  was  very  difficult  owing 
to  the  heavy  shell-fire,  mud,  and  exposure  which  were 
experienced,  and  as  no  one  means  could  be  rehed  on  many 
alternative  methods  had  to  be  provided.  Telegraph  and 
telephone  by  wire  and  cables,  wireless  telegraphy,  telegraphy 
through  the  ground  (power  buzzer),  visual  signalling  with 
electric  lamps,  helios  and  flags,  carrier  pigeons,  messenger 
dogs,  message-carrying  rockets,  firework  signals,  motor- 
cyclist despatch  riders,  mounted  orderhes,  cyclists,  and 
finally  runners  were  all  employed  in  turn  according  to 
circumstances.  The  telephone  cables,  being  too  vuhierable 
overground,  had  sometimes  to  be  buried  to  a  depth  of  six 
or  eight  feet  to  protect  them  from  shell  fire,  a  task  which 
entailed  the  digging  of  hundreds  of  miles  of  trenches.  During 
1917  some  80,000  miles  of  telephone  wire  were  buried  in 
this  way.  Further  to  the  rear,  out  of  range  of  the  enemy's 
artillery,  the  telegraph  and  telephone  were  used  much  in 
the  same  way  as  we  are  accustomed  to  in  civil  hfe.  The 
number  of  messages  dealt  with  on  the  different  systems  was 
astonishing,  and  in  the  great  battles  of  1917  and  1918  they 
amounted  to  tens  of  thousands  in  a  day. 

The  Royal  Flying  Corps,  as  the  Royal  Air  Force  was 
called  in  1915,  was  under  the  command  of  Major-General 
(now  Lieutenant-General  Sir)  David  Henderson,  who  had 
been  Director-General  of  Military  Aeronautics  before  the 
war,  and  may  be  termed  the  father  of  the  corps.  The 
detachment  on  the  West  Front  was  commanded  by  Brigadier- 
General  (now  Air-Marshal  Sir)  Hugh  Trenchard,  of  whose 
excellent  work  I  had  many  proofs  when  serving  with  him. 
At  the  time  the  corps  was  still  very  much  in  its  infancy  and 
below  the  requisite  strength,  but  it  had  considerably 
improved  as  compared  with  its  condition  in  August  19 14. 
The  development  and  unrivalled  efficiency  it  eventually 
attained  are  amongst  the  greatest  achievements  of  the  war. 
The  country  owes  much  to  the  Flying  Corps,  and  especially 
to  the  men,  or  rather  boys  for  the  most  part,  who  flew  and 
fought  the  machines  with  such  marvellous  courage  and  skill. 
The  pity  of  it  is  that  so  many  of  these  gallant  lads  lost  their 
lives.    I  always  maintained  that  they  were  taken  too  young. 


G.H.Q.  225 

and  the  answer  given  me  was  that  the  younger  ones  were 
always  the  most  daring.  No  doubt  this  was  so,  but  this  same 
daring  was  sometimes  little  less  than  recklessness,  and  led 
to  loss  of  life  which  would  have  been  avoided  by  men  a 
year  or  two  older. 

The  Military  Secretary,  working  directly  under  the 
Commander-in-Chief,  and  dealing  with  all  appointments, 
promotions,  and  rewards,  was  another  officer  with  whom  I 
had  much  to  do,  as  all  nominations  for  employment  on  the 
General  Staff  throughout  the  Force  were  made  by  me  before 
submission  for  the  Chief's  approval.  Colonel  "  Billy  "  (now 
Major-General  Sir  William)  Lambton  held  the  post  and 
filled  it,  so  I  thought,  exceedingly  well.  He  was  a  pleasant 
and  practical  officer  to  do  business  with,  and  his  numerous 
friends  were  extremely  sorry  when,  as  a  divisional  com- 
mander later  in  the  war,  he  had  the  misfortune  to  be 
seriously  injured  by  his  horse  coming  down  with  him. 

I  should  like  to  correct  the  idea,  prevalent  at  one  time 
if  not  now,  that  life  at  G.H.Q.  was  one  of  ease  and  indolence. 
It  was  very  strenuous,  and  as  a  general  rule  the  staff  were 
kept  hard  at  work,  either  in  their  offices  or  at  the  front, 
from  early  morning  till  ten  o'clock  or  later  at  night.  It 
should  be  remembered,  too,  that  they  carried  great  responsi- 
bihties.  Officers  who  have  done  splendidly  with  troops  at 
the  front,  or  have  shown  high  ability  in  administration, 
may  still  fail,  and  have  been  known  to  fail,  to  bear  the 
heavier  burdens  resting  upon  them  when  employed  at 
G.H.Q,  To  be  of  any  real  use  there  a  General  Staff  ofhcer 
must  not  be  content  with  carrying  on  according  to  estabhshed 
routine,  he  must  initiate  ;  he  has  to  decide  tangled  questions 
which  come  before  him  because  they  have  proved  to  be 
too  much  for  the  commanders  and  staffs  at  the  front ;  being 
at  the  top  of  the  military  structure,  there  is  no  one  upon 
whom  he  can  lean  ;  and  he  is  oppressed  with  the  thought 
that  a  slip  on  his  part  may  set  going  a  series  of  actions  involv- 
ing perhaps  the  loss  of  thousands  of  lives. 

Earher  in  the  war  I  had  known  staff  officers  to  be  so 
run  down  by  constant  work  and  worry  as  to  faint  away  at 
their  office  tables,  and  this  at  a  time  when  high  spirits, 
confidence,  and  energy  were  especially  needed.    Good  work 

Q 


226         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

calls  for  good  physical  and  mental  health,  and  I  insisted 
upon  my  staff  taking  exercise  at  least  once  during  the  day, 
preferably  on  horseback,  and  going  off  to  bed,  whenever 
possible,  by  ten  o'clock  at  night.  In  my  own  mess  we 
seldom  missed  going  for  a  ride  at  6.30  a.m.,  returning  for 
breakfast  at  8  a.m.,  and  with  this  invigorating  recreation 
in  hand  we  were  able  to  commence  the  day's  work  on 
cheerful  terms  with  ourselves  and  everybody  else.  I 
followed  the  same  rule  afterwards  when  at  the  War  Office, 
as  did  the  other  principal  members  of  my  staff  (with  one 
exception),  regularly  joining  the  "  Liver  Brigade  "  in  the 
Row  for  about  an  hour  every  morning,  and  sometimes  taking 
a  second  ride  in  the  afternoon. 

Another  matter  upon  which  I  laid  stress  was  that  staff 
officers  at  G.H.Q.  should  carefully  maintain  friendly  rela- 
tions with  the  troops  and  headquarters,  small  as  well  as  large, 
at  the  front.  By  this  means  only  is  it  possible  to  learn  what 
the  feeling  of  an  army  really  is,  where  the  shoe  pinches,  and 
how  it  can  be  eased.  A  sympathetic  listening  to  the  numerous 
worries  that  daily  beset  subordinate  commanders,  a  friendly 
chat  with  them  about  their  personal  duties  and  interests, 
the  passing  on  of  news  about  affairs  on  other  fronts  and  in 
other  theatres,  all  help  to  establish  that  spirit  of  comradeship 
and  mutual  confidence  without  which  the  wheels  of  the 
military  machine  will  never  go  round  smoothly  and  efficiently. 
I  used  to  visit  some  headquarters  or  troops  practically  every 
day,  attending  to  office  work  in  the  evening,  and  the  other 
officers  of  my  staff  were  expected  to  do  the  same,  as  far  as 
their  other  duties  would  permit.  Being  less  important 
personages  than  myself,  they  were  able  to  pick  up  informa- 
tion which  was  not  vouchsafed  to  me,  and  it  was  for  the 
common  good  that  they  should  tell  me,  as  they  did,  anything 
useful  that  came  to  their  notice. 

To  supplement  their  rather  restricted  opportunities  a 
certain  number  of  "  liaison  officers  "  were  employed  as  a 
more  permanent  link  between  G.H.Q.  and  the  front.  Each 
morning  before  leaving  they  would  visit  the  staff  offices  and 
prime  themselves  with  what  the  army  or  army  corps  with 
which  they  were  connected  should  know,  would  bring  back 
in  the  evening  all  the  information  gained  that  G.H.Q.  should 


I915  227 

have,  and  at  both  ends  would  clear  up,  if  they  could,  any 
points  about  which  there  might  be  misapprehension.  Similar 
but  more  extensive  arrangements  were  made  for  keeping  up 
connection  with  the  headquarters  of  the  French  and  Belgian 
armies,  each  of  the  three  Allies  having  a  "  military  mission  " 
permanently  located  at  the  headquarters  of  the  other  two. 
The  French  Mission  at  our  G.H.Q.  comprised  a  considerable 
number  of  officers,  as  there  were  daily  many  questions  in 
regard  to  civil  administration,  the  use  of  railways,  etc., 
which  had  to  be  dealt  with,  quite  apart  from  those  affecting 
the  fighting. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  describe  in  detail  the  operations 
which  took  place  on  the  British  front  in  1915.  That  has 
been  done  in  the  despatches  of  the  Commander-in-Chief,  and, 
moreover,  this  book  is  not  meant  to  be  a  history  of  the  war. 
My  observations  will  be  of  a  general  nature,  and  as  the 
operations  have  not  escaped  criticism  I  would  in  the  first 
place  remind  the  reader  that  they  should  be  judged  not 
merely  by  what  we  may  have  failed  to  achieve,  but  also  by 
what  we  prevented  the  enemy  from  achieving. 

The  problem  confronting  the  Commander  -  in  -  Chief 
throughout  1915  was  one  of  extreme  difficulty.  The  enemy 
was  within  a  short  distance  of  the  Channel  ports,  the  loss 
of  which  v/ould  be  very  serious  to  us,  if  not  fatal,  and  at 
any  moment  he  could  close  down  his  Russian  operations 
sufficiently  to  allow  of  reinforcements  being  sent  to  the 
West  Front  while  we  were  still  weak  in  men,  practically 
without  heavy  artillery,  and  woefully  short  of  artillery 
ammimition  of  all  kinds.  The  necessity  for  safeguarding  the 
Channel  ports,  together  with  our  lack  of  men  and  munitions, 
indicated  that  the  policy  most  favourable  to  us  would  be 
to  defer  offensive  operations  until  we  possessed  a  well-trained 
and  well-equipped  army  adequate  to  our  needs.  This, 
however,  would  be  to  take  a  narrow  view  of  the  situation, 
as  it  would  leave  out  of  account  the  effect  a  defensive 
attitude  might  have  upon  our  Allies,  to  say  nothing  of  its 
destructive  influence  upon  the  morale  of  our  own  troops. 

It  must  also  be  remembered  that  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  not  in  all  respects  master  in  his  own  house. 
Theoretically    he    was    an    independent    commander    and 


228        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

responsible  only  to  his  own  Government,  but  his  instructions 
laid  down— quite  rightly— that  "  the  special  motive  of  the 
Force  under  your  command  is  to  support,  and  co-operate 
with,  the  French  army  against  our  common  enemies,"  and 
obviously  he  could  not  so  co-operate  and  at  the  same  time 
retain  complete  independence  of  action.  The  enemy  was 
in  possession  of  a  large  and  valuable  part  of  French  territory  ; 
Russia,  suffering  from  a  series  of  defeats,  was  crying  out  for 
pressure  to  be  reheved  by  energetic  action  on  the  West  Front ; 
certain  prospective  alHes  were  sitting  on  the  fence,  wondering 
on  which  side  to  descend  or  whether  to  come  down  at  all ; 
and  if  General  Joffre  thought  that  this  situation  could  best 
be  met  by  an  early  offensive  his  British  colleague  could 
hardly  do  otherwise  than  support  him  to  the  best  of  his 
power.  For  these  and  a  score  of  other  reasons  a  defensive 
pohcy  was  not  practicable,  and  yet  it  is  true  that  our  armies 
were  not  in  a  condition  to  fight  with  any  good  prospect  of 
obtaining  decisive  results. 

Having  before  her  our  experiences  of  1915  and  1916,  and 
not  forgetting  perhaps  the  lessons  she  herself  had  learned 
in  the  Civil  War,  America  seems  to  have  decided,  when  she 
joined  the  Allies  in  1917,  not  to  commit  her  troops  to  battle 
until  they  were  fully  ready  and  of  sufficient  strength  to  be 
more  or  less  self-supporting  :  in  the  end,  and  in  consequence 
of  the  enemy's  action,  she  was  obliged  to  forgo  this  decision 
and  hurry  to  the  assistance  of  the  British  and  French  armies 
as  best  she  could.  The  inexorable  fact  is  that,  when  opposed 
by  a  capable  adversary,  the  unprepared  nation  is  invariably 
compelled  by  force  of  circumstances  to  put  its  troops  into 
battle  piecemeal  and  before  they  have  been  properly  trained 
to  fight,  with  the  result  that  losses  are  incurred  out  of  all 
proportion  to  the  progress  made  in  winning  the  war,  while 
the  lives  thus  sacrificed  are  usually  amongst  the  best  which 
the  nation  possesses. 

To  what  cause  history  will  attribute  our  unreadiness  I 
shall  not  attempt  to  prophesy,  but  when  I  think  of  the 
terrible  events  of  1914  and  1915  ;  of  the  privations  and 
mental  strain  suffered  by  the  men  of  our  attenuated  battalions 
through  being  kept  in  the  front  line  for  weeks  at  a  stretch 
owing  to  the  lack  of  reinforcements  ;  of  men  being  shot  down 


NEUVE  CHAPELLE  229 

like  rabbits  when  trying  to  pass  through  the  enemy's  wire 
entanglements  which  had  not  previously  been  demolished 
because  of  the  shortage  of  artillery ;  and  of  the  heavy  loss 
of  life  in  the  hastily-raised  and  inexperienced  divisions  of 
the  New  Armies,  I  wonder  what  are  the  feelings  of  those 
who,  occupying  high  positions  in  the  years  before  the  war, 
made  no  serious  effort  to  provide  such  an  army  as  the 
inevitable  struggle  with  Germany  would  demand,  and 
deliberately  held  up  to  scorn  those  who,  putting  patriotism 
before  self-interest,  strove  to  warn  the  country  of  the  peril 
in  which  it  stood. 

As  a  corollary  of  our  unreadiness  the  Commander-in- 
Chief  was  further  hampered  by  the  uncertainty  which 
prevailed  throughout  the  greater  part  of  1915  regarding  the 
reinforcements,  guns,  and  ammunition  which  he  might  hope 
to  receive  within  a  given  period  of  time.  No  one  could 
possibly  say  long  beforehand  when  particular  divisions  of 
the  New  Armies  would  be  ready  to  take  the  field,  or  whether 
contracts  for  war  material  would  or  would  not  be  fulfilled 
by  the  agreed  date,  while  both  men  and  material,  originally 
ear-marked  for  France,  were  liable  to  be  diverted  at  the  last 
moment,  and  were  diverted,  to  other  theatres  of  war.  It  is 
not  my  purpose,  for  the  moment,  to  question  this  dissemina- 
tion of  resources.  I  merely  wish  to  point  out  how  difficult  it 
was  to  utilise  to  the  best  advantage  such  resources  as  became 
available  for  the  West  Front,  owing  to  the  absence  of  any 
reliable  basis  upon  which  a  definite  and  comprehensive  plan 
of  campaign  could  be  constructed. 

Neuve  Chapelle,  the  first  battle  in  1915,  was  fought  on 
the  loth,  nth,  and  12th  March.  We  lost  some  2500  killed 
and  over  8000  wounded,  while  the  enemy  left  thousands  of 
dead  on  the  field  and  removed,  according  to  our  intelligence 
reports,  at  least  12,000  wounded  by  train. 

Judged  by  more  recent  standards  this  battle  would  be 
classified  as  quite  a  minor  engagement,  but  its  importance 
should  not  be  estimated  merely  by  the  numbers  engaged, 
the  duration  of  the  fighting,  or  the  results  immediately 
achieved.  It  helped  to  nourish  the  offensive  spirit  of  the 
troops,  who  had  endured  months  of  heart-breaking  sub- 
mission to  the  enemy's  will  under  the  most  trying  climatic 


230         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

conditions  ;  it  created  a  corresponding  feeling  of  disquiet 
and  disappointment  in  the  German  ranks  ;  it  afforded  many 
encouraging  proofs  that,  given  an  adequate  supply  of  guns 
and  ammunition,  the  enemy's  lines  need  not  be  regarded 
as  impregnable  ;  and,  finally,  the  elaborate  arrangements 
made  for  the  employment  of  artillery  fire,  which  were  intro- 
duced on  this  occasion  for  the  first  time,  furnished  useful 
guidance  for  both  the  British  and  French  armies  in  the  greater 
attacks  undertaken  at  a  later  period  of  the  war. 

The  second  battle  of  Ypres,  commencing  at  5  p.m.  on  the 
22nd  of  April  and  ending  on  the  24th  of  May,  is  prominent 
as  being  the  first  action  in  which  asphyxiating  gas  was  used. 
The  brunt  of  the  attack  fell  on  a  French  division  which  was 
holding  the  line  Steenstraat-Langemarck  on  the  extreme 
left  of  our  Second  Army,  where  the  ist  Canadian  Division  was 
posted.  Within  an  hour  the  position  had  to  be  abandoned, 
the  smoke  and  fumes  of  the  gas  hid  everything  from  view, 
the  ground  was  covered  with  men  in  a  dying  or  comatose 
condition,  and  in  the  panic  and  confusion  which  prevailed 
it  was  impossible  for  any  one  to  realise  at  first  what  had 
actually  happened.  Owing  to  the  retirement  of  the  French 
division — for  which  the  division  could  not  be  blamed,  as 
no  troops  would  have  held  their  ground  against  this 
unexpected  form  of  attack — the  left  flank  of  the  Canadian 
Division  became  completely  exposed,  and  had  it  been 
driven  in  the  whole  of  the  British  troops  in  the  salient 
would  have  been  threatened  with  disaster.  This  danger 
was  averted  by  the  splendid  gallantry  of  the  Canadians, 
and  by  the  prompt  despatch  of  reserves  from  other  divisions 
in  the  vicinity. 

The  necessity  for  rapidly  pushing  troops  forward  to 
check  the  enemy's  advance,  and  to  close  the  gap  between 
our  left  and  the  French  right,  inevitably  led  to  the  mixing 
of  units  ;  this  in  its  turn  made  the  exercise  of  efficient 
command  impossible  ;  and  although  large  reinforcements 
were  moved  up  and  various  other  measures  taken  to  meet 
eventualities,  the  situation  was  critical  during  the  next  few 
days.  The  ground  gained  by  the  enemy  placed  our  troops 
in  the  salient  in  a  very  awkward  position,  and  as  there 
seemed  little  prospect  of  recapturing  the  original  line  the 


FESTUBERT  231 

Commander-in-Chief  decided  on  the  ist  of  May  to  withdraw 
them  to  a  safer  hne  in  rear  which  had  already  been  fixed 
upon. 

To  withdraw  a  force  at  grips  with  a  winning  enemy 
must  always  be  a  difficult  and  dehcate  task,  and  in  this 
particular  case  the  conditions  were  specially  unfavourable. 
The  enemy  had  all  the  advantages  of  ground,  he  made 
violent  attacks  on  the  nights  of  the  2nd  and  3rd  of  May  while 
the  rearward  movement  was  going  on,  some  of  his  front  line 
trenches  were  less  than  100  yards  distant  from  ours,  the  sur- 
face of  the  sodden  fields  had  been  so  broken  by  artillery  fire 
as  to  be  nearly  impassable,  the  maintenance  of  rehable  com- 
munication was  impossible,  and  our  troops  were  absolutely 
worn  out  so  far  as  British  troops  ever  can  be.  In  spite  of  all 
this,  and  of  much  more,  the  retirement  was  effected  by  the 
morning  of  the  4th  of  May  with  scarcely  any  loss,  and  during 
that  day  the  enemy  shelled  the  trenches  we  had  abandoned, 
being  quite  unaware  that  our  men  were  no  longer  in  them. 
General  Plumer  succeeded  General  Smith-Dorrien  in  the 
command  of  the  Second  Army  while  the  above  events  were 
taking  place,  and  it  is  doubtful  if  any  commander  was  ever 
before  suddenly  called  upon  to  handle  so  difficult  a  situation. 

While  the  Second  Army  was  still  engaged  in  the  battle 
of  Ypres,  the  First  Army  made  an  attack  on  the  enemy's 
trenches  opposite  the  southern  part  of  our  Hne,  this  operation, 
usually  spoken  of  as  the  battle  of  Festubert,  being  part  of 
a  joint  attack  made  by  the  French  and  British  armies  on 
the  front  extending  from  near  Armentieres  to  Arras.  The 
role  of  the  British  was  to  hold  the  enemy  on  their  front, 
and  draw  towards  themselves  hostile  reinforcements  which 
might  otherwise  be  sent  to  oppose  the  main  attack  made 
by  the  French  troops  under  General  Foch,  the  chief  objective 
of  the  latter  being  the  Vimy  Ridge.  The  battle  commenced 
on  the  9th  of  May  and  was  continued  on  the  loth,  it  was 
resumed  on  the  i6th,  and  terminated,  so  far  as  we  were 
concerned,  on  the  25th.  The  French  continued  fighting 
in  their  attempts  to  take  the  Vimy  Ridge  until  the  13th  of 
July.  We  experienced  the  usual  trouble  with  the  enemy's 
machine-gun  posts,  with  which  we  did  not  yet  know  how  to 
deal,  and  we  again  felt  the  want  of  more  artillery  and 


232        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ammunition.  In  fact,  our  co-operation  ceased  on  the  date 
mentioned  because  of  the  want  of  ammunition.  The  results 
of  the  battle  were  somewhat  disappointing,  the  losses  of 
both  British  and  French  being  considerable  and  no  im- 
mediate material  advantage  was  gained.  In  consequence 
of  the  French  losses,  which  were  some  of  the  heaviest  in  the 
war,  Foch  became  rather  unpopular  in  certain  circles  in 
France,  by  whom  he  was  regarded,  quite  unjustly,  as  a 
leader  who  was  careless  of  the  lives  of  his  men. 

The  battle  of  Loos,  the  first  occasion  on  which  we  used 
gas,  began  on  the  25th  of  September  and  continued  until  the 
15th  of  October.  It,  also,  was  carried  out  in  combination 
with  an  attack  by  the  French  armies  under  General  Foch 
on  our  right,  a  third  and  more  powerful  attack  being  simul- 
taneously made  by  the  French  armies  under  General  Joffre 
in  Champagne.  The  enemy's  position  at  Loos  was  of 
exceptional  strength  and,  as  was  the  case  everywhere  else, 
there  were  few  or  no  weak  spots  in  the  formidable  defences 
upon  which  he  had  spent  the  gi-eater  part  of  a  year  in 
constructing  ;  the  ground  in  front  of  the  position  was  very 
open  to  view,  and  in  other  ways  unfavourable  to  us  as 
regards  both  the  preparation  and  execution  of  the  attack ; 
while  we  were  further  handicapped  by  bad  weather  inter- 
fering with  observation  of  fire  and  aerial  reconnaissance. 
Very  satisfactory  progress  was  made  at  the  beginning  of 
the  battle  but  it  could  not  be  exploited,  one  reason  for  this 
being,  amongst  others,  that  the  French  on  our  right  were 
unable  to  make  any  substantial  headway  in  their  efforts  to 
gain  complete  possession  of  the  Vimy  Ridge.  We  were  after- 
wards subjected  to  a  series  of  severe  counter-attacks,  the 
battle  swaying  to  and  fro  for  several  days,  particularly  in 
the  neighbourhood  of  the  renowned  Hohenzollern  Redoubt. 

The  French  attack  in  Champagne  also,  though  successful 
at  first,  did  not  fulfil  expectations,  but  taking  the  results  of 
these  autumn  operations  as  a  whole  there  is  no  doubt  that 
they  caused  the  enemy  genuine  anxiety,  and  I  sometimes 
think  that  he  might  have  suffered  a  real  set-back  had  the 
large  number  of  men  and  guns  then  in  the  Dardanelles  been 
on  the  West  Front.  Speaking  of  this  period,  Falkenhayn 
admits  that  "  a  serious  crisis  arose,  which  almost  led  to  the 


SHORTAGE  OF  EQUIPMENT  233 

withdrawal  of  the  whole  3rd  German  Army  on  the  Cham- 
pagne Front  "  ;  while  Ludendorff,  in  referring  to  the  "  power- 
ful offensive  near  Loos  and  in  Champagne,"  says  that  "  the 
troops  which  had  been  transferred  from  the  East  {i.e.  the 
Russian  Front)  arrived  just  in  time  to  support  the  defenders 
of  the  West  Front,  who  were  holding  out  so  gallantly,  and 
avert  a  serious  defeat." 

Our  captures  at  Loos  included  over  3000  prisoners  and 
26  field-guns,  and  many  thousands  of  the  enemy's  dead 
were  seen  lying  on  the  ground  in  front  of  our  lines.  We 
also  lost  heavily,  including  three  Divisional  Commanders, 
Capper  of  the  7th  Division,  Wing  of  the  12th  Division,  and 
Thesiger  of  the  9th  Division.  No  troops  in  the  world  could 
have  fought  with  greater  gallantry  than  ours  did,  but 
gallantry  is  not  of  itself  enough  to  cope  with  the  destructive 
effect  of  modern  armament ;  and  the  lack  of  adequate  training 
and  military  experience  in  general  from  which  the  new 
divisions  suffered,  and  the  need  for  increased  artillery  sup- 
port, very  quickly  made  themselves  felt.  More  troops,  more 
training,  more  aeroplanes,  more  guns,  more  ammunition, 
were  required  before  decisive  results  could  be  achieved. 

With  the  exception  of  France,  our  Allies  were  no  better 
off  than  ourselves,  and  some  of  them  were  worse.  Before 
the  war  they  were  supposed  to  have,  thanks  to  their  system 
of  universal  service,  large  numbers  of  men  available  for 
mobilisation  and  on  paper  they  had  them,  but  when  put  to 
the  test  it  was  found  that  insufficient  provision  had  been 
made  for  rifles,  clothing,  heavy  artillery,  ammunition, 
vehicles,  and  all  the  other  things  required.  Russia  had 
milhons  of  men  on  her  books,  but  could  only  put  a  com- 
paratively small  proportion  of  them  in  the  field,  and  she 
was  not  always  sure  as  to  what  amount  of  equipment  she 
had.  Some  which  she  thought  she  had  proved  to  be  not 
forthcoming  when  wanted,  while  in  one  instance  at  least 
stores  were  "  found  "  of  whose  existence  no  one  seems  to 
have  been  previously  aware.  Italy,  also,  had  more  men  of 
military  age  than  she  could  equip,  and,  hke  Russia,  lacked 
both  aeroplanes  and  heavy  artillery.  Belgium  had  naturally 
lost  much  of  what  she  had  at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  and 
Serbia  had  lost  practically  all.     The  two  countries  with  the 


234        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

greatest  surplus  of  men,  Russia  and  Italy,  were  badly 
situated  for  making  good  their  deficiencies  by  new  produc- 
tion, as  the  former  was  difficult  of  access,  the  latter  wanted 
coal,  and  both  needed  raw  material. 

In  December  1915  Joffre  assembled  representatives  of 
all  the  Allied  armies  at  his  headquarters  at  Chantilly,  so  as 
to  ascertain  the  men  and  material  they  then  had  and  hoped 
to  have  by  the  spring  of  1916,  and  to  try  to  arrive  at  some 
conclusions  with  respect  to  mutual  assistance.  The  meeting, 
like  those  which  followed  it,  was  handicapped  by  the  absence 
of  a  suitable  representative  from  Russia.  In  all  other  cases 
the  Allies  were  represented  either  by  their  Commander-in- 
Chief  or  his  Chief  of  the  Staff,  but  owing  to  distance  and  other 
causes  Russia  was  always  represented  either  by  an  officer 
permanently  attached  to  Joffre's  headquarters,  or  by  another 
officer  not  then  fiUing  a  high  position  in  the  Russian  army, 
and  neither  of  these  could  speak  with  the  requisite  knowledge 
or  authority.  The  meeting  had  some  good  results,  but  each 
representative  not  unnaturally  argued  that  his  own  front 
was  the  most  important  and  had  perhaps  been  authori- 
tatively instructed  to  say  so,  and  as  everybody  was  short 
of  nearly  everything  promises  of  assistance  were  rather 
reluctantly  given  and  were  usually  conditional. 

Joffre's  task  at  this  period  was  difficult,  for  the  war  had 
not  yet  proceeded  far  enough  to  admit  of  his  being  acknow- 
ledged as  supreme  commander  of  all  the  Allied  armies. 
Even  the  smallest  countries  were  quick  to  resent  outside 
interference  with  their  status  as  independent  nations.  This 
can  be  understood  if  we  remember  that  the  question  was 
not  merely  one  of  directing  the  armies  in  the  field  but  also 
of  organising  and  equipping  them,  and  this  affected  the 
commercial,  industrial,  and  financial  interests  of  the  whole 
nation.  Any  suggestion  at  this  time  of  introducing  the 
same  system  of  centralised  command  as  that  which  the 
prospect  of  stark  defeat  compelled  the  Allies  to  adopt  in 
1918  would  have  been  peremptorily  turned  down  as  too  im- 
possible for  any  self-respecting  country  to  entertain.  Joffre 
had  therefore  to  make  the  best  of  a  bad  job,  and  I  am  in- 
clined to  think  that  he  did  all  that  he  or  any  one  else  could 
then  have  done  to  unify  the  efforts  of  the  different  armies. 


SECONDARY  FRONTS  235 

G.H.Q.  in  France  were  of  course  concerned  only  with 
matters  on  that  front,  and  had  nothing  to  do  with  the 
conduct  of  the  war  in  general,  either  strategical  or  adminis- 
trative. That  was  the  business  of  the  authorities  in  London, 
but  it  was  the  subject  of  a  good  deal  of  conversation  with 
ministers  and  other  officials  who  from  time  to  time  visited 
G.H.Q,  The  views  of  the  General  Staff  were  unanimous 
and  simple.  They  were  that  the  West  Front  was  the  main 
front,  whether  we  liked  it  or  not ;  that  the  main  decision 
must  consequently  be  sought  on  that  front ;  and  that  every 
man,  gun,  and  round  of  ammunition  should  be  sent  to  it, 
except  such  as  were  absolutely  required  elsewhere  for  the 
defence  of  interests  vital  to  the  Empire.  All  our  visitors  did 
not  agree,  and  perhaps  suspected  us  of  undue  partiality  to  the 
front  on  which  we  were  employed,  but  at  least  two  of  them, 
Mr.  Asquith  and  Lord  Kitchener,  were  as  convinced  as  we 
were  that  so  long  as  we  won  in  the  west  temporary  set-backs 
in  other  parts  of  the  world  would  right  themselves.  Lord 
Kitchener  once  told  me  in  connection  with  the  enemy's 
activities  in  Persia  and  Afghanistan,  that  he  did  not  care 
what  happened  there  or  in  India  if  only  we  beat  the  German 
armies  in  Europe. 

For  one  reason  or  another,  however,  we  had  become 
committed  before  the  end  of  1915  to  operations  in  no  less 
than  three  secondary  theatres,  Mesopotamia,  Gallipoh,  and 
Macedonia  ;  a  fourth  campaign  was  about  to  begin  in  East 
Africa  ;  a  fifth  had  to  be  contemplated  against  the  Turks 
east  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  the  western  border  of  Egypt 
was  also  unsettled.  In  the  aggregate  these  liabilities  seemed 
likely,  before  finished  with,  to  make  such  demands  upon 
men,  material,  and  shipping  as  might  seriously  jeopardise 
success  in  the  main  theatre,  and  this  was  the  more  probable 
because  Russia  had  just  been  so  crippled  as  to  render  her 
future  assistance  a  very  doubtful  quantity.  As  far  as  an 
outsider  like  myself  could  judge,  these  secondary  operations 
formed  no  part  of  any  general  Entente  plan  embracing  the 
war  as  a  whole  ;  the  importance  of  making  proper  prepara- 
tions to  carry  them  out,  and  of  carefully  considering  the 
extent  to  which  they  might  develop,  had  been  obscured  by 
the  desire  to  present  the  pubhc  with  an  easy  and  dramatic 


236        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

success  ;  and  it  was  forgotten  that  any  success  of  real 
advantage  to  us  must  equally  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  the 
enemy,  who  therefore  might  be  expected  to  try  his  hardest 
to  prevent  it  from  being  gained. 

The  whole  situation  being  so  full  of  peril,  I  felt  it  to 
be  my  duty  to  do  what  I  could  to  bring  about  somewhat 
more  efficient  methods  in  the  supreme  direction  of  the  war. 
Strictly  speaking  I  had  no  right  to  interfere,  but  departure 
from  official  etiquette  was  a  small  matter  in  comparison  with 
the  danger  in  which  the  country  seemed  to  stand,  and  there- 
fore I  decided  to  embody  my  views  in  a  memorandum  and 
send  them  unofficially  to  Murray,  then  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  to  be  disposed  of  as  he  thought  fit.  The  memo- 
randum, which  strongly  advocated  better  co-ordination  of 
the  Entente  plans,  was  eventually  circulated  to  the  Cabinet, 
and  to  that  extent  it  served  its  purpose. 

A  short  time  afterwards,  when  I  happened  to  be  at 
home.  Lord  Kitchener  told  me  that  I  was  wanted  to  take 
up  the  duties  of  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  For 
some  weeks  past  I  had  suspected  that  this  suggestion  would 
be  made,  as  I  had  received  hints  from  influential  quarters 
that  I  would  be  more  useful  in  London  than  in  France, 
and  I  had  always  opposed  the  change.  It  was  distasteful 
to  me  to  supersede  Murray,  who  was  an  old  friend  and 
had  taken  up  the  appointment  as  recently  as  the  26th  of 
September.  Moreover,  he  was  rapidly  making  the  necessary 
improvements  in  the  General  Staff  machiner}/,  and  I  was 
not  vain  enough  to  suppose  that  I  could  do  any  better 
than  he  was  doing,  if  as  well.  A  minor  reason  for  wishing 
to  remain  in  France  was  that  the  open-air  life  and  spirit  of 
comradeship  and  cheerfulness  which  always  prevailed  at  the 
front,  no  matter  how  bad  the  weather  or  how  aggressive  the 
enemy,  were  far  more  attractive  than  the  gloomy  despond- 
ency of  London  and  the  thankless  work  of  Whitehall.  Still 
another  reason  was  that  I  could  not  help  being  influenced 
by  the  prevailing  gossip  that  Lord  Kitchener  centrahsed  all 
authority  in  his  own  hands,  and  would  not  allow  the  General 
Staff  at  the  War  Office  to  take  that  part  in  the  strategical 
direction  of  operations  which  it  ought  to  take.  My  acquaint- 
ance with  him  at  the  time  was  very  slight,  for  although  we 


LORD  KITCHENER  237 

had  served  together  in  South  Africa  I  was  then  only  a  junior 
officer  and  we  saw  practically  nothing  of  each  other. 

I  therefore  asked  him  to  leave  me  in  France,  but  to  this 
he  would  not  listen,  and  from  the  long  conversation  we  had 
the  same  evening  at  York  House  it  became  evident  that  I 
ought  to  comply  with  his  wishes.  In  the  course  of  our  talk 
he  referred  quite  frankly  to  the  unenviable  reputation  he 
had  acquired,  and  asked  me  not  to  believe  it  for  it  was  not 
true,  and  he  assured  me  that  I  might  rest  satisfied  that  no 
action  of  his  would  endanger  our  working  smoothly  together. 
I  was  much  impressed  by  his  outspoken  manner,  and  felt 
that  I  was  in  the  presence  of  a  man  whose  character  was 
totally  different  from  what  I  had  been  led  to  suppose  ;  but 
I  still  thought  it  would  be  best  for  both  of  us,  and  for  the 
country,  if  before  finally  deciding  we  came  to  a  definite 
understanding,  in  writing,  on  the  particular  points  regarding 
which  I  was  in  doubt. 

To  this  he  agreed,  and  as  soon  as  I  returned  to  France 
I  sent  him  a  memorandum  containing  my  proposals,  one  of 
them  being  that  all  operation  orders  issued  to  Commanders- 
in-Chief  to  give  effect  to  the  military  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment should  be  sent  by  me,  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff,  and  not,  as  hitherto,  be  issued  in  the  name  of  the 
Army  Council  and  over  the  signature  of  the  Secretary  of  the 
Council — a  civilian.  This  and  certain  other  proposals  did 
not  meet  with  his  approval,  and  in  the  letter  which  he  wrote 
me  by  return  of  post  he  said  that  it  would  be  impossible  for 
him  to  retain  the  responsibility  of  Secretary  of  State  for  War 
without  full  executive  power,  and  with  his  functions  cur- 
tailed to  the  feeding  and  clothing  of  the  army  (the  Ministry 
of  Munitions  having  recently  taken  over  the  other  services 
of  maintenance)  ;  but  that  although  he  could  not  remain 
Secretary  of  State  for  War  if  my  suggestions  were  accepted 
by  the  Government — as  he  thought  they  would  be — he  might 
still  continue  to  be  a  member  of  the  War  Council,  and  "  in 
that  case  you  may  rely  on  me  to  always  do  my  best  to 
support  you  in  carrying  out  the  difficult  task  you  will  have 
before  you." 

This  example  of  patriotism  and  subordination  of  self 
was  the  more  striking  as  coming  from  a  man  of  his  standing 


238        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

in  the  Empire  and  with  his  record  of  service,  and  I  had  not 
a  moment's  hesitation  as  to  the  right  thing  to  do.  His 
letter  reached  me  at  St.  Omer  about  seven  o'clock  in  the 
evening,  and  as  I  knew  that  he  was  passing  through  Calais 
at  eleven  o'clock  the  same  night  on  his  way  to  Paris,  I  got 
into  my  motor  after  dinner  and  went  to  Calais  to  meet 
him.  He  greeted  me  very  cordially,  albeit  a  little  sadly,  I 
thought,  and  with  an  air  of  disappointment.  I  came  at 
once  to  the  point  and  said  that  whatever  happened  I  could 
not  hear  of  his  leaving  the  War  Office,  since  there  was  no 
one  who  could  fill  the  position  which  he  held  in  the  country, 
and  I  begged  him  to  discuss  with  me  the  paragraphs  in  the 
memorandum  to  which  he  objected.  As  his  train  was  due 
to  start  almost  immediately  for  Paris  he  asked  me  to  go 
with  him.  I  jumped  in,  and  we  sat  up  talking  till  two 
o'clock  next  morning,  the  conversation  being  resumed  after 
we  had  breakfasted  in  Paris, 

I  had  two  special  reasons  for  wishing  to  abolish  the 
existing  system  of  issuing  operation  orders,  and  to  vest  this 
duty,  unhampered,  in  the  hands  of  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff.  At  the  time  the  Army  Council  consisted  of 
four  military  and  four  civil  members  (later  increased  by 
three  additional  miUtary  members,  or  eleven  in  all),  besides 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  and  all  these  members  had 
the  right,  if  they  chose  to  exercise  it,  to  be  consulted  before 
any  important  orders  were  issued  in  the  name  of  the  Council. 
This  would  have  entailed  interminable  delay,  and  as  all  the 
members  had  more  than  enough  to  do  in  their  own  depart- 
ments without  becoming  entangled  in  the  work  of  the 
General  Staff,  they  were,  in  practice,  not  consulted,  except 
in  so  far  as  their  respective  departments  were  concerned — 
a  custom  which  must  necessarily  prevail  under  an}^  system. 
Therefore  while  they  shared  the  responsibility  for  the  operation 
orders  issued,  they  knew,  in  fact,  Httle  or  nothing  about  them, 
and  this  was  neither  fair  to  them  nor  to  the  General  Staff. 

My  second  objection  to  this  sham  system  was  that  it 
prevented  the  General  Staff  at  the  War  Office  from  being 
recognised  as  the  Great  General  Staff  of  our  armies  at  the 
front,  and  in  my  opinion  this  recognition  was  essential.  At 
the  front  the  issue  of  operation  orders  was,  as  in  all  armies 


C.I.G.S.  239 

of  the  world,  the  business  of  the  General  Staff  and  of  no 
one  else,  and  my  proposal  brought  the  procedure  at  the 
War  Office  into  conformity  with  this  practice,  and  caused 
the  pretended  control  of  operations  by  the  Army  Council  to 
disappear.  It  did  not,  as  some  people  imagined,  involve 
any  diminution  in  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War.  It  merely  assigned  a  particular  duty  to  the  head 
of  one  department  of  the  W^ar  Office  instead  of  assigning  it 
to  the  Army  Council  as  a  whole,  made  the  position  of  the 
General  Staff  clear,  and  brought  that  Staff  into  more  direct 
relations  with  the  Cabinet. 

When  I  had  explained  the  proposal  in  this  way  to 
Lord  Kitchener,  and  cleared  up  the  other  points  with  which 
he  was  not  at  first  in  agreement,  the  offending  paragraphs 
of  the  memorandum — written  in  a  hurry  and  not  very 
happily  worded  in  all  respects — were  amended  in  a  manner 
satisfactory  to  both  of  us,  and  I  returned  to  G.H.Q.  at 
St.  Omer.  A  few  days  later  I  left  for  England,  and  on  the 
23rd  of  December  took  up  the  new  post. 

The  memorandum,  as  amended,  was  as  follows  : 

General  Headquarters, 

British  Army  in  the  Field  in  France, 

^th  December  1915. 

Dear  Lord  Kitchener — You  were  kind  enough  yesterday 
to  express  your  willingness  to  receive  some  observations  of  mine 
regarding  the  conduct  of  the  war,  with  special  reference  to  the 
status  and  duties  of  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff. 

For  a  long  time  past  I  have  given  careful  and  anxious  con- 
sideration to  this  question.  Both  the  history  of  past  wars  and 
our  experience  in  the  present  war  show  that  certain  conditions 
are  normally  essential  to  the  successful  conduct  of  military 
operations,  though  there  have,  it  is  true,  been  isolated  instances 
of  commanders  of  genius  who  have  triumphed  in  the  absence  of 
these  conditions. 

These  conditions  are  : 

(I.)  There  should  be  a  supreme  directing  authority  whose 
function  is  to  formulate  policy,  decide  on  the  theatres  in 
which  military  operations  are  to  be  conducted,  and  determine 
the  relative  importance  of  these  theatres.  This  authority 
must  also  exercise  a  general  supervision  over  the  conduct  of 
the  war,  and  must  select  the  men  who  are  to  execute  the 
poUcy  on  which  it  has  decided.     Its  constitution  must  be 


240        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

such  that  it  is  able  to  come  to  quick  decisions,  and  therefore 
as  regards  the  conduct  of  the  war  it  must  be  absolute. 

The  War  Council^  should  be  capable  of  performing  the 
functions  of  this  supreme  authority,  provided  it  is  relieved  of 
responsibility  to  the  Cabinet  as  a  whole  as  regards  the  conduct 
of  military  operations,  and  that  it  has  real  executive  power 
and  is  not  merely  an  advisory  committee. 

The  War  Council  will  frequently  find  itself  in  a  position 
similar  to  that  of  a  commander  in  the  field — that  is,  it  will 
have  to  come  to  a  decision  when  the  situation  is  obscure, 
when  information  is  deficient,  and  when  the  wishes  and  the 
powers  of  our  Allies  are  uncertain.  Whatever  these  diffi- 
culties may  be,  if  and  when  a  decision  is  required  it  must  be 
made.  If  it  is  deferred  success  cannot  be  expected;  the  com- 
mander concerned  will  have  a  grossly  unfair  burden  placed  upon 
him  ;  and  in  fact  the  absence  of  a  decision  may  be  little  less 
than  criminal  because  of  the  loss  of  life  which  may  be  entailed. 

(II.)  In  order  that  the  War  Council  may  be  able  to  come 
to  timely  decisions  on  the  questions  with  which  it  has  to 
deal,  it  is  essential  that  it  should  receive  all  advice  on  matters 
concerning  military  operations  through  one  authoritative 
channel  only.  With  us  that  channel  must  be  the  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff.  It  is  his  function,  so  far  as  regards 
military  operations,  to  present  to  the  War  Council  his  reasoned 
opinion  as  to  the  military  effect  of  the  policy  which  they  pro- 
pose, and  as  to  the  means  of  putting  this  approved  policy  into 
execution.  The  War  Council  are  then  free  to  accept  or  reject 
the  reasoned  advice  so  offered. 

Advice  regarding  military  operations  emanating  from 
members  of  the  Cabinet,  or  of  the  War  Council  in  their  indi- 
vidual capacity,  or  from  any  other  individual,  should  be 
sifted,  examined,  and  presented,  if  necessary  with  reasoned 
conclusions,  to  the  War  Council  by  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff  before  it  is  accepted  by  the  War  Council. 

(III.)  All  orders  for  the  military  operations  required  to 
put  into  execution  the  policy  approved  by  the  War  Council 
should  be  issued  and  signed  by  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  under  the  authority  of  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War,  not  under  that  of  the  Army  Council.  Similarly,  all 
communications  from  General  Officers  Commanding  regarding 
military  operations  should  be  addressed  to  the  Chief  of  the 
Imperial  General  Staff.  In  fact,  the  same  procedure  is 
required  in  London  as  obtains  in  the  field — the  War  Council 
being   in   the   position   of   the   Commander-in-Chief  of  the 

1  The  constitution  of  this  War  Council,  or  War  Committee,  is  described 
on  p.  253. 


MEMORANDUM  TO  LORD  KITCHENER       241 

whole  of  the  Imperial  Land  Forces,  and,  with  the  War 
Office  Staff,  constituting  the  Great  General  Headquarters 
of  the  Empire. 

(IV.)  The  adoption  of  this  system  by  which  communica- 
tions regarding  military  operations  are  issued  and  received  by 
the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  wiU  greatly  expedite 
the  despatch  of  business,  and  will  help  to  preserve  greater 
secrecy  than  now  prevails. 

Instances  have  occurred  in  the  war  of  the  contents  of  the 
most  important  documents  becoming  public  property  within 
a  few  days.  Than  this  nothing  could  be  more  harmful  to  the 
conduct  of  the  war.  It  would  be  for  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff  to  give  orders  as  to  the  reproduction  and  dis- 
tribution of  these  communications,  and  he  would  of  course  be 
responsible  for  seeing  that  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War  and 
the  War  Council  receive  at  all  times  full  information  of  all 
that  they  should  know. 

(V.)  The  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  must  be  free 
to  devote  his  entire  time  to  the  duties  above  indicated,  and 
have  sufficient  leisure  to  think  quietly  out  the  many  difficult 
problems  which  are  continually  arising,  and  also  to  keep  him- 
self thoroughly  fit  in  mind  and  body.  He  must  therefore  be 
relieved  as  far  as  possible  of  War  Office  routine  duties.  To  do 
this  the  Assistant  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  should 
become  a  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  with 
authority  to  represent,  as  and  when  necessary,  the  Chief  of 
the  Imperial  General  Staff  in  all  Army  Council  business. 

(VI.)  The  number  of  General  Officers  Commanding  with 
which  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  should  deal 
should  not  exceed  the  number  which  experience  shows  to  be 
possible — about  half-a-dozen. 

For  this  it  is  necessary  that  a  General  Officer  Commanding- 
in-Chief  should  be  appointed  to  the  Command  of  the  Home 
Forces  or  those  in  Great  Britain,  as  may  be  deemed  best,  his 
position  being  exactly  similar  to,  say,  that  of  the  General 
Officer  Commanding-in-Chief  in  France,  except  that  the 
present  system  of  administration  need  not  be  disturbed.  He 
would  also  be  responsible  for  Home  Defence,  the  troops  for 
this  purpose  being  allocated,  of  course,  under  instructions 
issued  by  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  as  in  all 
other  cases — vide  para  (III.). 

I  need  not  go  more  fully  into  my  reasons  for  the  above  pro- 
posals, as  I  am  sure  they  will  be  obvious  to  you.  It  is  of  para- 
mount importance  in  war  that  there  should  be  a  definite  plan  of 
operations,  and  that  that  plan  should  be  carried  out  with  prompt- 

R 


242        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ness  and  decision.  It  is  impossible  that  this  should  be  so  if  the 
War  Council  is  itself  compelled  to  listen  to  conflicting  advice, 
and  to  decide  between  the  merits  of  rival  experts.  It  is  equally 
impossible  that  this  should  be  so  if  the  War  Council  has  to  submit 
its  plan  for  the  conduct  of  the  war  to  the  approval  of  the  whole 
Cabinet.  The  War  Council  is  now  conducting  military  opera- 
tions in  a  number  of  separate  theatres  of  war,  and  has  control  of 
large  reserves  which  may  be  thrown  into  one  theatre  or  another. 
France  has  no  reserves  left,  therefore  the  decision  as  to  the 
future  conduct  of  the  war  by  the  Western  Allies  rests  in  great 
measure  with  the  War  Council.  It  is  vital  then  that  it  should 
possess  the  machinery  both  to  come  to  timely  decisions  and  to 
have  its  decisions  executed. 

My  proposals  seem  to  necessitate  some  modifications  of  the 
Orders  in  Council  which  lay  down  the  constitution  of  the  Army 
Council  and  the  duties  of  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff. 
If  that  is  so  those  Orders  should  be  amended  for  the  period  of  the 
war.  They  were  never  intended,  I  suppose,  to  meet  a  situation 
such  as  now  exists,  and  they  certainly  do  not  meet  it. 

I  hope  you  will  not  think  that  I  have  any  desire  to  make  a 
bargain  for  myself,  but  I  feel  strongly  that  I  cannot  serve  the 
War  Council  and  my  King  and  country  as  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff  unless  the  above  conditions  are  fulfilled.  It  is  my 
conviction  that  the  system  by  which  the  war  has  been  conducted 
hitherto  has  been  such  as  to  make  victory  very  difficult  indeed, 
if  not  impossible.  Having  no  faith  in  it  I  could  not  do  justice 
to  it,  and  therefore  if  my  proposals  cannot  be  accepted  you 
would  be  better  advised  to  select  an  officer  who  sees  in  the  exist- 
ing system  a  possible  means  of  bringing  this  war  to  a  successful 
conclusion. 

I  hope,  however,  that  the  proposals  may  not  be  considered 
unacceptable,  and  that  they  will  be  adopted  whoever  may  fill 
the  post  of  Chief  of  the  Imperial  Staff.  If  the  appointment  were 
offered  to  me,  I  should  have  to  make  a  few  alterations  in  the 
General  Staff  organisation  at  the  War  Office,  and  would  wish  to 
replace  two  or  three  officers  by  officers  from  this  country, 

I  need  not  trouble  you  with  these  alterations  except  to  say 
that: 

The  Directorate  of  Home  Defence  and  part  of  the  Training 
Directorate  would  be  handed  over  to  the  staff  of  the  General 
Officer  Commanding-in-Chief,  Home  Forces,  as  his  staff.  The 
remaining  part  of  the  Training  Directorate  would  be  placed  in  the 
Staff  Duties  Directorate. 

One  of  these  two  Directors  could  be  abolished. 

The  D.M.O.  Branch  would  be  divided  into  the  two  Direc- 
torates of  "  Operations  "  and  "  Intelligence." 


"  OUR  BARGAIN  "  243 

The  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  would  then  have  to 
deal  with  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff,  Director  of 
Operations,  and  Director  of  Intelligence.  The  Director  of  Staff 
Duties  would  be  under  the  Deputy  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff. 

I  enclose  a  duplicate  copy  of  this  letter,  which  I  hope  you  will 
send  to  the  Prime  Minister  should  it  ever  be  contemplated  to 
offer  me  the  appointment  of  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff. — 
Believe  me,  yours  sincerely, 

W.  R.  Robertson. 

On  the  27th  of  January  19 16  the  new  method  of  issuing 
operation  orders  was  authorised  in  the  following  Order  in 
Council  : 

The  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  shall,  in  addition  to 
performing  such  other  duties  as  may  from  time  to  time  be 
assigned  to  him  under  the  Order  in  Council,  dated  the  loth 
August  1914,  be  responsible  for  issuing  the  orders  of  the  Govern- 
ment in  regard  to  Military  Operations. 

During  the  time  we  worked  together  Lord  Kitchener 
would  sometimes  refer  to  the  memorandum  as  "  our  bargain," 
and  would  ask  his  personal  staff  whether  he  was  carrying 
his  part  of  it  out,  thus  showing  a  genuine  desire  to  make 
everything  go  smoothly.  For  myself  I  never  had  occasion 
to  give  it  another  thought,  and  I  shall  always  regret  that 
the  unfounded  gossip  to  which  I  have  alluded  caused  me  to 
misjudge  him,  even  though  temporarily,  and  so  add  to 
the  cares  and  anxieties  he  was  then  carrying,  alone  and 
unaided  save  by  those  loyal  friends  who  really  knew  and 
appreciated  him.  I  shall  say  more  on  this  point  in  the 
next  chapter. 

To  assist  me  in  forming  a  proper  general  headquarters 
in  London  I  took  home  Whigham  as  my  deputy  and  Maurice 
as  Director  of  Operations.  The  faithful  Lucas  accompanied 
me  as  a  matter  of  course.  I  was  sorry  to  have  to  move 
these  officers  from  France,  for  besides  condemning  them  to 
uncongenial  work  in  London  it  meant  placing  them,  in 
comparison  with  their  contemporaries  at  the  front,  at  a 
distinct  disadvantage  with  regard  to  their  prospects  of 
advancement.  But  like  the  good  feUows  they  are  they  made 
no  wry  faces,  and  expressed  their  willingness  to  go  wherever 


244        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

I  thought  they  could  best  help  me  and  be  of  most  use  to 
the  State. 

My  eldest  son  Brian,  who  had  come  to  France  as  my 
second  aide-de-camp  in  May,  six  months  after  passing  into 
the  Royal  Engineers  from  the  Royal  Military  Academy,  I 
left  behind  with  his  corps.  He  was  afterwards  employed  as 
aide-de-camp  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  and  then  on  the  General 
Staff  of  the  XI.  Corps,  where  he  won  the  good  opinion  of 
his  corps  commander,  Haking.  He  then  served  to  the  end 
of  hostilities  as  an  infantry  brigade-major  under  Brigadier- 
General  James.  I  am  proud  to  feel  that  his  services  in  the 
war  were  considered  sufficiently  meritorious  to  justify  the 
award  first  of  the  Military  Cross  and  later  of  the  Dis- 
tinguished Service  Order,  a  decoration  which  I  myself  had 
been  awarded  some  twenty-five  years  before. 

I  also  left  my  chauffeur,  Reginald  Settle,  in  France. 
Educated  at  a  pubUc  school  previous  to  joining  his  father's 
business,  he  volunteered  early  in  the  war  and  had  driven 
my  Rolls  Royce  since  the  autumn  of  19 14.  He  was  devoted 
to  his  car — which  he  would  allow  no  one  else  to  touch — 
and  also  to  myself  ;  and  he  wished  to  accompany  me  home 
so  as  to  continue  driving  me  to  the  end  of  the  war.  This 
duty,  as  it  would  be  in  London,  was  not  however  quite 
suitable  to  a  young  man  of  his  attainments  and  upbringing, 
and  therefore  I  decided  to  leave  him  behind.  He  was  a 
clean-living,  attractive  boy,  and  his  death  at  the  front  a 
few  weeks  later,  after  receiving  a  commission,  was  a  heavy 
blow  to  his  parents.  His  only  brother  died  in  a  French 
hospital  at  Mayence  shortly  after  the  armistice. 

Settle  was  succeeded  by  Corporal  Carthews,  another 
good  driver  and  loyal  servant,  who  remained  with  me  until 
his  death  from  a  sudden  attack  of  influenza  in  1918. 

Whilst  at  G.H.Q.  in  France  I  always  found  the  French 
General  Staff  most  friendly  and  helpful,  and  think  that 
the  relations  between  the  two  staffs  could  hardly  have 
been  better.  This  was  largely  due  to  the  French  Chief  of 
the  General  Staff,  General  Pelle,  with  whom  it  was  always 
easy  and  pleasant  to  work.  On  the  day  of  my  departure 
from  France  I  received  the  following  letter  from  General 
Joffrc  : 


Marshal  JoFFRE  conversing  with  some  French  officers  at  Cologne,  1919. 


LETTER  FROM  JOFFRE         245 

22  dec.  1915. 

MoN  CHER  GEN:i;RAL — Je  suis  tres  louche  des  sentiments  que 
vous  m'exprimez  au  moment  ou  vous  quittez  la  France  pour 
prendre  les  fonctions  de  Chef  d'£tat-Major  Imperial  au  War  Office. 

J'ai  ete  tres  heureux  de  votre  nomination  a  ce  poste,  parce 
que  je  suis  certain  que  vous  y  emploierez  au  benefice  de  la  cause 
commune  les  hautes  qualites  dont  vous  avez  fait  preuve  comme 
Chef  d'fitat-Major  des  Troupes  Britanniques  en  France. 

La  cordialite  de  nos  relations  anterieures  m'est  un  sur  garant 
que  I'accord  sera  toujours  de  plus  en  plus  intime  entre  nos 
armees  alliees  et  nul  mieux  que  vous  n'etait  qualifie  pour  assurer 
en  AngleteiTe  la  coordination  de  nos  efforts. 

Agreez,  mon  cher  General,  I'cLssurance  de  mes  sentiments  les 
plus  devoues. 

J.  JOFFRE. 

{Translation. 

I  highly  appreciate  the  sentiments  that  you  have  been 
good  enough  to  convey  to  me  at  the  time  when  you  are  leaving 
France  to  take  up  the  duties  of  Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff  at  the  War  Office. 

Your  nomination  to  this  post  gives  me  great  pleasure,  for  I 
feel  sure  that  you  will  display  in  it  to  the  benefit  of  the  common 
cause  the  same  high  quahties  as  those  of  which  you  have  given 
proof  while  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  with  the  British  Army  in 
France. 

The  cordiaHty  of  our  relations  in  the  past  is  a  safe  guarantee 
that  the  mutual  understanding  between  our  two  armies  will 
become  still  closer,  and  no  one  is  better  quahfied  than  yourself 
to  ensure  in  England  the  co-ordination  of  our  efforts. 

Pray  accept,  my  dear  General,  the  assurance  of  my  sincere 
respect. 

J.   JOFFRE.] 


CHAPTER  XV 

CHIEF  OF  THE  IMPERIAL  GENERAL  STAFF,  I916 

General  situation  in  all  theatres — Reorganisation  of  the  General  Staff — 
Position  of  C.I.G.S. — Relations  with  Joffre,  Cadorna,  and  Alexeieff 
— War  Council  and  War  Cabinet — Relations  between  Ministers  and 
their  professional  advisers — Proposed  war  poUcy  approved  by 
Cabinet  —  Send  instructions  to  Commanders-in-Chief  —  Steps  to 
improve  training  and  organisation  of  troops  at  home  and  abroad — 
Home  Defence^India  and  India  Office  responsible  for  Mesopotamia 
— Need  for  comprehensive  plan  for  utilising  man-power — Cabinet 
Committee  set  up  to  deal  with  the  question— Lord  Kitchener  and 
Compulsory  Service — Many  people  objected  to  it — Problem  of  pro- 
viding officers — Production  of  tanks — Evacuation  of  GalUpoh — 
Operations  in  Mesopotamia — Campaign  is  handed  over  to  the  War 
Office — Fall  of  Kut-el-Amara — Appointment  of  Maude  as  Com- 
mander-in-Chief— His  successes — Operations  in  Egypt  and  Mace- 
donia— Disadvantages  of  employing  armies  of  mixed  nationalities — 
East  Africa — Smuts  and  Van  Dewenter — Operations  on  the  West 
Front — Situation  at  the  end  of  the  year — Ministers'  dissatisfaction 
— Tendency  to  try  new  methods  and  plans — Joffre  superseded  by 
Nivelle  as  Commander-in-Chief  of  French  armies — His  plan  for 
1917  rejected  by  Governments  in  favour  of  Nivelle's  plan — My 
relations  with  Joffre — Change  of  Government — My  relations  with 
Lord  Kitchener — The  part  he  played  in  the  war. 

I  TOOK  up  the  post  of  C.I.G.S.  (Chief  of  the  Imperial  General 
Staff)  with  a  profound  sense  of  anxiety,  as  I  realised  that 
the  amount  of  work  to  be  done  was  enormous  and  without 
precedent,  and  that  many  things  would  be  expected  of  me 
with  which  I  had  had  no  previous  dealings,  for  I  had  not 
only  to  organise  the  armies  and  superintend  their  strategi- 
cal employment  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment, but  also  to  make  myself  acquainted  with  numerous 
matters,  great  and  small,  which  affected  almost  every 
branch  of  the  life  of  the  nation.  Moreover,  it  was  impressed 
upon  me  by  several  public  men  and  others,  especially  after 
the  death  of  Lord  Kitchener,  that  the  country  looked  to 
me  to  show  the  way  to  victory,  and  the  feeling  of  this 

246 


THE  GENERAL  SITUATION  247 

responsibility  never  left  me  for  an  instant.  A  heavier 
burden  could  hardly  have  rested  on  the  shoulders  of  any 
man,  and  I  could  only  hope  that  I  might  be  given  the 
strength  and  wisdom  to  carry  it  fearlessly  and  efficiently. 
I  am  thankful  to  remember  that,  notwithstanding  many 
disappointments,  I  never  once  felt  or  expressed,  privately 
or  officially,  any  doubt  as  to  our  ability  to  win,  provided 
the  Government,  supported  by  the  people,  put  into  the 
war  what  war  has  always  required — adequate  men,  material, 
and  moral  resolution, — and  put  them  in  at  the  right  time 
and  in  the  right  place. 

Though  not  so  immediately  critical  as  in  the  spring  of 
1918,  the  general  military  situation  at  the  end  of  1915  was 
darker  and  more  complicated  than  at  any  period  of  the 
war.  Russia  had  suffered  crushing  defeats  at  the  hand  of 
Mackensen,  losing  heavily  in  men,  territory,  and  morale, 
and  whether  she  would  be  able  to  recover  from  them  suffi- 
ciently to  be  of  effective  assistance  to  the  Allies  in  the 
future  was  at  least  doubtful.  The  Itahan  armies  seemed 
unable  to  make  material  progress  in  expelling  the  Austrians 
from  their  positions  beyond  the  Isonzo.  On  the  West  Front 
no  tangible  results  could  as  yet  be  shown  in  return  for  the 
great  expenditure  of  life  incurred.  Servia  had  been  over- 
run, the  remnants  of  her  army  driven  out  of  the  country, 
and  the  Anglo-French  forces  sent  out  too  late  to  help  her 
were  now  opposed  by  strong  hostile  forces  in  front,  had  an 
uncertain  neutral  on  their  flanks,  and  were  left  with  no 
better  objective  than  the  passive  defence  of  Salonika.  The 
Dardanelles  operations  had  been  partially  abandoned  as  a 
failure,  Anzac  and  Suvla  having  already  been  evacuated, 
and  the  remaining  troops  were  clinging  to  Cape  Helles 
pending  a  decision  as  to  whether  they  were  to  remain 
there  or  come  away.  On  the  western  frontier  of  Egypt 
the  Senussi  tribesmen  had  established  themselves  within 
striking  distance  of  the  Nile  valley ;  in  the  Sudan  there 
were  signs  of  trouble  with  the  Sultan  of  Darfur,  who  had 
been  approached  by  Turkish  agents  ;  and  on  the  east 
the  Turks  were  in  possession  of  the  Sinai  Peninsula,  and 
were  being  promised  German  support  in  an  attack  on  Egypt 
from  that  side,  thus  endangering  the  most  vital  of  our 


248        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Imperial  communications — the  Suez  Canal.  In  Mesopotamia 
an  Anglo-Indian  force  under  Major-General  Townshend, 
inadequate  in  strength  and  imperfectly  organised,  had 
retreated  from  Ctesiphon  after  the  abortive  attempt  to 
capture  Baghdad,  and  since  the  beginning  of  December 
had  been  besieged  by  a  considerable  Turkish  army  at  Kut- 
el-Amara.  Thus  the  "  one  bright  spot  on  the  military 
horizon,"  as  Baghdad  was  thought  to  be  by  certain  people 
only  a  few  weeks  before,  had  receded  so  far  into  space  as 
to  be  whoUy  invisible.  In  East  Africa  we  were  unable  to 
defend  our  territory,  and  British  prestige  was  at  its  lowest 
ebb. 

As  regards  our  own  share  in  bringing  about  this  state  of 
affairs  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  that  every  mistake  we 
had  made  in  our  wars  with  France  more  than  a  hundred 
years  before  had  been  repeated.  We  had  committed  our- 
selves to  expeditions,  on  a  vast  scale  and  in  remote  theatres, 
which  were  strategically  unsound,  had  never  been  properly 
thought  out,  and  in  the  Dardanelles  alone  had  already  cost 
us  considerably  over  100,000  casualties.  The  false  direction 
thus  given  to  our  strategy  imperilled  the  chances  of  ultimate 
success,  and  at  the  best  was  bound  to  hang  like  a  millstone 
round  our  necks  for  the  remainder  of  the  war — as  it  did. 

It  is  one  of  the  first  principles  of  war  that  all  available 
resources  should  be  concentrated  at  the  "  decisive  "  point 
— that  is,  at  the  place  where  the  main  decision  of  the  war 
is  to  be  fought  out.  There  may  be  a  difference  of  opinion 
as  to  where  that  point  should  be,  but  there  should  never 
be  more  than  one  such  point  at  a  time,  and  once  the  selection 
is  made,  no  departure  from  the  principle  just  mentioned  is 
admissible  except  (a)  when  it  becomes  necessary  to  detach 
troops  for  the  protection  of  interests  vital  to  oneself,  for 
example  the  Suez  Canal ;  or  {b)  when  by  detaching  them 
the  enemy  will  be  compelled  as  a  coimter-measure  to  send 
a  still  larger  detachment  in  order  to  protect  interests  which 
are  vital  to  him.  This  principle,  as  old  as  the  hills,  had  been 
inexcusably  violated  in  1914-15,  and  however  much  we 
might  afterwards  try  to  mitigate  the  evils  resulting  therefrom 
they  could  never  be  entirely  removed. 

But  there  was  another  side   to  the  picture.     In  spite 


CHANGES  AT  THE  WAR  OFFICE  249 

of  losses  and  unfulfilled  expectations  the  people  of  the 
Empire  remained  solid  in  their  determination  to  see  the 
war  through  to  a  successful  conclusion,  cost  what  it 
might,  and  so  long  as  this  spirit  continued  there  was  no 
reason  for  despair  in  the  minds  of  their  leaders  and 
servants.  That  it  would  continue  no  one  had  the  right  to 
doubt,  and  whenever  the  outlook  was  black  and  the  prospects 
of  victory  seemed  remote,  or  even  threatened  to  disappear 
altogether,  renewed  hope  and  strength  could  always  be 
derived  from  a  justifiable  belief  in  the  steadfastness  of 
the  British  race.  This  belief  was  many  times  confirmed  in 
1916  and  1917  by  letters  which  I  received  from  private 
persons  and  public  bodies  expressing  confidence  in  the 
General  Staff  and  showing  a  firm  resolution  to  win.  Much 
encouragement  was  also  given  by  individual  public  men 
who  promised  to  support  the  General  Staff  to  the  full 
extent  of  their  power  in  the  measures  recommended  for 
prosecuting  the  war. 

The  first  thing  required  of  me  was  to  give  the  General 
Staff  at  the  War  Office  an  organisation  similar  to  that  at 
G.H.Q.  in  France,  though  on  a  more  extensive  scale,  and 
then  hope  that,  as  a  result  of  its  increased  usefulness,  the 
Government  would  accord  to  it  that  position  in  the  direction 
of  the  war  which  a  General  Staff  at  Great  Headquarters  is 
intended  to  fill. 

The  reforms  commenced  with  the  room  assigned  for  my 
own  use  in  the  War  Office,  the  first  and  only  day  spent  in 
it  being  quite  the  most  exasperating  day  of  my  life.  The 
telephone,  which  I  have  always  detested,  rang  incessantly, 
and  a  constant  stream  of  people  of  both  sexes  and  all  grades 
— girl  typists,  wives  of  officers,  members  of  parliament, 
boy-scout  messengers,  general  officers — entered  the  room, 
one  after  another,  unannounced,  either  to  see  me  on  some 
trivial  matter  or  some  one  else  whose  room  they  thought  it 
was.  To  attempt  to  work  under  such  maddening  conditions 
was  worse  than  useless.  Lucas  realised  the  position  as  well 
as  I  did,  and  by  nine  o'clock  next  morning  he  had  taken 
possession  of  another  room  for  me,  from  which  all  telephone 
apparatus  was  expelled,  and  access  to  which  could  only 
be  gained  through  an  anteroom  where  he  or  my  private 


250         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

secretary  kept  constant  guard  so  that  I  might  be  left  in 
peace. 

I  have  described  in  the  preceding  chapter  the  new  system 
sanctioned  by  which  the  C.I.G.S.,  instead  of  the  Army 
Council  as  a  whole,  became  responsible  for  the  issue  of 
operation  orders,  and,  as  bearing  upon  this,  I  may  now 
explain  the  change  made  in  his  status  vis-d-vis  the  other 
military  members  of  the  Council.  When  the  Council  was 
first  formed  in  1904  the  military  members  were  given 
precedence  amongst  themselves  according  to  their  appoint- 
ments, the  C.I.G.S.  being  First  Military  Member,  the  Adjutant- 
General  second,  and  so  on.  This  system  had  been  altered 
during  the  war,  precedence  being  taken  according  to  seniority 
of  rank,  and  on  arrival  at  the  War  Office  I  occupied  the  third 
place.  I  represented  to  Lord  Kitchener  that  while  I  did 
not  care  two  straws  personally  what  place  was  allotted  to 
me,  I  was  in  fact  chief  military  adviser  to  the  Government, 
and  that  in  other  respects  the  system  was  illogical  and 
ought  to  be  replaced  by  the  original  one.  He  did  not 
agree,  taking  the  view  that  one  member  was  as  necessary 
to  the  constitution  of  the  Council  as  another,  and  there- 
fore that  each  was  entitled,  subject  to  seniority  of  rank,  to 
be  recognised  as  the  First  Member.  I  objected  that  this 
could  not  work  in  practice,  since,  for  example,  it  was  for 
the  C.I.G.S.  to  lay  down,  in  conformity  with  the  policy  of 
the  Government,  where  troops  were  to  be  sent,  and  it  then 
became  the  duty  of  the  Quartermaster-General  to  send  their 
food  there.  It  was  not  for  the  Quartermaster-General  to 
lay  down  the  place  where  food  would  be  sent,  and  then  for 
the  C.I.G.S.  to  send  troops  there  to  eat  it.  This  rough  and 
exaggerated  illustration  of  conducting  the  Council's  business 
had  effect,  and  as  he  disliked  going  back  on  the  system  but 
recently  set  up,  he  naively  settled  the  matter  by  promoting 
me  "  temporary  "  General.  As  this  was  a  higher  rank  than 
that  held  by  any  other  Councillor  it  automatically  made  me 
First  Member. 

With  respect  to  the  distribution  of  duties  as  between 
the  different  members  of  the  General  Staff  I  separated  the 
Operations  and  Intelligence  Directorate  into  two,  as  I  had 
done  in  France,  Maurice  taking  charge  of  the  Operations, 


SIR  CHARLES  CALLWELL  251 

and  Callwell  retaining  the  Intelligence.  I  was  lucky  to 
find  Callwell  in  the  department,  as  he  was  most  helpful  in 
making  me  acquainted  with  the  situation  in  the  various 
theatres  of  war,  and  with  numerous  other  current  questions 
about  which  I  naturally  knew  little  or  nothing.  He  had 
joined  the  General  Staff  from  the  retired  list  at  the  beginning 
of  the  war,  having  previously  had  many  years'  experience 
in  it,  and  I  shudder  to  think  what  I  would  have  done  during 
the  first  few  harassing  weeks  of  my  time  as  C.I.G.S.  had 
I  not  had  the  benefit  of  his  assistance.  Later  on  he  was 
succeeded  by  Macdonogh,  whom  I  thought  it  best  to  bring 
back  from  G.H.Q.  in  France  so  as  to  utilise  the  knowledge 
he  had  acquired  of  that  all-important  front  as  chief  of  the 
Intelligence  since  1914.  Whigham,  my  deputy,  had  charge 
of  all  General  Staff  work  not  included  in  Operations  and 
Intelligence,  and  acted  for  me  at  Army  Council  meetings, 
as  on  all  other  occasions,  when  I  could  not  be  present. 
Brigadier-General  Bird  was  Director  of  Staff  Duties  and 
Brigadier-General  Cockerill  Deputy  Director  of  Intelligence, 
and  amongst  the  numerous  other  officers  employed  were 
Kirke,  Bartholomew,  Ellington,  Earl  Percy  (now  Duke  of 
Northumberland),  and  Butler  (a  New  Army  officer  and  son 
of  the  late  Master  of .  Trinity  College,  Cambridge)  in  the 
Operations  branch,  and  Buckley,  French,  KeU,  and  Cox  in 
the  Intelligence. 

The  method  of  dealing  with  the  receipt  and  despatch 
of  official  letters  and  telegrams  connected  with  the  employ- 
ment of  the  field  armies  was  next  taken  in  hand.  According 
to  the  existing  procedure — the  old  peace  procedure  and 
quite  unsuitable  for  war — all  communications  arriving  at 
the  War  Office  were  received  and  distributed,  some  of  them 
first  being  printed,  by  the  civil  staff  of  the  Secretary's 
department.  They  poured  in  by  hundreds  daily  and 
referred  to  every  imaginable  subject,  from  a  demand  for 
more  socks  to  the  dispositions  of  whole  armies.  The  depart- 
ment did  its  work  manfully,  and  so  far  as  concerned  the 
socks  and  the  multitude  of  other  things  required  by  the 
troops  the  system  was  probably  a  good  one,  but  for  the 
direction  of  military  operations  in  face  of  the  enemy  it  was 
impossible.     Communications  on  this  subject  must  reach 


252        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  General  Staff  without  a  moment's  delay,  pass  through 
as  few  hands  as  possible,  and  be  distributed  to  such  persons 
as  the  trained  officers  of  the  General  Staff  can  alone  decide. 
With  the  concurrence  of  the  Secretary,  Sir  Reginald  Brade, 
the  system  was  so  modified  as  to  secure  these  results,  and 
I  formed  a  small  section  within  the  General  Staff  itself  for 
dealing  with  the  receipt  and  disposal  of  all  telegrams  and 
other  important  communications  of  a  General  Staff  nature. 

These  and  other  measures  made  the  General  Staff  a  live 
organisation,  caused  it  to  be  recognised  as  the  Great  General 
Staff  of  the  armies  in  the  field,  and  enabled  it  to  furnish 
the  Government  with  considered  advice  on  important 
military  questions,  so  that  whether  the  advice  were  accepted 
or  not  ministers  would  be  made  aware  of  the  probable 
military  effect  of  their  decisions. 

For  the  purpose  of  keeping  each  other  informed  on 
matters  with  which  we  were  mutually  concerned,  I  had 
officers  at  the  headquarters  of  Joffre,  Cadorna,  and  Alexeieff 
respectively,  and  they  had  their  representatives  with  me 
in  London.  Brigadier-Generals  Yarde-Buller,  Give  and 
Delme-Radcliffe,  and  other  officers  were  employed  on 
this  duty  in  France  and  Italy.  Mainly  as  a  result  of 
their  good  work  and  friendly  relations  with  the  French 
and  Italian  staffs,  there  was  always  a  complete  under- 
standing with  those  two  countries.  With  Russia  it  was 
not  equally  satisfactory,  although  the  representatives  at 
both  ends  did  their  best  to  make  it  so.  There  were 
several  reasons  for  this.  Alexeieff  and  I  were  strangers  to 
each  other  and  so  were  our  staffs  ;  I  could  not  meet  him, 
as  I  frequently  could  Joffre  and  Cadorna,  and  discuss 
matters  personally ;  he  was  inclined  to  press  for  more 
British  divisions  being  sent  to  the  eastern  theatres,  includ- 
ing co-operation  with  his  forces  in  Armenia,  which  was  at 
variance  with  my  views  ;  and  he  never  seemed  able  to 
appreciate  the  tax  imposed  by  long-distance  operations 
on  our  already  overstrained  naval  and  shipping  resources. 
Twice  during  1916  I  sent  Callwell  to  explain  these  and 
similar  questions  to  him,  and  to  some  extent  he  was  success- 
ful in  clearing  up  points  of  difference,  while  my  permanent 
representatives  also  achieved  something  in  the  same  direc- 


THE  WAR  CABINET  253 

tion,  but  the  understanding  was  never  as  complete  and  stable 
as  with  France  and  Italy.  It  could  not  possibly  be  so,  for 
although  Alexeieff  sincerely  desired  to  work  in  close  accord 
with  the  British  General  Staff,  and  to  the  best  of  my  know- 
ledge with  all  the  Entente  armies,  he  had,  over  and  above 
the  disadvantages  just  indicated,  to  contend  with  a  very 
difficult  situation  in  his  own  country,  which  daily  became 
worse  until  it  ended  in  the  revolution  of  1917. 

The  machinery  employed  by  the  Government  for  the 
supreme  conduct  of  naval  and  military  operations  consisted, 
at  the  commencement  of  the  war,  of  the  Cabinet  of  some 
twenty  odd  members,  aided  by  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence,  and  with  the  Admiralty  and  War  Office  acting  as 
its  executive  agents.  Later,  the  Committee  of  Imperial 
Defence  gave  place  to  a  War  Council  composed  of  certain 
selected  ministers,  with  the  Prime  Minister  as  Chairman ; 
this,  in  its  turn,  afterwards  became  known  as  the  Dardanelles 
Committee  ;  and,  finally,  the  latter  was  replaced  by  a  War 
Committee.  The  last-named  was  in  existence  when  I  be- 
came C.I.G.S.,  and,  as  I  had  said  to  Lord  Kitchener  in  my 
letter  of  the  5th  December  (reproduced  in  the  preceding 
chapter),  it  was  not  well  adapted  to  ensure  decisions  being 
promptly  reached,  for,  notwithstanding  some  delegation  of 
its  powers  to  the  War  Committee,  the  Cabinet  still  seemed  to 
be  regarded  as  the  supreme  authority  to  whom  the  more  im- 
portant questions  should  be  referred  before  action  was  taken. 

When  Mr.  Lloyd  George  became  Prime  Minister  in 
December  1916  the  old-time  Cabinet  and  its  War  Com- 
mittee both  disappeared,  and,  following  much  the  same 
principles  as  I  had  suggested  in  my  letter  to  Lord  Kit- 
chener, a  War  Cabinet  of  six  or  seven  members  assumed 
unrestricted  control  over  the  war-business  of  the  nation. 
From  a  military  standpoint — and  leaving  out  of  account 
the  constitutional  aspect  of  the  question,  about  which  I 
express  no  opinion — the  change  was  welcome,  if  only  for 
the  reason  that  six  men  could  be  trusted  to  give  a  de- 
cision in  less  time  than  a  score  would  ;  but  my  experience 
leads  me  to  add  that  the  War  Cabinet  did  not  by  any 
means  provide  a  complete  remedy  for  the  evils  from  which 
its  predecessor  had  suffered.     Most  of  its  members  were 


254        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ministers  without  portfolios,  and  having  Httle  if  any  first- 
hand knowledge  of  the  questions  with  which  they  had  to 
deal  they  were  necessarily  dependent  upon  those  ministers 
who  had  it.  Consequently  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War, 
the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  and  the  Foreign  Secretary, 
none  of  whom  were  members  of  the  War  Cabinet,  usually 
had  to  attend  once  a  day  when  meetings  were  held,  while 
other  ministers,  such  as  the  Secretary  of  State  for  India, 
the  Shipping  Controller,  the  Minister  of  Labour,  the  Minister 
of  the  Air,  and  the  Minister  of  Munitions,  had  also  frequently 
to  be  summoned.  The  result  was  that  the  total  number 
present  was  often  not  much  less,  and  was  sometimes  more, 
than  under  the  old  system,  and  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  this 
could  have  been  prevented,  for  whether  the  heads  of  the 
various  State  departments  do  or  do  not  permanently  belong 
to  the  body  charged  with  the  supreme  direction  of  a 
war,  they  must  be  called  in  when  important  questions 
concerning  their  departments  are  being  considered.  The 
fact  is  that  in  a  great  war  such  as  that  of  1914-18  the 
ramifications  of  the  numerous  problems  which  arise  are  so 
widespread  that  the  rapid  despatch  of  business  must  always 
be  exceedingly  difficult  to  achieve. 

In  1916,  and  throughout  1914-18  for  that  matter,  there 
was  much  public  criticism  of  the  way  in  which  the  Govern- 
ment was  conducting  the  war,  and  it  was  difficult  to  keep 
clear  of  the  poHtical  controversies  which  arose,  though  I 
persistently  strove  to  give  them  a  wide  berth.  To  me  it 
was  of  no  interest  how  the  Government  was  composed  so 
long  as  the  army  got  what  it  wanted,  and  was  not  asked 
to  undertake  unsound  and  impracticable  operations.  This 
seemed  the  proper  attitude  for  a  soldier  to  take  up,  though 
perhaps  it  was  unwise  of  me  to  disclose  it  as  openly  as  I 
did.  Since  the  end  of  the  last  century  the  professional 
careers  of  senior  officers  of  the  army  have  passed  by  degrees 
entirely  into  the  hands  of  ministers,  and,  however  necessary 
this  system  may  be,  the  consequence  of  it  is  that,  if  an 
officer  holding  a  high  position  shows  that  he  has  no  political 
leanings  one  way  or  the  other,  he  may  find  himself  without 
friends  in  any  political  party  and  be  suspected  by  all. 

It  goes  without  saying  that  professional  advisers  sliould 


THE  PROFESSIONAL  ADVISER  255 

try  their  hardest  to  meet  the  wishes  of  ministers,  but  the 
doctrine  is  easier  stated  than  practised.  In  war,  especially 
in  a  long  war,  things  do  not  proceed  on  simple  and  smooth 
lines,  but  bristle  with  knots  and  thorns  to  an  extent  quite 
unknown  to  those  who  have  not  experienced  them.  Profes- 
sional advisers  are  the  servants  of  the  Government,  and 
there  would  be  an  end  of  parUamentary  government  if  they 
were  able  to  override  Government  policy.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  time  may  come  when  a  policy  is  proposed  which 
they  feel  convinced  will,  if  pursued,  have  disastrous  results, 
and  they  then  have  to  choose  between  acquiescing  in  it, 
thereby  jeopardising  the  interests  of  the  nation,  and  sajdng 
in  unmistakable  terms  that  they  can  be  no  party  to  it. 
More  than  once  when  confronted  with  this  dilemma  I  felt 
it  my  duty  to  adopt  the  second  alternative. 

In  peace  time  differences  of  opinion  may  be  allowed  to  go 
by  the  board  without  great  harm  being  done,  as  it  may  be 
possible  to  adjust  them  at  a  more  convenient  season.  In 
war  the  case  is  different — chickens  remorselessly  and  rapidly 
come  home  to  roost,  errors  can  seldom  be  rectified  (the  enemy 
will  see  to  that),  and  men's  lives  are  at  stake. 

A  minister  once  tried  in  the  course  of  conversation  to 
persuade  me  that  the  duty  of  a  professional  adviser  begins 
and  ends  with  giving  his  advice,  and  that  after  it  has  been 
given  and  ministers  have  considered  it  the  orders  of  the 
Government  should  be  carried  out  without  further  question 
or  remonstrance.  I  was  unable  to  agree  with  him  as  to  the 
chief  professional  adviser,  holding  that  he  had  a  duty  to 
the  country  as  well  as  to  ministers,  and  I  said  so,  though  I 
admitted  that  only  special  circumstances  would  justify  the 
conclusion  that  duty  to  ministers  conflicted  with  duty  to 
country  and  must  accordingly  take  second  place. 

It  was  upon  such  principles  as  these  that  I  endeavoured 
to  regulate  my  attitude.  Whether  they  were  right  or  wrong 
the  reader  must  judge  for  himself,  but  I  have  no  doubt 
whatever  in  my  own  mind  that  to  their  cumulative  effect 
may  be  attributed  my  removal  from  the  post  of  C.I.G.S. 
in  February  1918,  and  therefore  from  the  standpoint  of 
personal  advantage  they  were  obviously  wrong. 

Having  now  cleared  the  ground  by  this  short  account 


256        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

of  the  military  situation  at  the  end  of  1915,  the  reorganisation 
of  the  General  Staff,  the  arrangements  for  keeping  connected 
up  with  the  Great  General  Staffs  of  the  Allies,  the  methods 
by  which  the  Government  conducted  its  war-business,  and 
the  relations  as  between  the  Government  and  its  professional 
advisers,  I  will  proceed  to  describe  the  nature  of  the  work 
with  which  the  General  Staff  had  to  deal. 

Sundays  excepted,  I  attended  the  meeting  of  the  War 
Committee— later  the  War  Cabinet — almost  every  day,  in 
order  to  elucidate  or  justify  our  written  recommendations  as 
to  the  miUtary  pohcy  to  be  followed,  give  an  account  of  and 
explain  the  events  of  the  last  twenty-four  hours  in  the 
different  theatres  of  war,  and  do  what  I  could  to  prophesy 
the  events  of  the  next  twenty-four.  It  was  not  easy  to  do 
any  of  these  things,  because  the  reasons  which  prompted 
a  given  recommendation  or  expression  of  opinion  might  be 
of  a  technical  nature  or  be  the  result  of  a  lifelong  study 
of  the  art  of  war,  and  it  was  not  always  possible  to 
substantiate  them  off-hand  in  the  course  of  a  discussion  in 
which  a  dozen  or  more  ingenious  debaters  were  taking  part, 
I  sometimes  envied  my  naval  colleague,  who,  although  he 
had  similar  duties  to  perform,  escaped  much  of  the  ex- 
amination and  criticism  which  fell  to  my  lot.  Amateurs 
who  do  not  hesitate  to  lay  down  the  law  on  questions  of 
military  strategy  and  tactics  proceed  more  warily  with 
respect  to  naval  operations.  They  have  many  opportunities 
for  picking  up  a  smattering  of  military  knowledge,  whereas 
their  acquaintance  with  naval  matters  may  be  limited  to  an 
occasional  trip  to  the  seaside  or  a  bad  attack  of  sea-sickness 
when  crossing  the  Channel.  The  sailors  do  not,  as  a  rule, 
give  them  much  assistance  to  become  more  proficient,  the 
phraseology  they  use  being  so  strange  and  technical  that  the 
amateur,  finding  himself  to  be  out  of  his  depth,  is  only  too 
glad  to  pass  on  to  the  discussion  of  other  subjects  in  which 
his  ignorance  may  not  be  so  apparent. 

The  first  question  to  which  I  had  to  ask  for  a  clear  and 
stable  answer  from  the  Government  on  becoming  C.I.G.S. 
was  what  policy  they  wished  to  pursue  in  each  and  all  of 
the  theatres  of  war  where  British  troops  were  emplo3^ed,  as 
upon  this  depended  the  action  to  be  taken  not  only  by  the 


DEFINITE  INSTRUCTIONS  257 

General  Staff  but  by  all  other  branches  of  the  War  Office. 
Murray  had  shortly  before  submitted  a  memorandum  on 
the  subject,  but  for  some  reason  unknown  to  me  no  decision 
had  been  reached.  His  views  being  in  general  agreement 
with  my  own,  I  summed  up  his  main  recommendations  and 
sent  them  to  the  Cabinet  for  approval  on  the  same  day  as 
I  took  up  office.  I  at  once  received  as  complete  an  answer 
as  circumstances  permitted,  and  the  hearts  of  the  General 
Staff  were  particularly  gladdened  by  the  acceptance  of  the 
recommendation  that,  from  the  British  point  of  view, 
France  and  Flanders  should  be  regarded  as  the  main  theatre 
of  operations.  So  long  as  this  policy  was  adhered  to  in  practice 
all  would  be  well. 

The  next  step  was  to  ensure  that  the  Commanders-in- 
Chief  understood  what  they  were  expected  to  do,  and  having 
obtained  an  authoritative  pronouncement  as  to  policy  I  was 
able  to  tell  them,  I  could  not  discover  that  they  had  any 
precise  and  up-to-date  directions  of  the  kind  required.  They 
had  received  various  telegrams  and  other  communications 
from  time  to  time,  and  may  have  been  given  verbal 
directions,  but  something  more  was  needed  to  enable  them 
to  look  ahead,  make  their  plans,  and  give  effect  to  the 
wishes  of  the  Government  in  the  manner  intended.  They 
required  to  be  furnished  with  concrete  "  Instructions  " 
("  Directives  "  in  French)  explaining  in  concise  and  definite 
language,  over  the  signature  of  the  Secretary  of  State  for 
War  on  behalf  of  the  Government,  the  exact  nature  of  their 
mission,  and  then  leaving  them  to  decide  as  to  the  method 
of  its  execution. 

It  may  be  mentioned,  too,  that  besides  their  obvious  use 
to  Commanders-in-Chief,  these  instructions  have  another 
value.  The  mere  act  of  putting  them  into  writing  for  future 
guidance  and  record  tends  to  lay  bare  any  defects  and  incon- 
sistencies there  may  be  in  the  policy  which  they  represent, 
and  had  they  been  drafted,  as  they  should  have  been,  in  all 
cases  in  1914-15  some  of  the  projects  then  undertaken  might 
have  been  consigned  to  obUvion  before  they  became  really 
dangerous.  Even  if  they  were  not  abandoned,  there  would 
at  any  rate  be  no  question  as  to  where  responsibiUty  rested, 
for  once  a  commander  receives  his  instructions  it  is  his  own 

s 


258        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

fault  if,  without  remonstrance,  he  attempts  to  carry  them 
out  when  of  opinion  that  they  are  impracticable. 

I  next  gave  attention  to  the  training  and  organisation 
of  the  troops,  both  at  home  and  abroad.  Egypt,  the  base 
for  all  operations  in  the  Mediterranean,  was  in  a  state  of 
chaos,  and  the  British  and  Colonial  divisions  transferred 
there  from  the  Gallipoli  Peninsula,  together  with  large 
reinforcements  of  partially-trained  personnel  from  Austraha 
and  New  Zealand,  and  other  partially-trained  drafts  for 
Gallipoh  and  Salonika,  constituted  an  unwieldy  accumula- 
tion of  some  300,000  men.  These  had  either  never  yet  been 
organised  as  fighting  forces,  or  their  organisation,  such  as 
it  was,  required  drastic  overhauHng  before  proper  value 
could  be  derived  from  them  in  the  field.  The  sorting  out 
of  this  medley  of  troops  and  the  vast  jumble  of  stores, 
transport,  and  equipment  collected  for  their  use,  was  a 
herculean  task  for  the  local  mihtary  authorities,  and  will  be 
further  referred  to  later. 

At  home,  again,  there  were  hundreds  of  thousands  of 
men  who,  for  the  most  part,  were  without  proper  organisation 
either  for  the  field  or  for  purposes  of  training,  and  in  addition 
there  was  a  large  number  of  divisions  which  as  yet  were  only 
half-trained  and  half-equipped.  Moreover,  the  number,  com- 
position, and  distribution  of  the  home  defence  troops  bore 
little  relation  to  the  actual  situation  ;  the  general  plan  of 
defence  was  fundamentally  faulty  ;  and  with  some  com- 
mendable exceptions  the  defences  themselves  were  insufficient 
and  often  of  unsuitable  types. 

For  all  this  no  one  in  particular  was  to  blame.  On  the 
contrary  the  War  Office,  commanders,  and  troops  had 
worked  their  hardest  and  best  under  most  adverse  conditions. 
It  was  the  natural  outcome  of  having  to  create  large  armies 
at  short  notice,  without  the  assistance  of  a  previously- 
prepared  plan,  and  of  being  frequently  obhged  to  send 
troops  abroad  in  small  packets  and  on  no  method  save  that 
of  meeting  an  urgent  need  in  one  of  the  many  theatres  in 
which  we  were  fighting.  It  fell  to  Lord  French,  Commander- 
in-Chief  in  the  United  Kingdom,  to  straighten  out  the  tangle 
at  home.  As  I  have  stated  elsewhere,  there  were  previous 
to  his   appointment   on   the   19th   December   1915,   seven 


MESOPOTAMIA  259 

Commanders-in-Chief  at  home,  each  of  whom  was  directly 
under  the  War  Office,  thus  making  with  the  Commanders- 
in-Chief  in  France,  Salonika,  Egypt  and  Gallipoli,  a  total  of 
eleven  commanders  with  whom  the  C.I.G.S.  had  to  deal. 
No  man  could  possibly  deal  with  such  a  number,  and  I  was 
glad  that  the  Government  approved  of  my  recommendation 
to  unite  all  troops  at  home  under  one  commander. 

The  organisation  of  the  troops  in  Mesopotamia  and  the 
arrangements  for  the  maintenance  of  the  long  and  precarious 
line  of  communication  in  that  country  were  notoriously  bad, 
but  with  this  theatre  the  General  Staff  was  not  directly 
concerned  as  the  operations  were  conducted  by  the  Govern- 
ment of  India  under  instructions  issued  by  the  India  Office. 
As  I  wish  to  avoid  saying  anything  which  might  revive  the 
controversial  question  of  responsibility  for  the  mismanage- 
ment of  the  early  part  of  this  campaign,  I  will  merely  remark 
that  a  sound  system  of  command  is  a  requisite  condition 
of  success,  and  that  no  worse  system  could  have  been 
devised  than  that  of  dividing  the  control  of  the  military 
forces  of  the  Empire  between  two  separate  departments 
(India  Office  and  War  Office)  and  two  separate  army  head- 
quarters (Simla  and  London).  British  officers  can  do  most 
things,  but  no  human  being  could  have  made  this  vicious 
system  work  efficiently,  and  it  is  no  reflection  on  either  the 
India  authorities  or  the  India  Office  to  say  that  it  was  bound 
to  lead  to  serious  trouble,  if  not  to  disaster,  as  unfortun- 
ately it  did. 

For  some  time  I  hesitated  to  put  my  finger  into  the 
Mesopotamian  pie,  but  as  matters  seemed  to  be  going  from 
bad  to  worse  I  was  at  last  compelled  to  point  out  to  the 
War  Committee  the  impossibility  of  continuing  the  existing 
arrangement,  and  I  recommended,  with  Lord  Kitchener's 
concurrence,  that  both  operative  and  administrative  control 
should  be  taken  over  by  the  War  Office  and  be  dealt  with 
by  it  as  in  the  case  of  aU  other  campaigns.  After  some 
discussion  the  recommendation  was  accepted  and  the  change 
took  effect  in  the  month  of  February  1916.  As  an  illustra- 
tion of  the  disadvantages  incurred  by  different  campaigns 
being  conducted  by  different  State  departments,  I  may  say 
that,  previous  to  this  change,  neither  the  Imperial  General 


26o        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Staff  nor  the  Army  Council  were  entitled  to  communicate 
direct  with  the  military  authorities  in  India.  All  correspond- 
ence of  importance  had  to  pass  through  the  India  Olhce — 
the  department  responsible  to  the  Home  Government. 

Another,  and  perhaps  the  most  complicated,  problem 
awaiting  solution  was  that  of  man-power.  In  July  1915 
the  National  Registration  Act  had  been  passed,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  it  every  person  in  Great  Britain — Ireland  being 
excluded — between  the  ages  of  16  and  65  years  had  been 
registered.  This  was  a  useful  and  necessary  preliminary 
to  any  legislation  for  universal  service,  but  it  was  no  more 
than  that .  Later,  the  ' '  Derby  Scheme  ' '  had  been  introduced 
so  as  to  give  the  voluntary  system  of  recruiting  its  last 
chance,  its  distinctive  features  being  that  men  "  attested  " 
their  willingness  to  join  the  army  when  wanted,  and  they 
then  entered  a  so-called  reserve  where  they  remained 
undisturbed  in  their  civil  employment  until  called  up. 
This  produced  good  results  at  first  but  soon  began  to 
dwindle  away,  and  by  the  end  of  1915  it  was  quite  clear, 
notwithstanding  the  wonders  hitherto  achieved  under  Lord 
Kitchener's  inspiration,  that  the  voluntary  system  was 
fast  breaking  down  and  must  be  replaced  by  compulsory 
measures.  To  the  procuring  of  these  I  forthwith  directed 
my  energies. 

No  plan  for  substituting  such  measures  had  as  yet  been 
thoroughly  considered,  and  the  hard  fact  that  the  entire 
manhood  of  the  nation  would  have  to  be  utilised  in  the 
prosecution  of  the  war,  either  in  the  fighting  services  or  on 
other  work  of  an  essential  kind,  and  utilised  in  an  appropriate 
way,  was,  so  far  as  my  knowledge  goes,  still  insufficiently 
recognised  by  any  one  in  the  Government  with  the  possible 
exception  of  Lord  Kitchener.  I  shall  show  presently  that, 
for  practical  purposes,  it  never  was  recognised  until  the 
enemy  made  his  last  throw  for  victor}^  in  March  1918,  and 
then  the  recognition  was  perilously  near  to  being  too  late. 

It  was,  perhaps,  not  surprising  that,  as  late  as  December 
1915,  the  important  question  of  man-power  had  not  yet 
been  dealt  with  in  a  comprehensive  manner.  For  several 
months  after  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  the  belief  had 
prevailed  that  the  war  would  soon  be  over,  and  in  the 


MAN-POWER  261 

meantime  shoals  of  men  had  come  forward,  voluntarily,  as 
quickly  as  they  could  be  handled.  Even  when  this  behef 
began  to  weaken,  it  was  supposed  that  the  only  problem 
was  the  provision  of  an  additional  number  of  men  for  the 
army  alone.  "  Business  as  usual  "  was  still  far  from  being 
dead,  and  when  it  was  suggested  that  certain  trades 
unconnected  with  the  war  might  be  discontinued,  the  reply 
was  that  an  "  awful  outcry  "  would  be  raised.  Moreover, 
ministers  had,  as  a  result  of  our  general  unpreparedness, 
been  overwhelmed  with  other  work,  and  some  of  them  did 
not  even  know  how  many  divisions  had  already  been  formed, 
let  alone  how  many  we  might  eventually  want.  I  had 
several  informal  conversations  with  ministers,  including  Mr. 
Asquith  and  Mr.  McKenna,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer, 
during  my  first  few  days  in  London,  and  their  common 
complaint  against  the  soldiers  was  that  they  could  get  from 
them  no  definite  and  reliable  opinion.  It  was  evident  to  me 
that,  whatever  had  been  the  case  before,  they  were  now  more 
than  anxious  to  have  the  advice  of  the  General  Staff  as  to 
what  was  to  be  done,  and  I  made  up  my  mind  that  on  this 
score  they  should  have  no  further  ground  for  dissatisfaction. 

Besides  three  cavalry  divisions  we  had  on  the  army 
books  a  total  of  seventy  British  infantry  divisions,  thirty- 
five  being  in  France,  others  in  Egypt,  Mesopotamia,  and 
Macedonia,  and  the  remainder  in  different  stages  of  formation 
at  home.  It  was  essential  that  the  latter,  except  such  as 
were  required  for  home  defence,  should  be  completed  with 
personnel  and  sent  to  the  front  as  soon  as  possible,  and  that 
men  should  also  be  provided  to  meet  the  great  expansion 
contemplated  in  heavy  artillery,  machine-guns,  aeroplanes, 
mechanical  transport,  railways,  tunnelling  companies,  and 
numerous  other  units  outside  the  divisions.  In  addition, 
there  must  be  sufficient  reserves  to  make  good  the  wastage 
caused  by  sickness  and  battle,  and  finally,  after  making 
provision  to  meet  all  these  demands,  it  would  be  necessary 
to  consider  whether  any  further  divisions  should  be  raised, 
and  if  so,  how  many. 

It  was  the  business  of  the  General  Staff  to  advise  on 
these  matters  from  the  standpoint  of  mihtary  policy,  and 
it  then  rested  with  the  Adjutant-General,  after  a  decision 


262         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

had  been  reached,  to  obtain  the  number  of  men  authorised. 
How  many  men  could  be  spared  for  the  army  was  of  course 
for  the  Government  and  not  for  the  War  Office  to  say,  as 
men  were  also  needed  for  the  navy,  shipbuilding,  food- 
production,  munitions,  industries,  and  many  other  services 
connected  with  the  war.  On  the  27th  December,  four  days 
after  I  became  C.I.G.S.,  the  General  Staff  views  on  man- 
power were  laid  before  the  Cabinet,  and  shortly  after- 
wards the  whole  question  was  investigated  by  a  "  Cabinet 
Committee  on  the  co-ordination  of  military  and  financial 
effort."  At  the  back  of  my  mind  I  had  the  intention  of 
obtaining  at  least  two  million  men  in  addition  to  the  two 
and  a  half  milHons  recruited  since  August  1914.  How  many 
more  might  be  required  later  could  not  yet  be  foreseen. 

The  investigation  was  particularly  exhaustive  respecting 
the  actual  needs  of  the  army,  and  the  effect  which  these 
needs,  if  met,  might  have  on  trade  and  consequently  on 
finance.  If  trade  were  crippled  then  money  would  become 
short,  in  which  case  we  might  be  unable  either  to  maintain 
the  existing  divisions  or  to  continue  giving  subsidies  to  our 
Allies,  and  there  were  those  who  feared  that  bankruptcy 
was  already  in  sight. 

Trade  and  finance  lay  outside  the  War  Office  sphere  and 
were  dealt  with  in  the  evidence  supphed  by  the  Board  of 
Trade  and  Treasury,  but  I  cannot  help  remarking  that  the 
views  held  by  experts  on  the  relation  of  finance  to  war  seem 
to  call  for  revision.  Before  1914  it  was  frequently  said, 
and  on  high  authority  sometimes,  that  future  wars  would 
be  of  short  duration,  if  not  entirely  prevented,  because  of 
the  financial  strain  and  the  general  dislocation  of  com- 
merce which  they  would  entail.  This  prophecy  was  not 
borne  out  by  the  Great  War,  though  I  would  hesitate  to 
guess  v/hat  may  yet  be  the  outcome  of  the  colossal  expen- 
diture incurred  in  it.  I  am  so  profoundly  ignorant  of  financial 
strategy  and  tactics — never  having  had  the  wherewithal  to 
indulge  in  them — that  I  cannot  even  understand  why  pubhc 
servants  like  myself  should  pay  income  tax  on  their  salaries 
months  before  the  same  tax  is  collected  from  the  business 
community. 

It  would  have  assisted  the  other  departments,  as  some 


"  MILITARY  SERVICE  ACT  "  263 

of  them  said,  if  a  specific  estimate  of  the  number  of  divisions 
required  to  win  the  war  could  have  been  made  by  the  War 
Office,  but  no  such  calculation  was  feasible,  and  the  posi- 
tion I  took  up  before  the  committee  was  that,  owing  to  the 
world-wide  character  of  the  war,  it  was  impossible  to  say 
how  many  men  would  eventually  be  required.  In  other 
words,  I  argued  that  we  could  not  hope  to  win  through  on 
any  basis  of  limited  liabihty,  and  that  the  only  limit  we 
were  justified  in  accepting  was  the  last  available  man. 
From  this  position  I  never  budged,  and  perhaps  was  some- 
times thought  to  be  obstinate  and  unreasonable,  but  the 
situation  was  much  too  grave  to  permit  of  watering  down 
considered  opinions  in  the  vain  endeavour  to  make  things 
easier.  To  have  shown  any  such  weakness  would  have 
been  tantamount  to  a  betrayal  of  the  trust  reposed  in  me 
by  virtue  of  the  office  I  held.  The  committee  gave  me  a 
very  patient  hearing,  as  they  did  all  other  War  Office 
representatives,  but  the  first  results,  the  passing  of  the 
"  Military  Service  Act  "  on  the  27th  of  January  1916,  were 
disappointing,  as  the  Act  rendered  Hable  to  mihtary  service 
only  those  men  who  were  unmarried  or  widowers  having 
no  dependent  children. 

The  inadequate  scope  of  this  half-baked  measure,  and 
the  ease  with  which  its  provisions  enabled  military  obliga- 
tions to  be  evaded,  were  apparent  from  the  first,  and  after 
further  investigation  by  the  committee  the  Bill  was  ex- 
tended, in  May  1916,  to  include  married  men  and  widowers 
with  dependent  children.  The  amended  Bill  still  excluded 
Ireland,  and  in  other  respects  was  not  as  comprehensive 
and  as  free  from  hampering  conditions  as  could  have  been 
desired,  but  it  was  a  great  step  in  advance,  for  it  ensured 
a  more  reliable  flow  of  recruits  from  Great  Britain  ;  it 
established  the  principle,  if  it  did  not  wholly  enforce  it,  of 
national  service  until  the  end  of  the  war ;  and,  thanks  to  it, 
close  upon  1,200,000  men  were  obtained  during  1916  out 
of  the  two  millions  I  had  set  out  to  get. 

When  at  the  commencement  of  the  enquiry  I  tried  to 
convince  Lord  Kitchener  that  we  must  resort  to  all-round 
compulsory  service  he  was  not  inclined  to  agree  with  me. 
This  was  only  natural,  as  he  had  been  marvellously  success- 


264        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

ful  in  obtaining  volunteers  for  the  New  Armies  he  had 
formed,  and  he  hoped  to  finish  the  war  without  applying 
compulsion,  especially  as  regards  married  men.  Moreover, 
in  his  dealings  with  the  representatives  of  Labour  he  had 
apparently  promised,  either  by  word  or  implication,  not  to 
apply  it  until  it  became  absolutely  necessary,  if  they  would 
co-operate  with  him,  as  I  believe  they  invariably  did,  in 
obtaining  men  under  the  Derby  Scheme,  and  he  was  anxious 
not  to  appear  guilty  of  a  breach  of  faith. 

But  the  chief  reason  which  induced  him  to  hold  back 
was,  I  believe,  the  desire  to  conserve  sufficient  reserves  to 
deal  the  finishing  blow  in  the  war  when  the  psychological 
moment  arrived.  "  Don't  try  to  hurry  things  so,"  he  would 
say  when  I  was  urging  my  view  of  the  case.  "  What  we 
should  aim  at  is  to  have  the  largest  army  in  Europe  when 
the  terms  of  peace  are  being  discussed,  and  that  will  not  be 
in  1916  but  in  1917."  Eventually  he  agreed  with  me  that, 
owing  to  the  increased  demands  by  new  services  (tanks, 
aeroplanes,  heavy  guns,  etc.),  to  the  gradual  decline  of  the 
voluntary  S3^stem,  and  to  the  time  it  would  take  to  start  a 
new  system  and  train  the  men  produced  by  it,  the  intro- 
duction of  compulsory  measures  could  no  longer  be  delayed, 
and  thenceforward  he  whole-heartedly  supported  them. 

He  has  been  blamed  for  not  introducing  them  in  1914, 
and  no  doubt  if  this  had  been  done  our  man-power  resources 
could  have  been  tapped  by  scientific  and  equitable  methods, 
and  much  discontent  and  disturbance  of  industry  would 
have  been  avoided.  We  would  not,  for  instance,  have 
depleted  the  country  of  skilled  engineers  by  placing  them 
in  the  trenches,  from  which  they  had  later  to  be  withdrawn 
for  employment  in  ship  -  building  yards  and  munition- 
shops.  But  these  were  matters  for  the  Government  and 
not  merely  for  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  who  was 
concerned  only  with  the  army.  Moreover,  the  necessary 
registration  and  legislation  would  have  taken  a  considerable 
time  to  carry  out  and  there  was  not  an  hour  to  lose,  and 
much  opposition  might  have  been  encountered  had  an 
attempt  been  made  to  introduce  compulsion  before  the 
voluntary  system  was  seen  to  be  inadequate. 

In  confirmation  of  this  I  may  say  that  when  the  Cabinet 


COMPULSORY  SERVICE  265 

enquiry  was  being  held  there  were,  to  my  personal  know- 
ledge— and  quite  irrespective  of  the  opinions  that  may  or 
may  not  have  been  held  by  members  of  the  Cabinet,  regard- 
ing which  I  shall  say  nothing — far  more  prominent  public 
men  outside  the  Cabinet  who  doubted  the  wisdom  of  in- 
troducing compulsion  than  is  generally  supposed.  Some  of 
these  maintained,  amongst  other  objections,  that  the  addi-' 
tional  men  procurable  would  not  be  worth  the  public  dis- 
content the  change  would  create,  and  would  be  more  than 
outweighed  by  the  additional  troops  required  for  the  pre- 
servation of  internal  order ;  while  as  to  Ireland,  it  was 
said  that  the  attempt  to  apply  compulsion  would  inevitably 
produce  a  rebellion.  As  we  now  know  these  forebodings 
proved  to  be  without  foundation,  though  it  should  be  added 
that  as  the  Bill  was  not  made  applicable  to  Ireland  the 
fancied  danger  of  rebellion  there  was  not  incurred. 

Personally,  I  doubt  if  any  such  danger  really  existed,  and 
as  is  well  known  the  rebellion,  so-called,  which  occurred  in 
Easter  week  did  not  represent  any  considerable  element  in 
Irish  life  as  a  whole,  and  was  condemned  by  the  greater 
part  of  Ireland  as  indignantly  as  by  England.  As  there  was 
at  the  time  no  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  usual  status  in  the 
country,  the  task  of  restoring  order  was  confided  by  the 
Government  to  Lieutenant-General  Sir  John  Maxwell,  who 
had  recently  returned  from  Egypt,  and  I  sent  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Hutchison  with  him  as  his  Chief  of  the  General 
Staff.  Maxwell  had  a  difficult  and  distasteful  duty  to 
perform,  as  all  soldiers  have  when  called  upon  to  use  force 
against  their  fellow-subjects,  and  I  am  sure  that  he  honestly 
tried  to  carry  it  out  in  accordance  with  the  letter  and  spirit 
of  his  instructions.  In  Dublin,  where  the  rebellion  started, 
severe  street  fighting  lasted  for  several  days,  about  100 
soldiers  and  180  civilians  being  killed.  There  were  also 
outbreaks  in  Galway,  Wexford,  and  Drogheda,  but  these 
were  less  serious,  and  the  National  Volunteers,  composed 
of  Irishmen,  helped  to  suppress  them. 

To  revert  to  the  question  of  man-power.  It  was  fre- 
quently suggested  to  me  during  1916  that  the  country  was 
still  imperfectly  informed  of  the  dimensions  of  the  struggle 
in  which  we  were  engaged,  and  that  it  longed  to  have  the 


266         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

facts  of  the  case  plainly  put  before  it.  To  speak  in  public, 
however,  did  not  properly  lie  within  my  province,  and  I 
never  spoke  without  obtaining  the  consent  of  the  Secretary 
of  State  for  War,  and  until  convinced  that  it  was  my  duty 
to  speak.  On  those  occasions  when  I  felt  it  necessary  to 
speak  I  was,  with  one  exception,  listened  to  with  earnest 
attention,  and  no  will  deny  that  the  country  invariably 
showed  the  greatest  readiness  to  comply  with  the  ever- 
increasing  demands  made  upon  it. 

The  exception  was  at  a  meeting  held  at  Woolwich 
Arsenal,  which  I  had  been  requested  to  attend  by  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions.  I  had  no  sooner  entered  the  room 
than  I  found  that  I  was  not  wanted.  I  told  the  men  that 
I  had  come  at  some  inconvenience  to  myself  and  purely  as 
a  matter  of  duty,  and  that  if  they  did  not  wish  to  hear  me 
I  would  go  away.  Their  leaders  appealed  to  them  to  keep 
order,  and  as  it  had  no  effect  I  walked  off  the  platform  and 
returned  to  London.  I  discovered  afterwards,  to  my 
astonishment,  that  some  labour  question  was  in  dispute  at 
the  time  betv/een  the  men  and  the  Ministry  of  Munitions, 
and  that  they  had  gone  to  the  meeting  to  hear  what  the 
minister  who  accompanied  me  had  to  say,  and  for  that 
purpose  alone.  Naturally,  therefore,  they  did  not  wish  to 
waste  time  in  listening  to  me. 

Connected  with  man-power  was  the  question  of  providing 
a  sufficient  number  of  officers  to  keep  pace  with  the  ex- 
pansion of  the  army  and  to  make  good  wastage.  The 
casualties  amongst  officers  had  amounted  in  1914  to  about 
5700,  and  in  1915  to  about  23,260,  and  it  was  expected  that 
the  number  would  be  much  larger  in  19 16,  as  several  more 
divisions  were  to  be  put  in  the  field.  As  early  as  the  winter 
of  1914-15  G.H.Q.  in  France  received  complaints  from 
regimental  commanders  that  many  of  the  officers  sent  from 
England  were  quite  untrained,  and  instead  of  being  a  help 
were  an  actual  danger  to  the  men  they  had  to  lead.  This 
was  due  to  the  fact  that  they  had  received  their  commis- 
sions straight  from  civil  life  before  undergoing  any  military 
training.  At  the  time  a  considerable  number  of  men  from 
the  ranks  were  being  recommended  for  commissions,  and 
in  order  to  give  them  some  little  instruction  in  the  duties 


CADET  BATTALIONS  267 

of  an  officer  before  appointing  them  to  commissions  the 
Commander-in-Chief  ordered  a  Cadet  School  to  be  formed 
at  Bailleul,  the  Artists  Rifles — which  had  belonged  to  the 
Officers'  Training  Corps  in  peace  time — being  used  for  the 
purpose.  The  results  were  satisfactory,  and  in  the  spring 
of  1915  the  school  was  transferred  to  near  St.  Omer  and 
enlarged  to  deal  with  about  100  cadets  at  a  time.  The 
demand  for  officers  was  at  first  so  heavy  that  only  six 
weeks  could  be  allotted  to  each  class,  but  this  was  later 
extended  to  a  course  of  three  months,  and  it  included  ex- 
perience in  the  fighting  line.  Instruction  was  given  in  all 
branches  of  training  required  by  a  platoon  commander. 

When  I  became  C.I.G.S.  the  only  sources,  apart  from 
the  Cadet  School  in  France,  from  which  officers  with  some 
previous  training  were  obtainable,  were  Sandhurst,  Woolwich, 
the  Honourable  Artillery  Company,  the  Inns  of  Court  and 
Artists  Rifles  contingents  of  the  Officers'  Training  Corps, 
and  the  Officers'  Training  Corps  of  the  universities.  The 
staffs  of  these  Training  Corps  had  not  the  necessary  know- 
ledge to  train  officers  up  to  the  required  standard,  and, 
moreover,  as  the  demand  had  quite  outstripped  the  supply, 
commissions  were  still  being  given  to  men  coming  direct  from 
civil  life.  I  therefore  obtained  Lord  Kitchener's  consent  to 
organise  at  home  a  number  of  cadet  battalions  similar  to 
the  one  which  had  given  such  good  results  in  France,  and 
in  the  month  of  February  I  brought  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Hutchison  to  the  War  Office  to  superintend  their  organisa- 
tion and  training,  he  having  been  charged  with  the  same 
duty  when  I  was  in  France.  Twelve  cadet  battalions  were 
formed,  each  consisting  of  about  500  cadets  ;  the  course 
was  one  of  three  months,  and  the  cadets  had  to  pass 
an  examination  before  receiving  their  commissions.  Each 
battalion  had  a  permanent  training  establishment  of  about 
30  officers  and  from  80  to  100  other  ranks,  most  of  whom 
had  had  experience  in  the  field. 

The  casualties  amongst  officers  in  all  theatres  rose  from 
23,260  in  1915  to  41,610  in  1916,  and  to  51,960  in  1917.  (It 
will  be  understood  that  these  are  gross,  not  nett,  figures,  and 
include  the  wounded  and  sick  who  returned  to  duty  after 
recovery.)     To  meet  this  increased  wastage  the  number  of 


268        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

cadet  battalions  had  to  be  enlarged,  and  included  cavalry, 
artillery,  engineers,  and  army  service  corps,  as  well  as 
infantry.  The  battalions  were  commanded  by  some  of  our 
best  officers,  full  of  energy  and  enthusiasm,  and  they 
answered  their  purpose  so  well  that  not  only  were  the 
losses  at  the  front  made  good  but  at  the  beginning  of  1918 
there  was  a  reserve  of  about  10,000  officers  at  home.  It 
was  fortunate  that  we  had  this  reserve  to  fall  back  upon  in 
the  critical  months  of  April  and  May  of  that  year.  In  all, 
more  than  84,000  officers  were  supplied  by  the  battalions 
during  the  war. 

The  General  Staff  had  also  to  deal  with  the  shortage  of 
junior  officers  fit  for  employment  on  the  staff.  To  meet 
this  need  in  France  we  had  started  a  staff  school  at  St. 
Omer  in  1915,  and  early  in  1916  I  formed  one  at  Cambridge 
university  under  Lieutenant-Colonel  R.  Hare.  The  school 
was  expanded  in  1917,  and  a  side  to  teach  more  senior  staff 
officers  was  added  to  it. 

Another  new  organisation  introduced  in  19 16  was  the 
Tank  Corps,  which  in  the  earlier  stages  of  its  existence  was 
recruited  from  selected  officers  and  men  transferred  from 
other  units,  and  was  designated  the  "  Heavy  Branch  Machine 
Gun  Corps." 

The  official  trial  of  the  first  tank,  known  as  "  Mother," 
took  place  in  Hatfield  Park  early  in  February,  Mr.  Balfour 
(First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty),  Mr.  M'Kenna,  Lord  Kitchener, 
myself,  and  several  other  officials  being  present.  Opinion 
was  by  no  means  unanimous  that  the  machine  would  prove 
suitable  for  employment  in  battle,  and  it  was  in  fact  much 
inferior  to  the  type  evolved  later  ;  but  before  we  left  the 
ground  Lord  Kitchener  agreed  to  my  proposal  that  a  hundred 
should  be  ordered  at  once.  In  the  following  September 
about  fifty  tanks  took  part  in  the  battle  of  the  Somme. 
As  in  the  case  of  all  new  inventions,  the  best  value  was  not 
derived  from  the  tank  until  the  troops  learnt  how  to  use  it, 
the  chief  difficulty  being  to  obtain  effective  co-operation 
between  the  three  arms — tanks,  artillery,  and  infantry,  and 
for  this  time  and  experience  were  required. 

The  War  Office  has  been  accused  of  obstructing  the  pro- 
vision of  tanks,  and  perhaps  those  who  made  the  accusation 


EVACUATION  OF  GALLIPOLI  269 

did  not  quite  realise  all  the  difficulties  which  attend  the 
starting  of  a  new  service  and  a  new  means  of  making  war, 
and  that  these  were  accentuated  in  the  case  of  the  Tank 
Corps  because  of  the  shortage  of  men  and  steel.  To  divert 
men  from  the  other  arms  and  services — who  were  incessantly 
clamouring  for  personnel  either  to  make  good  wastage  or 
for  purposes  of  expansion — so  as  to  provide  men  to  make 
and  man  tanks,  of  whose  utility  many  officers,  at  the 
front  as  at  home,  were  still  unconvinced,  was  not  a  decision 
to  be  lightly  taken  :  while  as  regards  steel  it  was  laid  down, 
not  by  the  War  Office  but  by  the  authorities  responsible 
for  assessing  the  order  of  "  priority,"  that  the  building  of 
tanks  should  not  be  permitted  to  interfere  with  the  output 
of  guns,  ammunition,  aeroplanes,  mechanical  transport,  and 
locomotives.  Having  made  this  explanation  I  should  add 
that  the  great  reputation  eventually  won,  and  deserved,  by 
the  tank  as  a  formidable  and  indispensable  fighting  machine, 
is  the  more  creditable  to  those  who,  in  the  face  of  adverse 
circumstances,  were  concerned  in  its  production. 

On  a  previous  page  I  have  said  that  the  evacuation  of 
Helles  in  the  GalHpoli  Peninsula  was  still  under  considera- 
tion at  the  end  of  1915.  Since  September  the  Government 
had  been  undecided  what  course  to  pursue  in  regard  to 
the  Dardanelles,  and  early  in  October  I  had  been  summoned 
from  France  to  advise.  I  recommended  cutting  our  losses, 
and  said  that  although  evacuation  must  necessarily  be 
attended  with  difficulty  and  risk  it  ought  nevertheless  to 
be  a  feasible  operation  provided  that  careful  arrangements 
were  made,  especially  with  respect  to  secrecy.  Later, 
General  Sir  Charles  Monro  was  sent  out  to  command  and 
to  advise,  and  he  was  followed  by  Lord  Kitchener,  who 
was  to  give  a  final  decision.  Eventually,  in  the  third  week 
of  December,  Anzac  and  Suvla  were  evacuated,  but  the 
question  as  to  whether  Helles,  at  the  toe  of  the  peninsula, 
should  or  should  not  be  retained  still  remained  to  be  settled. 

The  open  confession  of  failure  involved  by  complete 
evacuation  was  unpalatable  to  ministers,  and  some  of  them 
thought  that  we  should  lose  prestige  in  the  eyes  of  the 
eastern  world,  and  so  make  further  trouble  for  ourselves 
there  ;  some  of  the  soldiers  thought  that  Egypt  would  be 


270        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

seriously  threatened  by  the  Hberation  of  the  Turkish  troops 
hitherto  contained  in  the  peninsula  ;  the  sailors,  for  reasons 
not  very  convincing,  were  mainly  in  favour  of  continued 
occupation;  while  the  withdrawal  and  re-embarkation  of  a 
force  of  40,000  men,  150  guns,  4500  horses,  and  a  vast 
quantity  of  stores  was  undoubtedly  beset  with  enormous 
risks.  Much  more  so  than  the  withdrawal  from  Anzac  and 
Suvla,  for  the  hostile  forces  would  be  relatively  stronger, 
surprise  would  be  improbable,  and  bad  weather  would  be 
more  likely.  It  was  impossible  to  say  what  our  losses  might 
not  be,  for  apart  from  the  uncertainty  of  what  the  enemy 
might  do  or  omit  to  do,  much  depended  upon  the  extent 
to  which  weather  interfered  with  the  operation.  Some  of 
the  officers  on  the  spot  thought  we  might  lose  as  much  as 
thirty  per  cent  of  the  force. 

But,  after  all,  the  main  question  was  what  useful  purpose 
would  be  served  by  keeping  a  detachment  at  Helles,  now 
that  the  troops  had  been  withdrawn  from  Anzac  and  Suvla  ? 
Clearly  there  was  none,  and  to  continue  hanging  on  to  the 
place  merely  because  we  were  afraid  to  leave  it,  was  not 
only  a  waste  of  men  but  would  be  a  constant  source  of 
anxiety. 

On  the  28th  of  December,  five  days  after  becoming 
C.I.G.S.,  I  placed  before  the  War  Committee  a  memo- 
randum drafted  for  me  by  Callwell,  who  was  acquainted 
with  my  views,  advocating  the  immediate  and  total  evacua- 
tion of  the  peninsula.  Lord  Kitchener  supported  the 
recommendation,  evacuation  was  approved,  the  necessary 
orders  were  despatched  the  same  day,  and  by  the  8th  of 
January  the  operation  had  been  completed,  the  only 
casualties  being  one  man  hit  by  a  spent  bullet  and  three  men 
accidentally  injured  while  embarking.  Nearly  all  the  guns 
were  brought  away,  but  some  500  animals  had  to  be  left 
behind.  To  extricate  about  40,000  men  in  face  of  greatly 
superior  forces,  almost  without  a  single  mishap,  was  a  per- 
formance which  redounds  to  the  credit  of  all  soldiers  and 
sailors  who  took  part  in  it.  Maude,  with  the  headquarters 
of  his  division,  the  13th,  was  one  of  the  last  to  leave.  This 
division  had  previously  taken  part  in  the  withdrawal  from 
Suvla  and  was  afterwards  sent  to  relieve  a  tired  division  at 


KUT-EL-AMARA  271 

Helles.  Much  of  the  credit  for  the  retirement  therefore 
belongs  to  it  and  its  fine  commander. 

Having  got  rid  of  this  commitment,  my  next  desire  was 
to  send  as  many  divisions  as  could  be  spared  from  Egypt, 
where  the  Gallipoli  troops  had  been  disembarked,  to  join  the 
armies  on  the  West  Front,  and  to  send  back  to  the  same  front 
certain  reinforcements  which  had  been  directed  to  proceed 
thence  to  Egypt  just  before  I  became  C.I.G.S.  Orders  to 
this  effect  were  issued,  and  within  a  short  time  the  divisions 
were  on  their  way  to  France. 

Kut-el-Amara,  in  Mesopotamia,  was  a  more  difficult 
problem  than  Helles,  for  in  this  case  we  could  not  with- 
draw. We  must  first  fight,  and  fight  hard,  and  the  adminis- 
trative arrangements  in  this  theatre  were  so  defective 
that  it  was  almost  impossible  to  m.ake  a  satisfactory 
plan  for  the  fighting  and  at  the  same  time  be  reasonably 
certain  of  relieving  the  garrison  before  it  was  starved 
into  surrender.  Exactly  what  could  be  done  depended 
almost  entirely  upon  the  output  of  the  line  of  communication, 
and  this  was  doubtful  in  the  extreme.  The  line  was  of 
great  length — some  500  miles  along  the  river — imperfectly 
organised  in  itself  and  at  the  base,  and  the  amount  of  river 
transport  was  not  nearly  sufficient  to  convey  the  available 
troops  to  the  front,  supply  them  when  there  with  food 
and  ammunition,  and  maintain  them  in  reasonable  comfort 
and  health.  This  lamentable  shortage  of  river-craft  ham- 
pered, in  fact,  the  whole  operation,  and  at  the  best  must 
take  a  considerable  time  to  remedy. 

It  has  been  said  with  much  truth  that  a  line  of  com- 
munication is  the  main  artery  along  which  flows  the  life- 
blood  of  the  army  in  front,  and  that  if  any  congestion  or 
rupture  occurs  the  whole  military  body  becomes  sick  and 
may  even  die.  Before  any  attempt  had  been  made  to 
advance  as  far  as  Baghdad  every  precaution  should  have 
been  taken  to  establish  a  line  of  communication  which  would 
be  not  only  good  but  very  good.  Our  own  history  had  fur- 
nished dozens  of  examples  in  proof  of  this — one  being  Lord 
Kitchener's  advance  to  Khartoum — but  they  do  not  seem 
to  have  been  remembered. 

Three   attempts   were   made   to   relieve   Kut-el-Amara, 


272         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

respectively  beginning  on  the  4th  of  January,  the  8th  of 
March,  and  the  6th  of  April,  and  all  failed,  although  one 
at  least  might  perhaps  have  succeeded  had  everything  gone 
smoothly  and  as  expected.  This  seldom  happens  in  war, 
and  it  did  not  happen  at  Kut-el-Amara,  and  in  the  last 
week  of  April  the  garrison  of  2970  British  and  6000  native 
troops,  including  followers,  was  compelled  to  surrender,  after 
gallantly  holding  out  under  the  most  trying  conditions  for 
nearly  five  months.  Thus  was  exacted  the  inevitable 
penalty  for  allowing  operations  to  develop  without  any 
settled  policy  ;  without  making  proper  preparations  and 
providing  sufficient  means  to  attain  the  object  in  view  ; 
and  without  taking  sufficiently  into  account  what  the 
enemy  might  do  in  order  to  frustrate  that  object. 

The  original  purpose  of  the  campaign  had  been  the 
seizure  of  the  Persian  Gulf  water-way  up  to  the  point  where 
navigation  for  ocean-going  vessels  ceases,  and  the  protection 
of  the  Karun  oil-fields.  Incidentally,  the  operation  would 
exercise  a  useful  effect  on  the  tribes  around  the  Gulf,  and 
as  no  large  force  was  required  and  the  troops  themselves 
were  to  some  extent  not  suitable  for  employment  in  Europe, 
the  campaign  as  at  first  intended  may  be  regarded  as  justi- 
fiable. But  to  enlarge  its  scope  by  attempting  to  capture 
and  permanently  occupy  Baghdad  was,  at  the  time  the 
attempt  was  made,  not  within  the  limits  of  our  means,  and 
I  happen  to  know  that  Lord  Kitchener  dissented  from  it, 
la3dng  special  emphasis  on  the  disadvantages  of  the  long 
and  imperfect  line  of  communication.  (As  previously  men- 
tioned, the  campaign  was  being  conducted  at  this  period 
under  the  auspices  of  the  India  Office  and  not  of  the  War 
Office,  and  therefore  Lord  Kitchener  may  have  thought 
that  he  could  do  no  more  than  express  his  disapproval  of 
the  decision.) 

As  in  the  case  of  the  final  evacuation  of  the  Gallipoli 
Peninsula,  it  was  thought  that  the  fall  of  Kut-el-Amara  would 
create  serious  disquiet,  if  nothing  worse,  in  the  Muhammadan 
countries  adjacent  to  India ;  but  happily,  as  with  Gallipoh, 
it  did  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  the  prophecy  I  heard  made 
that  our  eastern  empire  would  be  shaken  to  its  foundations 
remained  unfulfilled.     I  think  we  need  to  correct  our  ideas 


ORIENTAL  PRESTIGE  273 

a  little  on  the  matter  of  prestige,  as  we  call  it.  Prestige,  no 
doubt,  carries  much  weight  in  eastern  countries,  but  in  war 
it  is  apt  to  become  a  bogy,  and  to  scare  away  the  timid 
from  doing  what  is  clearly  the  right  thing  to  do,  or,  what 
may  prove  to  be  worse,  frighten  them  into  a  dissipation 
of  strength  in  the  vain  endeavour  to  be  safe  everywhere 
at  the  same  time.  Years  ago,  when  means  of  communica- 
tion were  few  and  slow,  and  education  had  not  spread  to  its 
present  dimensions,  the  eastern  people  knew  little  about 
the  might  of  the  British  Empire  and  unimpaired  prestige 
may  then  have  been  a  necessity,  but  at  the  present  day 
they  are  fairly  shrewd  judges  of  a  situation,  and  may  be 
trusted  to  appreciate  a  temporary  set-back  at  something 
like  its  proper  value. 

This  does  not  mean  that  the  question  can  be  entirely 
neglected.  Orientals  are  as  susceptible  as  other  nations  to 
the  enemy's  wiles  and  propaganda.  In  the  early  part  of 
1916  enemy  agents  were  overrunning  Persia  and  Trans- 
Caspia,  and  were  also  to  be  found  in  Afghanistan  and  at 
other  places  on  the  borders  of  India,  spreading  abroad 
the  most  ludicrous  stories  concerning  the  war  and  the 
imminent  downfall  of  the  British  Empire,  and  backing  up 
their  statements  with  a  plentiful  distribution  of  promises 
and  hard  cash.  To  counteract  these  mischievous  proceed- 
ings no  effective  steps  had  been  taken,  and  the  enemy  was 
having  things  entirely  his  own  way.  The  remedy  did  not 
lie,  as  was  sometimes  suggested,  in  sending  packets  of  troops, 
varying  from  battalions  to  brigades,  to  "  show  the  flag  " 
or  to  support  some  professedly  loyal  chief,  and  without 
thinking  of  what  it  might  ultimately  cost  to  keep  the  same 
flag  flying. 

The  General  Staff  had  to  resist  more  than  one  suggestion 
of  this  kind  whilst  I  was  C.I.G.S.,  and  it  was  not  an  easy 
task,  for  they  usually  emanated  from  the  "  man  on  the 
spot,"  who  is  too  frequently  thought  to  be  the  most  com- 
petent judge,  whereas  his  outlook  is  often  narrow  and  his 
advice  by  no  means  always  the  best  to  follow.  What 
was  needed  was  to  despatch  to  the  centres  of  intrigue  and 
disaffection  a  few  Englishmen  of  the  right  type  to  give 
our  version  of  the  state  of  affairs,  furnish  them  with  money 

T 


274         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

to  pay  handsomely  for  intelligence  and  other  services 
rendered,  and  provide  them  with  just  sufficient  escort  to 
ensure  their  personal  safety.  On  the  advice  of  the  General 
Staff  measures  of  this  kind  were  initiated,  and  in  a  short 
time  matters  assumed  a  different  aspect.  Of  course,  the 
best  way  of  thwarting  the  enemy's  designs  and  of  making 
our  position  permanently  secure  was  to  give  the  Turks  in 
Mesopotamia  a  sound  beating,  and  arrangements  for  this 
were  put  in  train. 

Lieutenant-General  Sir  Percy  Lake  commanded  in  this 
theatre  between  January  and  August  1916,  and  was  then 
succeeded  by  Maude,  who  had  gone  to  Mesopotamia  with 
his  division  from  Egypt  early  in  the  year  and  had  subse- 
quently been  in  command  of  an  army  corps.  When  the 
question  of  a  successor  to  Sir  Percy  was  being  considered 
by  the  Government,  I  had  no  hesitation  in  recommending 
that  Maude  should  be  given  the  appointment,  and  although 
no  exception  was  taken  to  him  no  particular  desire  was 
shown  to  select  him,  one  reason  for  this  probably  being  that 
the  officers  whose  names  were  mentioned  as  alternatives 
were  much  better  known  to  the  ministers  with  whom  the 
decision  rested.  Maude  was,  in  fact,  almost  entirely  un- 
known to  them  at  the  time,  and  therefore  it  was  the  more 
gratifying  to  me  that  in  the  end  Mr.  Asquith  accepted  my 
recommendation. 

I  was  quite  ready  to  accept  responsibility  for  it.  I 
knew  that  Maude  possessed  a  high  standard  of  honour,  a 
quaUfication  without  which,  and  historical  exceptions  not- 
withstanding, no  man  is  fit  to  hold  an  important  command. 
I  also  knew  that  he  was  careful  of  the  interests  of  his  men, 
held  sound  views  on  tactical  and  strategical  questions, 
recognised  the  value  of  good  organisation,  and  in  every 
way  seemed  to  be  the  ideal  man  to  clear  up  the  Mesopotamian 
muddle  and  give  the  Turks  a  thrashing  into  the  bargain.  How 
well  he  justified  his  selection  is  one  of  the  most  brilliant 
chapters  in  the  history  of  the  Great  War.  Wisely  devoting 
his  energies  first  to  the  improvement  of  the  abominable  line 
of  communication  and  the  training  and  organisation  of 
his  troops,  he  patiently  laboured  and  waited  until  his  pre- 
parations were  sufficiently  good  to  justify  an  advance,  and 


MAUDE  IN  MESOPOTAMIA  275 

when  all  was  ready  he  struck  with  such  skill  and  vigour 
that  in  less  than  three  months  the  enemy  was  completely 
defeated.  Kut-el-Amara  was  recaptured  in  February  1917 
with  more  than  2000  prisoners,  and  on  the  nth  of  March 
Maude  entered  Baghdad  at  the  heels  of  the  flying  Turks  and 
chased  them  north  along  the  line  of  the  German  railway. 

Some  months  later  we  received  many  reports  indicating 
the  concentration  of  large  hostile  forces  about  Mosul,  but 
they  were  probably  circulated  for  the  express  purpose  of 
inducing  us  to  send  reinforcements  from  other  theatres, 
and  whatever  truth  there  may  have  been  in  them  (there 
was  httle  or  none)  they  did  not  seriously  disturb  the  minds 
of  the  General  Staff.  Having  at  last  estabhshed  a  reasonably 
good  line  of  communication,  and  enjoying  the  assistance  of 
Monro  (Commander-in-Chief  in  India  since  October  19 16) 
and  the  Indian  authorities  in  general,  we  felt  that  we  could 
safely  leave  the  rest  to  Maude.  His  death  from  cholera  on 
the  i8th  of  November  1917  was  a  great  loss  to  the  Empire 
and  to  all  those  many  comrades  by  whom  he  was  both 
admired  and  beloved.  Before  the  Great  War  he  had  served 
with  distinction  in  Egypt,  South  Africa,  Canada,  and  at 
home,  and  he  left  behind  him  a  name  for  devotion  to  duty 
and  uprightness  of  character  that  will  endure  for  all  time 
in  the  annals  of  the  British  army. 

Murray  in  Egypt,  like  Maude  in  Mesopotamia,  had  much 
spade  work  to  do  in  connection  with  the  organisation, 
equipment,  and  training  of  his  troops  before  he  could  dispose 
of  the  Turks  lying  east  of  the  Suez  Canal.  One  wonders 
why  these  essential  matters  had  been  permitted  to  get  into 
such  an  unsatisfactory  state,  and  in  all  theatres  except 
France,  for  every  soldier  possessing  a  rudimentary  know- 
ledge of  his  profession  is  aware  of  their  importance.  The 
reason  was  that  whereas  our  pre-war  preparations  for  offen- 
sive action  had  been  based  on  a  scale  not  exceeding  the 
employment  of  some  half-dozen  divisions,  we  had,  in 
addition  to  sharing  on  the  West  Front  in  the  greatest  con- 
flict the  world  has  ever  known,  become  engaged  in  five  other 
campaigns,  all  of  which  were  of  considerable  magnitude. 
These  commitments  would  have  taxed  the  resources  and 
ingenuity  of  the  most  perfectly  prepared  nation,  and  in 


276        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

our  case  they  were  bound  to  lead  to  confusion,  and,  if 
nothing  worse,  be  unproductive  of  useful  results  for  a  long 
time  to  come. 

Murray's  task  was  the  harder  because  the  normal  organi- 
sation of  the  divisions  which  had  returned  from  Gallipoli 
had  been  dislocated  when  they  were  sent  there.  A  variety 
of  personnel,  animals,  vehicles,  etc.,  not  required  in  Galli- 
poli were  then  left  behind  in  Egypt  and  these  had  of  necessity 
been  meanwhile  sent  to  the  western  frontier  of  the  country 
or  elsewhere,  and  were  still  absent,  hundreds  of  miles  away, 
when  the  divisions  returned  to  Egypt.  They  had  to  be 
collected  or  replaced  before  the  divisions  could  be  recon- 
structed. 

A  further  disadvantage  was  that  at  first  Murray  was  not 
sole  master  in  Egypt.  When  he  was  sent  there  at  the  end 
of  1915,  on  being  succeeded  by  me  as  C.I.G.S.,  it  was  decided 
that  he  should  command  only  the  troops  operating  in  the 
vicinity  of  the  Suez  Canal,  and  that  the  remainder  should 
continue  under  the  orders  of  Maxwell,  who  had  previously 
commanded  the  whole.  On  hearing  of  this  decision  when 
I  went  to  the  War  Office  I  represented  to  Lord  Kitchener 
that  it  was  impracticable,  but  he  was  anxious  to  retain 
Maxwell  because  of  his  unique  experience  in  Egyptian 
matters,  and  as  he  would  agree  neither  to  put  Murray  under 
Maxwell  nor  Maxwell  under  Murray  two  kings  of  Brent- 
ford were  set  up.  Both  Generals  tried  their  hardest  to 
make  the  system  work,  but  within  a  few  weeks  both  were 
forced  to  say  that  it  was  an  impossible  one  and  ought  to  be 
discontinued.  In  March,  Maxwell  returned  to  England  and 
Murray  assumed  command  of  all  the  troops. 

The  operations  in  Egypt,  as  in  other  theatres,  were  also 
hampered  by  the  lack  of  war  material,  and  Murray  was 
usually  worse  off  in  this  respect  than  other  Commanders-in- 
Chief,  for  as  the  output  was  still  much  below  the  sum  of 
our  requirements  he  frequently  had  to  go  short  in  order  that 
the  more  pressing  needs  of  other  fronts  might  be  satisfied. 
In  spite  of  these  adverse  conditions,  and  of  having  to  build 
a  broad-gauge  railway  as  he  advanced,  and  lay  down  a 
great  pipe-line,  with  pumping  stations,  to  bring  fresh  water 
from  Egypt  for  his  troops,  he  drove  the  Turks  out  of  the 


MACEDONIA  277 

Sinai  Peninsula  before  the  end  of  the  year  and  thus  put  a 
stop  to  further  hostile  designs  in  this  quarter.  He  also 
effectually  cleared  the  Senussi  out  of  the  oases  of  the  western 
deserts  of  Egypt. 

Of  the  campaign  in  Macedonia  there  is  little  to  be  said, 
except  that  for  about  three  years  it  absorbed  a  large  Entente 
force  which  contributed  nothing  material  to  the  winning  of 
the  war,  beyond  detaining  two  or  three  German  divisions 
of  inferior  quality,  and  a  number  of  Bulgarian  divisions 
who  would  probably  have  objected  to  serve  outside  the 
Balkan  Peninsula.  This  is  a  hard  statement  to  make, 
remembering  the  privations  and  sickness  our  troops  experi- 
enced and  the  fine  work  they  performed  in  the  offensive 
of  September  1918,  but  the  fact  remains  that  the  Bulgars 
were  defeated  on  the  West  Front  and  not  in  Macedonia. 
They  had  been  at  war  since  1912,  were  exhausted,  and 
realised  that  their  side  was  beaten  before  the  offensive  began. 
Practically  the  only  good  point  about  the  campaign  was 
that  it  enabled  the  Entente  to  use  Serb  and  Greek  troops 
whom  it  might  have  been  difficult  to  employ  elsewhere. 
The  total  Entente  force  in  Macedonia  was  usually  much 
stronger  than  the  enemy,  numbering  at  one  time  about 
650,000  men  as  against  some  450,000  Germans  and  Bulgars, 
and  the  bad  strategy  which  caused  this  situation  had  the 
result  of  creating  frequent  discussions  as  to  what  could  be 
done  to  improve  matters. 

Scarcely  a  month  passed  in  which  some  fresh  plan  was 
not  proposed  by  one  or  other  of  the  countries  interested 
— Russia,  France,  Serbia,  Greece,  Italy,  and  ourselves.  At 
one  time  it  would  be  a  question  of  increasing  the  force 
either  for  offensive  or  defensive  purposes  ;  at  another  of 
reducing  it  so  as  to  discontinue  the  waste  of  troops  who 
were  doing  nothing  and  could  do  nothing,  and  were  badly 
needed  elsewhere  ;  at  another  of  coming  away  altogether. 
No  one  policy  held  the  field  for  more  than  a  few  weeks,  and 
this  is  not  to  be  wondered  at,  seeing  there  was  no  hope  of 
achieving  anything  decisive  by  such  offensive  operations  as 
were  feasible,  while  on  the  other  hand  there  were  reasons 
why  the  force  could  neither  be  withdrawn  nor  reduced. 

As  might  be  expected,  the  enemy  exploited  the  position 


278        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

to  his  own  advantage,  and  frequently  spread  false  reports 
of  his  intention  to  make  a  preponderating  attack  and  drive 
the  Allies  into  the  sea.  What  was  worse,  the  reports 
sometimes  had  the  desired  effect  of  inducing  the  Allied 
Governments  to  reinforce  this  front  at  the  expense  of  the 
West  Front,  and  so  use  up  shipping  which  could  have 
been  more  profitably  employed  in  other  ways,  and  at  the 
same  time  that  shipping  became  an  additional  target  for 
submarine  attack.  Nothing  pleased  the  enemy  more  than 
to  see  the  Alhes  add  to  the  number  of  their  troops  in 
this  theatre,  which  he  facetiously  described  as  the  "entente 
internment  camp."  I  remember  that  considerable  excite- 
ment once  prevailed  because  Falkenhayn,  who  had  recently 
ceased  to  be  the  Chief  of  the  German  General  Staff,  was 
reported  to  have  arrived  in  Macedonia,  and  although  the 
British  General  Staff  discredited  the  rumour  some  of  the 
Allies  insisted  that  it  was  true.  Later,  the  Falkenhayn 
turned  out  to  be  a  major  having  a  somewhat  similar  name 
who  was  the  German  mihtary  attache  in  Greece. 

The  Macedonian  campaign  was  the  more  difficult  to 
conduct  because  of  the  mixture  of  nationalities  in  the  Allied 
forces,  for  although  General  Sarrail  was  theoretically  in 
supreme  command  of  the  whole,  no  important  measure  could 
be  taken  without  reference  to  the  Governments  concerned. 
The  entire  campaign,  in  fact,  was  complicated  and  tiresome, 
and  more  conferences  were  held,  either  at  London  or  in 
France,  in  regard  to  it  than  to  any  other  military  question. 
Even  when  it  did  not  figure  in  the  agenda  it  invariably 
obtruded  itself  before  the  conference  dispersed,  and  it  is 
no  exaggeration  to  say  that  at  one  period  it  made  more 
demands  on  the  time  and  temper  of  ministers  and  their 
naval  and  military  advisers  than  all  the  other  campaigns 
put  together.  Fortunately  for  the  General  Staff  we  had  a 
very  level-headed  General,  Milne,  in  command  of  the  British 
contingent,  upon  whom  we  could  always  rely  to  give  a 
sound  opinion  and  make  the  best  use  of  the  troops  he  had. 
Milne  was  an  old  comrade  of  mine,  having  served  with  me 
on  Lord  Roberts'  staff  in  South  Africa,  and  under  me  in 
the  Intelligence  Division  at  the  War  Office  when  in  charge 
of  the  Balkans  section. 


GENERAL  SMUTS  279 

Throughout  the  war,  ministers  never  seemed  able  to 
understand,  what  educated  soldiers  well  know,  that  the 
employment  of  troops  of  different  armies  in  the  same 
operation  is  attended  with  many  difficulties  and  complica- 
tions, and  that  the  aggregate  fighting  value  of  the  force  is 
thereby  reduced  to  a  corresponding  degree.  Mihtary  salads 
of  this  kind  are  sometimes  justifiable  and  may  be  unavoidable, 
but  it  must  be  remembered  that  the  mere  counting  of  heads 
may  give  quite  a  wrong  impression  of  the  capabilities  of  the 
force,  and  that  the  appointment  of  an  Allied  Commander- 
in-Chief  does  not  entirely  remove  the  disadvantages  in- 
curred, though  in  some  respects  it  may  perhaps  mitigate 
them. 

The  enemy  acted  more  wisely  than  we  did,  either  from 
choice  or  necessity,  and  kept  his  different  nationalities  on 
separate  fronts  where  they  could  most  conveniently  be 
placed  and  maintained.  Thus,  there  were  Germans  on  the 
West  Front,  Austrians  on  the  Itahan  Front,  Germans  and 
Austrians  on  different  sections  of  the  Russian  Front,  Bulgars 
in  Macedonia,  and  Turks  in  Asia.  From  this  principle  he 
seldom  departed,  except  for  the  purpose  of  temporarily 
stiffening  a  wobbhng  ally,  or  of  providing  for  a  special 
operation  the  requisite  reinforcements  which  could  not  be 
found  in  any  other  manner. 

In  East  Africa  the  campaign  had  commenced  with  the 
despatch  of  an  expeditionary  force  from  India  to  Mombasa 
in  August  19 14,  and  at  the  end  of  19 15  the  position  was  such 
that  the  Government  decided,  just  before  I  became  C.I.G.S., 
to  send  out  reinforcements,  the  bulk  of  which  were  to  be 
provided  by  South  Africa.  Sir  Horace  Smith- Dorrien  was 
appointed  to  the  chief  command,  but  in  consequence  of 
temporary  ill-health  he  was  unable  to  proceed  beyond  Cape 
Town,  and  his  place  was  taken  by  General  Smuts.  The 
latter  was  succeeded  at  the  end  of  1916  by  General  Van 
Dewenter. 

The  campaign,  though  comparatively  a  minor  one,  was 
attended  by  great  hardships,  owing  to  the  nature  and  chmate 
of  the  country,  the  absence  of  roads,  and  the  distances  to 
be  covered,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  German  commander, 
Von  Lettow,  displayed  commendable  skill  in  the  way  he 


28o         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

employed  his  troops — mainly  native  levies — and  sustained 
their  morale  under  what  must  have  seemed  to  them  rather 
disheartening  conditions.  Although  the  enemy  was  given 
no  rest,  first  by  Smuts  and  then  by  Van  Dewenter,  the 
operations  dragged  on  for  a  long  time,  and  in  the  circum- 
stances this  could  not  be  avoided.  It  was  a  matter  of 
patience  and  perseverance  both  on  the  part  of  commanders 
and  troops,  and  in  the  end  they  had  their  reward.  The 
enemy's  elusive  tactics  were  gradually  worn  threadbare,  his 
troops  were  broken  up  into  detachments  without  cohesion, 
and  the  last  of  them  were  driven  from  East  Africa  into 
Portuguese  territory  in  December  1917. 

In  an  earlier  chapter  I  have  mentioned  that  a  Staff 
College  training  is  a  great  help  in  war  to  officers  employed  on 
the  staff  or  in  command  of  troops,  in  that  it  enables  them 
to  understand  each  other's  methods  and  generally  to  work 
together  easily  and  efficiently.  This  advantage  is  the  more 
valuable  when  intercommunication  is  limited  to  the  tele- 
graph, and,  again,  if  the  officers  concerned  are  not  personally 
known  to  each  other.  Before  the  Great  War  Generals  Smuts 
and  Van  Dewenter  were  known  to  me  only  by  name,  and  as 
they  were  not  only  not  Staff  College  graduates  but  did  not 
belong  to  the  British  army,  I  wish  to  say  that  from  first  to 
last  I  found  no  difficulty  whatever  in  working  with  them. 
Their  telegrams  were  models  of  lucidity  and  conveyed  just 
the  information  and  advice  that  the  General  Staff  required 
to  have,  and  I  trust  that  the  two  Generals  felt  equally 
satisfied  at  their  end  of  the  wire.  If  they  did  not  I  owe  them 
a  further  debt  of  gratitude,  for  they  invariably  interpreted 
the  instructions  it  was  my  duty  to  send  them  in  the  way  in 
which  they  were  intended  to  be  understood. 

On  the  West  Front  the  most  conspicuous  events  during 
1916  were  the  battles  of  Verdim  and  the  Somme.  The  attack 
on  Verdun  was  a  desperate  bid  to  cripple  the  French  armies 
beyond  hope  of  recovery,  and  lasted  from  the  21st  of  February 
to  the  1st  of  July,  the  opening  day  of  the  battle  of  the  Somme, 
which  in  its  turn  did  not  end  till  the  17th  of  November.  The 
Somme  was  the  first  occasion  on  which  our  resources  in  men, 
guns,  and  ammunition  enabled  us  to  start  an  offensive  with 
a  reasonable  chance  of  success.    They  were  not  entirely  as 


THE  SOMME  281 

good  as  could  have  been  desired,  but  they  were  infinitely 
superior  to  anything  we  had  enjoyed  before. 

Coupled  with  the  heavy  punishment  meted  out  by  the 
French  at  Verdun,  who  firmly  and  patiently  fought  on  while 
we  completed  our  preparations,  the  Somme  battle  marked 
a  definite  stage  on  the  road  to  victory.  The  final  overthrow 
of  the  enemy  was  henceforward  no  longer  in  doubt,  provided 
the  Allies  resolutely  kept  up  the  pressure  at  the  decisive 
point  and  resisted  the  temptation  to  embark  on  side  issues. 
In  support  of  this  opinion  I  shall  quote  Ludendorff's  account 
of  the  condition  of  the  German  armies  at  the  time.  He  says, 
"  The  strain  during  this  year  (1916)  had  proved  too  great. 
The  endurance  of  the  troops  had  been  weakened  by  long 
spells  of  defence  under  the  powerful  enemy  artillery  fire  and 
their  own  losses.  We  were  completely  exhausted  on  the 
Western  Front.  .  .  .  We  now  urgently  needed  a  rest.  The  army 
had  been  fought  to  a  standstill  and  was  utterly  worn  out." 
(The  italics  are  mine.) 

But  the  far-reaching  effects  of  the  year's  fighting  on  this 
front  were  not  in  all  cases  appreciated  by  ministers,  some 
of  whom  asserted  that  the  battle  of  the  Somme  had  been 
a  ghastly  failure,  and  persisted  in  measuring  the  amount  of 
our  success  by  the  kilometres  of  ground  gained,  with  little  or 
no  regard  to  the  moral  ascendancy  our  troops  had  established. 
Moreover,  although  there  was  plenty  of  evidence  that  the 
enemy  had  suffered  heavily,  both  in  men  and  morale,  the 
Alhes  had  themselves  sustained  great  losses,  and  millions 
of  German  troops  were  yet  in  the  field.  On  the  Eastern 
Front  Brusiloff's  celebrated  advance  had  resulted  in  the 
capture  of  half  a  milHon  prisoners  and  an  enormous  amount 
of  war  material,  but  the  Russians  had  also  lost  heavily,  and 
throughout  their  ranks  the  sinister  influence  of  German  pro- 
paganda continued  to  spread  with  demorahsing  effect.  The 
Rumanians,  who  had  joined  the  Allies  on  28th  August, 
had  been  thrown  back  from  Transylvania  and  through 
Wallachia,  and  three  whole  Russian  armies  had  been  sent 
south  to  save  the  situation.  Finally,  the  enemy  was  care- 
ful to  play  on  the  fears  and  nerves  of  those  who,  unac- 
quainted with  the  practical  side  of  war  in  general  and  with 
the  conditions  of  the  Great  War  in  particular,  were  apt  to 


282         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

give  more  attention  to  his  cunningly-devised  communiques 
than  to  the  importance  of  strict  adherence  to  sound 
strategical  principles. 

In  face  of  these  circumstances  it  was  uphill  work  trying 
to  convince  some  of  those  with  whom  I  was  brought  into 
contact  that,  given  perseverance  in  the  right  direction, 
victory  was  assured.  Such  a  statement  would  be  received 
with  an  impatient  shrug  of  the  shoulders  as  if  to  say,  "  We 
have  heard  the  same  story  scores  of  times  before,  and  are 
still  as  far  from  winning  the  war  as  ever  we  were."  As 
might  be  expected,  this  dissatisfaction,  or  disappointment, 
was  the  most  pronounced  when  the  fighting  was  severe,  and 
it  would  be  argued  that,  as  the  attacker  was  more  exposed 
to  loss  in  crossing  the  open  than  the  defender  was  in  his 
dug-out,  the  right  policy  for  us  was  to  assume  a  defensive 
role  and  leave  the  enemy  to  do  the  attacking.  The  whole 
problem  appeared  to  be,  so  it  was  said,  purely  one  of 
mathematics.  To  this  I  would  demur,  pointing  out  that 
although  the  attacker  might  at  first  be  the  heavier  loser 
he  might  hope  to  make  a  good  bag  later,  and  that  there 
were  other  things  to  be  taken  into  account  besides  figures. 
Armies  like  boxers,  I  would  observe,  could  not  possibly  win 
battles,  and  certainly  not  wars,  if  they  restricted  their 
efforts  to  self-defence  and  never  led  off  to  damage  their 
opponents  ;  the  preliminary  step  to  victory  was,  as  always, 
the  wearing-down  of  the  enemy's  power  of  resistance,  and 
this  was  not  to  be  achieved  without  loss. 

Fresh  ground  would  then  be  taken  up  by  my  questioners, 
who  would  suggest  that  as  Russia  had  many  millions  of  men 
at  her  disposal  while  we  were  short  of  them,  she  and  not  we 
ought  to  undertake  the  wearing-down  business.  We  could 
provide  her  with  the  armament  she  needed,  of  which  we 
would  require  less,  and  incidentally  the  plan  would  solve 
our  man-power  difficulties,  leaving  a  greater  number  of 
men  available  for  employment  in  those  industries  which  it 
was  essential  for  financial  and  other  reasons  to  maintain. 
To  this  I  replied  that  perhaps  Russia  might  not  make  such 
good  use  of  the  armament  as  would  our  own  troops,  and 
that  in  any  case  it  would  be  wise  to  equip  the  latter  with 
what  they  still  wanted  before  giving  too  much  away.     To 


THE  WILL  TO  WIN  283 

some  extent  this  advice  prevailed,  but  not  so  far  as  could 
have  been  wished,  and  much  of  the  armament  as  well  as 
other  war  material  sent  to  Russia  was  put  to  indifferent 
use,  or  not  used  at  all,  while  some  of  it,  falling  into  the 
enemy's  hands,  was  eventually  used  against  us  on  the 
West  Front. 

Discussions  of  this  nature  were  bound  to  arise,  for  we 
had  suffered  unprecedented  losses,  and  it  was  the  duty  of 
ministers  to  consider  every  means  of  reducing  them  in  future. 
The  case  was  much  more  serious  when,  from  the  end  of 
1916  onwards,  a  desire  was  evinced  to  adopt  not  only  new 
tactics  but  new  strategy  —  strategy  that  would  find  a 
"  way  round  "  to  victory  in  place  of  courting  heavy  losses 
in  trying  to  achieve  what  was  held  to  be  impossible,  the 
defeat  of  the  enemy  on  the  West  Front.  There,  it  was  said, 
the  existing  stalemate  would  continue,  and  we  ought  to 
show  greater  "imagination"  in  our  plans.  We  were  too 
wooden  in  our  ideas  and  too  heavy-footed  in  our  movements. 
"  Why  go  on  battering  our  heads  against  a  brick  wall  ? 
Why  not  follow  the  example  of  Germany  which  has  been  so 
successful  in  Servia,  Russia,  and  Rumania,  and  give  first  a 
punch  here  and  then  a  punch  there  ?  "  I  was  once  asked, 
while  the  speaker,  suiting  the  action  to  the  word,  struck  out 
right  and  left  with  his  clenched  lists  against  the  imaginary 
foe.  I  could  only  reply  that  the  conditions  were  not  the 
same,  and  that  although  war  was  certainly  not  an  exact 
science,  and  had  no  fixed  code  of  rules,  there  was  in  it  one 
good  working  principle — the  concentration  of  superior  force 
at  the  decisive  point — which  could  never  be  disregarded 
without  great  risk,  and  which,  if  whole-heartedly  applied, 
would  generally  bring  success. 

The  persistence  with  which  views  such  as  the  above  were 
pressed  forward  caused  me  much  anxiety,  but  consolation 
could  always  be  had  from  the  knowledge  that  the  same 
thing  had  happened  in  past  wars  and  that  in  spite  of  it  we 
had  won  in  the  end.  That  valuable  book  Ordeal  by  Battle 
contains  some  pertinent  remarks  on  this  subject,  which  I 
extracted,  kept  on  my  table,  and  frequently  read.  I  hope 
that  the  author,  Mr,  F.  S.  Ohver,  will  not  object  to  my 
reproducing  them  here.     They  are  as  follows  : 


284         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

As  we  read  and  re-read  British  history  we  cannot  bat  be 
impressed  with  the  fact  that  our  leading  statesmen,  misled  by 
the  very  brilliancy  of  their  intellectual  endowments,  have 
always  been  prone  to  two  errors  of  policy  which  the  simpler 
mind  of  the  soldier  instinctively  avoids.  They  have  ever  been 
too  ready  to  conclude  prematurely  that  a  certain  line  of  obstacles 
is  so  formidable  that  it  cannot  be  forced  ;  and  they  have  also 
ever  been  too  ready  to  accept  the  notion  that  there  must  surely 
be  some  ingenious  far  way  round,  by  which  they  may  succeed 
in  circumventing  the  infinite. 

The  defect  of  brilliant  brains  is  not  necessarily  a  want  of 
courage — daring  there  has  usually  been  in  plenty — but  they  are 
apt  to  lack  fortitude.  They  are  apt  to  abandon  the  assault  upon 
positions  which  are  not  really  invulnerable,  and  to  go  off,  chasing 
after  attractive  butterflies,  until  they  fall  into  quagmires.  Dis- 
persion of  effort  has  always  been  the  besetting  sin  of  British 
statesmen  and  the  curse  of  British  policy.  There  is  no  clearer 
example  of  this  than  the  case  of  William  Pitt  the  Younger,  who 
went  on  picking  up  sugar  islands  all  over  the  world  when  he  ought 
to  have  been  giving  his  whole  strength  to  beating  Napoleon. 

Very  few  obstacles  are  really  insurmountable,  and  it  is  usually 
the  shortest  and  the  safest  course  to  stick  to  what  has  been 
already  begun.  Especially  is  this  the  case  when  your  resources 
in  trained  soldiers  and  munitions  of  war  are  painfully  restricted. 
At  the  one  point,  where  you  have  decided  to  attack,  the  motto  is 
push  hard  ;  and  at  all  others,  where  you  may  be  compelled  to 
defend  yourselves,  the  motto  is  hold  fast. 

The  peril  of  British  war  councils  in  the  past  has  always  been 
(and  may  be  still  is)  the  tendency  of  ingenious  argument  to  get 
the  better  of  sound  judgement.  In  the  very  opposite  of  this 
lies  safety.  We  find  the  true  type  of  high  policy,  as  well  as  of 
successful  campaigning,  in  the  cool  and  patient  inflexibility  of 
Wellington,  holding  fast  by  one  main  idea,  forcing  his  way  over 
one  obstacle  after  another  which  had  been  pronounced  invincible 
— through  walled  cities,  into  the  deep  valleys  of  the  Pyrenees, 
across  the  Bidassoa — till  from  the  crests  of  the  Great  Rhune  and 
the  Little  his  soldiers  looked  down  at  last  upon  the  plains  of 
France. 

Further  reference  to  the  different  plans  proposed  for 
1917  will  be  made  in  the  next  chapter,  but  mention  should 
be  made  here  of  the  plan  for  the  West  Front  drawn  up  in 
November  1916  at  a  conference  of  the  Allied  Commanders-in- 
Chief  held  at  Chantilly  under  the  presidency  of  General  Joffre, 
and  at  which  I  was  present.    The  exhausted  condition  of 


PLANS  FOR  1917  285 

the  German  armies  was  not  then  as  well  known  to  us  as  it 
has  since  become,  but  we  knew  sufficient  about  it  to  realise 
the  wisdom  of  taking  full  advantage  of  the  successes  gained 
in  the  Verdun  and  Somme  campaigns,  first  by  continuing  to 
exert  pressure  on  the  Somme  front,  so  far  as  the  winter 
season  would  permit,  and  secondly  by  preparing  to  attack 
the  enemy  early  in  1917,  with  all  the  resources  that  could 
be  made  available,  before  he  had  had  time  to  recover  from 
his  difficulties.  The  conference  decided  upon  a  plan  of  this 
nature,  but  it  was  not  carried  out,  as  General  Nivelle,  who 
shortly  afterwards  replaced  General  Joffre  in  the  command 
of  the  French  armies,  substituted  another  plan,  and,  as  will 
be  explained  in  the  next  chapter,  this  change  had  the  effect 
of  postponing  the  date  of  the  opening  of  the  combined 
offensive. 

Whilst  at  the  War  Office,  as  well  as  before  that  time,  I 
had  been  on  the  most  friendly  terms  with  General  Joffre, 
and  happening  to  be  in  Paris  shortly  after  he  vacated  his 
command  I  called  one  evening  at  his  house.  What  passed 
between  us  I  shall  not  repeat,  but  it  will  be  no  breach  of 
confidence  to  say  that  such  references  as  were  made  to  his 
replacement  showed  him  to  be  a  great  patriot,  actuated  by 
the  sole  desire  to  serve  his  country  faithfully,  though  he 
naturally  felt  disappointed  in  being  deprived  of  the  oppor- 
tunity of  leading  to  victory  the  armies  he  loved  so  well, 
and  with  whom  he  had  stood  up  against  the  onslaught  of 
19 14  and  afterwards  held  the  enemy  at  bay  for  two  years 
while  our  armies  were  being  prepared  to  come  to  his  aid. 
One  end  of  his  room  was  packed  with  floral  tributes  sent 
by  his  admiring  countrymen,  and  he  told  me  of  many 
other  testimonies  of  affection  and  confidence  which  he  had 
received  from  those  who  appreciated  the  value  of  his 
services.  I  have  never  seen  a  more  pathetic  picture  than 
this  fine  old  soldier,  who  had  hitherto  been  the  most 
prominent  figure  in  the  Allied  armies  and  was  now  prevented 
from  reaping  the  success  which  his  stout  heart  and  indomit- 
able will  had  made  possible.  France  produced  many  capable 
Generals  in  the  Great  War,  but  it  would  be  hard  to  think  of 
one  better  qualified  than  General  Joffre,  if  as  well,  to  be  at 
the  head  of  her  troops  during  the  early  stages  of  it,  especially 


286         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

in  August  1914  when  a  repetition  of  the  failure  of  1870  was 
deemed  sufficiently  imminent  to  justify  the  removal  of  the 
seat  of  government  from  Paris  to  Bordeaux. 

I  can  speak  with  some  personal  knowledge  on  this  point, 
for  I  saw  Joffre  on  two  or  three  critical  occasions  in  August 
and  September  of  1914,  one  of  them  being  at  two  o'clock 
in  the  morning  after  he  had  made  a  long  motor  drive.  This 
is  an  hour  when  a  man's  courage  and  judgment  are  not  at 
their  best,  and  for  myself  I  have  always  regarded  with 
suspicion  pessimistic  telegrams  sent  from  the  front  after 
II  P.M.  But  although  the  situation  was  as  bad  as  it 
could  be — hence  Joffre's  journey — he  was  as  calm  and 
imperturbable  as  ever,  and  one  felt  him  to  be  a  real  tower 
of  strength  against  which  weaker  natures  might  confidently 
lean  for  support.  When  his  original  plan  for  meeting  the 
enemy  in  1914  had  collapsed  he  carried  on  his  shoulders  a 
burden  which  would  have  broken  down  an  ordinary  man, 
but  he  never  wavered  in  his  determination  to  return  to  the 
attack.  The  opportunity  for  this  came  at  the  Mame  in  the 
first  week  of  September,  and  he  seized  it  with  such  prompti- 
tude and  success  as  will  always  place  him  in  the  front  rank 
of  great  commanders. 

When  making  one  of  my  periodical  visits  to  Paris  in 
1917  I  invited  Joffre,  then  a  Marechal,  to  dine  with  me  at 
the  Hotel  Crillon  and  meet  a  few  British  officers  with  whom 
he  was  acquainted.  We  had  a  most  enjoyable  evening,  the 
Marechal  evidently  being  very  gratified  at  the  attention 
shown  him,  and  he  told  me  a  good  deal  about  his  anxieties 
and  intentions  during  the  early  part  of  the  war.  Whilst 
we  were  at  dinner  it  became  known  outside  that  Pere 
Joffre  was  at  the  hotel,  and  on  leaving  he  received  a 
tremendous  ovation  from  the  crowd  which  had  assembled  in 
the  Place  de  la  Concorde. 

Like  most  other  senior  French  generals  Joffre  absolutely 
refused  to  converse  in  any  language  except  his  own,  but 
he  was  quick  to  grasp  the  sense  of  what  was  said  to  him, 
no  matter  how  quaint  the  words  or  vile  the  pronunciation. 
Once  when  having  dejeuner  together  at  his  headquarters 
we  were  discussing  a  new  plan  which  had  been  suggested 
for  winning  the  war,  and  for  the  moment  I  could  think  of 


LORD  KITCHENER'S  DEATH  287 

no  more  apt  remark  to  make  about  it  than  that  if  it  were 
attempted  we  would  find  ourselves  in  the  soup.  Not 
knowing  how  to  render  the  phrase  in  idiomatic  French,  I 
gave  it  to  him  literally  as,  "  nous  nous  trouverons  dans 
le  consomme."  He  immediately  tumbled  to  the  meaning, 
and  immensely  enjoyed  my  lion-hearted  effort  not  to  be 
defeated. 

In  December  1916  Mr.  Lloyd  George  became  Prime 
Minister  in  place  of  Mr.  Asquith,  Lord  Derby  succeeding 
the  former  as  Secretary  of  State  for  War.  All  public  men 
are  liable  to  be  either  over-praised  or  over-blamed,  and 
whether  Mr.  Asquith  was  or  was  not  an  exception  to  the  rule 
is  no  business  of  mine.  I  may  say,  however,  that  my  experi- 
ence of  him  as  Prime  Minister — which  extended  over  more 
than  half  the  duration  of  the  war,  and  the  most  difficult 
part  of  it — was  that  he  showed  a  much  more  sympathetic 
recognition  of  the  difficulties  with  which  our  commanders 
and  troops  in  the  field  were  faced  than  did  some  of  his 
colleagues  ;  and  he  was  always  ready  to  give  an  impartial 
hearing  to  the  views  of  the  General  Staff,  whether  able  to 
accept  them  or  not. 

Lord  Kitchener's  tragic  death  in  June  1916  was  an 
irreparable  loss  to  the  Empire  and  to  the  Entente.  He 
was  easily  the  most  outstanding  personality  at  the  Allied 
conferences,  and  was  listened  to  with  more  deference 
than  was  vouchsafed  to  any  one  else  during  the  two  and  a 
half  years  that  I  attended  these  meetings.  At  the  War 
Office  and  in  Downing  Street  I  found  him  to  be  a 
staunch  supporter  of  the  General  Staff,  and  his  aptitude  for 
detecting  essentials  enabled  him  to  give  us  much  con- 
structive assistance.  I  did  not  realise  how  valuable  his 
help  was  until  deprived  of  it,  when,  in  addition  to  carrying 
my  own  load,  I  had  to  shoulder  as  best  I  could  part  of  the 
load  which  he  had  hitherto  borne.  Without  quite  knowing 
why  sometimes,  he  had  a  wonderful  knack  in  being  right 
in  the  things  that  really  mattered. 

For  some  months  before  his  death  it  was  common  talk 
that  his  relations  with  certain  members  of  the  Government 
were  the  reverse  of  happy,  and  that  intrigues  were  afoot 
to  get  him  removed  from  the  Cabinet.     What  amount  of 


288         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

truth  there  was  in  this  gossip  I  do  not  pretend  to  know, 
but  I  had  not  been  a  week  in  the  War  Office  before  I  was 
warned  by  a  friend  that  "  they  "  hoped  I  would  "  down  K." 
He  did  not  say  who  "  they  "  were,  and  my  reply  was 
that  I  was  not  concerned  with  "  downing  "  anybody,  and 
certainly  not  Lord  Kitchener. 

Like  some  other  great  men  Lord  Kitchener  was  exacting, 
and  had  no  use  whatever  for  those  who  raised  petty  diffi- 
culties at  a  time  when  prompt  action  was  required  ;  while 
as  to  his  alleged  habit  of  over-centralisation  all  I  can  say 
is  that  it  was  never  displayed  during  the  six  months  I  had 
the  privilege  of  working  with  him,  and  that  he  was  as  ready 
to  listen  to  the  advice  of  his  departmental  heads  as  were 
any  of  the  other  seven  Secretaries  of  State  under  whom 
I  have  worked.  Nor  did  he  disclose  any  sign  of  that 
ruthless  and  domineering  disposition  attributed  to  him  by 
those  who  wished  to  injure  his  good  name.  On  the 
contrary,  he  was  a  kind  and  delightful  chief  to  serve,  once 
his  ways  were  understood  ;  and  I  know  that  he  many  times 
stood  up  against  opposition  in  high  quarters  so  as  to  protect 
officers  who  were  threatened  with  unfair  treatment.  As  an 
instance  of  this,  his  last  words  to  me  were,  when  I  said 
good-bye  to  him  on  the  eve  of  his  departure  to  Russia  : 

"  Remember  what  I  have  told  you  about and  mind  you 

look  after  him."  The  officer  in  question  was  then  being 
subjected  to  a  persecution  which  Lord  Kitchener  thought 
to  be  undeserved. 

Of  all  ministers  and  soldiers,  so  far  as  my  knowledge 
goes,  Lord  Kitchener  alone  was  convinced  from  the  first 
that  the  war  would  be  one  of  prolonged  attrition.  Ever 
looking  further  forward  than  his  contemporaries,  he  always 
maintained  in  his  talks  with  me  that  1917  would  be  the 
decisive  year,  and  this  conception  might  have  proved  re- 
markably correct  had  not  the  clock  been  put  back  twelve 
months  by  the  Russian  revolution,  which  he,  no  more  than 
all  others  at  the  time,  could  foresee  would  occur.  Indeed, 
it  might  have  proved  accurate  notwithstanding  the  revolu- 
tion had  not  the  Chantilly  plan  for  the  West  Front  in  1917 
been  rejected. 

There  were  officers  who,  holding  high  posts  in  London 


LORD  KITCHENER'S  WORK  289 

before  1914,  enjoyed  all  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from 
a  constant  study  of  the  problem  of  war  with  Germany,  and 
who  yet  utterly  failed,  not  only  at  first  but  for  months 
afterwards,  to  grasp  the  character  and  magnitude  of  the 
struggle.  Lord  Kitchener,  having  none  of  these  privileges, 
and  without  any  War  Office  or  other  home  experience  to 
guide  him,  and  suddenly  summoned  to  assume  supreme 
military  charge,  at  once  perceived,  with  a  marvellous  in- 
stinct, the  stupendous  effort  the  Empire  must  make.  He 
developed  our  military  forces  with  a  rapidity  previously 
unknown  to  the  world,  and  to  an  extent  imdreamt  of  by  his 
predecessors  in  Whitehall,  and  not  only  did  he  not  fail — as 
his  detractors  have  said — to  realise  the  importance  of  in- 
creasing the  output  of  munitions,  but  he  achieved  much  in 
this  respect  for  which  the  credit  has  been  assigned  to  or 
filched  by  others.  The  unexpected  enormous  demand  for 
munitions,  foreseen  by  nobody,  not  even  by  the  systemati- 
cally-prepared Germany,  could  not  be  met  by  a  stroke  of 
the  pen.  There  were  no  Krupp's  works  in  England.  It 
must  be  a  matter  of  many  months,  and  if  blame  is  to  be 
cast  upon  any  one  for  the  shortage  in  19 14-15,  it  should  be 
attributed  to  those  ministers  and  their  mihtary  advisers 
who  held  office  in  the  years  before  the  war. 

Lord  Kitchener  was  as  fully  alive  to  the  necessity  for 
increasing  the  output  of  munitions  as  for  increasing  the 
number  of  divisions,  and  when  proposals  of  this  kind  were 
submitted  to  him  he  usually  doubled  the  amount  recom- 
mended, thus  earning  for  himself  the  nickname  of  the 
"  doubler."  As  to  the  progress  actually  made,  it  may  be 
mentioned  that  between  the  autumn  of  1915  and  mid- 
summer of  1916 — i.e.  just  before  the  battle  of  the  Somme 
— the  supply  of  heavy  gims,  howitzers,  machine-guns, 
and  ammunition  to  the  field  armies  was  very  largely 
increased,  and  this  was  mainly  the  work  of  the  War  Office 
and  not  of  the  Munitions  Ministry,  which,  doing  valuable 
work  later,  had  not  yet  had  time  to  make  itself  felt  at 
the  front. 

On  the  whole  I  would  say  that  the  achievements  and 
foresight  of  Lord  Kitchener  place  him  in  a  class  entirely  by 
himself ;  and  they  justify  the  conclusion  that  no  man  in 

u 


290         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

any  of  the  Entente  countries  accomplished  more,  if  as  much, 
to  bring  about  the  final  defeat  of  the  enemy. 

A  few  days  before  he  left  for  Russia  I  was  due  to  inspect 
the  cadets  at  the  Royal  Military  Academy,  Woolwich,  and 
thinking  that  he  would  enjoy  a  brief  respite  from  his  War 
Office  duties  I  asked  him  to  go  in  my  place.  At  first  he 
demurred,  but  in  the  end  he  went,  and  in  this  way  it  came 
about  that  he  held  his  last  parade  on  the  same  ground  where, 
as  a  cadet,  he  had  begun  his  military  life  some  forty-seven 
years  before. 

In  order  to  fill  in  the  details  of  my  own  career,  and  at 
the  risk  of  being  accused  of  partiality  in  the  above  apprecia- 
tion of  Lord  Kitchener,  I  must  add  that,  quite  unknown  to 
me,  one  of  his  last  acts  at  the  War  Office  was  to  recommend 
to  the  King  that  I  should  be  promoted  General.  This 
promotion  was  announced  in  the  London  Gazette  of  the 
3rd  June  1916,  or  about  twenty-eight  years  after  the  date 
of  my  first  commission. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

CHIEF   OF   THE   IMPERIAL   GENERAL   STAFF,    I917-18 

Allied  Conference  at  Rome — Method  of  conducting  these  conferences — 
Admiral  Bacon — Dover  Patrol — Relations  with  Admiralty  Staff — 
Admirals  Jellicoe  and  Wemyss — Reorganisation  of  Admiralty  Staff 
— Lord  Fisher — Visit  to  Italian  Front — General  Staff  views  on 
man-power — Dif&culty  of  providing  drafts — Question  many  times 
raised  during  191 7 — Young  soldier  battalions — Events  on  Russian 
front — Palestine  Campaign — Operations  on  West  Front — Nivelle 
replaced  by  Petain — Foch  becomes  Chief  of  French  General  Staff — 
My  relations  with  him  —  Messines  —  Passchendaele  —  Cambrai — 
Defeat  of  Itahans — Alternative  plans  suggested  during  the  year — 
Evils  attending  unnecessary  changes  of  plan — Difficulty  of  keeping 
strategical  direction  of  war  on  right  lines — Consideration  by  General 
Staff  of  plans  for  191 8 — Conclusions  reached — Anxiety  regarding 
man-power  and  shipping — Generals  Pershing  and  BUss — Question 
of  unity  of  command — Various  proposals  made  in  191 5 — Calais 
agreement  of  February  191 7 — Consideration  by  mihtary  authorities 
in  summer  of  191 7 — Rapallo  Conference  estabUshes  a  Supreme 
War  Council — A  pohtical  not  a  military  body — The  technical 
advisers  of  the  Council  become  executive  officers — Am  unable  to 
accept  the  Government  arrangement  for  giving  effect  to  this  system 
— This  leads  to  my  removal  from  the  War  Ofdce — Measures  taken 
after  the  German  offensive  in  March  191 8 — My  indebtedness  to 
many  friends  whilst  C.I.G.S. 

In  the  first  week  of  January  1917  I  went  with  certain 
ministers  of  the  newly-formed  War  Cabinet  to  Rome,  where 
an  Allied  Conference  was  to  be  held  to  consider  future  plans. 
We  travelled  from  Paris  in  company  with  M.  Briand,  M. 
Thomas,  General  (now  Marshal)  Lyautey,  and  other  French 
representatives.  M.  Briand,  who  had  been  Prime  Minister 
since  October  1915,  was  a  delightful  fellow-traveller,  and  the 
life  and  soul  of  the  party.  General  Lyautey  had  just  been 
appointed  War  Minister  from  the  position  of  Governor- 
General  of  Morocco.  He  also  was  an  interesting  personality, 
and,  being  of  a  type  more  suited  for  business  in  the  field 
than  in  parliament,  he  apparently  did  not  expect  to  hold 

291 


292         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

office  for  more  than  a  short  time .  He  ceased  to  be  War  Minister, 
and  returned  to  Morocco,  two  months  later,  when  M.  Ribot 
replaced  M.  Briand,  M.  Painleve,  a  famous  mathematician 
and  scientist,  then  becoming  War  Minister.  Generals  Sarrail 
and  Milne  from  Macedonia  also  attended  the  conference, 
and  the  principal  ItaUan  representatives  were  M.  BoselH  and 
Baron  Sonnino,  Prime  Minister  and  Foreign  Minister  re- 
spectively. Many  Allied  conferences  had  been  held  in  1916, 
either  at  London,  Paris,  or  Calais,  but  this  was  the  first  to 
take  place  in  Italy,  and  the  Itahans  gave  us  a  most  hospitable 
reception. 

The  number  of  persons  present  at  these  conferences  was 
seldom  less  than  a  score,  and  when  the  whole  of  the  Allies 
were  represented  the  number  would  approximate  to  a  hun- 
dred or  more.  Besides  the  delegates  of  the  various  small 
countries,  each  of  the  principal  Powers  would,  as  a  rule,  be 
represented  by  its  Prime  Minister,  the  ministers  for  foreign 
affairs,  the  army,  navy,  and  munitions,  these  being  accom- 
panied by  their  professional  advisers,  commanders-in-chief, 
secretaries,  and  other  assistants. 

The  extent  to  which  the  conferences  were  productive  of 
decisions  largely  depended,  as  at  all  conferences,  on  the 
personahty  of  the  president,  who  was  invariably  the  Prime 
Minister  of  the  country  in  which  the  meeting  was  being 
held.  M.  Clemenceau  stood  out  by  himself  in  this  respect. 
He  had  a  tactful,  but  nevertheless  masterful,  way  of  getting 
through  the  business  on  hand,  and  I  can  recollect  many 
instances  when  he  succeeded  in  extracting  a  decision  and 
bringing  to  an  end  the  discussion  of  thorny  questions  which 
threatened  to  be  both  abortive  and  interminable. 

The  proceedings  were  the  more  prolonged,  not  to  say 
tedious,  because  they  usually  had  to  be  conducted  in  two 
languages,  French  and  EngUsh.  Some  of  the  English  repre- 
sentatives could  neither  speak  nor  understand  French ;  whilst 
most  of  the  French  and  the  other  foreign  representatives  had 
little  or  no  knowledge  of  English.  Consequently  not  only 
had  the  greater  part  of  the  discussion  to  be  duplicated,  but 
while  it  was  being  interpreted  for  the  benefit  of  those  who 
had  not  understood  the  original,  those  who  had  understood 
it  were  apt  to  engage  in  whispered  conversation  amongst 


'^—-rr-    "■':     »_                            ■»--    /Ite^'    iillf           ■*- 

• 

* 

'        1 

\ 

I'SiV 

I      •   ? 

« 

_      < 

—       w 


ADMIRAL  BACON  293 

themselves  and  so  distract  the  attention  of  those  who  were 
trying  to  Hsten  to  the  translation.  The  translation,  too,  as 
is  usually  the  case,  did  not  always  convey  the  intended 
meaning,  the  result  being  that  further  explanations  had  to 
be  made  in  order  to  clear  away  possible  misunderstandings. 
There  is  no  doubt  that  ministers  and  others  were  at  a  great 
disadvantage  if  they  did  not  possess  a  fair  working  know- 
ledge of  French — the  language  used  by  practically  all  the 
Allied  representatives  except  ourselves  and  the  Americans. 

My  duties  frequently  took  me  across  the  Channel  either 
to  attend  conferences,  or  to  see  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  or  for  some 
other  purpose.  In  1917  alone  I  crossed  from  England  no 
fewer  than  thirty-two  times,  the  arrangements  for  the 
voyage  being  made  by  Admiral  Bacon,  in  naval  command 
at  Dover,  who  could  always  be  depended  upon  to  produce, 
at  any  hour  of  the  day  or  night,  and  practically  in  any 
weather,  one  of  his  destroyers  for  my  use,  no  matter  how 
hard  they  might  be  working.  The  South-Eastern  and 
Chatham  Railway  Company  was  equally  obliging  in  pro- 
viding railway  facilities,  and  I  was  thus  able  to  leave  the 
War  Office  about  i  p.m.,  after  attending  War  Cabinet  meet- 
ings, and  be  at  G.H.Q.  in  France,  one  or  one  and  a  half 
hour's  drive  from  the  French  port,  in  time  for  tea. 

Admiral  Bacon  struck  me  as  being  a  man  of  great 
energy,  who  was  always  busy  devising  new  schemes  and 
inventions  for  outwitting  the  enemy,  of  whose  activities  he 
was  constantly  well  informed,  and  he  was  an  enthusiastic 
supporter  of  the  British  army  on  the  West  Front.  I  first 
made  his  acquaintance  early  in  1915  when,  as  a  "  Colonel," 
he  came  to  France  with  the  battery  of  the  15-inch  howitzers 
which,  as  a  director  of  an  English  firm,  he  had  been  instru- 
mental in  making.  Wishing  to  see  what  they  were  like  I 
visited  their  first  halting-place  between  Boulogne  and  the 
front,  and  found  that  on  entering  the  grounds  of  the  chateau 
which  had  been  allocated  as  their  billet  for  the  night,  one 
of  the  howitzers  had  collided  with  the  gate,  bringing  down 
the  greater  part  of  a  masonry  pillar,  and  had  then  gone  to 
rest  several  feet  below  the  surface  of  a  large  flower-bed. 
The  howitzers  were  of  considerable  weight  and  size,  as  were 
also  the  tractors  which  drew  them,  and  required  rather 


294         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

skilful  driving.  They  did  good  work  for  us,  and  at  a  time 
when  we  had  practically  no  modern  heavy  artillery  except 
a  few  9'2-inch  howitzers. 

The  Admiral,  who  joined  us  from  the  retired  list  of  the 
navy,  was  not  the  only  person  in  the  war  who  held  both 
naval  and  military  rank.  The  record  example  was  that  of 
a  civilian,  who,  from  Deputy  General  Manager  of  a  railway, 
became  both  Major-General  and  Vice- Admiral  in  less  than 
two  years. 

Admiral  Bacon  was  in  command  of  the  Dover  Patrol 
from  the  summer  of  1915  to  the  end  of  1917,  and  had  a 
fine  body  of  officers  under  his  orders.  Some  of  the  destroyer 
commanders  I  met  on  my  voyages  across  the  Channel  were 
boys  not  long  out  of  their  teens,  and  all  were  pronounced 
optimists,  full  of  high  spirits,  and  animated  by  the  single 
desire  to  "  have  a  go  "  at  the  enemy.  Twice  I  crossed 
under  the  care  of  Commander  Evans,  who  had  been  with 
Captain  Scott's  last  expedition  to  the  South  Pole.  On  one 
of  these  voyages  Evans  had  some  £4,000,000  or  £5,000,000 
of  bullion  on  board,  packed  in  small  bags  which  were  lying 
on  the  floor  of  his  cabin  and  the  ward  room  ! 

I  may  say  here  that  throughout  my  time  as  C.I.G.S. 
the  relations  between  the  General  Staff  and  Admiralty  were 
without  exception  extremely  cordial  and  helpful.  This  was 
an  improvement  upon  what  I  had  seen  at  the  War  Office 
years  before,  when  each  department  was  inclined  to  go  its 
own  way  in  disregard  of  the  other.  The  navy  was,  I  always 
thought,  the  chief  offender — which  was  excusable  perhaps, 
for  it  was  then  commonly  thought  to  be  sufficient  in  itself 
for  all  war  purposes,  and  the  army  to  be  hardly  worth 
considering,  except  for  garrison  duties  abroad.  This  better 
understanding  between  the  two  services  was,  as  I  have  said 
elsewhere,  partly  due  to  the  establishment  of  the  Naval 
War  College,  but  mainly  to  the  genuine  goodwill  shown  by 
the  three  officers  who  in  turn  held  the  post  of  First  Sea 
Lord — Sir  Henry  Jackson,  Sir  John  (now  Lord)  Jellicoe,  and 
Sir  Rossljm  (now  Lord)  Wemyss,  who  were  always  most 
anxious  to  work  in  close  accord  with  the  army  in  every 
possible  way. 

It  is  to  be  hoped  that  wc  shall  hear  no  more  about  one 


LORD  FISHER  295 

fighting  service  being  of  supreme  importance  to  the  country, 
and  the  others  of  little  or  none.  Having  an  Empire  scattered 
all  over  the  globe,  connected  together  not  by  roads  and 
railways  but  by  the  sea,  it  is  a  platitude  to  say  that  we 
must  maintain  a  navy  second  to  none  in  the  world.  But 
it  is  equally  true  that  ships  cannot  fight  on  land,  that  land 
fighting  occurs  in  all  great  wars,  and  therefore  that  land 
forces  are  necessary.  Again,  neither  the  navy  nor  the  army 
can  fight  effectively  without  the  assistance  of  the  Air  Force 
Each  service  is  in  fact  the  complement  of  the  other  two, 
and  this  view  is  now  accepted,  I  think,  by  the  officers  of 
all  three. 

During  19 17  the  War  Cabinet  came  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  organisation  of  the  Admiralty  was  not  satisfactory, 
one  of  the  alleged  faults  being  that  the  First  Sea  Lord  had 
such  a  multitude  of  duties  to  carry  out  that  he  could  not 
give  his  attention  to  the  really  vital  questions  connected  with 
the  employment  of  the  fleets.  Some  thirteen  years  before, 
as  described  in  a  previous  chapter,  the  Admiralty  system 
had  been  taken  as  the  pattern  for  the  War  Office  :  it  was 
now  decided  that  the  War  Office  system,  as  modified  and 
developed  by  further  experience,  should  be  taken  as  the 
pattern  for  the  Admiralty,  and  I  was  requested  to  assist  the 
sailors  in  making  the  necessary  alterations.  I  therefore 
placed  Whigham  at  their  disposal  for  a  few  days,  so  that 
he  might  explain  our  methods  to  them,  more  especially  in 
regard  to  General  Staff  duties. 

Lord  Fisher  was  not  a  member  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
whilst  I  was  C.I.G.S.,  and  I  had  no  official  dealings  with 
him  in  connection  with  the  Great  War,  We  had,  however, 
several  private  conversations  about  it,  and  although  I  did 
not  always  agree  with  him — more  especially  with  his  idea 
of  landing  a  force  in  Schleswig-Holstein,  of  which  I  had 
heard  years  before — I  could  not  help  admiring  the  incisive 
manner  m  which  he  expressed  his  views.  On  one  occasion  I 
was  invited  by  Lord  Rosebery  to  meet  him  at  dinner,  and  the 
three  of  us,  no  one  else  being  present,  had  a  very  interesting 
talk.  Lord  Fisher  had  much  to  say  about  submarines  and 
the  submarine  menace,  then  at  its  height,  and  he  repeatedly 
punctuated  his  arguments  by  driving  the  prongs  of  his 


296         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

dinner  fork  into  our  host's  tablecloth.  At  last  Lord  Rose- 
bery  quietly  drew  his  attention  to  the  destruction  he  was 
causing,  for  which  he  at  once  apologised,  but  he  immediately 
forgot  the  admonition  and  down  came  the  fork  again.  Like 
other  mortals  Lord  Fisher  had  his  defects,  but  I  should 
imagine  that  few  people  would  deny  that  to  him  is  due 
a  good  share  of  the  credit  for  the  rapidity  and  efficiency 
with  which  the  navy  began  its  heavy  task  in  August  1914. 

In  response  to  an  invitation  I  received  from  General 
Cadorna  whilst  at  Rome,  I  spent  a  fortnight  the  following 
March  in  visiting  the  Italian  front.  I  first  went  to  his 
headquarters  at  Udine,  and  afterwards  to  different  parts 
of  the  line  on  the  Isonzo  and  Trentino  fronts.  Lucas 
and  my  son  Brian  went  with  me,  as  did  also  General 
Weygand  and  another  French  officer,  the  French  govern- 
ment having  decided  to  send  them  when  they  heard  of  my 
projected  visit.  I  was  met  in  Italy  by  Brigadier-General 
Delme-Radcliffe,  who  was  head  of  the  British  mission  at 
Cadorna's  headquarters,  and  Colonel  Boriani  of  the  Italian 
army.  The  Colonel  was  an  entertaining  travelling  com- 
panion as  well  as  a  fine  fighting  soldier.  He  had  been 
wounded  seven  times  in  the  war,  and  as  far  as  I  could 
make  out  he  was  never  so  happy  as  when  in  the  thick  of  a 
fight  at  the  head  of  his  beloved  Sicilians.  He  could  con- 
verse in  English  quite  fluently,  and  had  once  written  a 
military  book  in  the  language,  but  like  most  people  who  have 
to  cope  with  a  foreign  tongue  he  occasionally  erred  in  being 
somewhat  too  literal.  I  remember  one  instance  of  this 
which  caused  us  some  amusement,  though  I  am  glad  to  say 
that  we  were  sufficiently  well-behaved  not  to  show  it.  He 
was  translating  the  menu  for  us,  which  was  written  in 
Italian,  the  joint  being  "  hind  quarter  of  veal."  This  he 
rendered  as  "  the  posterior  of  a  young  beast  "  ! 

I  was  much  impressed  with  the  administrative  efficiency 
of  the  troops.  They  were  well  housed,  clothed,  and  fed  ;  the 
transport  was  in  good  condition  ;  and  the  road  communica- 
tions through  the  steep  and  lofty  hills  were  most  skilfully 
constructed.  No  German  divisions  had  as  yet  been  em- 
ployed on  this  front,  and  although  the  season  was  not 
suitable  for  active  operations  one  could  not  help  noticing 


VISIT  TO  THE  ITALIAN  FRONT  297 

the  absolute  quiet  which  everywhere  prevailed  —  a  very 
different  state  of  affairs  from  what  we  were  accustomed  to  on 
the  West  Front.  It  was  seldom  that  firing  of  any  kind  was 
heard  beyond  an  occasional  rifle  shot,  and  I  do  not  remember 
once  seeing  an  aeroplane  in  the  air. 

A  special  train  was  placed  at  my  disposal  and  every- 
where I  was  accorded  great  hospitahty,  for  which  I  had 
to  thank  the  Italian  Foreign  and  War  Ministers,  and  the 
Italian  ambassador  in  London,  the  Marquis  Imperiali,  as 
well  as  General  Cadorna  and  the  other  officers  whom  I  met. 

During  my  visit  I  presented,  in  accordance  with  His 
Majesty's  commands,  the  G.C.M.G.  to  His  Royal  High- 
ness the  Duke  of  Aosta,  commanding  the  3rd  Army,  and 
other  decorations  to  Lieutenant  -  Generals  Pecori-Giraldi, 
Piacentini,  Di  Robilant,  and  Mambretti,  respectively  com- 
manding the  ist,  2nd,  4th,  and  6th  Armies. 

On  the  eve  of  my  departure  for  England  I  received  the 
following  telegram  from  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Italy  : 

Au  retour  a  Rome  de  ma  visite  aux  navires  de  guerre  je 
tiens  a  vous  exprimer  men  vif  regret  de  ne  pas  vous  rencontrer 
au  front.  J'espere  de  vous  voir  a  une  occasion  que  je  souhaite 
prochaine.  En  attendant  je  vous  confere  comme  marque  de  ma 
consideration  la  Grande  Croix  de  I'ordre  des  Saints  Maurice  et 
Lazare.  Cette  decoration  vous  sera  remise  par  mon  Ambassadeur 
a  Londres.  Vittorio  Emanuele. 

I  may  add  here  that  at  the  end  of  the  war  His  Majesty 
conferred  upon  me  the  further  honour  of  the  "  Order  of  the 
Crown  of  Italy,  Grand  Cross." 

Throughout  19 17  the  question  of  obtaining  a  sufficient 
number  of  recruits  to  meet  the  requirements  of  new  services 
and  to  supply  drafts  was  a  constant  source  of  anxiety,  and 
it  wiU  serve  to  explain  the  views  of  the  General  Staff  re- 
garding man-power  and  the  military  situation  in  general 
if  I  quote  from  a  speech  I  made,  by  request  of  the  Govern- 
ment, at  a  conference  on  the  "  trade-card  "  system  held  on 
the  4th  April  1917  at  the  Ministry  of  Munitions.  Repre- 
sentatives of  the  various  trades  unions  were  present,  Mr. 
Arthur  Henderson  being  in  the  chair.  Admiral  Jelhcoe  was 
also  deputed  to  speak.     I  said  : 


298         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  War  Office  has  often  been  blamed  for  doing  wrong  thmgs, 
but  the  War  Office  has  a  duty  to  perform.  It  has  to  win  this 
war,  and  to  do  that  it  must  have  men.  But  it  is  not  a  leech. 
The  War  Office  takes  the  men  which  the  Government  give  it,  and 
can  take  no  more.  The  War  Office  has  never  attempted  to  lay 
down  how  many  men  it  can  have,  or  where  they  are  to  come  from. 
It  has  told  the  Government  what  men  it  ought  to  have,  but  it 
has  always  left  the  Government  to  devise  the  means  of  providing 
them  and  to  specify  the  number. 

It  has  also  been  said  that  the  War  Office  does  not  make  the 
best  use  of  the  men  it  gets.  The  War  Office  makes  mistakes. 
Who  does  not  ?  No  doubt  there  have  been  cases  of  injustice 
to  individuals  and  many  anomalies,  and  men  have  been  taken 
who  should  not  have  been  taken,  square  pegs  have  been  put 
into  round  holes,  and  so  on.  I  admit  all  this,  but  look  at  the 
situation  with  which  we  were  faced  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war.  We  were  unprepared  for  this  war,  as  were  all  other  nations 
in  Europe  except  Germany  and  France.  We  had  no  organisation 
such  as  continental  nations  have  for  calling  up  the  population 
and  sorting  out  men  according  to  their  qualifications  for  military 
service,  for  industries,  for  munitions,  agriculture,  and  so  forth. 
We  had  no  system  of  universal  service,  but  had  to  call  on  volun- 
teers— we  had  to  improvise  as  we  went  along,  and  we  have  been 
living  from  hand  to  mouth  throughout  the  war.  The  consequence 
of  improvising  is  confusion,  waste  of  effort,  friction,  and  injustice. 
With  the  best  will  in  the  world  these  things  could  not  be  avoided. 
But  there  is  no  use  in  cr5dng  over  spilt  milk,  or  in  laying  blame 
on  individuals,  ministers,  or  the  Government.  It  is  not  their 
fault.  It  is  the  fault  of  the  system  or  rather  the  want  of  it,  and 
that  is  due  to  want  of  foresight  and  preparation  before  the  war 
on  the  part  of  the  nation  as  a  whole. 

Another  point  I  wish  to  refer  to  is  the  criticism  of  military 
operations  which  has  sometimes  been  made.  Here,  again,  mis- 
takes have  occurred,  but  marvellously  few  considering  we  had  to 
form  large  new  armies.  The  critics  are  chiefly  disgruntled  and 
otherwise  undesirable  members  of  the  community  who,  having 
failed  in  their  own  professions,  think  they  know  all  about  the 
professions  of  every  one  else,  and  instead  of  loyally  putting  their 
shoulders  to  the  wheel  employ  most  of  their  time  in  sowing 
discontent  and  distrust  of  those  in  authority.  Let  us  treat  them 
with  the  contempt  they  deserve,  as  do  the  soldiers  at  the  front. 
I  am  gratified  to  say  that,  more  than  in  any  campaign  in  which 
I  have  taken  part,  criticisms  within  the  army  itself  have  been 
practically  non-existent,  and  this  I  regard  as  a  great  tribute  to 
the  loyalty  and  discipline  of  the  nation  which  has  produced  the 
men  of  whom  our  New  Armies  are  composed. 


MAN-POWER  299 

Our  progress  with  the  war  is  bound  to  be  slow  because  of  the 
colossal  numbers  engaged,  and  because  Germany  enjoyed  a  great 
advantage  at  the  start.  It  is  a  difficult  and  long  business  in  war 
to  make  up  for  a  bad  start. 

She  (Germany)  has  been  preparing  for  war  and  nothing  else 
for  years  past,  and  has  recently  made  extraordinary  efforts. 
She  now  has  many  more  divisions  in  the  field  than  last  year,  and 
has  increased  the  number  of  her  soldiers  by  about  a  million. 
She  has  been  able  to  do  this  by  her  domineering  autocratic 
government,  acting  in  total  disregard  of  the  most  elementary 
principles  of  humanity  and  international  law.  After  over- 
running Poland  she  compelled  thousands  of  men  to  emigrate  to 
Germany  and  to  work  in  German  mines  and  munition  factories, 
thus  releasing  large  numbers  of  Germans  for  military  service. 
Her  next  method  of  obtaining  men  was  to  pass  last  November 
what  is  called  the  auxiliary  service  law,  by  which  all  persons, 
both  male  and  female,  in  Germany,  between  the  ages  of  17  and 
60,  were  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  Government.  This  measure 
alone  has  probably  set  free  for  military  service  considerably  over 
one  million  men.  She  has  adopted  a  system  of  slave-raiding  in 
Belgium  and  northern  France,  whereby  thousands  of  Belgian 
and  French  civilians  have  been  forcibly  removed  from  their 
homes  and  compelled  to  work  as  slaves  for  their  enemies  in 
Germany,  thus  releasing  still  more  Germans  for  military  service. 
We  must  meet  this  desperate  effort  the  enemy  has  made,  and  to 
meet  it  Vv^e  must  have  men. 

You  ask  how  many  men  do  we  want  ?  My  answer  is  the  same 
as  I  made  to  the  Government  a  few  days  after  taking  up  my 
present  post.  It  is  that  we  ought  not  to  expect  to  win  a  war 
such  as  this  unless  and  until  every  man  and  woman  in  the  country 
does  a  full  day's  work  of  an  essential  nature.  Many  times  during 
the  last  sixteen  months  the  question  of  man-power  has  been  con- 
sidered, and  I  have  never  varied  my  statement  to  the  Government. 
I  have  always  said  that  it  is  impossible  to  put  a  limit  to  the 
number  of  men  needed  for  the  army,  because  the  task  is  so 
enormous  that  we  must  have  all  the  men  who  can  be  spared  from 
the  navy,  the  various  industries,  agriculture,  and  other  employ- 
ments essential  to  the  prosecution  of  the  war.  It  is  not  for  me 
to  say  how  many  men  can  be  got,  or  from  where  they  are  to 
come,  but  surely  it  should  be  possible,  seeing  the  great  reserve 
of  men  still  in  the  country  and  with  a  proper  adjustment  of  man- 
power, to  give  the  army  the  men  needed,  and  our  immediate 
needs  are  half  a  million  men  between  now  and  July  next.  The 
failure  to  get  these  men  will  undoubtedly  involve  a  prolongation 
of  the  war  and  consequent  prolongation  of  hardship  and  misery. 
We  have  done  much.     Our  troops  at  the  front  are  the  wonder 


300         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

of  the  world.  No  one  has  ever  approached  the  colossal  task  that 
we  have  so  successfully  accomplished.  Individuals  throughout 
the  Empire  have  behaved  magnificently  in  the  way  of  absolute 
selflessness,  and  have  given  up  everything — their  money,  their 
time,  their  position,  their  prospects,  their  friends,  their  lives — 
to  the  State.  But  the  question  is,  have  we  done  all  that  we  can 
do — for  Germany  is  not  yet  beaten  ?  Do  not  think  I  am 
despondent.  I  am  perfectly  confident  of  success  provided  we 
remain  determined  to  win,  but  although  fuUy  persuaded  of  the 
righteousness  of  our  cause  and  therefore  fully  confident  of  victory, 
I  think  the  way  to  victory  may  be  long  and  certainly  will  be  hard. 
We  have  been  saved  by  our  navy  from  the  horrors  of  war  being 
brought  into  our  own  homes,  with  the  result  that  many  people  in 
the  land  are  still  ignorant  of  the  urgency  of  our  position.  I  for 
my  part  feel  that  an  enormous  responsibility  rests  upon  me,  as 
I  am  asked  to  win  the  war  and  it  is  impossible  to  do  that  unless 
sufficient  men  are  forthcoming. 

In  order  to  obtain  the  men  needed  it  seems  to  me  that,  for 
the  duration  of  the  war,  we  must  one  and  all  be  willing  to  sub- 
ordinate our  personal  liberty  and  will  to  that  of  the  State.  It  is 
only  in  this  way  that  the  State  officials — the  Government — can 
have  the  free  hand  necessary  to  enable  them  to  organise  the 
resources  of  the  Empire  to  the  best  advantage.  We  must  prac- 
tise self-denial  and  self-sacrifice,  and,  after  all,  what  is  demanded 
of  us  at  home  in  comparison  with  what  is  demanded  of  our  men 
at  the  front,  many  of  whom  are  every  day  making  the  supreme 
sacrifice  ?  Or  what  are  our  privations  as  compared  with  those 
of  the  countries  which  have  been  invaded  and  devastated  for 
generations  to  come,  homes  broken  up,  industries  ruined,  men 
deported  as  slaves,  and  old  people  and  children  left  without  food 
or  shelter  ?  It  is  upon  methods  of  outrage  such  as  these  that 
the  Germans  are  relying  to  induce  the  Belgian  and  French  people 
to  submit  to  their  terms. 

As  I  have  said,  it  is  difficult  for  us  at  this  distance  to  realise 
what  these  things  mean,  but  we  may  realise  them  one  day  if  we 
do  not,  before  it  is  too  late,  take  every  means  in  our  power  to 
crush  that  overbearing  spirit  which  has  degraded  a  great  nation, 
has  brought  all  this  misery  upon  the  world,  and  has  defied  every 
law  of  God  and  man.  We  must  in  fact  win.  The  point  is,  what 
do  we  mean  by  winning  ?  I  doubt  if  this  is  properly  understood. 
I  take  it  there  is  no  desire  on  the  part  of  any  one  of  us  to  crush 
the  German  nation,  and  the  sooner  the  German  people  know  that 
the  better.  Our  aim  is,  as  I  understand  it,  to  deal  German 
despotism  such  a  blow  as  will  for  generations  to  come  prevent  a 
recurrence  of  the  horrors  of  the  last  two  and  a  half  years.  In 
short  we  arc  fighting  in  the  cause  of  freedom,  and  before  we  can 


MAN-POWER  301 

get  freedom  Germany  must  be  taught  to  realise  that  might  is 
not  right.  Until  that  is  done  there  can  be  no  true  freedom  either 
for  individuals,  or  families,  or  societies,  or  for  the  Empire. 

We  are  a  law-abiding  race,  and  as  far  as  I  know  my  country- 
men all  they  need  in  a  situation  like  this  is  to  be  told  the  truth, 
and  what  it  is  they  are  required  to  do.  I  have  told  you  all 
that  it  is  possible  to  tell  you  with  regard  to  the  number  of  men 
we  need,  and  although  a  great  strain  has  already  been  put  upon 
us,  I  must  also  tell  you  that  we  must  be  prepared  for  a  still 
greater  strain  before  we  finish  the  war.  I  know  you  are  ready 
to  face  that  strain,  and  if  we  all  face  it,  resolutely  set  our  teeth, 
and  are  true  to  ourselves,  we  shall,  with  God's  help,  secure  that 
freedom  for  which  we  have  been  compelled  to  fight. 

I  did  not  obtain  the  half-million  men  for  the  army  which 
I  said  were  required  by  July,  but  it  should  not  be  assumed 
that  those  present  at  the  meeting  were  responsible  for  the 
failure.    There  were  other  reasons  for  it,  as  I  shall  show  later. 

The  difficulty  of  providing  drafts  in  1917  can  be  under- 
stood when  I  say  that  while  we  then  had  on  the  West 
Front  a  greater  number  of  divisions  than  before,  the  fighting 
being  prolonged  and  severe,  we  took  into  the  army  only 
about  820,000  men  as  against  1,200,000  in  the  previous  year. 
This  reduced  number  of  recruits  was  accentuated  by  the 
fact  that  the  proportion  of  wounded  men  who  recovered 
sufficiently  to  admit  of  being  sent  back  to  the  front  became 
less  as  time  went  on.  In  the  early  part  of  the  war  we  could 
rely  upon  some  sixty  per  cent  of  the  wounded  becoming 
available  for  redrafting,  but  by  the  end  of  1917  we  had  to 
modify  this  estimate  in  order  to  make  allowances  for  those 
men — an  ever-increasing  number — who  had  been  wounded 
more  than  once.  Obviously  men  wounded  for  the  third, 
fourth,  or  fifth  time  were  not  Hkely  to  recover  so  quickly, 
if  at  all,  as  men  wounded  for  the  first  time,  and  medical 
and  other  officers  concerned  were  reluctant  to  send  them 
back  to  the  trenches.  Many  hard  cases  of  this  kind  came 
to  my  notice  during  the  war,  and  it  was  not  pleasant  to 
see  men,  perhaps  fathers  of  families,  being  repeatedly  sent 
back  to  the  front,  while  there  were  others  in  the  country 
who  could  be  spared  and  were  not  called  upon  to  perform 
any  military  service. 

I  may  also  observe  that  the  necessity  for  keeping  fighting 


302        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

units  up  to  "establishment,"  or  authorised  strength,  is 
much  more  important  than  is  usually  supposed  by  the 
layman,  and  sometimes  even  by  the  professional  if  he  is 
not  employed  at  the  front.  The  fallacy  prevails  that  a 
battalion  of,  say,  five  hundred  men  is  only  fifty  per  cent 
inferior  in  fighting  power  to  one  having  its  authorised 
strength  of  about  a  thousand  men.  This  is  far  from  being 
the  case,  because  in  war  there  are  in  every  battalion  some 
hundred  and  fifty  to  two  hundred  men  who  are  necessarily 
employed  on  duties  which  take  them  away  from  their 
platoons,  and  this  number  remains  more  or  less  constant  no 
matter  what  the  total  strength  of  the  battalion  may  be. 
Hence  if  a  battalion  loses  five  hundred  men  in  action  its 
fighting  strength  is  reduced  not  to  five  hundred  but  to 
between  three  hundred  and  four  hundred  men,  and  its 
whole  fighting  organisation  thereby  becomes  dislocated  and 
imperfect. 

Weakness  in  numbers  may  also  affect  morale.  Battalions 
usually  take  a  very  local  view  of  matters,  and  judge  the 
progress  of  events  largely  by  what  happens  immediately 
around  them,  and  if  they  know  that  they  are  weak  and  may 
continue  to  be  so  for  an  indefinite  period  they  cannot  be 
expected  to  fight  with  the  same  confidence  as  they  would 
if  supported  by  the  knowledge  that  their  ranks  were  full. 
Nothing,  in  short,  is  more  discouraging  to  a  battalion  than 
to  see  its  ranks  depleted  without  observing  signs  of  their 
being  replenished. 

To  meet  the  situation  as  above  described,  and  bearing 
in  mind  that  the  Russian  revolution  was  certain  to  react 
to  our  disadvantage  on  the  West  Front,  it  was  clear  that 
the  Military  Service  Act  of  1916,  as  well  as  the  method  of 
its  application,  called  for  drastic  amendment.  This  Act  was 
perhaps  as  good  as  we  could  hope  to  get  at  the  time  it 
became  law,  but  it  was  hampered  by  many  conditions  which 
tended  to  nullify  its  value,  it  was  in  itself  too  limited  in 
scope,  and  it  was  unaccompanied  by  proper  machinery 
for  co-ordinating  the  man-power  activities  of  the  various 
departments  concerned  —  e.g.  War  Office,  Admiralty, 
Munitions,  Board  of  Trade.  In  September  1916  a  Man- 
Power  Distribution  Board  was  set  up,  and  in  the  following 


MINISTER  OF  NATIONAL  SERVICE  303 

December  a  National  Service  Department  was  established, 
but  neither  of  them  exercised  reaUy  effective  control  over 
the  competing  interests  of  the  different  departments,  which 
continued  to  tug  with  added  vigour,  each  in  its  own  direction, 
in  proportion  as  the  shrinkage  of  man  -  power  resources 
became  more  pronounced. 

Subject  to  the  orders  of  the  Government  and  to  the  in- 
structions of  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  recruiting  was, 
as  I  have  explained  in  an  earlier  chapter,  primarily  the  business 
of  the  Adjutant-General,  but  as  C.I.G.S.  it  was  my  duty 
to  take  a  hand  also,  and  at  the  end  of  November  1916  I 
recommended  that  the  mihtary  age  should  be  raised  to  fifty- 
five  years,  and  that  all  men  up  to  that  age  should  be  utiUsed 
for  such  national  work  as  the  Government  deemed  essential  to 
the  prosecution  of  the  war.  This  meant,  of  course,  all-round 
Uability  to  national  service.  A  few  days  later  events  occurred 
which  led  to  a  reconstruction  of  the  Government,  Mr.  Lloyd 
George  becoming  Prime  Minister,  and  for  the  moment  con- 
sideration of  the  recommendation  was  unavoidably  post- 
poned. 

From  time  to  time  in  1917  various  questions  connected 
with  man-power  were  referred  to  committees  and  individuals 
appointed  by  the  War  Cabinet  to  enquire  into  them,  and 
certain  improvements  of  a  minor  nature  were  made,  but 
they  were  far  from  being  adequate.  They  remained  so  when 
the  duty  of  deahng  with  man-power  was  subsequently 
vested  in  a  Minister  of  National  Service.  Then,  as  before, 
a  smaller  share  of  the  men  available  was  allotted  to  the  army 
than  a  judicial  review  of  the  circumstances  showed  to  be 
necessary,  and  eventually  some  twenty-five  per  cent  of  the 
battahons  on  the  West  Front  were  disbanded  in  order  to  help 
to  fill  up  the  remainder. 

The  problem  with  which  ministers  were  faced  was 
difficult,  as  most  problems  in  war  are,  since  many  conflicting 
demands  for  men  for  the  three  fighting  forces,  for  ship- 
building, food-production,  munitions,  and  other  national 
services  had  to  be  reconciled.  Still,  the  outstanding  factor 
was  that  if,  for  lack  of  men,  the  armies  on  the  West  Front 
were  beaten  the  war  would  certainly  be  prolonged,  if  nothing 
worse  than  that,  and  therefore  their  maintenance  at  full 


304        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

strength  unquestionably  ranked  second  in  importance  to  no 
other  requirement. 

Unfortunately,  arguments  of  this  nature  failed  to  carry 
sufficient   weight  in   adjusting  the   different   claims   until, 
in  the  spring  of  191 8,  the  truth  of  them  was  driven  home  by 
the  enemy  in  such  a  manner  that  it  could  no  longer  be 
disputed.     Measures  to  provide  more  men  were  then  taken, 
and  the  Act  of  1916  was  amended  by  the  Military  Service 
Act  (No.  2),  which  raised  the  miUtary  age  from  forty-one  to 
fifty-one  years  and,  by  Order  in  Council,  this  age  could  be 
increased  to  fifty-six  years  and  the  operation  of  the  Bill  be 
extended  to  Ireland.     If  these  measures  had  been  taken  in 
1917  the  heavy  losses  we  suffered  in  1918  might  have  been 
fewer,   the   ultimate    drain   upon    our   man -power  might 
therefore  have  been  less  than  that  which  actually  took  place, 
and  the  necessity  for  sending  boys  to  the  front  under  nineteen 
years  of  age  would  have  been  minimised  if  not  entirely 
obviated.     Exactly  why  they  were  not  taken  at  an  earlier 
date   is   a  question  that  I  shall  not  attempt  to  answer, 
since,  as  already  observed,  it  was   for   the   Government, 
who  had  all  the  facts  before  them,  and  not  for  the  General 
Staff,  to  determine  the  man-power  effort,  both  as  to  time 
and  amount,  that  the  nation  could  properly  be  called  upon 
to  make.     I  will  merely  say  that  there  seemed  to  be  no 
justifiable  grounds  for  supposing,  either  in  1917  or  before 
or  after  that   time,  that  the   people  would  flinch  at  any 
demand  that  might  be  made  upon  them,  and  it  will  be 
agreed  that  of  all  the  Entente  countries  not  one  was  more 
eager  to  do  its  duty  or  was  more  easy  to  lead  than  our  own. 
While  on  the  subject  of  men  I  may  mention  that  in  the 
winter  of  1916-17  a  very  desirable  change  was  made  in  the 
composition  of  the  infantry  training  battahons  at  home, 
which  had  heretofore  received  recruits  irrespective  of  their 
age,  the  ages  varying  between  boys  of  eighteen  and  men 
of  forty-one  years.     It  was  clearly  objectionable,  both  from 
a  training  and  social  point  of  view,  to  mix  up  boys  with 
men  old  enough  to  be  their  fathers,  and,  moreover,  after 
the  spring  of  1917  the  training  battalions  comprised  the  only 
infantry  of  the  home  army,  and  as  they  were  almost  daily 
deprived  of  men  for  drafts  for  the  armies  abroad  there  was 


YOUNG  SOLDIER  BATTALIONS  305 

and  could  be  no  stability  in  the  arrangements  for  home 
defence. 

The  Adjutant-General  and  I  therefore  arranged  to  place 
all  recruits  of  about  the  age  of  eighteen  in  "  Young 
Soldier  Battalions,"  where  they  remained  for  four  months 
whilst  undergoing  their  recruits'  course  of  training.  They 
were  then  passed  on  by  complete  companies  of  250  strong 
to  "  Graduated  Battalions,"  where  they  stayed  for  eight 
months  and  so  reached  the  age  of  nineteen  years,  at  which 
they  were  eligible  to  be  sent  abroad.  The  companies  were 
transferred  to  the  Graduated  Battalions  at  intervals  of  two 
months,  and  as  these  battalions  had  five  companies  each 
the}^  were  able  to  send  abroad  one  company  every  two 
months  and  still  have  four  companies  left,  the  personnel  of 
which  had  been  under  training  for  periods  varying  between 
four  and  twelve  months.  This  was  an  advantage  that 
greatly  simplified  home  defence  duties. 

We  secured,  in  course  of  time,  excellent  commanding 
and  company  officers  who  took  a  keen  interest  in  their 
young  charges,  and  the  latter,  living  in  a  kind  of  public 
school  atmosphere,  derived  far  greater  benefit,  civil  as  well 
as  military,  from  their  twelve  months'  training  than  had 
been  possible  under  the  old  system.  All  officers  spoke  in 
the  highest  terms  of  the  good  behaviour  of  their  boys,  and 
I  always  regard  this  innovation  in  the  composition  of 
training  battalions  as  one  of  the  best  things  in  which  I  had 
a  hand  during  the  war.  When  these  lads,  many  being 
under  nineteen,  were  sent  out  to  help  to  stem  the  disaster 
on  the  West  Front  in  the  spring  of  1918,  they  more  than 
upheld  the  reputation  they  had  deservedly  earned  while  in 
England. 

Of  the  operations  in  1917  sufficient  reference  has  already 
been  made  to  those  in  Macedonia,  Mesopotamia,  and  East 
Africa. 

On  the  East  Front  Germany  had  matters  all  her  own 
way.  It  had  been  decided  in  the  autumn  of  1916  to  send 
to  Russia  an  inter-allied  mission  in  substitution  for  the 
ill-fated  visit  of  Lord  Kitchener,  and  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  proposed  that  I  should  accompany  it.  I  explained 
to  the  Prime  Minister,  then  Mr.  Asquith,  that  I  could  not 


3o6         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

possibly  leave  my  work  at  the  War  Office,  and  he  was  good 
enough  not  to  take  me  away.  Further,  I  had  grave  doubts 
whether  the  mission  would,  at  that  late  hour,  make  any 
material  improvement  in  what  was  evidently  a  bad  situation, 
and  they  proved  to  be  only  too  well  founded.  The  mission 
started  at  the  middle  of  January  1917,  and  on  the  12th  of 
March,  shortly  after  it  returned  to  England,  the  revolution 
broke  out.  On  the  15th  of  March  the  Czar  abdicated,  and 
before  the  end  of  the  year  Russia  had  concluded  an  armistice 
with  the  enemy  preparatory  to  the  settlement  of  terms  of 
peace. 

To  what  extent  Lord  Kitchener  might  have  been  able  to 
stave  off  the  revolution  and  keep  the  Russian  armies  in  the 
field,  had  he  not  been  drowned  when  going  to  Russia,  it 
would  be  futile  for  any  one  to  attempt  to  say,  but  there 
can  be  no  question  that  he  was  far  more  Hkely  to  succeed 
than  was  the  mission  which  went  in  his  place.  He  had  the 
insight  to  appreciate  the  gravity  of  the  situation  ;  the 
prestige  and  experience  to  ensure  his  advice  receiving  an 
attentive  hearing  ;  and  the  Czar  and  Alexeieff  were  longing 
for  his  assistance.  The  mission  was  without  most,  if  not  all, 
of  these  advantages.  Being  a  mission  of  many  members,  it 
lacked  the  valuable  element  of  personality  ;  and  it  does  not 
seem  to  have  been  afforded — whatever  it  may  have  sought — 
the  best  opportunities  whilst  in  Russia  for  obtaining  reliable 
information  as  to  the  real  state  of  affairs,  either  at  the  front 
or  at  Petrograd.  Alexeieff,  who  died  in  1918,  practically  of 
a  broken  heart,  always  maintained  that  the  death  of  Lord 
Kitchener  was  the  greatest  misfortune  that  ever  befell 
Russia. 

In  the  Egyptian  theatre  Murray  attacked  the  Turkish 
main  position  near  Gaza  in  March  and  again  in  April,  but 
this  was  not  destined  to  fall  until  a  stronger  force  with  a 
more  powerful  artillery  could  be  brought  against  it.  The 
offensive  was  resumed,  with  success,  at  the  end  of  October 
under  the  direction  of  General  AUenby,  who  had  taken  the 
place  of  Murray  in  June,  and  following  the  capture  of 
Beersheba,  Gaza,  and  Jaffa,  Jerusalem  fell  into  our  hands 
on  the  7th  of  December.  The  collapse  of  Russia  having  left 
the  whole  of  the  Turks  in  Asia  on  our  hands,  the  advance 


GENERAL  NIVELLE  307 

into  Palestine  had  for  its  main  object  the  thwarting  of 
hostile  designs  against  Mesopotamia,  and  not  the  capture 
of  Jerusalem  or  any  other  town. 

Operations  on  the  West  Front  were,  as  stated  in  the 
preceding  chapter,  based  on  the  plan  recommended  by 
General  Nivelle,  which  had  been  accepted  by  the  French 
and  British  governments  in  lieu  of  the  plan  proposed  at 
the  Chantilly  conference  held  under  the  presidency  of 
General  Joffre.  According  to  it  the  British  armies  were  to 
attack  from  the  southern  part  of  their  line  so  as  to  draw 
the  enemy's  reserves  in  that  direction,  and  then  the  French 
armies  were  to  deliver  the  main  attack  from  the  Aisne 
front  with  the  object  of  breaking  through  the  trench  barrier. 
A  feature  of  the  plan  which  seemed  to  have  a  special 
attraction  for  ministers  was  that,  if  the  main  attack  did 
not  produce  material  results  within  about  forty-eight  hours, 
the  fighting  was  to  be  dehberately  stopped  so  as  to  prevent 
a  repetition  in  1917  of  what  was  regarded  as  the  failure  on 
the  Somme  in  1916. 

The  two  governments  further  agreed,  at  a  conference 
held  at  Calais  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  February,  to  vest 
supreme  control  of  the  operations  in  General  Nivelle,  the 
British  Commander-in-Chief  to  conform  to  such  instructions 
as  General  Nivelle  might  see  fit  to  issue.  The  proposal  to 
make  this  innovation  came  as  a  complete  surprise  both 
to  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  myself,  as  neither  of  us  had  heard 
anything  about  it  before  it  was  put  forward  on  the  evening 
of  the  26th.  The  conference  was  being  held,  so  we  had 
been  given  to  understand,  mainly  in  regard  to  another 
matter — transportation. 

Not  having  been  consulted,  and  having  no  idea  that 
the  nomination  of  General  Nivelle  as  Allied  Commander- 
in-Chief  was  contemplated.  Sir  Douglas  and  I  had  had 
no  opportunity  of  considering  what  it  involved,  and  our 
position  was  the  more  awkward  because  General  Nivelle 
had,  so  he  told  me,  been  informed  by  his  government 
beforehand  of  what  was  intended.  We  were  not  in 
favour  of  the  proposal,  but  as  the  two  governments  had 
apparently  made  up  their  minds  to  adopt  it,  I  concluded 
that,   apart    from    suggesting   certain    amendments   as   to 


3o8        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

procedure,  we  could  do  no  more  than  express  our  dissent 
and  leave  responsibility  for  the  future  to  the  War  Cabinet. 
The  bearing  of  the  decision  upon  the  whole  question  of  what 
is  called  "  unity  of  command  "  will  be  dealt  with  later. 

One  of  my  objections  to  the  decision  was  that  as  the 
operations  might  have — as  in  fact  they  did  have — far- 
reaching  consequences,  it  was  not  wise  to  entrust  them  to 
a  General  who,  although  he  had  won  high  distinction  at 
Verdun  in  1916,  had  done  so  in  a  comparatively  subordinate 
capacity,  and  therefore  had  yet  to  prove  his  fitness  for  so 
important  a  post  as  that  of  Commander-in-Chief  of  the 
combined  Franco-British  armies. 

While  the  conference  was  in  progress  news  was  received 
that  the  Germans  were  withdrawing  from  their  positions  on 
the  Ancre  and  Somme  to  the  previously-prepared  Hinden- 
burg  Line.  This  retreat  radically  interfered  with  the  plan 
that  Nivelle  had  designed,  and  the  alterations  which  neces- 
sarily had  to  be  made  to  it  led  to  delay  in  its  execution. 
Eventually  the  British  armies  attacked  from  the  vicinity  of 
Arras  on  the  gth  of  April,  and  the  French  armies  attacked 
on  the  Aisne  front  a  week  later.  The  operations  entailed 
much  heavy  fighting  and  did  not  terminate  until  the  third 
week  of  May,  and  although  we  gained  a  great  victory  at 
Vimy,  the  results  elsewhere  fell  far  short  of  the  expectations 
that  had  been  formed  by  those  who  were  in  favour  of  the 
plan.  Soon  afterwards  General  Nivelle  was  succeeded  in 
the  command  of  the  French  armies  by  General  (now  Marshal) 
Petain. 

I  do  not  propose  to  enter  into  the  controversy  which 
took  place  in  France  over  what  became  known  as  the 
Nivelle  affair,  or  to  discuss  the  extent  to  which  that  General 
was  responsible  for  the  failure  to  win  the  decisive  victory 
anticipated.  I  may  say,  however,  that  I  had  not  the 
slightest  faith  in  his  theory  that  he  could,  if  he  desired, 
break  off  the  battle  at  the  end  of  forty-eight  hours,  for 
once  a  commander  commits  his  troops  he  cannot  hope  to 
be  able  suddenly  to  stop  fighting  at  the  moment  which  best 
suits  his  own  purpose.  The  enemy  has  something,  often  a 
great  deal,  to  say  in  the  matter,  and,  as  just  mentioned,  the 
fight  did  in  fact  go  on  for  weeks.     The  General  Staff  at  the 


THE  NIVELLE  AFFAIR  309 

War  Office,  like  Haig  and  his  staff,  were  convinced,  as  for 
months  past,  that  before  a  break-through  on  the  scale 
contemplated  could  be  accomplished  the  enemy's  resistance 
must  be  worn  down  by  preparatory  attacks  made  in  great 
strength,  and  it  was  not  possible  for  Nivelle  or  any  one  else 
to  forecast  how  long  such  attacks  would  take  to  produce  the 
required  effect. 

In  fairness  to  the  General  it  should  be  stated  that, 
besides  his  inexperience  as  Commander-in-Chief,  and  the 
interference  with  his  plan  caused  by  the  German  retirement, 
he  must  have  been  sorely  handicapped  if,  as  was  afterwards 
alleged,  some  of  his  senior  commanders  had  little  or  no 
belief  that  the  plan  would  succeed.  M.  Painleve  has  told 
us  that  at  a  meeting  of  French  generals  held  before  the 
operations  began,  the  President  of  the  French  Republic 
being  present,  General  Nivelle  asked  to  resign  because  of 
the  want  of  confidence  shown  towards  his  plan.  I  have 
never  been  able  to  understand  why  he  did  not  insist 
upon  one  of  two  things  being  done  ;  either  that  he  should 
be  allowed  to  resign,  or  that  only  those  commanders  who 
had  absolute  trust  in  his  judgment  should  be  allowed  to 
assist  him.  A  man  does  not  require  to  be  a  soldier  to  know 
that  no  plan,  however  good,  has  m.uch  prospect  of  success 
if  those  charged  with  its  execution  think  that  it  will  end  in 
failure.  No  one  has  so  heavy  a  load  of  anxiety  to  bear  in 
war  as  a  Commander-in-Chief,  who  carries  in  his  hands  the 
lives  of  his  men,  and  there  is  no  greater  addition  to  this  load 
than  the  knowledge,  or  suspicion,  that  he  does  not  possess 
the  confidence  both  of  his  subordinates  and  superiors. 

General  Petain  accomplished  valuable  work  in  pulling 
together  the  French  armies  after  their  ill-success,  and  I 
doubt  if  any  one  could  have  done  it  better.  I  had  not  seen 
much  of  him  before  he  took  over  his  new  command,  but 
afterwards  we  frequently  met.  He  was  essentially  practical, 
held  sound  ideas  on  tactics  and  strategy,  and  it  was  at  all 
times  a  pleasure  to  work  with  him. 

He  was  succeeded  as  Chief  of  the  French  General  Staff — 
a  post  he  had  held  for  about  a  fortnight  only — by  General 
Foch.  This  General  had  been  in  semi-retirement  for  the 
previous  five  months,  having  been  removed  in  December 


310         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

19 16  from  the  command  of  the  "  Groupe  des  Armees  du 
Nord  " — our  next-door  neighbours  from  the  time  we  arrived 
in  Flanders  in  1914 — and  had  afterwards  held  temporary- 
command  of  the  "  Groupe  des  Armees  de  I'Est  "  whilst 
General  de  Castelnau  was  away  with  the  inter-allied  mission 
sent  to  Russia.  Before  his  removal  from  the  command 
in  the  north  General  Foch  had  been,  next  to  General 
Joffre,  one  of  the  most  prominent  French  leaders,  and  the 
omission  to  make  greater  use  of  his  talents  between 
December  1916  and  May  1917  may  seem  incomprehensible 
when  it  is  remembered  that  he  was  destined  to  become 
the  Generalissimo  of  the  allied  armies,  and  to  lead  them 
to  complete  victory  from  a  situation  which  threatened 
to  involve  them  in  complete  defeat.  The  reader  may  find 
an  explanation  of  the  omission  in  my  later  remarks  on  the 
subject  of  unity  of  command. 

I  saw  much  of  General  Foch  whilst  serving  in  France 
in  1914-15,  and  had  several  conversations  with  him  when 
visiting  France  in  my  capacity  as  C.I.G.S.  In  reply  to  a 
letter  I  sent  him  at  the  end  of  1916  he  wrote  : 

3. 1. 17. 

MoN  CHER  GENERAL — Je  vous  remercie  des  sentiments  que 
vous  m'exprimez  au  moment  ou  je  quitte  le  contact  immediat  de 
I'armee  Britannique.  J'ai  pu  apprecier  toute  sa  valeur  dans 
les  jours  diffiiciles  du  debut  de  la  guerre  notamment,  comme 
aussi  la  droiture  et  I'energie  qui  ont  toujours  inspire  son  com- 
mandement,  vous  en  particulier.  Si  nous  avons  vaincu,  si  nous 
avons  d'abord  arrete  la  formidable  invasion,  c'est  bien  a  notre 
union  sincere  et  etroite  que  nous  le  devons.  L'histoire  nous 
rendra  cette  justice  que  jamais  Allies  ne  travaillerent  ensemble 
d'un  coeur  si  uni.  Vous  comprendrez  facilement  comme  ces 
souvenirs  me  sont  precieux  quand  ils  me  reviennent  traces  par 
voire  plume.  Vous  avez  aujourd'hui  une  grande  et  magnifique 
armee.  Les  directions  que  vous  lui  donnez  sont  des  plus  heureuses. 
Nous  pouvons  en  toute  confiance  envisager  I'avenir.  Je  n'en 
reste  pas  moins  par  I'esprit  pres  d'elle,  dans  le  souvenir  et  dans 
I'espoir  le  plus  absolu.  C'est  dans  ces  sentiments,  mon  cher 
general,  que  je  me  dis — Tout  a  vous,  F.  Foch. 

[Translation. 

I  thank  you  for  the  sentiments  you  express  at  the  moment 
when  I  sever  my  connection  with  the  British  army.     I  have 


GENERAL  FOCH  311 

learned  to  appreciate  its  worth,  especially  in  the  difficult  days 
at  the  beginning  of  the  war,  as  well  as  the  honesty  and  energy 
of  its  commanders  and  of  yourself  in  particular.  If  we  have 
succeeded,  if  we  have  at  the  first  checked  the  enemy's  formidable 
invasion,  it  is  entirely  due  to  the  sincere  and  intimate  relations 
that  have  existed  between  us.  History  will  do  us  the  justice 
to  say  that  no  allies  ever  worked  together  with  greater  single- 
mindedness  of  purpose.  You  will  readily  understand  that  I 
value  these  recollections  the  more,  coming  as  they  do  from  you. 
You  now  have  a  large  and  magnificent  army.  The  directions 
you  are  giving  it  are  perfectly  sound.  We  may  look  forward  to 
the  future  with  full  confidence.  Having  these  thoughts  in  mind, 
and  with  implicit  faith,  I  shall  be  with  your  army  in  spirit  no  less 
than  before.  It  is  with  these  feeHngs,  my  dear  General,  that  I 
subscribe  myself — Yours  always,  F.  Foch.] 

When  he  became  Chief  of  the  French  General  Staff  in 
1917  our  relations  became  still  closer,  and  from  first  to  last 
I  do  not  remember  any  appreciable  difference  of  opinion 
between  us  with  regard  to  the  general  lines  upon  which  the 
war  should  be  prosecuted.  He,  like  myself,  held  that  the 
only  sound  policy  for  the  Allies  to  pursue  was  to  con- 
centrate as  far  as  possible  all  their  strength  against  the 
principal  enemy,  and  anything  which,  without  good  cause, 
entailed  a  departure  from  this  principle  he  abhorred  as  much 
as  I  did. 

He  was  exceedingly  easy  and  pleasant  to  work  with,  this 
doubtless  being  due  in  a  great  measure  to  his  ability  to 
understand  the  English  temperament.  We  Allied  Generals 
always  found  it  difficult  to  appreciate  each  other's  point  of 
view  and  methods,  but  I  believe  that  Foch  found  less 
difficulty  than  others,  and  this  advantage  must  have  been 
very  helpful  to  him  when  he  became  Generalissimo.  Of  his 
other  qualifications  for  this  position  it  would  be  unbecoming 
of  me  to  speak  as  they  are  within  the  knowledge  of  every- 
body, and  it  is  no  disparagement  of  them  to  say  that  he 
was  fortunate  in  being  allowed,  as  a  result  of  the  gravity 
of  the  situation  when  he  assumed  command,  to  make  and 
carry  out  his  plans  with  a  comparatively  free  hand. 

On  the  7th  of  June  our  2nd  Army  won  a  brilliant  victory 
by  the  capture  of  the  Messines  Ridge — a  masterpiece  of 
modern  tactics — and  this  opened  the  way  for  the   third 


312         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

battle  of  Ypres,  which  commenced  on  the  31st  of  July  and 
did  not  terminate  until  the  first  week  in  November.  This 
battle,  better  known  as  Passchendaele,  was  fought  for  the 
most  part  under  atrocious  conditions  of  weather  ;  impassable 
mud  and  unfordable  craters  covered  the  whole  German 
front ;  and  no  praise  could  do  justice  to  the  sufferings  and 
achievements  of  the  British  soldier  in  this  long  and  terrible 
struggle.  Further  to  the  south  we  attacked  the  enemy 
at  Cambrai  on  the  20th  of  November,  the  fighting  here 
being  continued  until  the  7th  of  December.  This  action 
brought  the  operations  on  the  West  Front  to  a  close  for 
the  year. 

Meanwhile,  in  the  last  week  of  October,  the  2nd  Italian 
Army,  demoralised  by  insidious  propaganda,  had  been 
heavily  defeated  at  Caporetto  by  the  Austrians  (reinforced 
for  the  first  time  by  some  German  divisions),  and  this  led 
to  a  general  retreat  to  the  line  of  the  Piave.  The  battle 
commenced  on  Wednesday  the  24th  of  October,  and  about 
two  days  later,  when  we  first  became  aware  of  the  extent 
of  the  disaster,  General  Foch  and  I  agreed,  with  the  approval 
of  our  Governments,  to  reinforce  the  Itahans  with  five 
divisions  each  from  the  West  Front.  During  my  visit  to 
Italy  the  previous  March  I  had  discussed  with  General 
Cadorna  the  question  of  sending  troops  to  his  assistance  in 
case  of  need,  and  subsequently,  working  in  conjunction  with 
the  French  and  Italian  staffs,  detailed  arrangements  were 
made  by  my  staff  for  the  transport  of  the  reinforcing  troops 
by  rail  and,  as  far  as  possible,  for  their  dispositions  and 
employment  on  arrival.  Consequently  no  delay  was  incurred 
when  the  need  for  these  troops  arose. 

The  reports  we  received  from  Italy  regarding  the  number 
of  German  divisions  present  were  of  an  alarming  kind,  the 
number  given  varying  between  fifteen  and  thirty.  Judging 
from  our  own  sources  of  intelligence,  and  bearing  in  mind 
the  strain  imposed  upon  the  enemy  by  our  offensive  in 
Flanders,  it  was  impossible  to  believe  that  more  than  seven 
or  eight  divisions  had  been  sent.  This  proved  to  be  correct, 
and  the  only  two  divisions  that  had  been  taken  from 
the  West  Front  were  at  once  replaced  by  two  others  from 
the  Russian  front. 


THE  ITALIAN  FRONT  313 

On  Sunday  the  28th  of  October,  the  news  received  having 
become  still  more  serious,  I  motored  over  to  Walton  Heath 
to  see  the  Prime  Minister,  as  soon  as  I  had  finished  my 
morning's  work,  to  suggest  to  him  that  I  should  go  to 
Italy,  ascertain  the  true  state  of  affairs,  and  arrange  to 
give  further  assistance  if  it  was  really  required.  As  our 
divisions  had  been  fighting  almost  continuously  since  the 
previous  April  they  needed  time  to  rest  and  refit,  and  I  was 
averse  from  sending  more  than  the  five  if  it  could  be  avoided. 
The  Prime  Minister  agreed  to  my  going  and  I  left  London 
early  next  morning,  reaching  General  Cadorna's  headquarters 
on  the  Wednesday.  I  found  him  at  Treviso,  Udine,  his 
previous  headquarters,  having  been  occupied  by  the  enemy 
two  days  before.  Having  discussed  matters  with  him,  and 
observed  the  condition  of  the  retreating  troops,  I  telegraphed 
my  report  to  the  War  Cabinet,  and  then  proceeded  to  Rome 
in  order  to  see  the  Italian  War  Minister  before  returning  to 
London. 

While  at  Rome  I  was  the  guest  of  Sir  Rennell  Rodd,  the 
British  ambassador,  to  whom  I  am  very  grateful  for  the 
hospitahty  Lady  Rodd  and  he  were  good  enough  to  show 
me.  On  the  Saturday  evening,  just  as  I  was  about  to  start 
for  the  railway  station,  I  received  instructions  from  London 
that  certain  members  of  the  War  Cabinet  were  leaving  for 
Italy  to  confer  with  the  French  and  Italian  ministers,  and 
to  consider  the  question  of  forming  a  Supreme  War  Council. 
I  was  requested  to  be  present,  and  will  deal  with  the  forma- 
tion of  this  Council  and  the  whole  question  of  so-called 
"  imity  of  command  "  after  making  a  few  observations  on 
certain  plans  suggested  during  1917  as  alternatives  to  full 
concentration  of  effort  on  the  West  Front,  and  after  dis- 
cussing the  general  situation  as  it  appeared  to  the  General 
Staff  at  the  end  of  the  year. 

These  alternative  plans  having  been  already  described 
by  several  public  writers,  their  principal  features  are 
generally  well  known.  The  first  one  put  forward  was  that 
proposed  early  in  January  for  an  offensive  across  the  Itahan 
front,  its  object  being  to  "  knock  out "  Austria  and  so 
bring  down  Germany,  and  British  troops  from  the  West 
Front,  to  the  extent  required,  were  to  be  employed.     As 


314        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

far  as  I  could  understand,  those  in  favour  of  this  plan 
argued  that  our  best  poHcy  in  future  would  be  to  attack 
the  enemy  not  where  he  was  strongest,  namely  on  the 
West  Front,  but  where  he  was  weakest.  I  doubt  if  they 
sufficiently  bore  in  mind  that  if  it  would  be  to  our  advantage 
to  "  knock  out  "  Austria,  Germany  would  try  to  prevent 
her  from  being  knocked  out,  and  a  glance  at  the  map  of 
Europe  will  show  that  she  was  far  better  placed  than  we 
were  for  transferring  troops  to  the  Italian  front,  and  there- 
fore could  always  hope  to  counter  our  offensive  designs  in 
that  direction. 

Put  in  another  way,  and  leaving  out  of  account  the 
dubious  conclusion  that  the  defeat  of  the  weak  (Austria) 
would  involve  the  downfall  of  the  strong  (Germany),  the 
policy  of  attacking  the  weak  could  only  be  justified  on  the 
assumption  that  we  could  in  the  meantime  pin  the  strong 
to  his  present  positions,  otherwise  the  attempt  to  fight  the 
former  might  merely  lead  to  fighting  the  latter  in  another 
place.  As  no  such  assumption  could  be  entertained  the 
proposal  was  fundamentally  unsound. 

General  Cadorna  was  entrusted  with  the  duty  of  working 
out  the  details  preparatory  to  a  final  decision  being  given, 
but  before  he  had  completed  his  task  the  plan  had  been 
superseded  by  the  acceptance  meanwhile  of  Nivelle's  plan, 
which  entailed  the  employment  of  the  full  strength  of  our 
armies  on  the  West  Front,  and  was  itself  a  substitute  for 
the  Chantilly  plan. 

Another  plan  was  that  suggested  early  in  October  for 
transferring  divisions  from  the  West  Front  to  operate 
against  the  Turks  from  the  vicinity  of  Alexandretta.  A 
project  for  sending  an  expedition  to  this  region  had  first 
been  mooted  in  December  1914,  and  there  was  then  some- 
thing to  be  said  in  its  favour,  but  the  Dardanelles  enterprise 
began  to  take  shape  soon  afterwards  and  for  the  moment 
put  an  end  to  it.  It  was  revived  in  the  autumn  of  1915 
when  the  evacuation  of  the  Dardanelles  had  to  be  con- 
sidered, and  as  circumstances  had  meanwhile  changed  to 
our  disadvantage  it  was  then  properly  rejected  by  the 
General  Staff,  just  before  I  became  CT.G.S.,  and  was  again 
dropped. 


THE  ALEXANDRETTA  PLAN  315 

It  was  still  more  impracticable  in  October  1917,  for 
the  enemy's  communications  had  been  much  improved; 
he  was  in  a  position  seriously  to  oppose  an  attempted 
landing  ;  and  his  submarines,  of  which  there  were  none  in 
the  Mediterranean  in  1914,  were  now  particularly  active. 
Further,  at  least  six  divisions  must  be  sent,  requiring  for 
their  transport  about  a  milhon  tons  of  shipping,  and  the 
Entente  were  already  at  their  wits'  end  to  know  how  to 
find  ships  for  the  thousands  of  American  troops  waiting 
to  cross  the  Atlantic,  for  maintaining  the  large  forces  then 
employed  in  eastern  theatres,  and  for  meeting  their  own 
domestic  requirements. 

These  were,  however,  but  insignificant  objections  as 
compared  with  the  very  obvious  one  that  the  operation 
could  not  possibly  be  carried  out  in  sufficient  time  to  admit 
of  the  divisions  being  brought  back  by  the  spring,  when  a 
heavy  attack  on  the  West  Front  might  have  to  be  met. 
Instead  of  sending  them  on  such  an  absurd  errand  it  was 
important  that  they  should  be  given  opportunities  for  rest 
and  training  before  being  called  upon  to  meet  the  attack 
with  which  we  were  threatened. 

Being  required  to  advise  upon  the  project  at  short 
notice,  I  examined  it  one  Sunday  morning  at  a  conference 
held  in  the  War  Office,  the  First  Sea  Lord,  the  Deputy  First 
Sea  Lord,  and  representatives  of  the  railway  and  shipping 
authorities  being  present,  and  our  conclusions  were  such 
that  the  proposal  had  once  more  to  be  laid  aside.  This 
proved  to  be  fortunate  when,  a  week  or  two  later,  it 
became  necessary  to  assist  the  Italians  by  sending  divisions 
from  the  West  Front,  and  still  more  so  when  the  German 
offensive  on  that  front  had  to  be  met  in  March  1918. 

Although  the  Alexandretta  plan  was  abandoned,  the 
theory  that  the  principal  enemy  could  be  overthrown  by 
the  defeat  of  a  minor  one  was  not  yet  extinct ;  and  following 
on  Allenby's  successes  in  Palestine  at  the  end  of  the  year 
it  was  suggested  that  he  should  continue  and  develop  his 
operations  with  the  object  of  putting  the  Turkish  armies 
completely  out  of  the  war.  The  General  Staff  were  unable 
to  regard  this  plan  with  any  more  favour  than  that  accorded 
to  its  predecessor,  but  it  found  supporters  at  Versailles,  and 


3i6         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

at  the  conference  held  there  at  the  end  of  January  and 
beginning  of  February  1918  its  adoption  was  recommended, 
subject  to  the  West  Front  being  made  secure. 

A  recommendation  of  this  sort  was  not  of  much  value, 
since  it  left  unanswered  the  vital  question  as  to  the  means 
required  to  make  and  keep  the  West  Front  secure,  and 
whether,  after  providing  them,  there  would  remain   over 
sufficient  troops  for  AUenby.     To  submit  for  approval  a  plan 
depending  upon  conditions  of  a  purely  mihtary  character 
was  to  throw  upon  the  Supreme  War  Council — that  is,  upon 
civilian  ministers — a  task  which  did  not  come  within  either 
its  province  or  its  competency  to  perform.     The  advocates  of 
the  plan  were  not  entitled  to  have  it  both  ways,  and  to  place 
themselves  in  the  happy  position  of  the  man  who  can  say, 
"  heads  I  win,  tails  you  lose."     It  was  for  them,  before 
submitting  their  recommendation,   definitely  to  make  up 
their  minds  as  to  whether  there  were  sufftcient  troops  for 
the  double  purpose  of  an  absolutely  reliable  defensive  in 
France  and  a  really  effective  offensive  against  the  Turks, 
remembering  at  the  same  time  that  the  transfer  of  divisions 
backwards  and   forwards  between   Picardy   and   Palestine 
could  not  be  accomplished  by  a  stroke  of  the  pen,  but  would 
be  a  matter  of  many  weeks  and  much  shipping.     If  the 
answer  was   in   the   affirmative   the   plan  would,   to  that 
extent,  be  justified  ;    if  in  the  negative,  the  plan  ought  to 
be  pronounced  impracticable,  and  in  unequivocal  terms. 

With  a  large  part  of  their  country  in  German  hands, 
and  with  the  constant  arrival  of  German  divisions  from 
the  Russian  front,  it  was  not  to  be  expected,  apart  from 
what  may  be  called  mere  strategy,  that  the  French  would 
look  upon  the  plan  with  any  marked  approval,  and  after 
some  discussion  it  was  settled  that  no  troops  should  be 
taken  away  from  the  West  Front,  Even  this  compromise 
was  liable  to  react  detrimentally  in  respect  of  drafts  and 
other  matters,  and,  what  was  still  more  important,  it  pre- 
vented the  West  Front,  where  we  obviously  could  not  be 
too  strong,  from  being  reinforced  by  troops  that  could  safely 
be  brought  away  from  Palestine.  I  therefore  strongly 
advised  against  it,  but  it  was  accepted,  and  accordingly 
no  troops  were  withdrawn   from  Palestine  until   this  was 


SIR  CHARLES  MONRO  317 

enforced   by   the  enemy's   attack  in  France   some  six   or 
seven  weeks  later. 

The  aim  of  the  General  Staff  had  for  long  been  to  replace 
British  infantry  in  eastern  theatres  by  native  infantry  from 
India,  and  then  entrust  the  Palestine  operations  to  the  latter 
and  mounted  men,  both  of  whom  could  be  spared  from 
the  decisive  theatre.  The  question  of  raising  more  native 
battahons  was  first  taken'  up  in  1916,  when  Sir  Charles 
Monro  became  Commander-in-Chief,  and,  thanks  to  his 
co-operation  and  administrative  abihty,  about  a  hundred 
and  fifty  battalions  as  well  as  other  units  were  added  to  the 
Indian  army,  being  sent  to  Palestine  or  Mesopotamia  as 
soon  as  ready.  Indirectly,  therefore,  he  had  a  notable  share 
in  the  success  of  the  Palestine  campaign  of  1918,  for  when, 
in  September  of  that  year,  the  offensive  was  carried  out 
against  Damascus  and  Aleppo  nearly  three-fourths  of  the 
infantry  belonged  to  these  same  Indian  battalions,  the  bulk 
of  the  British  infantry  having  before  that  time  been  hurried 
off  post-haste  to  the  West  Front. 

As  can  be  imagined,  it  was  a  most  unpleasant  duty  to 
have  to  oppose  plans  of  operations  which  ministers  wished 
to  see  adopted,  especially  on  those  occasions — fortunately 
very  rare — when  it  had  to  be  performed  before  AlUes.  The 
Palestine  plan,  supported  by  the  Prime  Minister,  was  an 
instance  of  this,  and  immediately  after  the  meeting  at 
Versailles  at  which  the  project  was  discussed  I  expressed 
my  regret  that  I  had  been  obliged,  in  the  presence  of  foreign 
delegates,  to  differ  from  him,  and  assured  him  that  I  had 
done  so  with  the  greatest  reluctance,  and  only  because  of  the 
risks  involved  with  respect  to  the  situation  on  the  West 
Front.  I  represented  to  him  that  if  I  had  remained  silent  the 
other  delegates  would  naturally  have  thought  that  I  agreed 
with  the  proposal,  or  at  any  rate  had  no  particular  objection 
to  it ;  that  my  name  would  appear  in  the  conference 
proceedings  and,  in  case  of  future  reference,  would  imply 
agreement  unless  my  objections  were  recorded  ;  and  I  re- 
minded him  that  naval  and  military  officers  had  been  publicly 
condemned  in  the  past  for  neglecting  to  state  their  opinions 
on  professional  questions  brought  before  conferences  to 
which  they  had  been  summoned,  and  therefore  that  I  was 


3i8         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

placed  in  the  dilemma  of  having  to  choose  between  laying 
myself  open  to  the  same  charge,  and  giving  offence  to 
ministers  with  whom  it  was  essential,  in  the  general  interest, 
that  I  should  work  in  harmony. 

The  Prime  Minister  did  not  agree  with  this  way  of 
looking  at  things,  and  was  angry  at  the  course  I  had  taken. 
He  said  that  as  I  had  already  informed  him  of  my  objections 
there  was  no  necessity  to  repeat  them  at  the  conference,  and 
that  it  was  sufficient  that  he  should  know  them.  He  then 
turned  away,  leaving  me  wondering  why  I  had  been  in- 
structed to  attend  the  conference  if  not  for  the  purpose  of 
giving  advice  when  important  military  questions  were  under 
discussion. 

I  may  explain  that  I  had  especially  in  mind  the  remarks 
made  regarding  the  duty  of  naval  and  military  advisers  by 
the  Dardanelles  Commission  a  few  months  before.  For  the 
convenience  of  the  reader  I  will  quote  a  portion  of  them  : 

We  also  think  that  the  naval  advisers  should  have  expressed 
their  views  to  the  (War)  Council,  whether  asked  or  not,  if  they 
considered  that  the  project  which  the  Council  was  about  to  adopt 
was  impracticable  from  a  naval  point  of  view. 

We  are  unable  to  concur  in  the  view  set  forth  by  Lord  Fisher 
that  it  was  his  duty,  if  he  differed  from  the  Chief  of  his  Depart- 
ment, to  maintain  silence  at  the  CouncU  or  to  resign.  We  think 
that  the  adoption  of  any  such  principle  generally  would  impair  the 
efficiency  of  the  public  service. 

The  following  also  appears  in  the  report : 

Mr.  Lloyd  George  did  not  concur  in  the  description  given  by 
Lord  Fisher  of  the  position  he  occupied  in  the  War  Council.  On 
being  asked  the  question,  "  If  the  experts  present  did  not  express 
dissent,  did  you  assume  that  they  assented  to  what  was  done  ?  " 
he  replied,  "  Certainly." 

Several  other  ministers  gave  similar  evidence  on  this 
point,  the  conclusion  drawn  from  it  by  the  Commissioners 
being  that  : 

The  Chairman  and  ministerial  members  of  the  War  Council 
looked  to  the  naval  and  military  experts  to  express  their  opinions 
if  they  dissented  from  the  views  put  forward  by  the  heads  of 
their  respective  departments. 


ALTERNATIVE  PLANS  319 

To  revert  to  the  recurring  desire  to  start  new  plans  or 
change  old  ones,  it  has  to  be  remembered  that  the  same 
thing  has  happened  in  other  wars,  particularly  in  those 
of  long  duration.  It  was  the  more  Hkely  to  be  a  feature  of 
the  Great  War  because  the  latter  was  of  such  dimensions 
as  to  affect  every  part  of  the  national  Hfe,  and  mihtary 
operations  thereby  passed  to  an  unprecedented  extent  under 
the  control  of  ministers — that  is,  of  men  untrained  in  either 
the  theory  or  practice  of  war.  A  further  inducement  to 
make  changes  of  plan  was  the  comparative  ease  with  which, 
in  appearance,  they  could  be  arranged  owing  to  the  greater 
facilities  afforded  by  modern  means  of  communication. 

It  is  not  my  purpose  to  enlarge  upon  the  evils  which 
accompany  the  tendency  to  change  from  one  plan  to  another 
— at  bewilderingly  short  intervals  and  without  sufficient 
military  reason — beyond  observing  that  it  has  an  unsettling 
effect  on  the  troops,  and  monopolises  much  of  the  time  of 
commanders  and  their  staffs  which  ought  to  be  given  to 
other  matters.  At  a  guess  I  would  say  that  in  1917  at  least 
twenty  per  cent  of  the  time  of  the  General  Staff  at  the  War 
Office  was  occupied  in  explaining,  either  verbally  or  in 
writing,  that  the  alternative  projects  put  forward  were  either 
strategically  unsound  or  were  wholly  impracticable. 

The  General  Staff  must  expect  to  have  the  same 
experience  in  future  wars,  and  they  must  try  neither  to 
despair  nor  to  become  impatient,  but  they  will  not  find 
these  precepts  easy  to  practise,  and  for  myself  I  must  confess 
to  frequent  failures.  Much  will  depend  on  the  personality  of 
ministers  and  of  their  responsible  professional  advisers,  and 
whether  the  former  have  sufficient  confidence  in  the  latter 
to  accept  their  opinion  without  asking  for  it  to  be  sub- 
stantiated in  every  detail  by  lengthy  memoranda  and 
tabulated  statements,  or  by  the  test  of  poHce  court  cross- 
examination  and  a  bout  in  dialectics. 

I  say  "  responsible  "  advisers  because  advice  given  by 
others,  although  they  may  be  professionals,  is  often  without 
value  and  may  be  positively  mischievous.  Such  advice 
poses  as  being  expert,  whereas  the  person  who  gives  it  can 
seldom  possess  the  information  on  which  to  base  a  reUable 
opinion,  and  as  he  is  not  responsible  for  the  execution  of 


320        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

his  proposals  his  outlook  is  quite  different  from  that  of 
the  person  who  has  the  responsibility.  I  frequently  told 
ministers  that  if  I  were  not  C.I.G.S.  I  could  produce  half-a- 
dozen  different  plans  for  winning  the  war,  quickly  and  at 
small  cost,  but  as  it  was  I  had  but  one  plan,  and  that  a 
hard  one  to  carry  out — the  defeat  of  the  German  armies  on 
the  West  Front. 

The  task  of  keeping  the  strategical  direction  of  the  war 
on  right  lines  became  harder  as  the  end  of  1917  approached. 
For  more  than  three  years  we  had  endured  terrible  sacrifices 
without  victory  being  either  achieved  or  coming  clearly 
within  sight,  the  German  barrier  was  still  intact,  Russia 
had  made  terms  with  the  enemy,  Italy  had  been  severely 
defeated,  and  for  these  and  other  reasons  misgivings  arose 
in  the  minds  of  some  people  as  to  whether  we  could  after 
all  hope  to  win  through. 

I  do  not  refer  to  those  who  were  accused — sometimes 
quite  unjustly — of  being  pacifists,  but  to  those  who,  in  1917 
as  in  1916,  could  see  only  their  own  difficulties  and  losses, 
and  apparently  would  never  be  prepared  to  admit  that  the 
enemy  had  suffered  from  either  unless  and  until  he  wrote 
them  a  letter  to  that  effect.  This  attitude  of  mind  was  not 
only  stupid  but  grossly  unfair  to  our  men  and  their  leaders. 
The  British  General  Staff  in  France  have  since  had  the 
satisfaction  of  finding  their  views  regarding  the  state  of 
German  morale  in  1917  confirmed  by  Ludendorff,  who  has 
said  that  "  The  (German)  troops  had  borne  the  continuous 
defensive  with  extreme  difficulty.  Skulkers  were  already 
numerous.  They  reappeared  as  soon  as  the  battle  was  over, 
and  it  had  become  quite  common  for  divisions  which  came 
out  of  action  with  desperately  low  effectives  to  be  consider- 
ably stronger  after  only  a  few  days.  Against  the  weight  of 
the  enemy's  material  the  troops  no  longer  displayed  their 
old  stubbornness ;  they  thought  with  horror  of  fresh 
defensive  battles  and  longed  for  the  war  of  movement. 
.  .  .  There  had  been  incidents,  too,  which  indicated  that 
their  cohesion  was  no  longer  the  same." 

Although  there  could  at  the  time  be  no  certainty  as  to 
the  actual  amount  of  progress  made  in  wearing  down  the 
enemy's   power    of    resistance,    we    knew    enough    to    feel 


THE  SUPREME  EFFORT  321 

satisfied  that  there  was  no  occasion  for  either  gloom  or 
despair  provided  we  were  prepared  to  face  the  music.  It 
was  with  the  object  of  preventing  despondency  from  arising 
in  the  pubhc  mind  that  as  early  as  the  month  of  July  I 
took  advantage  of  a  speech  I  had  been  asked  to  make  to 
point  out  that  "  There  comes  a  time  in  every  war  when 
each  side  has  to  put  forward  its  greatest  effort,  when  the 
strain  becomes  greater  every  day,  and  when  a  little  extra 
effort  may  suffice  to  turn  the  scale.  That  time  has  come 
now,  and  in  this  war  as  in  all  wars  victory  will  incline 
to  that  side  which  best  retains  its  cohesion  and  confidence." 

There  were  other  people  who,  with  more  justification 
than  the  pessimists  I  have  mentioned,  doubted  if  we  could 
decisively  win  as  early  as  1918,  and  argued  that  we  ought 
not  to  make  the  attempt  until  1919,  by  which  time  the 
output  of  tanks,  aeroplanes,  and  other  mechanical  means 
of  warfare  would  be  enormously  increased,  and  America 
would  be  able  to  exert  her  full  strength. 

Questions  of  the  above  nature  had  several  times  to  be 
dealt  with  by  the  General  Staff  towards  the  end  of  1917, 
and  although  we  were  able  to  dispose  of  those  which  threw 
doubt  upon  the  abihty  of  the  Entente  ultimately  to  emerge 
victorious — always  provided  that  the  armies  were  not 
starved  for  men — it  was  not  so  easy  to  advise  on  the  best 
military  policy  to  be  followed  in  the  year  1918 — that  is,  as 
to  whether  a  supreme  effort  to  win  should  be  made  then 
or  should  be  deferred  till  the  following  year. 

Had  we  been  engaged  in  a  war  in  which  the  British  army 
alone  were  fighting  a  single  belligerent,  and  in  which 
considerations  other  than  these  of  a  purely  mihtary  character 
were  of  Httle  or  no  account,  a  definite  opinion  could  have 
been  formed  with  comparative  ease.  But  nothing  resembled 
these  conditions  in  a  world  war  of  some  twenty  or  more 
nations,  and  there  were  many  factors  about  which  we  could 
not  possibly  make  a  reliable  forecast,  such  as  the  pohtical, 
social,  and  economic  situation  and  the  general  staying  power 
of  the  different  members  of  the  Entente,  the  effect  of 
submarine  warfare,  the  naval  and  shipping  position,  and 
food  production.  I  used  to  estimate  that  of  the  total  effort 
of  which  the  nation  was  capable  only  twenty-five  per  cent 

Y 


322        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  purely  military,  the  remaining  seventy-five  per  cent 
being  of  a  non-military  nature  ;  and  when  asked  sometimes 
what  our  chances  of  winning  were,  I  would  reply :  "  Why 
ask  me,  with  my  twenty-five  per  cent  ?  Ask  those  who 
manipulate  the  seventy-five." 

But  certain  elements  stood  out  quite  clearly,  one  of  the 
most  comforting  being  the  continued  staunchness  of  the 
men  and  women  of  the  Empire,  who  only  asked  of  their 
leaders  to  tell  them,  without  hesitation,  what  they  were 
required  to  do  in  order  to  win,  and  this  being  so  there  was 
no  insuperable  difficulty  in  reaching  a  conclusion  which 
would  be  sufficiently  reliable  for  all  practical  purposes. 

The  total  collapse  of  Russia,  the  defeat  of  the  ItaHans, 
the  depletion  of  the  French  reserves  of  man-power,  the 
unsatisfactory  position  in  regard  to  drafts  for  our  own 
armies,  and  the  probability  that,  owing  to  the  alleged 
scarcity  of  sea-transport,  America  would  not  have  a  really 
large  force  in  Europe  before  the  autumn  of  19 18,  all  pointed 
to  the  necessity  of  adopting  a  defensive  poHcy  in  that 
year,  or  at  any  rate  for  the  greater  part  of  it.  This  did  not 
mean,  as  some  seemed  to  think,  that  in  the  meantime  we 
should  not  be  called  upon  to  fight,  or  that  we  could  do  just 
as  much  or  as  little  fighting  as  we  chose.  On  the  contrary  it 
meant  that,  as  the  initiative  would  rest  with  the  enemy,  he 
and  not  we  would  dictate  the  amount  of  fighting  to  be  done. 
If  a  waiting  policy  on  the  West  Front  would  be  of  advantage 
to  us,  obviously  it  would  be  to  the  disadvantage  of  the  enemy, 
who  might  therefore  be  trusted  to  try  and  force  a  decision 
as  quickly  as  possible,  and  the  arrival  of  six  divisions  from 
the  Russian  front  in  November  and  nineteen  in  December 
was  a  sufficient  indication  that  this  was  his  intention. 

Again,  his  economic  conditions  were  known  to  be  worse 
than  those  of  the  Entente,  and  his  recent  peace  proposals 
showed  that  he  felt  compelled  to  bring  the  war  to  an  end 
with  the  least  delay.  Further,  the  strain  to  which  his 
troops  had  been  subjected  by  our  persistent  attacks  on  the 
West  Front  would  be  aggravated  by  cold  and  want  during 
the  coming  winter,  and  might  well  reach  breaking  point 
before  the  expiration  of  19 18  if  those  attacks  were  resumed 
and  as  relentlessly  pushed  home  as  in  the  previous  year. 


THE  ENEMY'S  PLAN  323 

Assuming  that  it  was  to  the  enemy's  interest  to  win  such 
a  success  before  we  could  further  increase  our  resources,  and 
before  America  could  effectively  intervene,  as  would  bring 
the  war  to  an  end — at  least  for  the  time  being — the  next 
question  was,  where  would  he  make  his  main  attack  ?  He 
had  three  objectives,  the  Channel  coast,  Paris,  and  Italy,  and 
of  these  the  first  and  third  could  hardly  be  regarded  as  feasible 
before  the  month  of  May  on  account  of  climatic  conditions. 
This  delay  would  not  suit  the  enemy's  purpose.  The  second 
objective  was  feasible  at  almost  any  season,  and  the  attack 
could  be  aimed  at  the  point  of  junction  between  the  British 
and  French  armies,  which,  as  everybody  knows,  is  the  danger 
point. 

Macedonia  might  perhaps  be  regarded  as  a  fourth  ob- 
jective, but  the  Bulgarians  had  apparently  no  intention  of 
doing  any  more  fighting  if  they  could  help  it ;  the  country 
was  difficult  and  the  communications  bad  ;  and  in  any  case 
a  victory  here  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  cause  the  Entente 
to  come  to  terms.  Ludendorff  had  hitherto  not  seemed  to 
agree  with  the  views  of  Falkenhayn,  who  was  always  a 
"  westerner  "  of  the  most  pronounced  type,  and  has  de- 
clared that  "  No  decision  in  the  east,  even  though  it  were 
as  thorough  as  it  was  possible  to  imagine,  could  spare  us 
from  fighting  to  a  conclusion  in  the  west."  But  by  the  end 
of  1917,  with  the  experiences  of  1916  and  1917  behind  him, 
it  was  to  be  supposed  that  even  Ludendorff,  notwithstanding 
his  eastern  tendencies,  would  reaUse  that  he  could  never 
win  until  he  had  gained  a  complete  victory  in  the  west, 
and  that  the  sooner  he  made  the  attempt  the  greater  would 
be  his  chance  of  winning.  As  a  matter  of  fact  he  did  reaUse 
it,  though  at  the  time  we  could  only  guess  that  he  might, 
for  he  has  admitted  that  "  The  condition  of  our  Allies  and 
of  our  army  all  called  for  an  offensive  that  would  bring 
about  an  early  decision.  This  was  only  possible  on  the 
western  front.  All  that  had  gone  before  was  only  a  means 
to  the  one  end  of  creating  a  situation  that  would  make  it  a 
feasible  operation.  ...  I  set  aside  all  idea  of  attacking  in 
Macedonia  or  Italy.  All  that  mattered  was  to  get  together 
enough  troops  for  an  attack  in  the  west." 

After  a  long  and  careful  review  of  the  whole  situation 


324        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

the  conclusions  I  reached  towards  the  end  of  1917  were 
that  the  campaign  of  1919  might  never  come  ;  that  although 
there  were  strong  reasons  why  we  should  defer  offensive 
action  on  the  West  Front  in  1918  until  the  Americans  arrived 
in  full  strength,  we  might,  quite  apart  from  the  question  of 
whether  we  should  or  should  not  deliberately  aim  at  obtain- 
ing a  decision  that  year,  be  compelled  by  the  enemy,  in 
self-defence  alone,  to  fight  our  hardest ;  that  he  might 
commence  his  attack  at  any  time  from  February  onwards, 
according  to  the  rate  at  which  he  could  bring  over  his 
surplus  divisions  from  Russia  ;  and,  finally,  that  we  must 
be  prepared  to  endure  in  1918  a  greater  strain  than  any 
we  had  yet  undergone.  The  corollary  of  these  conclusions 
was  that  we  should  at  once  send  to  the  West  Front  every 
man,  gun,  and  aeroplane  we  could  lay  hands  on,  and  make 
available  every  ship  we  could  for  helping  the  Americans  to 
bring  over  their  divisions  as  quickly  as  possible.  //  this 
were  done  we  might  confidently  hope  to  break  up  the  enemy's 
offensive,  while  the  gradually  increasing  strength  of  the 
American  troops  might  enable  us  to  seek  and  obtain  a 
final  decision  before  the  year  expired. 

Shipping  and  men  were,  as  for  months  past,  the  cardinal 
factors,  and  we  used  to  calculate  that,  to  maintain  a  given 
number  of  men  in  Egypt  or  Salonika,  the  amount  of  shipping 
required  was  some  six  times  greater  than  that  required  to 
maintain  the  same  number  on  the  West  Front.  There  were 
towards  the  end  of  19 17  probably  no  fewer  than  1,200,000 
men  in  distant  theatres,  who,  be  it  noted,  were  mainly 
fighting  Turks  and  Bulgars  and  not  Germans,  and  although 
a  large  proportion  of  them  were  native  troops  and  therefore 
not  altogether  suitable  for  employment  in  France,  they 
contained  a  considerable  number  of  British  troops  who 
could  well  be  spared  without  incurring  any  risk,  as  our 
successes  in  Palestine  and  Mesopotamia  had  removed  all 
danger  to  Egypt,  Persia,  and  India.  By  reducing  our  forces 
in  these  theatres  to  a  defensive  minimum  we  would  set  free 
not  only  more  troops  for  the  West  Front  but  also  more 
shipping  for  the  Americans,  As  already  shown,  this  was 
not  done. 

Towards  the  end  of  1916  the  enemy  had  made  a  flashy 


REVIEWING  THE  ENEMY  PLAN  325 

attempt  to  score  points  by  overrunning  Rumania,  but  in 
the  west,  according  to  Ludendorff,  he  had  been  "  fought  to 
a  standstill."  Fortunately  for  him,  at  this  particular 
moment  Joffre  was  superseded,  Foch  shelved,  and  Nivelle's 
plan  adopted  in  place  of  that  proposed  at  the  Chantilly  con- 
ference. The  result  of  this  change  of  plan  was  that  when 
the  enemy  withdrew  in  February  1917  to  the  Hindenburg 
Line  he  got  away  without  serious  molestation,  broke  up 
Nivelle's  plan  to  some  extent,  and,  while  it  was  being  re- 
constructed, gained  time  for  that  rest  and  recuperation 
which  his  troops  so  sorely  needed.  Instead  of  enjoying  this 
advantage  he  would  have  had  to  submit  to  further  punish- 
ment if  the  Chantilly  plan  had  held  good,  as  the  direction 
it  gave  to  the  projected  offensive  would  not  have  been  so 
greatly  interfered  with  as  was  the  case  with  the  operations 
which  Nivelle  had  designed.  The  Russian  revolution  brought 
the  enemy  further  reUef  from  his  difficulties  ;  he  derived 
some  moral  and  material  advantage  from  his  unrestricted 
submarine  warfare ;  and  in  the  month  of  October  he 
repeated  his  Rumanian  adventure  in  Italy  with  considerable 
success. 

On  the  other  hand  his  troops  on  the  West  Front  had 
suffered  very  heavily,  both  in  numbers  and  morale,  from  the 
determined  attacks  to  which  they  were  subjected  throughout 
the  year,  and  this,  coupled  with  the  powerful  addition  to 
the  Entente  strength  afforded  by  the  entry  of  America  into 
the  war,  would  undoubtedly  have  made  his  position  Httle, 
if  any,  less  serious  at  the  end  of  1917  than  it  was  at  the  end 
of  1916  had  not  so  many  of  our  troops  been  locked  up  in 
secondary  theatres,  and  had  not  our  divisions  been  so 
reduced  in  strength  owing  to  the  lack  of  drafts. 

The  situation  being  what  it  was,  the  armies  on  the  West 
Front  were  once  again  unable  to  reap  the  fruits  of  their 
efforts,  and  it  was  even  conceivable  that,  in  warding  off 
the  attack  which  threatened  them,  they  might  become  so 
depleted  and  exhausted  as  to  find  it  very  difficult  to  hold 
on  until  sufficient  American  troops  arrived  to  redress  the 
balance,  while  at  the  best  it  was  to  be  feared  that  they 
would  lose  heavily  in  men  and  guns.  The  year  therefore 
closed  with  considerable  anxiety  as  to  the  future,  and  this 


326        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  increased  in  January  by  the  arrival  of  more  German 
divisions  from  Russia. 

With  regard  to  shipping,  I  may  add  that  the  Admiralty 
Staff,  whose  views  on  the  question  of  strategy  coincided 
with  those  of  the  General  Staff,  had  for  long  wished  to  cut 
down  the  tonnage  employed  in  distant  waters,  because  of 
the  difficulty  of  finding  naval  escorts  to  protect  the  transports 
against  the  enemy's  submarines,  especially  after  it  became 
necessary  to  help  in  safeguarding  the  passage  of  American 
troops  across  the  Atlantic. 

It  was  obvious  from  the  day  that  America  declared  war, 
the  6th  April,  that  the  rate  at  which  she  could  make  her 
assistance  felt  would  be  governed  by  sea-transport,  and  in 
the  numerous  consultations  I  had  with  General  Pershing, 
General  Bliss,  and  other  American  representatives  between 
the  summer  of  1917  and  February  1918,  it  was  always 
found  that  the  troops  which  could  be  made  ready  for 
despatch  by  a  certain  date  were  much  in  excess  of  the 
tonnage  said  to  be  procurable.  These  two  generals  dis- 
played every  desire  to  expedite  the  arrival  of  their  troops, 
and  were  prepared  to  meet  the  British  General  Staff  more 
than  half-way  in  any  suggestion  put  forward  which  might 
conduce  to  that  end,  but  of  course  nothing  substantial 
could  be  accomplished  unless  the  requisite  shipping  was 
forthcoming. 

The  question  was  constantly  discussed,  but  no  satisfactory 
decision  was  reached.  Everybody  was  short  of  shipping, 
and  everybody  wished  to  use  for  themselves  what  they  had 
or  could  borrow  from  others.  The  General  Staff,  having 
no  jurisdiction  over  the  matter  and  no  certain  knowledge 
of  it,  could  do  no  more  than  advise  that  the  operations  in 
the  distant  theatres  should  be  so  restricted  as  to  ensure 
the  greatest  economy  in  shipping,  and  continue  to  emphasise 
the  importance  of  getting  the  American  troops  into  France. 
It  rested  with  the  Government  to  say,  on  the  advice  of  the 
shipping  and  other  departments,  what  amount  of  tonnage 
could  be  provided  for  the  latter  purpose.  The  problem 
was  beset  with  many  difficulties,  but  I  cannot  help  thinking 
that  all  the  countries  concerned  could  have  done  more  in 
1917  to  solve  it  than  they  did,  seeing  what  was  accompUshed 


UNITY  OF  COMMAND  327 

in  the  spring  of  1918  under  pressure  of  the  German  offen- 
sive. Exactly  by  what  means  transports  were  then  found 
to  convey  the  large  number  of  troops  brought  over  with 
such  astonishing  rapidity  I  do  not  know,  as  I  had  ceased 
to  be  C.I.G.S.,  but  the  tonnage  provided  was  far  in  excess 
of  the  amount  previously  said  to  be  procurable. 

I  now  come  to  the  question  of  "  unity  of  command," 
and  it  is  no  exaggeration  to  say  at  once  that  the  measures 
taken  under  its  name  at  the  well-known  Rapallo  and  Ver- 
sailles conferences  resulted  not  in  unifpng  the  command  of 
the  armies  but  in  dividing  it,  thus  making  it  more  com- 
plicated than  before. 

As  early  as  the  autumn  of  19 15  various  proposals  were 
put  forward,  both  by  ministers  and  soldiers,  lor  setting  up 
some  form  of  AUied  body  charged  with  ensuring  more  unified 
action  and  whole-hearted  co-operation,  but  for  reasons 
unknown  to  me  they  failed  to  materiahse.  Some  progress 
was  made,  however,  in  the  required  direction  in  that  con- 
ferences between  the  AUied  ministers  and  Allied  mihtary 
authorities  took  place  much  more  frequently  during  1916 
than  they  had  previously  done. 

In  February  1917,  as  already  told,  Nivelle  was  given 
command  of  the  Franco-British  armies  engaged  in  the 
operations  designed  by  him  in  heu  of  those  recommended 
at  the  Chantniy  conference  in  November  1916,  but  this 
merely  placed  the  commander  of  one  army  in  temporary 
command  of  another  for  a  particular  purpose,  and  did 
nothing  to  ensure  permanent  co-ordination  and  direction  of 
the  Entente  operations  in  general. 

Nivelle's  failure  to  provide  the  expected  victory  checked 
for  the  time  any  further  desire  on  the  part  of  ministers  to 
try  new  systems  of  command,  and  nothing  more  was  heard 
of  the  matter  for  some  months  so  far  as  they  were  concerned. 
The  Alhed  mihtary  authorities,  however,  discussed  it  in  the 
summer  of  1917,  when  considering  the  effect  of  the  Russian 
collapse  and  the  consequent  probability  that  a  defensive 
role  would  be  imposed  upon  us  pending  the  arrival  of  the 
Americans,  and  their  deliberations  favoured  the  establish- 
ment of  an  inter-aUied  staff,  to  be  located  at  Paris,  but 
again  nothing  came  of  the  idea. 


328        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  question  next  came  up  at  the  Rapallo  conference 
in  November,  after  the  Italian  reverse,  and  it  was  then 
decided  to  form  a  "  Supreme  War  Council  "  consisting  of 
the  Prime  Minister  and  one  other  minister  of  each  of  the 
Great  Powers.  Each  of  these  Powers  was  to  delegate  a 
permanent  military  representative  as  "  technical  adviser  " 
to  the  Council.  These  officers  were  to  have  no  executive 
power,  but  to  act  only  in  an  advisory  capacity.  It  was 
arranged  that  the  Council  should  have  its  permanent  head- 
quarters at  Versailles,  though  its  meetings  would  not  neces- 
sarily always  be  held  there. 

The  establishment  of  the  Council  filled  a  much-felt  want, 
for  it  enabled  ministers  to  meet  regularly,  helped  to  secure 
co-ordination  of  national  policies,  the  proceedings  could  be 
properly  recorded  by  the  permanent  secretariat,  and  in 
many  ways  it  furthered  the  methodical  despatch  of  business. 
But  it  should  be  noted  that,  although  the  object  of  setting 
up  the  Council  was  to  ensure  the  better  co-ordination  of 
military  action,  the  members  of  the  Council  were  ministers, 
and  therefore  it  was  a  political  and  not  a  mihtary  body. 
Consequently,  it  did  nothing  to  improve  the  system  of 
military  command,  while  in  one  respect  it  struck  deeply  at 
the  root  principle  of  all  military  organisation,  in  that  the 
"  technical  advisers  "  were  empowered  to  advise  the  Council, 
i.e.  their  ministers,  independently  of  their  General  Staffs. 

It  is  the  right  of  a  government  to  select  its  own  pro- 
fessional advisers  and  to  change  them  as  often  as  it  pleases, 
but  it  ought  not  to  appoint  independent  advisers  in  addition, 
for  such  a  proceeding  must  produce  divided  responsibility, 
delay,  friction,  and  confusion.  No  business,  military  or 
other,  could  be  smoothly  and  efficiently  conducted  if  the 
board  of  directors  employed  two  separate  managers  to 
advise  them  on  the  work  of  one  and  the  same  department, 
more  especially  if  one  of  the  managers  were  responsible  for 
carrying  out  the  instructions  of  the  board,  while  the  other 
had  no  such  responsibility. 

In  order  to  avoid  all  risks  in  this  respect  the  French 
nominated  as  their  representative  General  Weygand,  the 
deputy  of  their  Chief  of  the  General  Staff ;  the  Italians  were 
represented  by  an  officer  deputed  by  General  Cadorna,  their 


APPOINTMENT  OF  A  GENERALISSIMO       329 

Chief  of  the  General  Staff ;  and  the  Americans  nominated 
their  Chief  of  the  Staff,  General  Bliss.  The  British  repre- 
sentative, appointed  by  the  War  Cabinet,  was  alone  given 
a  position  not  under  the  Chief  of  the  General  Staff  of  the 
army  to  which  he  belonged. 

It  seems  clear  that,  in  setting  up  the  Council,  the  real 
object  of  ministers  was  not  so  much  to  provide  effective 
unity  of  military  command  as  to  acquire  for  themselves  a 
greater  control  over  the  military  chiefs.  That  there  was  no 
intention  of  unifying  the  command  by  the  appointment  of  an 
Allied  Commander-in-Chief  seems  equally  evident,  not  only 
from  the  constitution  of  the  Council  itself,  but  also  from 
the  fact  that  a  few  days  later  the  Prime  Minister  stated 
in  the  House  of  Commons  that  he  was  "  utterly  opposed  " 
to  the  appointment  of  a  Generalissimo,  as  it  "  would  produce 
real  friction  and  might  create  prejudice  not  merely  between 
the  armies  but  between  the  nations  and  governments." 

Irrespective  of  what  the  Prime  Minister  may  or  may 
not  have  had  in  his  mind  when  using  these  words,  I  may 
point  out  that,  before  agreeing  to  the  appointment  of  a 
Generahssimo,  it  was  essential  that  the  Allied  ministers  should 
be  agreed  amongst  themselves  as  to  the  policy  they  wished 
to  see  carried  out,  since  without  "  unity  "  of  pohcy  the 
establishment  of  so-called  "  unity  "  of  command  might  lead 
to  the  operations  being  conducted  in  the  interests  of  one 
ally  rather  than  of  the  others,  and  so  defeat  its  own  ends. 
Whether  these  considerations  had  any  influence  on  the 
Rapallo  decision  I  do  not  know,  nor  shall  I  discuss  the 
extent  to  which  unity  of  policy  existed. 

The  creation  of  a  properly  constituted  High  Command 
became  a  matter  of  increased  importance  in  January  1918, 
as  it  was  imperative  that  strong  strategical  reserves  should 
be  available  for  use  when  and  where  required  to  deal  with 
the  expected  German  attack,  and  to  ensure  this  the  inter- 
vention of  some  authority  superior  to  the  French  and  British 
Commanders-in-Chief  was  necessary.  For  example,  the 
British  and  French  fronts  might  be  attacked  simultaneously, 
in  which  case  it  might  be  advisable  to  give  ground  on  one  front 
in  order  to  furnish  additional  troops  for  a  counter-stroke 
on  the  other.     Or  one  front  alone  might  at  first  be  attacked 


330         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  be  in  need  of  help,  while  the  Commander-in-Chief  of 
the  other  might  be  expecting  an  equally  heavy  attack  to 
be  made  upon  himself  later,  and  therefore  not  feel  justified 
in  sending  assistance  to  his  colleague.  In  circumstances 
such  as  these,  it  would  only  be  natural  that  the  two  Com- 
manders-in-Chief should  consider  themselves  bound  both  by 
their  duty  to  their  governments  and  their  troops  to  take  a 
local  rather  than  a  general  view  of  the  situation.  Other 
cases  might  be  quoted — such  as  the  despatch  of  further 
reinforcements  to  Italy — in  which  some  superior  authority 
ought  to  step  in  and,  having  assessed  the  relative  importance 
of  the  different  fronts,  issue  such  instructions  to  the 
Commanders-in-Chief  as  would  best  further  the  success  of 
the  operations  in  general. 

In  my  opinion  it  was  ridiculous  to  think  that  control 
over  the  strategical  reserves  could  be  separated  from  control 
over  the  operations  as  a  whole,  and  therefore,  faihng  the 
appointment  of  a  Generalissimo  —  to  which  the  Prime 
Minister  had  told  parliament  he  was  opposed — the  duty 
must  be  performed  jointly  by  the  Chiefs  of  the  General 
Staff,  the  responsible  executive  officers  of  the  Govern- 
ments. I  communicated  these  views  in  a  memorandum 
I  sent  to  the  Prime  Minister  on  the  30th  of  January 
while  attending  the  Versailles  conference  previously  men- 
tioned. They  were  concurred  in  by  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and 
Generals  Foch  and  Petain  at  a  meeting  we  held  next  day, 
and  arrangements  for  putting  them  into  practice,  including 
the  formation  of  an  Allied  Staff,  were  discussed  by  General 
Foch  and  myself. 

On  the  1st  of  February  the  subject  was  considered  by  the 
Supreme  War  Council,  and  it  was  then  suggested  that  the 
duty  in  question  should  be  vested  in  the  "  technical 
advisers  "  of  the  Council.  No  decision  was  reached,  and  as 
it  was  important  that  the  matter  should  be  put  on  a  sound 
footing,  I  sent  to  the  Prime  Minister  a  second  memorandum 
in  which  I  again  advocated  the  principle  of  assigning  the 
duty  to  the  Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff.  When  the  Council 
met  on  the  following  day,  however,  it  was  decided  to  adopt 
the  alternative  system,  and  the  technical  advisers  thus 
became  an  "  Executive  Committee,"  with  General  Foch  as 


THE  SUPREME  WAR  COUNCIL  331 

president.  The  committee  was  empowered  to  determine  the 
strength,  dispositions,  and  employment  of  the  strategical 
reserves,  and  to  issue  orders  thereon  to  the  Commanders- 
in-Chief.  In  short,  it  was  made  to  constitute  the  High 
Command  of  the  AlUed  armies. 

I  took  little  or  no  part  in  the  discussion  at  this  second 
meeting,  as  it  did  not  seem  either  appropriate  or  desirable 
for  me  to  intervene.  The  proposal  to  utilise  the  technical  ad- 
visers in  the  manner  indicated  had  emanated  from  ministers 
themselves  ;  my  impression  was  that  they  had  made  up  their 
minds  to  adopt  it ;  I  had  already  recommended  a  system 
of  a  totally  different  nature ;  and,  moreover,  the  selection 
of  officers  to  exercise  the  powers  of  High  Command  rested 
with  the  Council  and  not  with  the  Generals.  I  also  knew 
that  the  Prime  Minister  was  strongly  in  favour  of  the  pro- 
posal, and  I  remembered  that,  as  stated  earher  in  the  chapter 
when  referring  to  the  Palestine  operations,  he  had  only  the 
day  before  resented  my  expressing  opinions  in  front  of  the 
Council  that  were  at  variance  with  his  own  when,  as  in 
this  case,  I  had  already  made  them  known  to  him. 

I  record  these  few  explanatory  details  of  my  share  in  the 
proceedings  so  as  to  amplify  the  statement  made  by  the 
Prime  Minister  in  the  House  of  Commons  on  the  19th  of 
February  19 18  when  he  was  describing  what  had  passed  at 
the  conference.  The  statement,  which  I  read  with  some 
surprise,  was  : 

Everybody  was  free  to  express  his  opinion,  not  merely 
ministers  but  generals.  The  generals  were  just  as  free  to  express 
their  opinions  as  the  ministers,  and  as  a  matter  of  fact  Sir  Douglas 
Haig  did  call  attention  to  what  we  admitted  was  a  weak  point 
in  the  proposal.  I  think  he  called  attention  to  two  points,  and 
we  promised  to  put  them  right,  and  some  of  the  time  we  occupied 
was  time  occupied  in  adjusting  the  arrangements  arrived  at 
at  Versailles  to  the  criticisms  of  Sir  Douglas  Haig.  They  were 
points  in  regard  to  the  army  and  the  Army  Council,  and  con- 
stitutional points,  not  points  that  went  to  the  root  of  the  pro- 
posal itself.  I  want  the  House  again,  at  the  expense  of  repeating 
myself,  to  recollect  that  this  passed  the  Versailles  Council  without 
a  single  dissentient  voice  as  far  as  all  those  who  were  present  are 
concerned,  and  as  far  as  I  know  it  was  completely  accepted  by 
every  military  representative  present. 


332        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  decision  to  set  up  the  Executive  Committee  was  a 
proof  that  ministers  were  as  strongly  opposed  to  having  an 
AlHed  Commander-in-Chief  as  they  had  been  at  Rapallo  ; 
and  it  must  be  remembered  that,  although  from  a  military 
standpoint  there  was  much  to  be  said  for  a  Generalissimo, 
there  was,  besides  the  question  of  unity  of  policy,  a  further 
important  matter  that  required  attention — namely,  the 
placing  of  troops  under  a  foreign  officer  having  no  respon- 
sibility to  the  parUament  of  the  natioti  to  which  they 
belonged.  Had  there  been  any  outstanding  General  who 
would  satisfy  all  the  countries  concerned  this  objection 
would  have  counted  for  much  less,  but  no  such  General 
was  forthcoming. 

There  is  no  reason  to  suppose,  however,  that  these 
considerations  had  any  bearing  upon  the  decision,  which 
may  more  correctly  be  attributed  to  a  desire  on  the 
part  of  ministers  to  increase  their  control  over  mihtary 
affairs.  This  desire  had  been  manifest  for  months  past,  and 
the  new  arrangement  promised  to  provide  the  means  for 
achieving  it,  since  ministers  may  have  thought  that  a  com- 
mittee of  their  own  Council  would  be  more  amenable  to 
their  influence  than  would  either  a  Generalissimo  or  the 
Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff. 

In  short,  no  minister,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
M.  Clemenceau,  seemed  at  this  period  to  have  the  shghtest 
wish  to  appoint  a  Generalissimo ;  so  far  as  I  know  the 
appointment  was  never  discussed  by  them ;  and  if  it  had 
been  proposed  it  would  probably  have  been  rejected  on  the 
plea  that  there  was  no  General  fit  to  hold  the  post.  Sir 
John  French,  Generals  Joffre  and  Nivelle,  and  General 
Cadoma,  had  all  been  superseded  in  the  chief  command 
of  their  respective  armies  ;  Sir  Douglas  Haig  had  been  made 
subordinate  to  General  Nivelle ;  and  even  General  Foch 
had  been  removed  from  the  command  of  the  French  armies 
of  the  north  and  afterwards  employed  on  less  important  duty. 
Throughout  my  time  as  C.I.G.S.,  not  one  of  the  principal 
military  leaders,  as  far  as  I  could  see,  was  regarded  by 
ministers  as  a  sufiiciently  capable  commander  to  whom  the 
supreme  command  of  the  Allied  armies  might  confidently  be 
entrusted,  while  on  the  other  hand  I  can  recall  more  than 


EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEES  333 

one  instance  of  their  being  considered  mediocre  and  in- 
competent. I  may  add  here  that,  throughout  the  war, 
there  was  an  undue  tendency  to  assess  the  capacity  of 
senior  commanders  by  results  alone,  in  disregard  of  the  fact 
that  in  no  sphere  is  accident  so  active  as  in  war  ;  that 
Generals,  even  good  ones,  are  as  liable  as  other  people  to 
make  mistakes  ;  and  that  the  extent  of  their  success  is  largely 
governed  by  the  ability  and  nerves  of  their  subordinates. 

The  system  of  forming  committees  and  councils  for  the 
purpose  of  commanding  armies  in  the  field  is  historically 
notorious  for  giving  miserable  and  mischievous  results.  The 
Executive  Committee  was  unlikely  to  prove  any  less  harmful, 
for  it  had  in  it  two  flaws  that  were  particularly  dangerous. 
First,  the  proper  handling  of  the  strategical  reserves  called  for 
quick  decisions  and  complete  knowledge  of  the  situation,  and 
this  could  not  possibly  be  expected  from  a  body  which  would 
first  have  to  adjust  the  conflicting  views  of  the  Commanders- 
in-Chief  as  to  the  strength  and  intentions  of  the  enemy,  the 
liability  of  the  different  fronts  to  attack,  and  their  relative 
importance.  Secondly,  the  Commanders-in-Chief  would  re- 
ceive orders  from  two  independent  sources,  their  respective 
Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff  and  the  committee,  and  this  must 
obviously  lead  to  confusion.  The  only  remedy,  and  that  but 
a  partial  one,  for  these  defects  was  that  the  members  of  the 
committee  should  be  either  the  Chiefs  of  the  General  Staff 
themselves,  or  the  deputies  of  those  officers,  and  this  was 
reaUsed  by  Italy,  France,  and  America. 

The  Itahan  army  being  commanded  by  the  King  in 
person,  the  Italian  representative  was  automatically  in  the 
position  of  a  deputy.  America  was  represented  by  her 
Chief  of  Staff  ;  while,  as  just  mentioned.  General  Foch,  the 
French  Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  was  appointed  president 
of  the  committee.  Hence  these  three  countries  were 
secured  against  the  dangers  attaching  to  duality  of  advice 
and  executive  command. 

I  advised  the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  Lord  Derby, 
on  my  return  from  Versailles  to  London,  that  we  ought  to 
follow  the  example  of  France  and  America  and  make  the 
C.I.G.S.  our  representative  on  the  committee  ;  and  that  as 
he  could  not  always  be  at  Versailles  he  should  be  permanently 


334        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

represented  by  a  deputy  to  act  for  him  in  case  of  urgency. 
Only  by  this  means  could  confusion  and  complication  in  the 
direction  of  the  operations  be  prevented.  The  other  military 
members  of  the  Army  Council  shared  this  opinion,  and 
during  the  first  week  of  February  frequent  communications 
on  the  subject  passed  between  the  Council  and  the  War 
Cabinet. 

The  matter  remained  in  this  position  on  the  7th  of 
February,  when  I  went  to  Eastbourne  for  a  few  days  in  order 
to  shake  off  the  effects  of  a  bad  cold.  Three  days  later, 
having  heard  unofficially  that  there  had  been  further  develop- 
ments, I  returned  to  London  and,  on  the  nth,  was  informed 
by  Lord  Derby  that,  during  my  absence,  an  arrangement 
as  to  the  procedure  to  be  followed  had  been  come  to  by  him 
and  the  Prime  Minister,  to  which  Sir  Douglas  Haig,  called  to 
London,  had  assented.  In  a  conversation  I  subsequently 
had  with  the  latter  I  did  not  gather  that  he  had  given  an 
unquahfied  assent,  but  in  any  case  it  was  not  a  matter  to 
which  his  assent  need  necessarily  have  been  sought. 

The  arrangement  made  was,  that  while  the  C.I.G.S. 
should  continue  to  be  the  supreme  mihtary  adviser  of  the 
Government,  the  mihtary  representative  at  Versailles  should 
"  be  absolutely  free  and  unfettered  "  in  the  advice  he  gave 
as  a  member  of  the  Executive  Committee  ;  that  he  should 
be  an  Army  Councillor  (thus  enabling  him  to  issue  orders 
to  the  Commander-in-Chief)  ;  and  that  I  should  be 
succeeded  as  C.I.G.S.  by  Sir  Henry  Wilson,  whose  place  I 
would  take  on  the  Executive  Committee.  (This  General 
had,  I  learnt,  been  recalled  from  Versailles  to  London  the 
day  after  I  went  to  Eastbourne.) 

I  was  not  surprised,  nor  will  the  reader  be,  at  the  decision 
to  remove  me  from  the  War  Office,  for,  as  already  shown, 
I  had  been  unable  to  agree  with  some  of  the  strategical 
plans  the  Prime  Minister  wished  to  see  adopted,  and  my 
opposition  to  the  Palestine  plan  a  few  days  before  was 
the  culminating  point  of  previous  refusals  to  lend  my 
authority  and  name  to  acts  which,  I  was  convinced,  were 
unsound  and  a  danger  to  the  Empire.  This  incident, 
coupled  with  my  warnings  as  to  the  consequences  likely  to 
ensue  from  the  armies  on  the  West  Front  not  being  kept 


REMOVED  FROM  THE  WAR  OFFICE         335 

up  to  strength,  doubtless  decided  the  Prime  Minister  to 
try  another  C.I.G.S.  whose  strategical  views  might  be  more 
in  conformity  with  his  own,  and  who  could  devise  a  way 
of  winning  the  war  without  the  additional  men  for  whom 
I  had  asked.  Further,  Lord  Derby  had  already  told  me 
in  the  course  of  conversation  that  the  Prune  Minister  could 
not  "  get  on  "  with  me.  After  that  there  was  nothing  more 
to  be  said,  and  I  said  nothing  except  to  ask  when  it  was 
desired  that  I  should  hand  over  my  duties  to  my  successor. 

The  question  of  taking  up  the  new  post  at  Versailles 
was  on  a  different  plane.  On  the  principle  that  a  soldier 
should  obey  orders,  put  personal  considerations  aside,  and 
do  the  best  for  his  country  wherever  he  may  be  sent,  my 
first  impulse  was  to  accept  the  post,  but  after  careful 
reflection  I  resolved  that  I  could  be  no  party  to  a  system 
which  established  a  dual  authority  for  the  military  direction 
of  the  war.  Having  made  up  my  mind,  I  told  Lord  Derby 
that,  whilst  anxious  to  do  everything  in  my  power  to  serve 
His  Majesty's  Government  and  to  help  to  retrieve  the 
situation  in  which  the  country  was  placed,  I  felt  that  to 
undertake  a  duty  on  the  pretence  of  giving  assistance 
when  convinced  that  I  could  not  possibly  give  it  would  be 
of  no  benefit  to  ministers  and  would  bring  disgrace  upon 
myself. 

In  the  conversations  which  took  place  during  the  next 
two  days  Lord  Derby  stated  that  he  was  most  desirous 
and  always  had  been  that  I  should  remain  C.I.G.S.,  and 
he  suggested  a  procedure  which  would  allow  me  to  remain, 
and  at  the  same  time  would  satisfactorily  adjust  the 
relations  between  myself  and  our  representative  on  the 
Executive  Committee.  This  procedure  I  was  able  to  accept 
as  it  stood,  but  when  he  referred  it  to  the  War  Cabinet  for 
approval  the  only  result  was  that,  whilst  my  continuance 
as  C.I.G.S.  was  not  disapproved,  the  original  arrangement 
as  to  the  status  of  our  representative  at  Versailles  remained 
unaltered.  This  being  the  only  point  in  dispute,  the  pro- 
posed modus  operandi  came  to  nothing. 

The  following  day,  the  14th,  I  personally  stated  the 
whole  case  afresh  to  the  War  Cabinet.  This  also  came  to 
nothing,  and  the  post  of  C.I.G.S.  was  then  offered  to  Sir 


336        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Herbert  Plumer,  notwithstanding  that  Sir  Henry  Wilson 
had  been  nominated  a  week  earher.  On  the  i6th,  Sir 
Herbert  Plumer  having  the  day  before  dechned  the  offer  (a 
fact  of  which  I  had  not  been  informed),  the  Prime  Minister 
personally  asked  me  to  acquiesce  in  the  original  arrangement. 
I  took  an  hour  to  think  the  matter  over  once  again,  and 
then  sent  him  a  written  reply  to  the  effect  that  I  could  not 
go  back  on  what  I  had  already  said. 

The  same  evening  the  Press  Bureau  issued  a  notice  that 
the  Government  had  accepted  my  resignation  as  C.I.G.S. 
Strictly  speaking,  this  was  not  correct.  I  had  not  resigned 
for  I  was  not  in  a  position  to  do  so,  having  been  told  on 
the  nth  that  I  was  to  leave  the  War  Office. 

I  must  apologise  to  the  reader  for  describing  in  such 
detail  this  particular  phase  of  my  mihtary  life,  for  it  can 
be  of  little  interest  to  any  one  except  myself.  My  excuse 
is  that  the  circumstances  were  not  fully  represented  to  the 
general  public  at  the  time,  and  I  wish  to  prove  to  those 
whose  good  opinion  I  value  that  there  was  no  ground  for  the 
report  circulated  that  I  was  opposed  to  making  a  change  in 
the  system  of  command.  On  the  contrary,  I  submitted 
proposals  for  such  a  change,  while,  as  already  explained, 
the  appointment  of  a  Generalissimo — made  later  under 
stress  of  the  German  attack — was  not  yet  in  the  picture  as 
a  practical  proposition,  either  in  the  person  of  General 
Foch  or  of  any  other  General.  My  opposition  referred 
solely  to  the  manner  in  which  the  system  adopted  by  the 
Supreme  War  Council  was  to  be  carried  out,  and  the  pro- 
cedure I  suggested  was  the  same  as  that  put  into  practice 
by  France  and  America. 

I  certainly  had  no  faith  in  the  system,  as  I  was  con- 
vinced that  effective  military  command  could  not  be  exer- 
cised by  a  body  working  as  a  "  committee  "  of  a  "  council," 
but,  wishing  to  make  the  best  of  it,  I  was  anxious  that 
its  dangers  should  not  be  aggravated  by  our  having, 
unlike  the  other  Powers,  a  representative  who  would  be 
independent  of  his  General  Staff.  This  was  the  only  point 
at  issue,  and  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  the  statement  that 
I  had  adopted  an  intolerable  attitude  in  refusing  either  to 
go  to  Versailles  or  to  remain  in  London  as  C.I.G.S.     Whether 


END  OF  THE  "  EXECUTIVE  COMMITTEE  "   337 

I  stayed  in  London  or  went  to  Versailles  could  make  no 
difference  to  the  pernicious  arrangement  which  created  two 
separate  miUtary  advisers  and  executive  officers.  Moreover, 
it  was  plain  from  what  had  recently  passed  that,  wherever 
I  might  be,  my  advice  would  not  be  accepted  unless  it 
happened  to  be  of  the  desired  kind,  and  if  that  were  so  the 
period  of  my  usefulness  had  evidently  come  to  an  end. 

Had  I  seen  a  practicable  and  honourable  way  of 
filling  either  post  I  should  certainly  have  taken  it,  for 
I  naturally  did  not  wish  to  forfeit  the  opportunity  of 
finishing  the  war  as  C.I.G.S.,  or  in  some  other  responsible 
position,  while  by  declining  both  posts  I  might  find 
myself  out  of  active  employment  altogether,  and  would 
thereby  inflict  hardship  upon  my  family  by  the  financial 
loss  incurred.  Seeing  no  such  way  I  determined  to  do  what 
any  average  Britisher  in  my  place  would  have  done — act 
according  to  my  convictions  be  the  consequences  what  they 
might. 

Elsewhere  I  have  stated  that,  as  a  result  of  the  enemy's 
last  bid  for  supremacy  in  the  spring  of  1918,  British  re- 
inforcements were  hurriedly  despatched  to  the  West  Front 
from  the  eastern  theatres,  divisions  and  brigades  thus  turning 
up  of  whose  existence  the  troops  in  France  had  never  before 
heard  ;  that  the  scope  of  the  Military  Service  Act  of  1916 
was  enlarged  so  as  to  produce  more  recruits  ;  and  that 
much  more  shipping  was  provided  for  the  transport  of  the 
American  armies.  In  order  to  complete  the  story,  and  in 
justice  to  the  British  armies  on  the  West  Front,  I  should 
add  that  while  these  belated  measures  were  being  carried 
out,  the  critical  situation  created  by  the  omission  to  take 
them  earUer  was  saved,  as  often  before  in  our  history,  only 
by  the  courage  and  tenacity  of  the  regimental  officers  and 
men,  who,  fighting  steadfastly  on  till  help  arrived,  helped 
to  convert  into  complete  victory  the  greatest  defeat  the 
British  army  has  ever  suffered. 

As  to  the  "  Executive  Committee,"  it  broke  down,  as  an 
organ  of  command,  within  a  few  weeks  of  its  constitution. 
Early  in  March  Sir  Douglas  Haig  reported  that  he  was 
unable  to  furnish  the  troops  which  the  committee  desired 
to  have  under  its  orders  as  part  of  the  strategical  reserve, 

z 


338        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  thereupon  its  functions  of  command  ended,  though  it 
nominally  remained  in  existence  till  the  month  of  May. 

On  the  1 8th  of  February  I  left  the  War  Office  for  the 
fourth  and  last  time,  having  first  telegraphed  my  thanks 
to  Monro  and  the  other  Commanders-in-Chief  for  the 
readiness  with  which  they  had  always  met  my  wishes  and 
helped  to  make  the  military  machine  run  easily. 

My  deahngs  with  the  Prime  Ministers  and  other  ministers 
of  the  Overseas  Dominions  who  visited  England  from  time 
to  time,  and  with  the  High  Commissioners  and  General 
Officers  of  the  Overseas  Forces,  were  equally  happy,  and  I 
was  greatly  indebted  to  these  gentlemen  for  the  whole- 
hearted manner  in  which  they  co-operated  with  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  so  far  as  the  conditions  of  their  respective 
countries  would  permit.  It  had  been  thought  before  1914 
that  the  Dominions  ought  specifically  to  state  what  number 
of  troops  they  would  contribute  in  the  event  of  a  great 
war,  and  within  what  period  of  time  these  troops  would  be 
forthcoming,  so  that  definite  plans  could  be  prepared.  To 
the  best  of  my  recollection  no  such  statement  was  made, 
and  we  could  not  expect  that  it  would  be,  for  so  long  as 
there  is  no  Imperial  body  charged  with  the  control  of 
Imperial  policy  there  can  be  no  complete  co-ordination  of 
the  Imperial  Forces. 

I  think  I  may  say  that  the  relations  between  the  General 
Staff  and  the  administrative  staffs  and  services  of  the  War 
Office  were  also  mutually  helpful,  including  the  oft-abused 
Finance  Branch,  of  which  the  head  was  Mr.  (now  Lord) 
Forster,  his  principal  assistant  being  Sir  Charles  Harris.  I 
would  wish  it  to  be  understood  that  the  reason  I  have 
omitted  to  mention  more  fully  the  work  of  the  adminis- 
trative officers  is  only  because  they  were  not  under  my 
orders,  and  not  because  I  do  not  recognise  that  all  General 
Staff  plans  must  ultimately  depend  for  success  upon  the 
assistance  of  these  officers.  I  relied  in  a  special  measure 
upon  the  advice  of  Sir  Sam  Fay  and  Sir  Guy  Granet,  of  the 
Great  Central  and  Midland  Railways  respectively,  who  placed 
their  services  at  the  disposal  of  the  War  Office  during  the 
war.  They  were  in  charge  of  the  arrangements  for  the 
conveyance  by  rail,   river,   and  sea  of  all  men,   supplies. 


LORD  PIRRIE  339 

stores,  etc.,  for  all  theatres,  and  to  them  is  due  a  share  of 
the  credit  for  the  improvement  of  the  Tigris  line  of  com- 
munication from  Basra  to  Baghdad,  and  for  the  provision 
of  an  efficient  railway  service  from  Egypt  through  the  Sinai 
Peninsula  to  Palestine. 

As  regards  the  officers  of  the  General  Staff  itself,  all 
I  need  say  is  that,  without  exception,  they  had  given  me 
loyal  and  able  assistance  during  the  arduous  times  of  the 
two  preceding  years.  Lucas  had  been,  as  always,  a  devoted 
comrade,  displa3dng  abihty  and  initiative  much  above 
the  ordinary,  and  having  but  one  object  in  life— to  serve 
me  to  the  utmost  of  his  power.  I  can  never  adequately 
repay  him.  He  and  my  civiHan  private  secretary,  Brooke, 
another  faithful  helper,  had  often  kept  me  straight  on 
matters  of  a  personal  nature — or  had  tried  to  do  so — and 
saved  me  from  numerous  worries  about  which  I  was  some- 
times never  even  allowed  to  hear. 

I  must  also  acknowledge  the  generosity  shown  by  many 
people  outside  the  War  Office,  who,  in  their  desire  to  Hghten 
my  cares,  invited  me  to  spend  Sunday  at  their  country 
houses.  I  always  had  far  more  of  these  invitations  than  I 
could  possibly  accept,  often  from  people  whom  I  had  not 
before  known,  but  occasionally  I  was  able  to  take  advan- 
tage of  them,  coming  back  to  work  on  the  Sunday  evening 
greatly  refreshed  in  mind  and  body.  This  form  of  hos- 
pitaUty  was  many  times  accorded  to  me  at  Witley  Park, 
the  country  residence  of  Lord  and  Lady  Pirrie,  and  thirty- 
five  miles  from  London. 

When  I  first  made  the  acquaintance  of  Lord  Pirrie,  in 
1916,  he  flattered  me  by  saying  that  a  few  years  before  he 
had  been  interested  in  reading  a  farewell  address  I  gave  to 
a  party  of  officers  when  they  were  leaving  the  Staff  College. 
My  remarks  referred,  amongst  other  things,  to  the  relations 
which  ought  to  exist  between  superiors  and  subordinates 
and  vice  versa,  the  importance  of  sound  administration, 
and  other  matters  of  a  hke  nature.  Apparently  he  felt 
that  the  principles  which  I  had  impressed  upon  my 
officers  were  equally  applicable  to  his  own  army  of 
workers,  and  he  accordingly  brought  them  to  the  notice  of 
his  staff. 


340        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Lord  Pirrie's  achievements  in  the  shipbuilding  industry 
are  a  striking  example  of  what  can  be  accomplished  by  a 
man  who  takes  the  long  view,  has  the  courage  to  act  upon 
it,  and  reahses  the  value  of  good  organisation.  It  is  a  matter 
of  regret,  I  have  always  thought,  that  his  unique  experience 
was  not  utilised  and  his  advice  sought  at  a  much  earher 
period  of  the  war  than  they  were.  If  they  had  been,  many 
matters  connected  with  the  building  and  repairing  of  ships 
might  not  have  got  into  the  unsatisfactory  condition  they 
were  in  when,  in  1918,  he  was  asked  to  remedy  them  as 
Controller- General  of  Merchant  Shipbuilding. 

I  was  also  fortunate  while  at  the  War  Office  in  regard 
to  a  residence  in  London.  Early  in  the  summer  of  19 16 
Sir  George  and  Lady  Fowke  gave  me  the  use  of  their 
house  in  South  Street,  and  in  November  of  that  year  the 
King  graciously  placed  York  House,  St.  James's  Palace, 
at  my  disposal  for  the  duration  of  the  war,  a  privilege 
which  added  greatly  to  my  personal  convenience.  Although 
I  ceased  to  be  C.I.G.S.  nine  months  before  the  war  ended. 
His  Majesty  allowed  me  to  remain  at  York  House  until 
February  1919,  when  it  was  put  into  the  hands  of  the 
decorators  preparatory  to  becoming  the  residence  of  the 
Prince  of  Wales. 

I  enjoyed,  too,  the  hospitality  of  the  Naval  and  Military, 
Cavalry,  Bath,  Savage,  and  Ranelagh  clubs  in  London,  and 
the  New  Club  at  Brighton,  of  which  I  was  made  an  honorary 
member  in  each  case,  and  I  was  admitted,  honoris  causa, 
into  the  "  Worshipful  Guild  and  Fraternity  "  of  the  Cloth- 
workers  Company  of  the  City  of  London. 

In  a  multitude  of  different  ways  I  discovered  whilst 
C.I.G.S.  that  there  were  far  more  generous-minded  and 
appreciative  people  in  the  world  than  I  had  supposed,  and 
I  had  further  proofs  of  this  when  it  was  announced  that  I 
had  left  the  War  Office.  A  member  of  the  House  of  Lords, 
then  unknown  to  me  except  by  name,  sent  a  pencilled  note 
from  his  sick-bed  in  London  asking  me  to  take  my  family 
to  his  house  in  the  country  and  stay  there  as  long  as  I 
wished.  Another  and  highly  valued  friend,  who  must  also  be 
nameless,  offered  a  cheque  with  which  to  provide  myself 
with  a  home  in  place  of  York  House,  which  he  thought 


FELLOW-COUNTRYMEN  341 

I  would  at  once  be  reqmred  to  vacate.  Letters  arrived 
daily  by  the  score  from  persons  of  all  classes,  and  although 
they  referred  to  my  past  services  in  much  too  flattering 
terms,  the  sincerity  of  motive  which  had  prompted  them 
was  unquestionable,  and  I  was  gratified  as  well  as  surprised 
to  find  that  I  had  won  the  esteem  of  so  many  of  my  fellow- 
countrymen. 

These  observations  should  perhaps  be  quahfied  in  the 
case  of  one  of  the  letters,  which  afforded  me  so  much  amuse- 
ment as  to  deserve  special  mention.  The  writer,  a  man  I 
had  not  met  for  nearly  thirty  years,  after  deploring  the  loss 
my  departure  from  the  War  Office  would  be  to  the  State, 
went  on  to  ask  for  the  temporary  loan  of  four  pounds  ! 
Why  he  did  not  ask  for  the  round  sum  of  five  pounds  I  have 
never  been  able  to  understand,  for  his  chances  of  receiving 
the  loan  could  hardly  be  affected  by  so  small  a  matter  as 
an  extra  sovereign. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,   GREAT   BRITAIN 

Appointed  Commander-in-Chief  of  Eastern  Command — Excessive  number 
of  men  retained  in  United  Kingdom — Reorganisation  of  the  Eastern 
Command  Staff — Become  Commander-in-Chief,  Great  Britain — 
Reorganisation  of  Headquarters  Staff — Organisation  of  commands 
Inspections — Good  work  of  hospitals— Defence  schemes — Anti- 
aircraft defences— Air  warfare  of  the  future — Science  should  be 
given  a  more  prominent  place  in  our  war  preparations — Visits  to 
the  Grand  Fleet — Co-operation  of  American  Navy — Admiral  Sims — 
Discontent  on  demobihsation — Industrial  unrest — Chairman  of  Com- 
mittee on  Officers'  Pay — King  reviews  young  soldier  battahons  in 
Hyde  Park — Appointed  to  command  the  British  Army  of  the 
Rhine. 

On  ceasing  to  be  C.I.G.S.  I  was  offered  and  accepted  the 
Eastern  Command,  which  includes  that  part  of  England 
lying  roughly  between  the  south-east  coast  and  a  line 
drawn  from  the  Wash  to  Chichester,  but  is  exclusive  of 
Aldershot  and  London,  both  of  which  constitute  separate 
commands.  I  took  up  my  new  post,  which  was  much 
inferior  in  status  to  the  one  I  had  previously  held,  on  the 
19th  of  February. 

About  ten  days  later  I  went  to  Lincoln  as  the  guest  of 
Sir  William  Tritton,  one  of  the  pioneers  in  the  production 
of  the  tank.  During  my  two  days'  stay  I  visited  the  works 
of  Messrs.  Foster  &  Company,  of  which  my  host  was  the 
executive  head  ;  opened  a  club  which  had  been  established 
for  the  employees  at  Bracebridge,  just  outside  the  town  ; 
and  was  shown  round  the  works  of  Messrs.  Ruston  & 
Proctor.  The  programme  also  included  a  civic  welcome, 
the  Mayor  and  Corporation  meeting  me  on  the  boundary  of 
the  city,  whence  I  was  conducted  to  the  famous  old  Guildhall 
to  receive  an  address. 

There  were  at  the  beginning  of  1918  nearly  a  million 

342 


C.-IN-C.  EASTERN  COMMAND  343 

and  a  half  of  men  in  the  United  Kingdom  borne  on  the 
strength  of  the  army,  of  whom  about  half  a  million  were 
in  the  Eastern  Command,  and  it  was  frequently  asked  why 
the  number  should  be  so  great.  It  certainly  was  much 
greater  than  it  ought  to  have  been,  and  as  C.I.G.S.  I  had 
many  times  endeavoured,  though  without  much  success,  to 
get  it  reduced.  The  responsibility  for  reducing  it  rested 
with  the  Army  Council  as  a  whole  and  not  with  the  General 
Staff,  as  each  department  of  the  War  Office  retained  men  at 
home  on  services  connected  with  its  own  special  duties, 
and  the  General  Staff  could  do  nothing  except  try  to 
bring  about  a  reduction  so  as  to  set  free  more  men  for  the 
battle-fronts. 

Of  the  million  and  a  half  men  some  80,000  were  in 
the  Flying  Corps,  which  was  supervised  by  an  Army 
Councillor  and  had  not  yet  become  a  separate  service  ;  close 
upon  50,000  belonged  to  the  army  medical  corps,  under 
the  Adjutant-General ;  some  90,000  belonged  to  the  anny 
service  corps,  under  the  Quartermaster-General ;  others  to 
the  army  ordnance  corps  and  army  pay  corps  ;  others 
again  to  the  labour  corps,  of  whom  there  were  nearly 
200,000  ;  some  46,000  were  borne  on  the  strength  of  the 
army  who  were  not  employed  on  army  work  but  under  the 
Ministry  of  Munitions,  in  agriculture,  or  in  dock  and  trans- 
port work  ;  and  finally,  the  number  of  sick  and  wounded 
at  home  usually  amounted  to  some  300,000  or  400,000  men. 
After  making  these  and  many  other  deductions,  less  than 
one-third  of  the  million  and  a  half  remained  over  as  potential 
drafts  for  the  armies  abroad,  and  the  majority  of  these  were 
not  sufficiently  trained,  or  were  not  old  enough,  to  go  to 
the  front. 

I  mention  these  facts  because  it  was  commonly  supposed 
that  the  enormous  numbers  retained  at  home  were  for  home 
defence,  whereas  the  men  earmarked  for  that  purpose 
were  sometimes  only  about  one-tenth  of  the  whole,  and 
these,  as  explained  in  the  previous  chapter,  were  largely 
composed  of  youths  under  nineteen  years  of  age  and  there- 
fore were  not  eligible  to  be  sent  abroad.  In  consequence  of 
the  situation  created  by  the  German  offensive  in  March  the 
long-delayed  reduction  in  the  strength  of  the  troops  at  home 


344        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

was  made,  though  unfortunately  it  was  largely  effected  at 
the  expense  of  sending  out  boys  under  nineteen  years  of  age. 

As  priority  of  treatment  had  to  be  given  to  the  armies 
abroad,  it  followed  that  the  troops  at  home  were  in  a  con- 
stant state  of  change,  and  that  the  majority  of  the  officers 
and  non-commissioned  officers  were  unfit  for  active  service 
either  on  account  of  health,  age,  or  professional  capacity. 
Some  of  the  officers  had  been  sent  home  on  grounds  of 
inefficiency,  and  others  had  not  been  allowed  to  go  to  the 
front  because  they  had  had  no  experience  there — a  defect 
for  which  they  obviously  were  not  answerable.  Officers 
such  as  these  could  not  well  avoid  a  sense  of  disappointment, 
but  they  loyally  stuck  to  their  monotonous  work  of  pre- 
paring men  for  the  front,  where  they  themselves  were 
considered  to  have  failed  or  were  not  permitted  to  go. 

I  had  a  large  staff  at  my  headquarters  in  Pall  Mall, 
which,  according  to  peace  custom,  was  divided  into  two 
branches — General  Staff  and  Administrative  Staff.  This 
system,  set  up  on  the  recommendation  of  the  Esher  Com- 
mittee in  1904,  works  fairly  well  in  peace  time,  but  in  time 
of  war  it  is  not  the  one  used  in  the  field,  and  it  did  not  work 
well  at  home  as  regards  the  administrative  side.  The 
amount  of  work  to  be  done  was  far  too  great  for  any  one 
officer  to  supervise,  and  it  was  also  much  mixed  up  with 
questions  connected  with  home  defence,  and  therefore 
instead  of  retaining  a  "  Major-General  in  Charge  of  Adminis- 
tration," it  would  have  been  better  to  follow  the  method 
which  obtained  at  the  front  and  divide  the  duties  between 
two  branches. 

With  the  approval  of  the  War  Office  I  introduced  this 
system,  the  two  branches  being  respectively  placed  under 
a  Deputy  Adjutant-General  and  a  Deputy  Quartermaster- 
General,  who  relieved  the  Major-General  in  Charge  of 
Administration  of  the  mass  of  detail  with  which  he  had 
previously  tried  to  cope.  Major-General  Sir  F.  Robb  held 
this  appointment,  and  as  he  had  exceptional  knowledge 
of  all  administrative  duties  I  could  safely  leave  them  in  his 
hands.  I  was  thus  enabled  to  give,  as  I  did,  most  of  my 
time  to  visiting  the  troops,  observing  the  conditions  under 
which  they  were  trained,  and  investigating  the  arrangements 


C.-IN-C.  GREAT  BRITAIN  345 

for  home  defence,  more  especially  those  at  the  three  im- 
portant ports  of  Harwich,  London,  and  Dover.  By  the  end 
of  May  I  had  visited  at  least  once  every  station  and  camp 
in  the  command. 

On  the  3rd  of  June,  Lord  French  having  been  appointed 
Viceroy  of  Ireland,  I  was  given  command  of  the  whole  of 
the  forces  in  Great  Britain,  with  headquarters  at  the  Horse 
Guards.  Lord  French  had  commanded  the  troops  in 
Ireland  as  well  as  those  in  Great  Britain,  but  it  was  decided 
that  in  future  the  Irish  Command  should  be  directly  under 
the  War  Office. 

The  Chief  of  my  General  Staff  was  Major-General  Romer, 
who  had  served  under  me  at  the  War  Ofhce  before  the 
war.  Adjutant-General  and  Quartermaster-General  duties 
were  under  one  officer,  Major-General  Sir  H,  Tagart.  In  this 
case  again  I  felt  it  necessary  to  divide  the  duties  into  two 
branches  under  a  Deputy  Adjutant-General  and  Deputy 
Quartermaster-General,  these  posts  eventually  being  held 
by  Brigadier  -  General  Lucas  (my  old  aide-de-camp)  and 
Brigadier-General  Jones  of  the  army  service  corps. 

Besides  the  officers  of  these  three  branches,  I  had  a 
number  of  Inspectors  of  the  different  arms  and  services 
whose  duty  it  was  to  visit  the  troops  at  training,  and  to 
keep  me  informed  of  the  progress  made  and  the  difficulties 
encountered. 

My  personal  staff  consisted  of  Lieutenant  -  Colonel 
Eddowes,  private  secretary,  and  Captains  Peek,  Bovey,  and 
De  Burgh,  as  aides-de-camp.  Peek  and  Bovey  had  both  been 
with  me  in  the  same  capacity  in  the  Eastern  Command. 
Colonel  Stanley  Barry  was  military  secretary. 

The  Generals  in  charge  of  the  various  commands  were  : 
Fielding,  London  ;  Murray,  Aldershot  ;  Woollcombe, 
Eastern  ;  Sclater,  Southern  ;  Maxwell,  Northern  ;  Snow, 
Western  ;  McCracken,  Scotland  ;  Pulteney,  the  XXIst 
Army  Corps — an  independent  formation  of  three  divisions 
composed  almost  entirely  of  youths  under  nineteen  years 
of  age  ;  and  Dallas,  the  Kent  Force — largely  composed  of 
cyclists.  These  Generals  gave  me  excellent  assistance  and 
made  my  task  quite  easy. 

Being  weU  informed  as   to   the   Eastern   Command,   I 


346        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

commenced  a  series  of  inspections  of  the  other  five  commands, 
and  during  the  next  six  months  visited  in  turn  nearly  every 
military  station  in  them  from  Cromarty  in  the  north  to 
Plymouth  in  the  south. 

For  long  journeys  the  railway  companies  usually 
provided  a  special  saloon  for  myself  and  staff,  which  was 
a  great  convenience  as  it  enabled  us  to  do  a  certain  amount 
of  work  en  route.  On  going  to  Aberdeen  on  one  occasion 
we  discovered  on  arrival  that  the  doors  of  the  saloon  on  the 
platform  side  had  been  locked  before  we  left  London  so 
as  to  prevent  people  at  the  stopping  stations  from  entering 
during  the  night,  and  by  some  mistake  the  key,  a  special 
one,  had  not  been  given  to  the  guard.  It  was  at  first 
proposed  that  we  should  get  out  by  the  window,  and  then 
it  occurred  to  us  to  try  the  doors  on  the  other  side.  These 
were  found  to  be  unlocked,  and  having  descended  on  that 
side  I  chmbed  on  to  the  platform  at  the  dead  end  of  the 
line,  thus  presenting  myself  in  a  very  undignified  manner 
to  the  Lord  Provost  and  other  high  officials  who  had  come 
to  the  station  to  receive  me. 

When  making  these  tours  of  inspection  I  endeavoured  to 
visit  as  many  of  the  mihtary  hospitals  as  my  other  duties 
would  permit,  and  it  is  a  pleasure  to  record  that  the  officers 
and  men  whom  I  questioned  spoke  in  the  highest  terms  of 
the  way  in  which  they  were  treated. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  refer  to  the  services  rendered, 
at  home  as  in  the  field,  by  the  regular  officers  and  nursing 
service  of  the  army  medical  corps,  nor  is  it  necessary  to 
do  so,  but  in.regard  to  the  V.A.D.  establishments  it  may 
be  said  that  of  all  the  good  work  done  during  the  war  by 
the  women  of  Great  Britain  none  surpassed  the  devoted 
service  of  those  engaged  in  the  care  of  the  sick  and  wounded. 
The  greater  credit  is  due  to  them  because  in  not  a  few  cases 
the  value  and  amount  of  their  work  were  not  known  to,  or 
appreciated  by,  the  public  in  general.  Hospitals  and 
convalescent  homes  sprang  up  all  over  the  country,  and 
as  some  of  them  were  in  rather  out-of-the-way  places  they 
were  seldom  if  ever  visited  by  any  one  except  the  inspecting 
medical  authorities.  One  could  but  feel  unbounded  admira- 
tion for  the  way  in  which  the  staff  silently  worked  on,  month 


HOSPITAL  STAFFS  347 

after  month  and  year  after  year,  content  with  the  knowledge 
that  they  were  doing  their  best  to  alleviate  the  sufferings  of 
those  under  their  charge. 

I  remember  in  the  South  African  war  stories  being 
current  that  some  of  the  non-professional  nurses  who  found 
their  way  out  to  that  country  were  held  in  absolute  terror, 
either  because  they  were  ignorant  of  their  duties,  or  because 
they  thought  that  these  duties  consisted  in  talking  to  their 
patients  or  otherwise  forcing  their  attention  upon  them  at 
a  time  when  what  they  most  needed  was  to  be  left  alone 
in  peace.  "  Too  ill  to  be  nursed,"  was  said  to  have  been 
written  on  a  card  and  placed  on  his  bed  by  one  man  who 
suffered  from  these  amateurs.  In  the  Great  War  the 
amateur  element  was  absent,  so  far  as  my  experience  goes. 
The  hospitals  were  models  of  cleanliness,  comfort,  and 
efficiency,  and  it  was  recognised  in  a  way  unknown  before 
that  the  heaUng  of  the  body  is  best  expedited  by  keeping 
the  mind  cheerful  and  contented.  All  honour  to  the  women 
who  came  forward  to  do  this  important  work,  and,  what 
is  more,  stuck  to  it  regularly  and  systematically. 

The  country  is  also  indebted  to  those  civil  practitioners, 
surgical  and  medical,  who  gave  their  services  free  and  to 
whose  unremitting  care  and  attention  it  was  due  that 
many  a  poor  fellow  was  restored  to  health  whose  condi- 
tion at  first  seemed  hopeless.  Amongst  those  so  employed 
was  my  friend  Sir  3  Peter  Freyer.  He  was  Consulting 
Surgeon  in  the  Eastern  Command  throughout  the  war,  and 
travelled  hundreds  of  miles  every  week  in  visiting  the 
hospitals  within  his  area.  In  1918,  when  food  was  strictly 
rationed,  I  suggested  that  as  he  was  doing  army  work  he 
should  apply  to  be  issued  with  army  rations,  which  were 
on  a  more  liberal  scale  than  the  amount  allowed  by  the 
regulations  of  the  Food  Controller.  He  applied,  and  the 
answer  he  received  was  that  as  he  was  not  in  receipt  of 
army  pay  for  the  army  work  he  was  doing  he  could  not  be 
supplied  with  army  rations  ! 

The  arrangements  for  home  defence,  on  land,  had  been 
greatly  improved  under  the  direction  of  Lord  French.  There 
was,  for  reasons  that  need  not  be  described,  little  probability 
that  they  would  ever  be  put  into  execution,  but  as  there 


348        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

could  be  no  certainty  about  what  the  enemy  might  try  to 
do,  it  was  only  a  reasonable  precaution  to  ensure  that  the 
troops  should  be  capable  of  turning  out  quickly,  and  that 
every  officer  and  man  should  be  acquainted  with  his  duties 
in  case  of  emergency.  With  this  object  in  view  I  occasionally 
issued  instructions,  without  previous  warning  of  my  intention, 
which  put  the  coast  defence  schemes  into  force.  The  tests 
brought  to  light  many  defects,  and  caused  all  ranks  to  take  a 
greater  interest  in  this  part  of  their  work. 

It  can  be  understood  that  the  practical  execution  of  the 
schemes  involved  considerable  interference  with  the  tele- 
graph, telephone,  and  railway  systems  ;  entailed,  in  some 
cases,  in  accordance  with  arrangements  made  with  the  civil 
authorities,  the  evacuation  of  the  inhabitants,  cattle,  trans- 
port, etc.,  from  the  locality  threatened  ;  and  in  many  ways 
disturbed  the  everyday  life  of  the  country.  Rather  elaborate 
measures  had  therefore  to  be  taken  when  testing  the  schemes 
so  as  not  to  lead  the  whole  community  to  believe  that  a 
hostile  landing  was,  in  fact,  taking  place.  Otherwise  there 
would  have  been  unnecessary  dislocation  of  business,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  alarm  that  might  have  occurred. 

I  usually  issued  the  order  for  the  tests  late  at  night  or 
early  in  the  morning,  according  to  the  conditions  affecting 
the  scheme,  and  I  discovered  after  the  first  few  tests  that 
garrisons  were  very  much  on  the  qui  vive  if  I  was  known  or 
suspected  to  be  in  the  neighbourhood.  It  was  difficult  to 
prevent  my  presence  becoming  known,  as  certain  preliminary 
arrangements  had  to  be  made,  and  I  had  to  be  accompanied 
by  several  staff  officers.  Consequently  I  was  not  always 
able  to  bring  off  my  intended  surprise — without  which  the 
test  naturally  lost  something  of  its  value — but  on  one 
occasion  at  least  I  may  claim  to  have  scored,  though  in  a 
somewhat  different  manner. 

I  was  visiting  a  large  garrison  on  the  east  coast,  and  so 
determined  were  the  staff  and  commanding  officers  not  to 
be  caught  napping  that  they  remained  at  their  posts  for 
two  consecutive  nights,  waiting  for  the  arrival  of  the 
appointed  code- word  which  put  their  scheme  into  force. 
But  it  never  came,  and  while  these  officers  carried  out  their 
weary  vigil  my  staff  and  I  slept  peacefully  in  our  beds  I 


AIR  DEFENCES  349 

Even  when  I  left  on  the  evening  of  the  third  day  they 
seemed  to  doubt,  from  what  they  said  to  my  staff,  whether 
I  was  really  going  away  or  intended  to  double  back  on  my 
tracks  at  a  later  hour.  The  incident  provided  us  with  much 
mutual  amusement,  and  it  may  have  taught  the  officers 
something  more  about  the  details  of  their  defence  scheme 
than  they  had  hitherto  known. 

The  anti-aircraft  defences  were,  when  I  took  over  the 
command  in  Great  Britain,  probably  the  best  of  their  kind 
in  the  world  so  far  as  London  was  concerned,  and  I  imagine 
that  the  Germans  realised  how  perfect  they  were,  for  no 
further  attacks  were  made  during  the  war.  Owing  to  the 
initial  lack  of  means  this  result  had  taken  nearly  four  years 
to  achieve,  and  in  the  meantime  London  had  been  subjected 
to  many  raids.  The  loss  of  life  and  damage  to  property 
were,  however  resolutely  accepted,  and  instead  of  causing 
panic  and  despair  they  made  the  people  more  determined 
than  ever  to  see  the  war  through  to  a  finish.  Thus,  again, 
had  the  enemy  mistaken  the  psychology  of  his  opponent. 

As  C.LG.S.  I  had  for  long  endeavoured  to  supply  Lord 
French  with  the  resources  he  needed,  but  as  the  output  of 
aeroplanes  was  never  equal  to  requirements  until  1918,  if 
then,  it  was  impossible  to  give  him  what  he  wanted  without 
starving  the  armies  on  the  West  Front.  That  they  should 
be  so  starved  was  what  the  enemy  most  desired — hence  the 
raids — for  without  a  proper  complement  of  aeroplanes  to 
assist  them  the  armies  would  have  been  at  a  hopeless 
disadvantage.  The  same  remarks  apply,  though  to  a  less 
extent,  to  the  other  fronts  on  which  we  were  fighting,  and 
from  all  of  them  requests  to  be  suppHed  with  more  aircraft 
were  constantly  being  received. 

Again,  anti-aircraft  guns,  of  the  really  useful  type,  were 
required  in  large  numbers  by  the  navy  and  for  arming 
merchant  vessels  against  submarine  attacks,  while  search- 
lights and  other  equipment  for  the  defences  were  also 
deficient.  In  these  circumstances  it  was  not  feasible  to 
satisfy  every  need,  and  home  defence  had,  as  a  rule,  neces- 
sarily to  take  second  place. 

For  reasons  that  can  be  understood,  I  shall  not  describe 
the  air  defences  in  detail.    They  were  under  the  command 


350        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

of  Major-General  Ashmore,  assisted  by  a  very  capable  and 
hard-working  body  of  officers  and  men,  a  due  proportion 
of  whom  were  always  on  duty  throughout  the  twenty-four 
hours.  The  first  requisite  was  to  ensure  that  immediate 
notice  of  an  impending  raid  should  be  received  by  all 
concerned,  as  the  time  taken  by  the  hostile  machines  to 
reach  London  from,  say,  the  mouth  of  the  Thames,  was 
only  just  sufficient  to  allow  of  our  own  machines  cHmbing 
up  from  the  ground  to  an  altitude  equal  to  that  at  which 
the  enemy  was  probably  flying.  A  sharp  look-out  on  the 
coast  and  rapid  methods  of  transmitting  information  were 
therefore  of  the  first  importance.  In  both  cases  the  arrange- 
ments were  about  as  perfect  as  they  could  be  made. 

It  was  supposed  by  most  people  that  the  one  and  only 
object  of  the  anti-aircraft  guns  was  to  bring  down  the 
enemy's  machines,  but  this  was  only  one  of  two.  The  other, 
almost  equally  important,  was  that  the  guns  should  compel 
the  enemy  to  fly  at  a  great  elevation  in  order  to  be  safe 
against  their  fire.  In  this  way  they  reduced  his  chances 
of  bombing  his  objectives,  and  restricted  him  to  a  smaller 
aerial  space  in  which  our  own  aeroplanes,  assisted  by  search- 
lights at  night,  would  have  to  look  for  him.  Aprons,  formed 
of  long  strands  of  wire  and  suspended  between  captive 
balloons,  helped  to  serve  the  same  purpose  of  keeping  the 
enemy  well  up  in  the  air  and  to  Hmit  his  available  lines  of 
approach .  Once  a  balloon  unfortunately  broke  loose  when  two 
men  were  working  on  it.  One  poor  fellow  dropped  when  at  a 
great  height ;  the  other  was  never  seen  again,  or  the  balloon. 

On  the  fighting  fronts  the  aeroplane  has  proved  itself  to 
be  indispensable  in  collecting  information,  directing  artillery 
fire,  bombing  the  enemy's  depots,  railways,  camps,  etc.,  but 
perhaps  its  most  important  feature,  and  the  one  with  the 
greatest  future,  is  that  it  permits  of  the  war  being  carried 
into  the  enemy's  country,  irrespective  of  the  situation  on 
land  and  sea.  The  ostensible  object  of  raids  of  this  kind  may 
be  to  inflict  damage  upon  naval  bases,  supply  depots,  and 
other  military  establishments,  but  non-military  places  will 
also  suffer,  for  although  raids  upon  them  may  theoretically 
be  classed  as  unjustifiable,  the  limits  of  what  is  permissible 
and  what  is  not  are  very  elastic  in  these  days. 


AIR-ATTACK  35i 

Modern  war  being  largely  a  matter  of  war  against 
economic  life,  it  has  turned  more  and  more  towards  the 
enemy's  home  country,  and  the  old  principle  of  making  war 
only  against  armies  and  navies  has  been  consigned  to  the 
background.  Raids  on  non-mihtary  places  and  people  may 
be  regarded  as  barbaric,  and  they  may,  by  exasperating 
the  inhabitants,  have  the  opposite  effect  to  that  intended 
— the  breaking  down  of  the  country's  morale— but  they 
are  bound  to  play  a  prominent  part  in  the  next  contest, 
and  on  a  far  more  extensive  scale  than  in  the  Great  War. 
A  new  weapon,  such  as  the  aeroplane  or  submarine,  will 
always  open  up  new  paths  for  itself,  and  in  the  case  of  the 
aeroplane  the  path  can  be  followed  within  a  few  minutes  of 
the  declaration  of  war — if  not  before. 

I  make  these  observations  about  future  aerial  warfare 
because  in  the  Great  War  we  had  no  good  defences  against 
air-attack  with  the  exception  of  London  and  its  immediate 
vicinity.  In  the  next  war  the  enemy's  radius  of  action  will 
doubtless  be  much  increased,  as  well  as  the  number  and 
destructive  power  of  his  aeroplanes,  and,  in  the  air  as  on  land 
and  sea,  our  best  form  of  defence  will  he  in  the  ability  to  attack. 
In  this  respect  as  in  some  others  we  need  to  take  greater 
advantage  of  the  assistance  that  can  be  afforded  by  science 
than  we  have  hitherto  done.  In  the  Great  War  valuable 
methods  of  submarine  warfare  were  quickly  discovered ; 
sound-rangers  were  invented  by  means  of  which  a  particular 
sound,  such  as  the  discharge  of  a  gun,  could  be  located  at 
great  distances  and  even  in  the  din  of  battle,  and  upon  it  our 
own  guns  could  be  laid  ;  the  tank  was  produced  in  large 
numbers  and  proved  itself  to  be  an  indispensable  weapon  in 
trench  warfare  ;  means  of  defence  against  gas  were  provided 
in  a  few  weeks,  and  of  offence  in  a  few  months  ;  while  the 
surgical  and  medical  arrangements  for  the  sick  and  wounded 
surpassed  anything  before  seen.  All  this  was  mainly  due  to 
science,  which,  conspicuously  absent  in  our  pre-war  prepara- 
tions, had  hurriedly  to  be  called  in  at  a  time  of  stress.  It  is 
to  be  hoped  that  not  only  in  the  fighting  services  but  in  every 
State  department,  in  peace  and  in  war,  science  will  in  future 
be  definitely  given  a  place  consistent  with  its  great  import- 
ance to  the  national  welfare. 


352        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

In  1917  and  again  in  1918  I  was  invited  by  Admiral 
Beatty  to  visit  the  Grand  Fleet  in  the  Firth  of  Forth,  and 
the  spectacle  it  presented,  strengthened  by  the  fine  business- 
hke  looking  ships  of  our  American  Allies,  caused  me  to 
understand  why  the  enemy  refrained  from  repeating  his 
Jutland  effort. 

From  conversations  I  had  with  the  Admiral  the  arrange- 
ments for  home  defence  as  between  the  navy  and  army 
did  not  appear  to  be  as  good  as  they  ought  to  have  been, 
and  for  this  I  myself  was  not  blameless.  With  regard  to 
purely  naval  operations,  I  found  that  control  over  the  naval 
forces  employed  off  the  coasts  of  Great  Britain  was  much 
more  centralised  at  the  Admiralty  than  was  the  control 
over  the  land  forces  exercised  by  the  War  Office.  At  first 
it  seemed  to  me  to  be  overdone,  notwithstanding  that  the 
sea  is  all  one,  but  as  the  sailors  may  be  presumed  to  know 
their  own  business  best  I  shaU  not  dare  to  criticise  them. 
There  is  of  course  much  difference  in  the  characteristics  of 
the  two  services,  their  field  of  operations,  and  the  means 
of  acquiring  and  distributing  intelligence  of  the  enemy's 
movements,  and  the  same  system  of  command  may  not 
therefore  be  practicable  for  both. 

In  visiting  other  Scottish  ports  I  saw  something  more 
of  the  work  being  done  in  the  North  Sea  by  the  Americans 
in  combination  with  our  own  sailors,  and,  as  is  well  known, 
they  also  co-operated  effectively  with  us  in  the  Atlantic. 
One  of  the  most  pleasing  features  of  the  war  was  the 
excellent  relations  which  existed  between  the  soldiers  and 
sailors  of  the  two  great  English-speaking  nations,  and  in 
securing  this  result  Admiral  Sims  took  a  place  second 
to  none.  He  is  a  typical  naval  officer,  do^\^lright  in 
the  expression  of  his  opinions,  and  was  actuated  only  by 
the  desire  to  do  his  best  for  the  common  good.  We 
frequently  met  when  I  was  C.I.G.S.,  and  in  our  journeys 
together  between  London  and  Paris  when  attending  Alhed 
conferences  he  would  sometimes  show  that  besides  being 
a  fine  sailor  he  was  also  an  accomplished  raconteur,  his 
racy  stories  helping  to  while  away  many  a  tedious  hour,  and 
to  give  a  more  cheery  aspect  to  what,  at  the  moment,  might 
be  rather  a  dreary  outlook. 


DEMOBILISATION  353 

At  the  beginning  of  1919  there  was  mucli  discontent 
amongst  the  troops  at  the  manner  in  which  demobihsation 
was  being  carried  out.  Regulations  on  the  subject  had 
been  carefully  prepared  by  the  War  Ofhce  before  the  Armis- 
tice, and  presumably  in  consultation  with  the  other  State 
departments  concerned  ;  but  when  put  into  force  they  were 
subjected  to  many  modifications,  while  it  was  impossible 
in  some  cases  to  decide  into  which  category  men  feU  for 
demobilisation  owing  to  the  vague  and  complicated  con- 
ditions under  which  they  had  entered  the  army.  Moreover, 
the  men  had  been  led  to  believe  at  the  general  election 
in  the  previous  December  that  demobilisation  would  be  im- 
mediate and  rapid  ;  they  knew  that  employment  was  being 
snapped  up  by  others  who  had  already  been  demobilised 
or  who  had  escaped  mihtary  service  altogether  ;  and  for 
many  reasons  they  were  more  anxious  to  return  to  civil  life 
than  to  continue  military  training  at  home. 

To  make  matters  worse,  demobilisation  was  not  dealt 
with  solely  by  one  department  in  the  War  Office,  for  although 
the  Adjutant-General  was  responsible  for  the  greater  part 
of  it  a  considerable  amount  of  personnel  was  demobihsed 
under  the  instructions  of  the  Quartermaster-General,  with 
the  result  sometimes  that  men  who  had  joined  the  army 
under  similar  conditions  found  that  they  were  not  treated 
similarly  in  regard  to  demobilisation.  Of  two  such  men 
one  would  be  demobilised  under  instructions  issued  by  the 
Adjutant-General,  while  the  other,  employed  in  the  admin- 
istrative services  under  the  Quartermaster-General,  might 
find  himself  retained. 

The  state  of  affairs  was  becoming  extremely  unsatis- 
factory, both  as  to  the  feeUng  of  the  troops  and  the  main- 
tenance of  sufficient  forces  to  meet  our  Uabilities,  when 
Mr.  Churchill  became  Secretary  of  State  for  War  in  February 
19 19.  Within  a  few  days  of  taking  office  he  issued  instruc- 
tions which  put  matters  on  a  proper  footing.  Demobilisa- 
tion regulations  were  made  clearer,  the  men  were  definitely 
informed  as  to  when  they  were  likely  to  be  demobihsed,  and 
those  who  had  to  be  retained  were  given  the  increase  of 
pay  and  other  privileges  to  which  they  were  in  the  circum- 
stances entitled. 

2  A 


354        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

There  was  about  this  period  also  much  industrial  unrest. 
This  was  only  to  be  expected,  seeing  the  wholesale  disloca- 
tion caused  by  the  war,  and  at  the  departmental  meetings 
which  I  attended  in  Whitehall,  when  actual  or  threatened 
strikes  were  being  discussed,  it  was  evident  that  there  was 
something  to  be  said  on  the  side  of  the  men  as  well  as 
on  that  of  the  employers.  Troops  were  frequently  held  in 
readiness  to  assist  the  civil  authorities,  but  only  at  one 
place — Glasgow — was  any  considerable  number  used,  and 
fortunately  order  was  quickly  restored. 

Whilst  at  the  Horse  Guards  I  was  inundated  with  re- 
quests to  take  part  in  various  pubhc  ceremonies,  but 
besides  my  distaste  for  making  speeches  in  pubhc — especi- 
ally when  there  is  nothing  useful  to  be  said — I  had  more 
than  enough  to  do  to  get  through  my  military  duties. 
My  rule  was,  therefore,  to  decline  all  such  requests  except 
when  it  seemed  really  necessary  to  comply  with  them. 
One  of  these  exceptions  was  when  I  went  to  Worcester 
in  January  1919  to  lay  the  foundation  stone  of  the  first 
block  of  buildings  to  be  erected  in  "  Gheluvelt  "  park  as 
Homes  for  the  sailors  and  soldiers  of  the  county  who  had 
become  disabled  in  the  Great  War.  (The  park  was  given 
the  name  of  "  Gheluvelt  "  because  of  the  distinction  gained 
at  that  place  by  the  Worcestershire  Regiment  in  1914.) 
Curiously  enough  I  remembered  only  the  day  before  the 
ceremony,  while  the  guest  of  Lord  Beauchamp  at  Madresfield 
Court,  that  it  was  at  Worcester  that  I  had  enhsted  some 
forty-two  years  earher,  and  the  announcement  of  this  fact 
in  a  speech  I  made  at  a  pubhc  luncheon  at  the  Guildhall 
came  as  a  great  surprise  to  all  present,  and  lent  an  added 
interest  to  the  address  of  welcome  with  which  the  Corpora- 
tion had  presented  me  in  the  morning. 

As  a  preliminary  to  the  revision  of  the  rates  of  officers' 
pay  the  Army  Council  appointed  a  committee  at  the  end 
of  1918,  of  which  I  was  nominated  chairman,  to  report  on 
the  necessary  expenses  of  life  in  the  army.  We  went  care- 
fully into  the  matter,  obtaining  much  evidence  from  officers 
well  quahfied  to  give  it,  and  had  no  difficulty  in  showing 
that,  while  most  officers  were  receiving,  with  the  exception 
of  certain  temporary  increases,  much  the  same  pay  as  fifty 


RATES  OF  PAY  355 

or  more  years  ago,  the  cost  of  living  had  gone  up  a  hundred 
per  cent.  In  order  to  effect  a  reasonable  adjustment  we 
recommended  amongst  other  things  that  married  officers  of 
the  age  of  thirty  and  over  should  be  treated  as  such  by  the 
State,  and  be  given  corresponding  privileges  in  respect  of 
rations,  quarters,  and  traveUing  ;  that  all  officers,  married 
or  not,  should  be  treated  more  Hberally,  in  money  or  in 
kind,  in  the  way  of  "  allowances  "  for  fuel,  light,  and 
quarters,  the  system  to  be  made  sufficiently  elastic  to  ensure 
fair  compensation  being  given  for  the  cost  incurred,  no 
matter  where  the  officer  might  be  stationed ;  that  the 
amount  of  uniform  should  be  reduced  to  the  minimum, 
steps  taken  to  cheapen  the  cost,  and  the  initial  outfit  to  be 
paid  for  by  the  State  ;  and  that  all  questions  of  officers' 
emoluments  should  be  decided  on  the  basic  principle  that 
the  more  senior  regimental  officers  should  have  secured  to 
them  such  remuneration  as  would  be  an  adequate  return 
for  their  length  of  service  and  the  responsible  duties  they 
have  to  perform,  and  as  would  enable  them  to  maintain 
and  educate  their  famihes  in  a  manner  consistent  with  their 
station  of  hfe.  The  committee  had  the  satisfaction — not 
the  usual  experience  of  committees — of  seeing  many  of  their 
recommendations  adopted  in  the  revised  scale  of  pay  and 
allowances  issued  the  following  July,  though  there  were 
some  not  unimportant  omissions. 

On  the  1st  March  the  King  held  a  review  in  Hyde  Park 
of  several  Young  Soldier  BattaUons,  brought  in  from  stations 
outside  London,  which  had  been  ordered  to  join  the  Army 
of  the  Rhine  in  replacement  of  the  battalions  sent  there 
from  the  West  Front  when  the  Rhine  territories  were  first 
occupied  by  the  Allies  in  the  previous  December.  Un- 
fortunately greatcoats  had  to  be  worn  as  the  weather  was 
not  very  fine,  and  this  rather  spoilt  the  effect  of  the  parade, 
but  the  battalions  nevertheless  presented  a  good  appearance, 
considering  that  practically  all  the  personnel  were  under 
nineteen  years  of  age.  After  the  parade  the  King  was  good 
enough  to  express  his  appreciation  in  the  following  letter  : 

It  gave  me  much  pleasure  to  inspect  in  Hyde  Park  to-day 
the  battalions  about  to  proceed  overseas  to  join  the  Army  of  the 
Rhine. 


356  FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  steadiness  on  parade  and  general  soldierly  appearance  of 
all  ranks  was  most  satisfactory,  and  reflects  great  credit  alike 
upon  the  men  themselves  and  upon  those  responsible  for  their 
instruction. 

Since  1916,  when  separate  battahons  were  first  formed  at 
home  for  the  reception  and  training  of  recruits  of  18  years  of  age, 
many  thousands  of  young  men  have  passed  through  them,  and 
have  earned  high  praise  from  their  officers  and  non-commissioned 
of&cers  for  their  keenness  to  learn  and  their  consistent  good 
behaviour. 

Com.manders  at  the  front  have  also  told  me  of  their  intelli- 
gence, courage,  and  devotion  to  duty  in  the  field. 

I  am  confident  that  this  high  reputation  will  be   jealously 

guarded  and  maintained  by  the  14  battalions  inspected  to-day, 

also   by  those   other  battalions  which   are   proceeding   to  the 

Rhine,  and  which  I  much  regret  to  be  unable  to  see  before  their 

departure. 

George  R.I. 

1st  March  1919. 

A  few  days  after  this  parade  Mr.  Churchill  offered  me  the 
command  of  the  British  army  of  the  Rhine,  adding  that  in 
view  of  the  services  I  had  rendered  in  winning  the  war  it 
was  appropriate  that  I  should  command  the  troops  employed 
in  enforcing  compHance  with  the  terms  of  peace.  I  did  not 
suppose  that  the  appointment  would  be  of  long  duration, 
but  I  was  nevertheless  glad  to  accept  the  offer.  On  the 
14th  April  I  handed  over  command  of  the  forces  in  Great 
Britain  to  Sir  Douglas  Haig  and  left  the  Horse  Guards, 
where,  for  about  eleven  months,  I  had  occupied  the  same 
room  and  sat  at  the  same  table  as  used  by  many  previous 
Commanders-in-Chief,  including  the  Duke  of  Wellington. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,    BRITISH   ARMY   OF   THE   RHINE 

Composition  of  Headquarters  Staff — Distribution  of  Allied  troops — The 
British  zone  —  The  Military  Governor  —  Administration  of  the 
occupied  territory  —  Meaning  of  martial  law  —  Policy  as  to  in- 
dustrial questions  —  Strength  of  Army  —  Its  reorganisation — 
Preparations  for  the  advance  into  unoccupied  territory — Visit  of 
the  King  and  Queen  of  the  Belgians — Visits  of  the  Duke  of 
Connaught,  Marshal  Foch,  Marshal  J  off  re,  General  Pershing,  and 
other  distinguished  officers — Visit  of  the  Army  Council — Inter- 
change of  visits  with  Allied  Generals — Peace  celebrations  at  Paris, 
Brussels,  and  London — Deer-stalking  in  Scotland- — Sir  Michael 
Culme-Seymour — Lord  Charles  Beresford — Changes  made  in  system 
of  administration — Reduction  of  Army  on  ratification  of  peace — 
Farewells  previous  to  leaving  for  England — Promoted  Field- 
Marshal. 

I  LEFT  London  for  the  Rhine  on  the  i8th  April  (Good 
Friday),  being  received  by  Lieutenant-General  Sir  J.  Asser 
(commanding  the  British  troops  in  France)  and  his  staff  at 
Boulogne,  and  reaching  Cologne  the  following  day.  I  took 
with  me  the  same  aides-de-camp  as  I  had  at  the  Horse 
Guards,  my  private  secretary  at  first  being  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Seymour  of  the  Scots  Greys,  and  afterwards  Lieu- 
tenant-Colonel Dillon  of  the  Munster  Fusiliers,  who  had 
been  one  of  my  students  at  the  Staff  College.  Dillon's 
knowledge  of  French  and  the  French  army  was  very  useful, 
and  in  every  way  he  was  an  ideal  staff  officer.  In  November 
19 19  he  took  over  the  command  of  one  of  the  Rhine  bat- 
talions, being  succeeded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Newman. 
The  latter  was  followed  by  another  gunner,  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Gore-Browne,  and  both  gave  me  great  assistance. 
The  same  may  be  said  of  Peek,  whom  I  was  sorry  to  lose 
when,  having  been  with  me  for  nearly  two  years  in  all,  he 
went  home  to  rejoin  his  regiment,  the  9th  Lancers.  He  had 
been  badly  wounded  at  the  beginning  of  the  Great  War, 

357 


358         FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

afterwards  being  repatriated.  To  the  regret  of  his  many 
friends  he  was  killed  in  March  192 1  while  serving  in  Ireland. 
Lieutenant  Phillips,  who  came  to  me  as  A.D.C.  in  July  and 
remained  till  I  returned  to  England  for  good,  was  a  first- 
class  manager  of  our  mess,  and  made  all  arrangements  for 
the  entertainment  of  my  numerous  guests. 

The  principal  members  of  the  headquarters  staff  whom 
I  found  at  Cologne  were  Major-General  Sir  A,  Montgomery, 
Chief  of  the  General  Staff,  Major-General  Sir  A.  F.  Sillem, 
Deputy  Adjutant-General,  and  Major-General  Sir  E.  Chi- 
chester, Deputy  Quartermaster-General.  Montgomery  re- 
turned to  England  in  August,  and  some  time  afterwards  his 
appointment  was  reduced  in  status  and  filled  by  Brigadier- 
General  Fuller.  Sillem  was  replaced  in  June  by  my  friend 
Hutchison  from  the  War  Office,  who,  in  November,  took 
charge  of  both  Adjutant-General  and  Quartermaster-General's 
duties,  Chichester  returning  to  England.  A  great  deal  of 
work  devolved  upon  the  staff  throughout  the  year,  first  in 
giving  the  army  a  settled  organisation  and  preparing  it  to 
resume  active  operations — a  matter  to  which  I  wiU  refer  later 
— and  afterwards  in  connection  with  the  repeated  reorganisa- 
tions which  had  to  be  made  consequent  on  demobilisation. 

I  took  over  command  from  Sir  Herbert  Plumer  on  the 
2ist  April.  The  army  then  occupied  the  territory  extending 
north-west  from  the  Belgian  frontier  to  the  left  bank  of  the 
Rhine,  from  Dusseldorf  on  the  left  to  about  ten  miles  above 
Bonn  on  the  right,  as  well  as  the  Cologne  bridgehead  (with 
a  radius  of  30  kilometres)  on  the  right  bank.  On  our  right 
was  the  American  army  of  occupation,  with  headquarters 
at  Coblence,  and  on  the  left  the  Belgian  army,  with  head- 
quarters at  Aix-la-Chapelle.  French  armies  held  the  country 
between  the  Americans  and  Switzerland,  their  principal 
headquarters  being  at  Mayence,  Metz,  Kaiserslautern,  and 
Strasburg.  The  whole  were  under  the  command  of  Marshal 
Foch,  who  remained  with  his  staff  at  Paris. 

At  Cologne  there  was  a  British  naval  flotilla  of  twelve 
motor  launches  under  Commander  the  Hon.  P.  Acheson. 
It  was  a  useful  addition  to  the  army  of  occupation  and  did 
good  work  in  patrolhng  the  Rhine,  on  which  there  was 
a  considerable  amount  of  traffic  that   required  watching. 


General  Allen,  Commander  of  the  American  Army  of  the  Rhine. 
WITH  the  Author  and  Colonel  Gore-Browne. 


ON  THE  RHINE  359 

Not  being  allowed  to  go  through  Dutch  waters,  the  flotilla 
came  to  the  Rhine  by  way  of  the  French  rivers  and  canals, 
entering  at  Havre  and  reaching  Cologne  after  a  journey 
extending  over  several  weeks. 

The  British  zone  of  occupation  measured  something  over 
2000  square  miles  and  had  a  population  of  nearly  two  and 
a  half  million  souls.  It  was  divided  both  for  military  and 
civil  purposes  into  five  army  corps  areas,  these  areas,  as 
well  as  their  sub-divisions,  being  made  to  coincide  as  far  as 
possible  with  the  German  civil  boundaries.  My  instructions 
were  that  each  area  should  be  regarded  in  the  same  way  as 
a  "  command  "  at  home,  and  that  all  troops  in  it,  whether 
forming  part  of  the  army  corps  or  not,  should  be  under  the 
orders  of  the  corps  commander  for  administration,  discipline, 
and  defence  duties. 

Similarly,  each  corps  commander  was  responsible  for  the 
civil  administration  of  his  area,  which  he  carried  out  through 
the  medium  of  the  local  civil  authorities.  The  only  excep- 
tion to  this  arrangement  was  Cologne  and  its  suburbs, 
which  were  placed  under  a  separate  "  civil  administrator  " 
attached  to  the  staff  of  the  Military  Governor.  The  back 
areas  of  Malmedy,  Montjoie,  and  Schheden,  being  unoccupied 
by  troops,  were  administered  by  specially  appointed  officers 
reporting  direct  to  general  headquarters. 

The  so-called  "  Military  Governor  "  was  merely  the  senior 
staff  officer  at  general  headquarters  for  civil  administrative 
measures  :  he  commanded  no  troops,  and  therefore  could 
issue  no  orders  to  corps  commanders  except  with  my 
authority.  The  real  "  Military  Governor  "  was  in  fact  none 
other  than  myself,  the  Commander-in-Chief.  The  title  must 
have  often  puzzled  the  Germans,  and  it  certainly  tended  to 
create  confusion  in  the  minds  of  the  corps  commanders,  but 
as  it  had  been  in  existence  since  we  entered  the  country  I 
decided  not  to  change  it  so  as  to  avoid  causing  further 
confusion.  I  did,  however,  issue  instructions  to  corps  com- 
manders to  make  it  clear  that  they  were  responsible  to  me 
for  their  respective  areas,  and  that  the  Military  Governor 
was  not  a  commander,  but  the  staff  officer  through  whom 
my  instructions  regarding  civil  administration  were  conveyed 
to  them. 


36o        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

The  occupied  territory  was,  of  course,  under  martial 
law,  and  as  this  term  is  rather  imperfectly  understood  by 
the  general  public  I  may  explain  what  it  means  as  appHed 
to  a  conquered  country.  In  the  first  place  it  is  not,  as  so 
often  supposed,  the  same  thing  as  "  military  law."  Mihtary 
law  is  the  law  governing  the  soldier  in  peace  and  in  war, 
at  home  and  abroad.  It  is  contained  in  the  Army  Act, 
supplemented  by  other  Acts,  Rules,  and  Regulations,  and 
the  Act  is  brought  into  operation  annually  by  a  separate 
statute,  generally  known  as  the  Army  Annual  Act.  It  is  part 
of  the  statute  law  of  England,  and,  with  the  important  differ- 
ence that  it  is  administered  by  mihtary  courts  and  not  by  civil 
judges,  is  construed  in  the  same  manner  and  carried  out  under 
the  same  conditions  as  the  ordinary  civil  law  of  England. 

Martial  law  is  something  entirely  different,  and  it  differs 
according  as  to  whether  it  is  applied  to  our  own  country  or  to 
a  conquered  country.  In  the  former  case  it  means  that 
exceptional  powers  are  assumed  by  the  Crown,  acting 
through  its  mihtary  forces,  for  the  restoration  and  main- 
tenance of  good  order.  In  other  words,  the  ordinary  law 
is  suspended  and  government  by  military  tribunals  is  sub- 
stituted. In  a  sense,  it  is  not  legal,  for  as  the  Enghsh  law 
does  not  presuppose  the  possibility  of  civil  war  it  makes  no 
express  provision  for  such  a  contingency.  The  fact  that 
martial  law  is  "  proclaimed  "  makes  no  difference  from  the 
purely  legal  standpoint.  The  proclamation  merely  means 
that  as  the  ordinary  civil  administration  is  inadequate  to 
deal  with  the  situation,  the  Government,  in  the  rightful 
exercise  of  its  duties,  has  decided  to  replace  it  temporarily 
by  military  administration. 

As  there  is  no  "  law  "  to  govern  their  actions,  the  military 
authorities  charged  with  the  application  of  this  kind  of 
martial  law  have  necessarily  to  act  according  to  their  own 
judgment,  in  conformity  with  the  instructions  they  receive 
from  the  Government,  and  in  order  to  obviate  any  question 
as  to  the  legality  of  the  measures  taken  by  them,  it  is  usual 
to  pass  an  "  act  of  indemnity."  If  these  measures  are 
honestly  taken,  and  in  accordance  with  official  instructions, 
an  officer  may  rely  on  the  act  of  indemnity  for  meeting  any 
legal  question  that  may  be  raised. 


ADMINISTRATION  OF  JUSTICE  361 

As  applied  to  a  conquered  country  martial  law  is  simply 
the  will  of  the  conqueror.  The  commander  of  the  troops 
stands  temporarily  in  the  position  of  Governor  of  the 
country  he  occupies,  and  imposes  such  laws  on  the  inhabitants 
as  he  thinks  expedient  for  securing  the  safety  of  his  army 
and  the  good  government  of  the  district  which,  by  reason 
of  his  occupation,  is  for  the  time  being  deprived  of  its 
ordinary  rulers.  The  legality  of  the  laws  he  imposes  cannot 
be  called  in  question  because  there  is  no  human  means 
of  doing  so,  but  it  is  his  duty  to  conform  to  what  is  known 
as  the  "  laws  and  usages  of  war  "  in  the  admmistration  of 
the  occupied  territory. 

This  brief  explanation  will  suffice  to  show  the  principles 
upon  which  the  civil  administration  of  the  Rhine  districts 
occupied  by  British  troops  was  based.  As  already  stated, 
the  Mihtary  Governor's  branch  of  the  headquarters  staff  was 
charged  with  carrying  it  out,  working  in  connection  with  the 
German  administrative  officials  at  Cologne.  Lieutenant- 
General  Sir  Charles  Fergusson  was  Military  Governor  from 
the  commencement  of  the  occupation  to  July  1919,  and  vv^as 
succeeded  in  turn  by  Brigadier-General  Chve  and  Major- 
General  Kennedy.  Exclusive  of  deciding  questions  of  general 
policy,  I  was  relieved  by  these  officers  of  practically  all  civil 
administrative  work,  and  was  thus  free  to  devote  my  time 
and  attention  to  the  troops. 

Justice  was  administered  by  "  summary  "  and  "  military  " 
courts,  the  former  being  either  permanent  courts  or  courts 
composed  of  regimental  officers,  while  the  military  court, 
or  court-martial,  was  assembled  as  and  when  necessary  by 
the  area  commandant  concerned.  As  a  rule  prisoners  served 
their  sentences  in  German  civil  prisons,  a  check  being  kept 
on  this  by  a  British  "  Inspector  of  Prisons."  The  German 
civil  authorities  were  as  desirous  of  maintaining  the  peace 
and  ensuring  good  administration  as  we  v/ere,  and  although 
it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  they  accepted  our  rule  with 
any  special  pleasure,  they  quite  realised  the  position, 
recognised  that  they  were  much  better  off  than  their  com- 
patriots in  the  unoccupied  parts  of  Germany,  were  formal 
but  correct  in  their  attitude,  and  promptly  carried  out  the 
orders  they  received. 


362        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

At  different  times  there  was,  as  in  other  parts  of  the 
world,  England  included,  disagreement  between  employers 
and  workmen,  but  considering  the  shortage  of  food  and  coal, 
and  the  fact  that  the  country  was  passing  through  a  form 
of  revolution,  there  was  far  less  trouble  than  might  have 
been  expected.  My  policy  was  to  keep  clear  of  all  labour 
disputes  except  when  they  threatened  to  interfere  with  the 
interests  of  the  troops — such  as  the  stoppage  of  electric  light, 
water  supply,  or  railway  transport — or  to  cause  disturbances 
for  the  suppression  of  which  troops  might  have  to  be 
employed.  The  procedure  I  laid  down  was  that  all  disputes 
likely  to  lead  to  a  strike  must  in  the  first  instance  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  German  "  court  of  conciliation,"  in  which  both 
sides  were  represented  ;  if  no  agreement  was  reached  the 
case  was  submitted  to  a  British  court  of  arbitration,  whose 
decision  was  final  and  binding. 

The  officers  of  the  Military  Governor's  staff  rendered 
excellent  service  in  settling  many  strikes  which  threatened 
to  become  serious,  and  throughout  the  thirteen  months  of 
British  military  administration  no  great  or  prolonged  strike 
occurred.  It  should  be  added,  perhaps,  that  when  a  strike 
did  occur  no  picketing  was  allowed  ;  protection  was  always 
afforded  to  those  men  who  wished  to  work  ;  every  considera- 
tion was  given  to  the  point  of  view  of  the  workmen,  who, 
by  our  intervention,  frequently  obtained  the  terms  they 
demanded  ;  and  any  one  who  did  not  abide  by  our  decision, 
whether  employer  or  employee,  was  liable  to  be  dealt  with 
as  an  offender,  and  was  so  dealt  with  when  the  occasion 
required. 

For  reasons  that  can  be  understood,  no  one  in  the  Rhine 
Army  was  allowed  to  "  fraternise  "  with  the  inhabitants, 
and  to  meet  this  unusual  condition  of  military  life  additional 
facilities  were  afforded  to  officers  and  men  for  taking  part  in 
games,  theatricals,  concerts,  day-trips  on  the  Rhine,  and 
other  forms  of  recreation  and  amusement.  The  Y.M.C.A., 
Church  Army,  Men's  Leave  Club,  and  similar  societies 
gave  invaluable  help  in  this  respect,  and  I  am  sure  that 
thousands  of  the  young  men  who  served  in  the  command 
will  remember  with  gratitude  for  the  rest  of  their  lives  the 
many  happy  hours  which  these  institutions  provided  for  them. 


ARMY  RECONSTRUCTION  363 

One  of  the  theatres  in  Cologne  was  appropriated  for  the 
use  of  British  performers,  and  a  suitable  proportion  of  seats 
at  the  opera  were,  by  my  orders,  permanently  reserved  for 
the  troops,  the  prices  paid  varying,  in  English  money,  from 
a  few  pence  to  about  two  shillings.  The  opera  was  said  to 
be  one  of  the  best  in  Germany  and  certainly  was  very  good, 
completely  putting  in  the  shade  the  operatic  efforts  usually 
heard  in  England. 

When  I  arrived  on  the  Rhine  the  British  army  there  con- 
sisted of  five  army  corps,  each  of  two  divisions,  with  a  cavalry 
division  and  various  other  troops,  making  a  total  strength 
of  about  220,000  men.  To  meet  the  requirements  of  de- 
mobilisation the  army  was  still  in  process  of  reconstruction, 
divisions,  brigades,  and  battalions  of  the  old  field  armies 
from  France  being  broken  up,  recast,  and  renamed,  and 
amalgamated  with  some  sixty  Graduated  and  Young 
Soldier  battahons  from  home.  Of  the  latter  some  battaHons 
were  retained  intact,  and  others  were  broken  up  and 
distributed  amongst  the  old  battalions  from  France. 

One  result  of  all  this  dislocation  was  that  the  regimental 
traditions  and  reputations  which  had  been  estabUshed  during 
the  fighting  disappeared  to  a  great  extent,  and  to  make 
matters  more  difficult  the  army  was  for  some  time  deficient 
in  two  important  classes  of  men — cooks  and  commanding 
officers — without  which  it  is  impossible  to  have  efficiency 
and  contentment.  Only  a  few  of  the  young  battahons  had 
been  supplied  with  trained  cooks  before  leaving  England, 
while  many  of  the  old  units  had  lost  theirs  by  demobilisa- 
tion ;  and  of  the  ninety  battalions  in  the  army  thirty  had 
not  yet  received  their  permanent  commanding  officers,  and 
in  most  of  the  remaining  sixty  these  officers  had  but  just 
been  posted  and  knew  httle  or  nothing  about  their  men  or 
their  men  about  them. 

The  same  may  be  said  of  the  junior  regimental  officers, 
many  of  whom  had  recently  been  brought  in  from  disbanded 
battahons  ;  they  were  mainly  "  temporary  "  officers,  the 
regular  officers  having  been  sent  home  to  join  the  regular 
units  then  in  process  of  re-creation  ;  and  as  their  mihtary 
experience  had  been  confined  almost  entirely  to  trench- 
warfare  they  were  but  indifferently  quahfied,  as  a  rule,  to 


364        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

deal  with  the  new  duties  of  administration  and  training 
which  now  devolved  upon  them. 

Further,  commanders  of  all  grades  found  themselves, 
consequent  on  the  reduction  of  the  field  armies,  tumbling 
down  the  ladder,  and  Generals  who  had  commanded  divisions 
for  months  and  years  in  the  fighting  were  placed  in  command 
of  brigades  ;  brigadiers  in  the  war  dropped  down  to  the 
command  of  a  battalion  or  even  a  company ;  battalion 
commanders  fell  to  a  company  or  a  platoon. 

Most  of  the  regular  non-commissioned  officers  had  also 
been  sent  home  to  join  the  regular  units,  the  battalions  on 
the  Rhine  thus  being  left  chiefly  with  non-regulars  who,  as 
a  rule,  were  young  both  in  age  and  service  and  incapable 
of  exercising  proper  authority  over  the  men.  These  and 
practically  all  the  men  were  entitled  to  be  demobilised  at 
varying  dates  according  to  the  conditions  under  which  they 
had  entered  the  army,  and,  for  the  same  reasons  as  those 
which  had  led  to  dissatisfaction  at  home,  to  which  reference 
has  been  made  in  the  preceding  chapter,  there  was  some 
discontent  amongst  the  men  with  respect  to  the  manner 
in  which  demobilisation  was  being  carried  out.  To  allay 
disturbing  elements  of  this  kind  it  was  essential  to  have 
good  regimental  officers,  personally  known  to  and  trusted 
by  the  men,  and  as  just  explained  these  were  seldom 
forthcoming. 

Practically  every  post  brought  me  appeals  from  employers 
or  relatives  in  England  to  release  men  who  were  held  to  be 
entitled,  either  legally  or  on  compassionate  grounds,  to  be 
set  free.  Some  hard  cases  came  to  my  notice,  and  hard  or 
otherwise  all  were  sympathetically  dealt  with  by  my  staff 
as  far  as  the  regulations  would  permit.  Some  of  my  corre- 
spondents were  very  grateful  for  the  help  we  were  able  to 
give  them.  Here  is  a  letter  I  received  from  the  wife  of  a 
man  whose  release  was  expedited  : 

Dear  Sir — Just  a  line  thanking  you  very  much  for  seeing 

into  Mr. 's  case  for  me.     For  you  have  done  a  great  lot  for 

me  in  sending  him  home,  and  I  hope  that  the  best  of  luck  follows 
you  for  ever.  Once  again  thank  you  very  much. — Yours  truly 
greatfull,  


REORGANISATION  COMPLETED  365 

The  unsatisfactory  state  of  affairs  above  described  could 
not  have  been  wholly  prevented,  but  there  it  was,  and  it 
was  not  calculated  to  make  the  general  atmosphere  either 
contented  or  exhilarating,  or  to  render  easy  the  preparations 
which  had  to  be  made  for  an  advance  into  unoccupied 
Germany  if  that  became  necessary  in  order  to  compel  her 
to  sign  the  treaty  of  peace — when  ready  for  signature. 

My  first  step  was  to  assemble  the  corps  commanders, 
Morland,  Godley,  Jacob,  Haldane,  and  Braithwaite,  discuss 
the  situation  with  them,  and  inform  them  of  my  intentions. 
This  I  did  immediately  after  assuming  command,  and  I  also 
began  a  tour  of  inspections  so  as  to  make  myself  personally 
acquainted  with  the  officers  and  men,  and  with  the  state 
of  readiness  of  the  army  for  resuming  active  operations. 
During  the  first  two  months  I  was  engaged  in  carrying  out 
these  inspections  every  day  in  the  week  except  Sunday 
(when  I  visited  the  hospitals),  and  having  regard  to  the 
conditions  under  which  the  army  had  been  thrown  together 
it  was  not  surprising  that  many  shortcomings  were  evident. 

Besides  the  disadvantages  to  which  reference  has  been 
made,  I  had  to  contend  against  the  assumption — fostered 
by  what  had  been  said  during  the  general  election — that 
the  war  was  "  over,"  from  which  it  was  argued  that  training 
was  no  longer  necessary.  Further,  many  of  the  young 
infantry  soldiers  from  home  had  not  been  instructed  in  the 
use  of  the  rifle  ;  the  young  artillery  soldiers  could  neither 
drive  nor  shoot  ;  and  some  of  the  cavalry  regiments  were  so 
weak  in  numbers  that  they  could  not  move  from  one  station 
to  another  without  borrowing  men  from  other  regiments  to 
lead  their  spare  horses.  Sometimes  I  almost  despaired  of 
ever  straightening  out  the  tangle  and  reaching  a  reasonable 
standard  of  efficiency,  but  British  officers  and  men  are  made 
of  good  material,  and  once  a  matter  is  properly  explained 
and  they  understand  what  is  expected  of  them,  they  may 
be  depended  upon  to  respond.  They  did  so  on  this 
occasion.  Everybody  put  his  shoulder  to  the  wheel,  and 
by  the  middle  of  June,  when  a  further  advance  into  Germany 
was  contemplated,  reorganisation  had  been  fairly  well 
completed  ;  the  troops,  elated  at  the  prospect  of  going 
forward,  presented  a  cheerful  and  Vv^orkmanUke  appearance  ; 


366        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

and  I  felt  satisfied  that  they  were  capable  of  carrying  out 
the  mission  assigned  to  them. 

I  had  been  summoned  to  Paris  to  confer  with  Marshal 
Foch  and  the  Commanders-in-Chief  of  the  Allied  armies  as 
far  back  as  the  end  of  April,  as  it  was  thought  that  we  might 
have  to  advance  about  the  middle  of  May,  but  owing  to  the 
slow  progress  made  in  completing  the  peace  negotiations  no 
movement  of  troops  became  necessary  until  the  17th  of  June. 
On  that  day  the  divisions  began  to  concentrate  east  of  the 
Rhine,  and  by  the  evening  of  the  19th  were  in  readiness  to 
cross  the  hne  separating  occupied  from  unoccupied  territory. 
Five  days  later  Germany  undertook  to  sign  the  treaty  ;  her 
delegates  for  that  purpose  passed  through  Cologne  from 
Berlin  en  route  to  Versailles  on  the  27th,  and  on  the  28th 
the  treaty  was  signed. 

During  the  spring  and  summer  of  1919  I  received  several 
distinguished  visitors  at  my  headquarters,  the  first  to  come 
bemg  the  King  and  Queen  of  the  Belgians.  Their  Majesties 
arrived  by  aeroplane  on  the  26th  of  April  and  returned  to 
Brussels  in  the  same  manner,  despite  very  unsettled  weather, 
on  the  28th  of  April.  The  same  evening  the  King  sent  me 
the  following  telegram  : 

The  Queen  and  myself  express  to  you  our  most  sincere  thanks 
for  the  kindness  you  have  shown  to  us  in  Cologne.  It  was  a 
great  pleasure  to  see  you  and  to  visit  a  part  of  the  British  sector 
of  occupation  on  the  Rhine. 

Albert. 

The  Duke  of  Connaught,  accompanied  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Sir  Malcolm  Murray,  arrived  on  the  6th  of  May  and 
spent  three  days  with  the  army.  Amongst  other  events 
His  Royal  Highness  inspected  three  battalions  of  the  Rifle 
Brigade,  of  which  he  is  Colonel-in-Chief,  and  held  a  review 
of  the  Northern  Division,  about  10,000  men,  on  the  German 
parade  ground  just  outside  the  town.  This  review  was  of 
interest  as  being  the  only  one  of  its  kind  held  by  a  member 
of  the  Royal  Family  during  the  occupation. 

General  Liggett,  commanding  the  American  army  of 
occupation,  paid  me  a  visit  at  the  same  time  as  the  Duke 
of  Connaught ;  General  Pershing  came  to  present  me  with  the 


o 

^    7. 


:;  o 


70 


MARSHAL  FOCH'S  VISIT  367 

American  distinguished  service  medal  on  the  12th  of  May  ; 
and  General  Bliss  came  two  days  later.  General  Liggett 
was  succeeded  by  General  Allen,  with  whom,  as  well  as  with 
General  Michel,  commanding  the  Belgian  army  of  occupation, 
I  frequently  exchanged  visits.  Itahan,  Japanese,  and  Chinese 
Generals  were  also  amongst  my  visitors. 

Marshal  Foch,  with  General  Weygand  and  others  of  his 
staff,  came  on  the  i6th  of  May  and  left  the  following  day. 
He  had  begun  a  tour  down  the  Rhine  at  Strasburg  a  few  days 
earher,  the  first  since  the  Armistice,  halting  at  Mayence  and 
Coblence  en  route  to  Cologne.  He  travelled  on  board  one  of 
the  Rhine  steamers,  the  Prince  Bismarck,  and  on  entering 
the  British  zone  was  received  with  a  salute  from  our  naval 
flotilla ;  a  squadron  of  aeroplanes  followed  his  course  down 
the  river,  the  banks  of  which  were  lined  with  troops  at  Bonn 
and  other  places  ;  and  at  Cologne  he  was  greeted  with 
rousing  cheers  from  the  troops  assembled  on  the  Hohenzollem 
bridge  and  from  others  who  clustered  round  his  motor-car 
as  it  proceeded  from  the  quay  to  my  house  outside  the  town. 
Thousands  of  Germans  came  to  see  the  man  of  whose  name 
they  had  heard  so  much,  and  although  they  did  not 
contribute  to  the  cheering  their  demeanour  was,  as  always, 
strictly  "  correct." 

As  the  car  slowly  forced  its  way  through  the  troops,  who, 
with  the  exception  of  the  guard  of  honour,  were  not 
"  formed  up  "  but  had  been  allowed  to  line  the  road  in  their 
own  way,  the  Marshal  was  much  moved  at  the  welcome 
accorded  him,  and  compared  the  anxious  times  we  had 
experienced  together  between  1914  and  1918  with  the  drive 
we  were  then  making  on  the  banks  of  the  Rhine,  saluted 
by  German  policemen  and  acclaimed  by  British  soldiers — 
a  termination  to  the  Great  War  which  in  those  far-off  and 
critical  days  would  sometimes  have  seemed,  had  we  thought 
of  it  at  all,  to  be  impossible  of  reaUsation  in  May  1919,  if  ever. 

After  we  had  discussed  the  operations  which  might  have 
to  be  undertaken,  he  motored  round  part  of  the  bridgehead 
east  of  the  Rhine,  being  greatly  impressed,  as  all  my  visitors 
were,  with  the  tidiness  and  general  prosperity  of  the  country, 
the  multitude  of  children  to  be  seen,  and  the  orderly 
behaviour  of  the  inhabitants. 


368        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Marshal  Joffre  made  a  tour  of  the  Rhine  Provinces 
similar  to  that  of  Marshal  Foch,  and  arrived  at  Cologne  by 
rail,  accompanied  by  la  Marechale,  on  the  24th  of  September, 
leaving  the  same  night  for  Aix-la-Chapelle  after  dining  at 
my  house.  He  was  received  by  a  guard  of  honour,  composed 
of  cavalry,  infantry,  and  tanks,  on  the  Dom  Platz,  where 
large  numbers  of  Germans  congregated  to  see  him.  He 
evidently  felt  gratified  at  the  opportunity  of  renewing  his 
acquaintance  with  British  troops,  and  it  was  equalh^  a 
pleasure  to  us  to  receive  him. 

Other  French  officers  who  came  to  Cologne  were  Marshal 
Petain,  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  French  armies  ;  General 
Mangin,  commanding  part  of  the  French  armies  of  occupa- 
tion, an  interesting  personality  who  had  seen  much  service 
in  the  French  colonies  and  was  with  Colonel  Marchand  at 
the  time  of  the  Fashoda  incident ;  General  FayoUe,  com- 
manding another  part  of  the  French  armies  of  occupation, 
with  headquarters  at  Kaiserslautern ;  General  Gouraud, 
commanding  the  Strasburg  area,  who  had  served  with  the 
French  contingent  sent  to  Gallipoli,  where  he  was  severely 
wounded ;  and  General  Degoutte,  who  later  succeeded 
General  Mangin  at  Mayence  and  eventually  became  Com- 
mander-in-Chief of  all  the  Allied  forces  of  occupation. 
These  Generals  spoke  in  high  terms  of  the  appearance  of  the 
troops  shown  for  their  inspection,  and  of  the  soldier-like 
manner  in  which  they  moved  on  parade.  A  typical  example 
of  this  appreciation  was  provided  in  a  letter  I  received  from 
General  Gouraud,  who  wrote  : 

Croyez  que  je  n'oublierai  jamais  votre  cordial  accueil  et 
remouvante  revue  ou  j'ai  Thonneur  de  voir  defilcr  devant  moi 
de  magniliques  detachements  de  troupes  britanniques  sur  la  place 
de  la  cathedrale  de  Cologne. 

I  should  add  that  the  relations  between  the  British 
troops  and  the  French,  Belgian,  and  American  armies  were 
throughout  of  the  most  cordial  nature  as  regards  work, 
while  as  to  play  there  was  much  friendly  rivalry  in  racing, 
horse-shows,  and  football,  and  some  mutual  benefit  was,  no 
doubt,  also  derived  from  the  other  forms  of  amusement  and 
recreation  for  which  reciprocal  invitations  were  given. 


^ 


5:^ 


z  fc 
<  z 


<  o 


VISIT  OF  THE  ARMY  COUNCIL  369 

The  Army  Council,  represented  by  the  Secretary  of  State 
for  War  (Mr.  Winston  Churchill),  the  Chief  of  the  Imperial 
General  Staff,  and  the  Adjutant-General,  arrived  at  Cologne 
on  the  17th  of  August  and  left  on  the  20th  of  that  month. 
They  were  shown  as  many  of  the  troops  as  time  would 
permit  them  to  see,  including  a  review  of  the  6th  Army 
Corps,  the  women-workers,  clubs,  and  regimental  institutes, 
and  on  the  last  day  they  descended  the  Rhine  from  Remagen, 
15  miles  above  Bonn,  to  Cologne,  accompanied  by  the 
naval  flotilla  and  two  squadrons  of  the  air  force.  The 
reverberations  of  the  naval  salute  in  the  defiles  of  the 
Rhine  when  the  party  went  on  board,  the  sheets  of  white 
foam  thrown  up  by  the  rapidly-moving  motor  launches,  the 
humming  of  the  aeroplanes  in  the  cloudless  sky,  and  the 
wonderful  colouring  of  the  surrounding  country  characteristic 
of  the  Rhine  valley,  constituted  an  impressive  spectacle  not 
easily  to  be  forgotten. 

After  their  return  to  England  the  Council  sent  me  the 
following  telegram  : 

Please  convey  to  all  ranks  Rhine  army  the  thanks  of  the 
Army  Council  for  their  message  of  August  21.  The  Council 
have  greatly  valued  the  opportunities  of  personal  touch  with 
the  troops  afforded  them  by  their  visit,  of  which  they  retain  the 
pleasantest  memories.  The  Council  were  deeply  impressed  with 
the  soldierly  bearing  and  the  fine  spirit  shown  by  the  troops 
under  your  Command,  who  worthily  uphold  the  best  traditions 
of  the  British  army. 

In  returning  the  visits  of  the  Alhed  Generals  I  was 
always  shown  great  courtesy  and  hospitaUty,  the  guards  of 
honour  with  which  I  was  received  usually  being  drawn  up 
in  the  principal  square  of  the  town  and  consisting  of  at 
least  a  battalion  of  infantry,  cavalry  also  being  included  if 
available.  The  general  arrangements  and  the  turn-out  of 
the  troops  were  a  proof  that  the  ceremony  was  not  merely 
a  matter  of  form,  but  that  pains  had  been  taken  to  make 
it  a  genuine  mark  of  respect  to  the  representative  of  the 
British  army. 

One  of  the  first  of  these  visits  was  paid  to  General 
Mangin  at  Mayence  on  the  2nd  of  June,  when,  by  the  King's 
command,  I  presented  him  with  the  K.C.B.     The  General 

2B 


370        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

lived  in  the  palace  of  the  Duke  of  Hesse,  which  was  frequently- 
occupied  by  Napoleon  during  his  campaigns  beyond  the 
Rhine,  and  the  room  in  which  he  slept  is  still  retained  in 
much  the  same  order  as  when  he  used  it.  I  was  told  that 
when  Marshal  Foch  was  stajdng  here  with  General  Mangin 
he  was  invited  to  sleep  in  the  bed.  His  reply  was,  "  Thank 
you,  but  I  am  too  small." 

The  following  morning  I  reached  Metz,  where,  after  visit- 
ing the  battlefield  of  Verdun  during  the  day,  I  dined  with 
the  garrison  commander.  General  Maud'huy,  who  occupied 
the  same  house  as  that  in  which  the  German  commandant 
had  Hved,  and  to  which  I  used  to  go  to  report  my  arrival 
when  at  Metz  before  the  war.  General  Maud'huy  is  a 
native  of  Metz,  and  as  a  boy  of  about  ten  years  of  age  was 
living  in  the  town  at  the  time  of  the  1870  war.  He  told 
me  that  some  years  later,  when  he  had  become  an  officer  of 
the  French  army,  the  German  authorities  at  Metz  refused  to 
give  him  permission  to  go  there  to  attend  his  mother's  funeral. 

On  the  2oth  of  July  I  paid  another  visit  to  General  Mangin, 
who  met  me  at  Bingen  and  accompanied  me  in  the  train  to 
Mayence,  where  the  arrival  platform  and  waiting-room  were 
profusely  decorated  with  flags  and  flowers.  Outside  the 
station  a  fine-looking  French  battalion  formed  the  guard  of 
honour,  a  squadron  of  African  cavalry  escorted  us  through 
the  town  to  the  palace,  and  there  we  were  received  by  a 
battalion  of  African  infantry.  In  the  evening  there  was 
a  dinner-party,  a  dance,  and  a  torchhght  tattoo,  which, 
as  seen  from  the  palace  windows  overlooking  the  Rhine, 
presented  a  remarkably  brilliant  spectacle. 

The  following  day  I  went  to  Strasburg  as  the  guest  of 
General  Gouraud,  who,  after  dejeuner,  made  a  very  compli- 
mentary speech  about  the  British  army,  for  which  I  was 
quite  unprepared  and  therefore  experienced  some  difficulty 
in  giving,  in  French,  a  suitable  reply  to  it.  I  spent  the 
evening  at  the  house  of  M.  Millerand,  then  Governor  of 
Alsace  and  now  President  of  the  French  Republic,  who  had 
invited  about  thirty  people  to  dinner.  In  the  course  of  our 
conversation,  which  was  very  interesting  to  me,  he  recalled 
the  fact  that  we  had  first  met  on  the  West  Front  in  1915 
when  he  was  Minister  of  War. 


PEACE  CELEBRATIONS  371 

On  the  23rd  I  arrived  at  Kaiserslautern,  and  after  dejeuner 
went  with  General  Fayolle  for  a  four  hours'  motor  drive 
through  the  beautiful  country  of  the  Vosges.  He  was  a 
charming  host  and,  like  the  other  French  generals,  did  all 
in  his  power  to  render  the  visit  agreeable. 

On  the  31st  of  July  I  went  to  Aix-la-Chapelle  to 
present  about  thirty  decorations  to  certain  Belgian  officers 
and  men.  A  battalion  of  Belgian  infantry  and  a  squadron 
of  cavalry,  as  well  as  a  detachment  of  French  troops,  were 
formed  up  in  the  square  in  front  of  the  Rathaus,  and  after 
the  presentation  was  over  I  met  a  number  of  Belgian  and 
French  officers  at  the  General's  house. 

By  the  invitation  of  M.  Clemenceau  I  attended  the  peace 
celebration  held  at  Paris  on  the  14th  of  July,  the  British 
contingent  consisting  of  1000  men  from  the  Rhine  and 
about  half  that  number  from  England.  Paris  was  seen  at 
its  best,  which  is  saying  a  good  deal,  for  there  is  no  city  in 
the  world  so  well  adapted  for  a  pubhc  display  or  that  so 
well  understands  how  to  make  it  attractive,  and  all  classes 
seemed  to  combine  to  give  the  proceedings  an  air  of  genuine 
rejoicing.  In  the  evening  a  dinner  was  given  by  M.  Poincare 
at  the  filysee  to  about  120  officers,  to  which  I  had  the 
honour  of  being  invited.  Madame  Poincare  was  the  only 
lady  present. 

I  was  also  invited  to  attend  the  Belgian  peace  celebration 
at  Brussels  on  the  22nd  of  July,  but  was  prevented  by  duty 
from  going. 

At  the  British  peace  celebration  in  London  on  the  19th 
of  July  I  was  not  present,  as  I  was  not  asked  to  attend. 

In  September  I  took  a  few  days'  leave  for  deer-stalking 
at  Langwell,  the  Scottish  home  of  the  Duke  and  Duchess  of 
Portland,  where  I  had  received  some  lessons  in  the  art  of 
stalking  from  the  Duke  himself  during  two  brief  visits  in  1918. 

Admiral  Sir  Michael  Culme-Seymour  and  Lord  Charles 
.Beresford  were  of  the  party,  as  they  had  been  the  year 
before  and  on  many  previous  occasions.  Sir  Michael,  I 
believe,  had  not  once  missed  for  over  twenty  years.  These 
two  fine  old  sailors  were  splendid  company,  and  amused  us 
greatly  by  the  downright  way  in  which  they  expressed  their 
opinions  about  things  naval  and  otherwise.     I  remember 


372        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

that  Lord  Fisher  had  just  written  one  of  his  characteristic 
letters  to  The  Times — its  subject  has  escaped  my  memory 
— and  the  editor  telegraphed  to  Lord  Charles  asking  for  his 
views  upon  it.  On  the  Thursday  evening  Lord  Charles  told 
us  that  he  would  devote  Sunday  to  the  preparation  of  his 
reply,  and  would  write  something  pretty  hot.  "  Don't  make 
a  fool  of  yourself,  Charlie,"  advised  Sir  Michael  in  his 
characteristically  blunt  manner.  But  man  proposes  and 
God  disposes.  When  I  left  Langwell  on  the  following  morn- 
ing Lord  Charles  seemed  to  be  in  his  usual  health  and  was 
certainly  in  excellent  spirits,  much  good-humoured  chaff 
taking  place  between  him  and  Sir  Michael  during  breakfast 
about  a  new  suit  of  clothes  he  was  wearing.  On  the  Saturday 
evening,  having  retired  early  to  his  room,  he  was  seized 
with  a  sudden  illness  and  within  a  few  minutes  was  dead. 
The  contribution  to  The  Times  was  therefore  never  written. 

Sir  Michael,  over  80  years  of  age,  was  a  marvel  of  vitality 
and  energy.  He  would  walk  all  day  over  the  moors  killing 
his  one  or  two  stags,  sometimes  three,  and  when  not  out 
stalking  would  take  his  place  on  the  tennis-court  or  the  golf 
links  little  inferior  to  men  years  younger  than  himself. 
Some  months  later  his  health  broke  down,  and  when  I  was 
next  at  Langwell,  in  October  1920,  we  received  the  news  of 
his  death. 

Langwell  is  situated  on  the  east  coast  of  Scotland, 
43  miles  south  of  John  o'  Groat's  house.  It  stands  on 
high  ground  flanked  north  and  south  by  the  deep  and 
wooded  gorges  of  the  Berriedale  and  Langwell  rivers  re- 
spectively. These  streams  unite  in  the  little  village  of 
Berriedale  at  the  foot  of  the  hill,  the  combined  stream 
then  flowing  for  some  two  hundred  yards  through  a  defile, 
the  sides  of  which  are  nearly  300  feet  high,  before  dis- 
charging its  waters  into  the  North  Sea.  Amid  this  grand 
highland  scenery,  and  at  the  point  of  confluence  of  the  two 
streams,  is  the  memorial  recently  erected  by  the  Duke  in 
honour  of  the  officers  and  men  of  his  Caithness  estates  who 
served  in  the  Great  War.  It  is  one  of  the  most  impressive 
and  best-designed  war  memorials  I  have  seen. 

The  Duke  is  not  only  an  excellent  all-round  sportsman 
himself,   but  does  everything  he  can  to  ensure  that  his 


HONORARY  DEGREES  373 

guests  have  good  sport  and  plenty  of  it  Whenever  I  go 
to  Langwell,  or  think  of  the  pleasant  days  I  have  spent 
there,  I  find  it  difficult  not  to  break  the  tenth  command- 
ment. 

In  November  I  went  to  Cambridge  to  receive  the  honorary 
degree  of  LL.D.,  which  that  university  was  kind  enough  to 
confer  upon  me  and  other  officers  of  the  fighting  services  in 
recognition  of  our  work  during  the  war.  The  ceremony  of 
giving  the  degrees  was  presided  over  bj^  Mr.  Balfour,  and 
was  of  a  rather  more  elaborate  kind  than  usual  as  he  was 
installed  Chancellor  of  the  university  on  the  same  day. 
The  undergraduates,  of  whom  a  large  number  were  present, 
surprised  me  by  the  mildness  of  their  behaviour  during  and 
after  the  proceedings,  as  I  had  always  understood  that  it 
was  their  custom  on  these  occasions  to  behave  in  anything 
but  a  mild  manner.  They  rode  on  the  roofs  and  bonnets  of 
the  motor-cars  conveying  the  new  "  Doctors  "  to  the  college 
where  the  official  luncheon  was  to  take  place  ;  the  heels  of 
some  of  them  found  their  way  through  the  glass  of  the  car 
windows  ;  and  they  insisted,  with  rare  good  humour,  on 
carrying  us  on  their  shoulders  into  the  college  grounds  when 
we  left  the  cars.  This,  however,  was  the  sum  of  their 
attentions,  and  it  gave  us  as  much  amusement  as  it  seemed 
to  give  them. 

I  had  been  informed  earUer  in  the  year  that  the  university 
of  Oxford  was  desirous  of  showing  me  a  similar  kindness  by 
the  granting  of  an  honorary  degree  as  D.C.L.,  but  I  could 
not  leave  my  command  at  the  time  the  ceremony  took  place. 
The  invitation  was  renewed  in  1920,  and  I  was  then  able  to 
be  present.  M.  Paderewski  and  M.  Venizelos  were  amongst 
those  who  received  degrees  on  this  occasion. 

Soon  after  the  peace  treaty  had  been  signed  instructions 
were  received  from  the  War  Office  to  proceed  with  the 
reduction  of  the  Rhine  army.  At  first  it  was  the  intention 
to  retain  six  divisions,  and  two  of  the  ten  divisions  then 
on  the  Rhine  were  ordered  to  England  on  31st  July.  Many 
different  instructions  were  subsequently  received,  and  in  the 
end  it  was  decided  to  retain  only  about  15,000  men  as  the 
permanent  garrison,  with  an  independent  division  of  about 
the  same  strength  for  temporary  service  in  East  Prussia  and 


374        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Silesia  pending  the  taking  of  the  plebiscite  after  the  peace 
treaty  had  been  ratified.  Demobilisation,  and  consequent 
reorganisation,  accordingly  continued  for  the  greater  part 
of  1919,  and  as  the  treaty  was  not  ratified  until  the  loth 
of  January  1920  it  was  then  found  that  the  independent 
division  could  not  after  all  be  employed  in  the  manner 
intended,  as  the  majority  of  the  men  were  due  for  de- 
mobihsation  before  the  end  of  March  and  some  of  them  at 
a  much  earher  date.  The  division  was  therefore  ordered 
to  be  demobilised  forthwith,  and  the  battahons  for  the 
plebiscite  area  were  sent  out  from  home.  By  the  end  of 
February  demobihsation  had  been  completed  and  the  Rhine 
garrison  had  been  nearly  reduced  to  its  assigned  strength. 

The  ratification  of  peace  caused  another  modification  of 
our  arrangements,  as  by  the  terms  of  the  treaty  the  civil 
administration  of  the  occupied  territory  passed  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  military  authorities  and  was  vested  in  a  civilian 
body  styled  the  "  Rhineland  High  Commission,"  composed 
of  representatives  of  France,  Belgium,  America,  and  Great 
Britain.  I  beheve  that  this  system  of  setting  up  a  civilian 
body  as  the  supreme  authority  during  the  mihtary  occupa- 
tion of  a  conquered  country  is  without  precedent,  and 
there  was  a  chance  that  it  might  lead  to  difficulty  in 
application. 

For  example,  the  civil  administration,  which  had  hitherto 

been  supervised  by  the  Allied  Commanders-in-Chief,  reverted 

to  the  German  authorities,  subject  to  certain  saving  clauses 

with  respect  to  the  AUied  troops  and  to  the  "  ordinances  " 

that  might  be  issued  by  the  Rhineland  High  Commission. 

The  German  authorities  were  thus  left  responsible  for  the 

maintenance  of  order,  but  not  being  allowed  to  retain  any 

troops  in  the  occupied  territory  they  had  only  the  pohce  to 

rely  upon,  and  they  were  of  indifferent  quahty.     If  and 

when  the  pohce  required  assistance  the  German  authorities 

had  to  apply  to  the  Commission,  and  the  latter  had  then 

to  instruct  the  Commander-in-Chief  of  the  Alhed  forces  to 

direct  the  AlUed  Commander-in-Chief  concerned  to  furnish 

the    requisite    troops,   or,  if    the    Commission   deemed    it 

desirable,  they  could  declare  a  "  state  of  siege,"  or  martial 

law  as  we  would  call  it,  upon  which  the  military  authorities 


SIR  HAROLD  STUART  375 

would  resume  complete  control.  In  either  case,  therefore, 
these  authorities  would  suddenly  be  required  to  deal  with  a 
situation  with  which  they  might  have  previously  had  no 
connection,  and  about  which  they  might  know  little  or 
nothing. 

The  use  of  military  forces  to  assist  the  civil  power  is  a 
difficult  task  in  one's  own  country  ;  the  use  of  Allied  troops 
to  assist  German  police,  in  the  circumstances  just  described, 
was  likely  to  be  even  more  complicated.  The  necessity  for 
giving  this  assistance  did  not,  I  am  glad  to  say,  arise  during 
my  period  of  command,  but  had  it  arisen  I  have  no  doubt 
that  a  way  out  of  the  difficulties  would  have  been  found, 
as  they  were  fully  recognised  by  the  Commission.  My 
relations  with  the  Commission  were  particularly  cordial,  a 
result  which  I  feel  was  mainly  due  to  the  good  offices 
of  the  British  representative,  Sir  Harold  Stuart. 

America,  I  may  add,  had  as  yet  no  legal  status  on  the 
Commission,  for  not  having  ratified  the  peace  treaty  she 
did  not  come  under  its  terms,  and  therefore  while  the 
French,  British,  and  Belgian  areas  were  administered  under 
the  new  system,  in  the  American  area  the  old  system  was 
continued,  the  American  General  remaining  the  supreme 
authority.  Like  the  practical  man  he  was,  the  General 
solved  the  difficulty  by  issuing  to  the  inhabitants  of  his  area 
the  same  orders  as  were  issued  by  the  Commission  to  the 
other  areas.  Another  rather  quaint  feature  was  that  the 
Commission,  called  into  being  by  the  ratification  of  peace, 
had  its  headquarters  at  Coblence  in  the  area  of  the 
Americans  who  were  stiU  at  war  ! 

Consequent  on  the  reduction  of  the  army  and  the  change 
in  the  system  of  civil  administration  I  was  ordered  to  hand 
over  my  command  to  a  more  junior  officer,  Lieutenant- 
General  Morland,  on  the  3rd  of  March. 

Previous  to  leaving,  my  wife  and  I  had  the  honour  of 
being  invited  to  stay  with  the  King  and  Queen  of  the  Belgians 
at  their  palace  at  Laeken.  Thanks  to  the  kind  reception 
accorded  to  us  by  Their  Majesties,  the  visit  was  most 
enjoyable  and  interesting. 

General  Degoutte  came  from  Mayence  to  Cologne  to  bid 
me  good-bye,  and  General  Michel  and  his  wife  came  over 


376        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

from  Aix-la-Chapelle  for  the  same  purpose.  Colonel  Biddle, 
the  popular  American  liaison  officer  attached  to  my  head- 
quarters, with  Mrs.  Biddle,  General  and  Mrs.  Allen,  and 
other  Americans,  entertained  us  at  dinner  at  Cologne  on 
the  25th  of  February,  and  on  the  27th  we  were  similarly 
entertained  at  Coblence  by  the  Rhineland  High  Commission, 
M.  Tirard,  the  French  representative  on  the  Commission, 
being  the  chief  host.  The  dinner  was  followed  by  a  ball,  at 
which  General  Degoutte  and  other  French  Generals  from 
Mayence  and  General  Allen  and  many  American  officers 
and  their  wives  were  present. 

Next  day  Sir  Harold  Stuart  took  me  for  a  motor  drive 
through  the  American  area  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhine, 
and  in  the  course  of  it  Gore-Browne  made  an  excellent 
snapshot  of  us  while  standing  near  the  stone  at  Ems  which 
marks  the  spot  of  the  historic  meeting  between  Benedetti 
and  King  William  of  Prussia  just  previous  to  the  Franco- 
German  War  of  1870.  On  return  to  Coblence  I  was  received, 
for  the  last  time,  by  an  American  guard  of  honour,  and  after 
luncheon  parted  company  with  General  Allen  and  my  other 
American  friends. 

There  were  more  farewell  gatherings  at  Cologne  during 
my  few  remaining  days  on  the  Rhine.  They  included  a 
dinner  with  some  forty-five  members  of  the  headquarters 
staff,  with  whom  I  spent  one  of  the  most  gratifying  evenings 
of  my  life,  notwithstanding  the  thought  that  I  was  separating 
from  some  of  the  best  fellows  in  the  world.  The  series  was 
brought  to  an  end  on  the  night  of  the  3rd  of  March,  when, 
having  previously  attended  the  opera  with  the  Hutchisons, 
I  left  for  Calais  at  11  p.m.  by  the  special  train  which  I  had 
used  throughout  my  period  of  command. 

Although  I  had  caused  it  to  be  known  that  I  did  not 
wish  for  any  one  to  see  me  off  from  the  station,  a  number 
of  ofhcers  and  their  wives  assembled  on  the  platform,  which 
was  covered  with  the  red  carpet  used  by  the  ex-Kaiser  on 
his  visits  to  Cologne,  the  Inniskilling  Dragoons  sent  their 
band,  and  the  loth  Middlesex  formed  a  guard  of  honour, 
the  commanding  officer — Dillon,  my  old  private  secretary 
— irregularly,  but  affectionately,  taking  command  of  it.  It 
was  a  bad  wrench  parting  with  so  many  good  friends,  and 


RETURN  HOME  377 

the  train  carried  me  away  with  a  sharp  pain  in  my  heart 
and  the  tune  of  "  Auld  Lang  Syne  "  ringing  in  my  ears. 

Hutchison  and  Gore-Brown  accompanied  me  to  Calais, 
and  there  I  was  received  by  General  Gibb,  commanding  the 
British  troops  in  France,  his  staff,  and  a  guard  of  honour 
formed  by  the  Labour  Battalion  of  the  King's  Liverpool 
Regiment — a  fine  body  of  old  soldiers  wearing,  for  the  most 
part,  several  medal  ribbons.  I  felt  that  this  was  probably 
my  last  parade  in  an  active  capacity,  which  now  extended 
over  a  period  of  more  than  forty-two  years,  and,  as  can  be 
imagined,  each  hand-shake,  each  good-bye,  became  harder 
than  its  predecessor.  I  was  glad  when  the  boat  cast  off, 
and  the  sound  of  "  Auld  Lang  Syne  "  had  died  away. 

The  two  people  I  last  recognised  were  the  faithful 
"  Hutch,"  who  had  walked  on  alone  to  the  end  of  the 
quay  so  as  to  give  me  a  final  salute  as  I  stood  on  the  bridge, 
and  my  German  attendant  on  the  special  train,  who  waved 
a  table  napkin  from  the  saloon  window,  his  regrets  at  my 
departure — though  probably  quite  sincere  in  themselves 
— ^possibly  being  mixed  with  fears  that  the  future  might 
have  in  store  for  him  a  less  pleasant  life  than  when  his  only 
duty  was  to  see  to  the  creature  comforts  of  the  English 
General  commanding  at  Cologne. 

The  anti-climax  of  these  events  was  experienced  when, 
on  a  dark  and  dismal  night,  I  arrived  at  Victoria  Station. 
Here  there  was  no  guard  of  honour,  no  official  greeting  of 
any  kind,  and  having  secured  a  broken-down  taxi  I  drove 
off  to  my  residence  in  Eccleston  Square,  and  thereupon 
joined  the  long  list  of  unemployed  officers  on  half -pay, 

Dobson,  my  soldier-groom  and  a  typical  artillery  driver, 
accompanied  me  home,  having  been  almost  continuously 
with  me  for  thirteen  years.  I  owe  a  great  deal  to  him  for 
the  way  in  which  he  looked  after  my  horses  and  saddlery 
during  that  period.  Robinson,  my  soldier-valet  in  the  war 
and  belonging  to  the  K.R.R.C,  had  been  demobilised  shortly 
after  the  Armistice.  He  also  rendered  me  much  good  service, 
and,  besides  seeing  to  my  personal  affairs  when  serving  on 
the  West  Front,  was  very  helpful  in  the  frequent  journeys  I 
made  between  England  and  the  continent  when  C.LG.S.  I 
was  fortunate  to  have  had  two  such  good  men  with  me. 


378        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Before  leaving  Cologne  I  sent  a  short  letter  of  adieu  to 
Marshal  Foch,  to  which  he  replied  thus  : 

26.3.20. 

MoN  CHER  General — Vous  avez  ete  tres  aimable  de  penser  a 
moi  en  quittant  Cologne  et  moi  j'ai  ete  tres  malheureux  de  ne 
pas  vous  y  trouver  quand  je  m'y  suis  rendu.     Les  circonstances 
dans  lesquelles  nous  nous  sommes  connus  et  pratiques,  depuis  le 
debut  de  la  grande  guerre,  nous  avaient  permis  une  mesure 
exacte    et    complete    de    nous-memes.     Nous    avions    souvent 
travaille  ensemble  dans  des  journees  critiques,  nous  avions  joints 
tons  nos  efforts  pour  sortir  des  crises.     Et  de  cette  union  aussi 
franche  et  aussi  droite  que  possible  nous  avions  bien  tire  des 
solutions  heureuses  pour  nos  armees.     Nous  n'avions  pas  perdu 
tout  notre  temps.     De  ces  souvenirs,  dont  je  suis  fier,  je  vous 
reste  particulierement  attache,  soyez-en  bien  convaincu.     J'ai 
toujours  presents  a  I'esprit,  votre  conscience,  votre  experience, 
votre  activite,   avec  une  parfaite  droiture  dans  les  relations. 
Aujourd'hui   le   commandement   de   Cologne   ne   pouvait   tant 
exiger,  et  c'est  pour  cela  que  j'espere  bientot  vous  voir  dans  un 
de  vos  grands  commandements  devenu  plus  important.     En  tout 
cas,  mon  cher  General,  je  souhaite  que  les  circonstances  de  la 
carriere  me  permettent  de  vous  retrouver  souvent,  ce  sera  la 
toujours,  pour  moi,  une  grande  satisfaction.     Recevez  une  fois  de 
plus  I'assurance  de  mes  bien  attaches  sentiments. 

F.  Foch. 

[Translation. 

It  was  most  kind  of  you  to  think  of  me  when  leaving  Cologne, 
and  I  was  very  disappointed  not  to  find  you  there  at  the  time  of 
my  visit.  The  conditions  under  which  we  became  acquainted 
and  have  worked  together  since  the  commencement  of  the  Great 
War  have  enabled  us  to  get  to  know  each  other  very  intimately. 
We  have  worked  together  in  critical  times,  and  have  combined 
our  efforts  in  overcoming  the  crises  as  they  arose.  From  this 
concord,  as  frank  as  it  was  straightforward,  we  have  been  able 
to  reach  decisions  of  the  best  advantage  to  our  armies.  We  have 
made  good  use  of  our  time,  and  you  may  rest  assured  that  these 
memories,  of  which  I  am  proud,  make  me  particularly  attached  to 
you.  I  always  have  in  mind  the  perception,  experience,  activity 
and  perfect  honesty  which  you  showed  during  our  relationship. 
The  Cologne  command  does  not  now  call  for  the  same  qualifica- 
tions as  before,  and  for  that  reason  I  hope  you  may  soon  be  given 
a  command  of  greater  importance.  In  any  case,  my  dear 
General,  I  trust  that  circumstances  will  permit  of  my  frequently 


PROMOTED  FIELD-MARSHAL  379 

meeting   you,  which  will  always  be  a   great   pleasure.     Pray 
receive  once  more  the  assurance  of  my  closest  regard. 

F.  FocH.] 

I  had  reason  to  believe  when  I  left  the  Rhine  that 
I  should  be  appointed  to  command  the  forces  in  Ireland, 
but  the  Government  decided  otherwise.  Ireland  was  not 
altogether  a  bed  of  roses,  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of 
the  Commander-in-Chief,  and  such  disappointment  as  I  felt 
at  remaining  unemployed  was  further  mitigated  on  the 
29th  of  March,  when,  on  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Churchill, 
the  Secretary  of  State  for  War,  His  Majesty  promoted  me 
Field-Marshal, 


CHAPTER  XIX 

SOME   FINAL  REFLECTIONS 

Characteristics  of  British  soldier — Unpopularity  of  the  army  as  compared 
with  the  na\y — Study  of  miUtary  history  by  statesmen — Results 
of  its  neglect. 

Having  now  brought  to  an  end  the  story  of  my  military 
career,  it  is  with  a  feehng  of  regret  that  I  take  leave  of  the 
British  soldier,  with  whom  I  served  for  so  many  years,  in 
all  grades,  in  different  countries,  in  peace  and  in  war.  He 
may  not  possess  to  the  same  extent  the  elan  and  logical 
mind  of  his  French  comrade  in  arms  ;  he  may  not  be  such 
an  adept  at  expedients  or  at  first  fight  with  such  vehemence 
as  his  American  kinsman  ;  he  is  apt  to  be  rather  a  slow 
starter  and  casual  in  things  military  ;  but  once  he  reaUses 
that  he  is  up  against  a  tough  proposition  and  decides  to  take 
off  his  coat,  there  is  no  limit  to  his  staying  power  as  there 
is  none  to  the  initiative  and  daring  of  which  he  is  capable, 
and  the  tougher  the  proposition  the  firmer  becomes  his 
resolution  to  overcome  it.  His  world-wide  reputation  for 
stubborn  resistance  is  well  deserved,  for  in  ill  fortune  as  in 
good  it  is  seldom  that  a  British  regiment  has  failed  to  hold 
together.  This  indestructible  cohesion,  the  most  valuable 
quality  that  an  armed  body  of  men  can  possess,  is  not  to  be 
attributed  merely  to  hereditary  causes.  It  is  largely  based 
on  reciprocal  confidence  and  respect,  and  can  only  be  secured 
when  the  men  in  the  ranks  have  implicit  faith  in  the  ability 
and  justice  of  their  officers,  and  when  the  officers  have  the 
same  belief  in  the  valour  and  discipline  of  their  men.  It 
is  gratifying  to  know  that,  notwithstanding  the  levelling 
tendencies  of  the  age  in  which  we  live,  and  the  fact  that 
our  armies  were  mainly  composed  of  personnel  taken  straight 
from  civil  life,  these  mutually  good  relations  were  as  readily 

380 


THE  BRITISH  SOLDIER  381 

and  spontaneously  forthcoming  in  the  Great  War  as  when 
they  proved  their  worth  in  the  days  of  Marlborough  and 
Wellington. 

As  I  have  remarked  in  an  earlier  chapter,  the  British 
soldier  has  no  use  for  those  who,  showing  no  personal 
interest  in  him,  would  push  him  about  as  a  pawn  on  a 
chessboard,  and,  like  other  sane  mortals,  he  is  not  prepared 
to  be  killed  "  by  order."  But  win  his  esteem,  make  him 
proud  of  himself  and  his  regiment,  remind  him  of  his  home, 
and  he  will  flinch  at  nothing.  "  Why  on  earth  do  you  want 
bands  ?  "  once  demanded  a  staff  officer  of  a  General  who 
was  then  serving  on  the  West  Front  and  had  suggested  that 
the  regimental  bands — left  behind  in  England — should  be 

sent  out.     "  Why  on  earth  do  you  ask  such  a  d d  silly 

question  ?  "  inquired  the  General  in  reply.  "  But  since  you 
ask  I  will  teU  you.  I  want  my  men  occasionally  to  hear 
'  It's  a  long,  long  way  to  Tipperary  '  and  their  other  favourite 
music-haU  songs,  and  on  Sundays  to  hear  the  church  hymns 
they  were  accustomed  to  hear  when  they  were  boys  at  home." 
The  bands  were  sent  out,  eventually. 

There  is  an  old  proverb  that  one  volunteer  is  worth  three 
pressed  men,  but  without  being  in  any  way  unmindful  of 
the  hundreds  of  thousands  of  our  race  who  joined  the  fighting 
forces  of  their  own  free  wiU,  many  of  whom  were  living  in 
remote  parts  of  far  distant  continents,  it  may  still  be  said 
that  the  truth  of  the  proverb  received  little,  if  any,  support 
from  the  evidence  to  be  derived  from  the  Great  War.  The 
conscripts,  so  called,  were  not  less  ready  to  accept  the 
sacrifice  by  which  victory  is  achieved  than  were  those  who 
entered  the  armies  as  volunteers,  just  as  those  who  were 
soldiers  only  for  the  war  were  no  less  resolved  to  conquer 
than  were  the  men  who  belonged  to  the  regular  forces. 

It  was  sometimes  alleged  during  the  Great  War,  and  after 
it,  that  appropriate  use  was  not  made  of  the  officers  of  non- 
regular  units,  and  that  regular  officers  not  endowed  with 
half  their  intellectual  ability  were  given  appointments  in 
preference  to  them.  Not  improbably  this  statement  was 
born  of  the  opinion,  rather  commonly  held,  that  the  best 
brains  of  the  nation  gravitate  more  generally  to  the  learned 
professions  or  to  commerce  than  to  the  fighting  services.     I 


382        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

question  if  this  opinion  is  substantiated  by  the  history  of 
our  Empire,  and  as  regards  the  early  period  of  the  war  it 
should  be  remembered  that  an  officer  who  has  served  in  the 
army  for  only  a  few  weeks  is  not  likely  to  be  so  competent, 
or  to  command  the  same  confidence  from  those  above  and 
below  him,  as  one  whose  service  may  run  into  several  years. 
In  the  army  as  in  civil  life  efficiency  and  success  depend 
upon  systematic  training. 

Later  in  the  war,  when  the  non-regular  officers  had  ac- 
quired much  the  same  experience  at  the  front  as  many  of  their 
regular  comrades,  there  was,  perhaps,  more  justification  for 
the  complaint,  but  here  again  it  should  be  remembered  that, 
as  in  all  cases  of  improvisation,  waste  of  valuable  material 
is  bound  to  occur  when  large  armies  have  to  be  created  at 
short  notice,  and  cannot  be  entirely  prevented.  One  can 
only  hope  that,  in  the  nation's  interest,  every  effort  will  be 
made  to  minimise  it.  Subject  to  these  remarks,  I  cannot 
think  that  any  responsible  General  would  make  the  slightest 
difference  in  the  treatment  of  either  officers  or  men,  whether 
belonging  to  the  new  army  or  to  the  old,  and  I  am  sure  that 
all  regular  officers  admired  the  keenness  with  which  the  non- 
regulars  shouldered  their  new  duties,  and  rapidly  learnt  to 
appreciate  the  importance  of  discipline. 

Unfortunately  for  the  British  soldier,  whether  regular 
or  non-regular,  the  army  is  not  popular  in  the  sense  that  the 
navy  is.  The  latter  usually  enjoys  full  public  support,  the 
army  seldom  does  except  in  war,  and  consequently  it  labours 
under  considerable  disadvantages  in  its  efforts  to  prepare 
for  war,  and  from  this  it  has  followed  that  our  wars  have  so 
often  been  a  case  of  "  muddling  through."  In  the  Great 
War  nearly  every  household  in  the  country  had  at  least  one 
of  its  members  in  the  army  ;  every  one  having  a  shred  of 
justification,  or  even  none  at  all,  hurried  to  put  on  khaki ; 
and  one  hoped  that  at  last  the  army  had  made  good  in  the 
eyes  of  the  people.  In  fact  the  height  of  success  seemed  to 
have  been  attained,  for  the  people  and  the  army  had  become 
one  and  the  same  thing,  and  the  brick  wall  that  used  to 
separate  them  seemed  to  have  been  effectively  broken  down. 
But  no  sooner  was  the  war  over  than  the  dislike  to  military 
uniform  reasserted  itself,  every  one  who  could  promptly 


EDUCATED  LEADERS  383 

discarded  it,  the  officers  at  the  War  Office  setting  the 
example,  and  the  army  quickly  drifted  back  to  the  position 
it  had  held  before  the  war.  This  disappointing  result  was 
perhaps  not  surprising,  and  it  need  not  be  a  cause  of  anxiety, 
since  it  was  only  natural  that  there  should  be  a  reaction  after 
the  long  years  of  war  through  which  we  had  passed.  The 
resolution  shown  by  all  classes  at  home  during  these  years, 
and  the  deeds  of  the  men  who  fought  at  Ypres,  on  the 
Somme,  at  Passchendaele  and  Gallipoli,  more  than  prove 
that,  if  correctly  informed  by  its  parliamentary  representa- 
tives, the  country  may  safely  be  trusted  to  answer  the  call 
of  duty,  in  the  future  as  in  the  past.  To  think  otherwise 
would  be  a  libel  on  the  living  and  an  insult  to  the  dead. 

A  matter  of  more  immediate  importance  is  that  the  nation 
should  realise  the  necessity  for  having  educated  leaders — 
trained  statesmen — to  conduct  its  war  business,  if  and  when 
war  should  again  come  along.  This  is  a  direction  in  which 
much-needed  preparation  can  be  made  without  the  expen- 
diture of  cash,  and  it  may  be  the  means  of  saving  tens  of 
thousands  of  lives  and  hundreds  of  millions  of  money.  In 
all  trades  and  professions  the  man  who  aims  at  taking  the 
lead  knows  that  he  must  first  learn  the  business  he  purposes 
to  follow  :  that  he  must  be  systematically  trained  in  it. 
Only  in  the  business  of  war — the  most  difficult  of  all — is 
no  special  training  or  study  demanded  from  those  charged 
with,  and  paid  for,  its  management.  This  is  the  more  to 
be  regretted  because,  as  the  Empire  is  scattered  all  over 
the  globe,  occupies  about  a  quarter  of  the  world's  surface, 
and  exceeds  in  population  one-quarter  of  the  human  race, 
the  problems  which  confront  British  statesmen  are  far  more 
numerous  and  intricate  than  those  which  have  to  be  dealt 
with  by  the  statesmen  of  other  countries.  Long  after 
August  1914  ministers  could  be  seen  groping  uncertainly 
forward  in  the  discharge  of  their  duties,  having  no  good 
knowledge  of  the  principles  or  methods  which  should  guide 
them  ;  the  numerous  questions  which  daily  arose  came 
too  frequently  as  a  surprise,  whereas  they  ought  to  have 
been  foreseen  ;  and  the  ability  to  deal  with  them  on  sound 
lines  had  too  often  to  be  acquired  by  experience — the  most 
costly  of  all  schools. 


384        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

Years  before  the  close  of  the  last  century  thinking  men 
urged  that  those  intending  to  follow  a  political  career  should 
prepare  themselves  for  it  by  a  careful  study  of  military 
history — that  is,  of  the  defence  of  empires — but  although 
some  of  the  universities  took  steps  to  provide  facilities  for 
this  study,  it  continued  to  be  shunned  in  favour  of  more 
popular  subjects,  such  as  social  reform,  which  were,  and  still 
are,  deemed  to  have  greater  value  for  the  Cabinet  aspirant. 

Far  be  it  from  me  to  suggest  that  embryo  statesmen 
should  study  military  history  with  a  view  to  becoming 
generals  and  admirals.  As  a  great  military  writer  has 
truly  said  :  "  War  is,  above  all,  a  practical  art,  and 
the  application  of  theory  to  practice  is  not  to  be  taught 
at  any  university,  or  to  be  learned  by  those  who  have 
never  rubbed  shoulders  with  the  men  in  the  ranks."  This 
being  so,  the  statesman  should  never  attempt  to  frame  a 
plan  of  campaign  for  himself — that  way  lies  disaster,  as  was 
proved  in  the  Great  War  ;  he  should  never  try  unduly  to 
influence  the  professional,  whose  function  it  is  to  frame  the 
plan,  to  go  back  on  his  considered  judgment ;  once  he  has 
approved  of  a  plan  he  should  not  interfere  with  its  execution, 
or  limit  the  number  of  troops  to  be  employed  ;  and,  in 
general,  he  should  recognise  the  line  beyond  which  his 
interference  in  the  domain  of  the  naval  and  military  leader 
becomes  an  impediment  rather  than  an  aid  to  success. 

But  although  the  statesman  is  not  required  to  handle 
fleets  and  armies,  and,  from  lack  of  practical  experience 
and  acquaintance  with  details,  should  never  attempt  to 
handle  them,  he  ought  to  have  a  correct  knowledge  of  the 
way  in  which  the  use  or  misuse  of  those  instruments  may 
affect  the  welfare  of  the  State,  and  he  is  required  to  have 
the  same  kind  of  knowledge  with  respect  to  finance,  shipping, 
industry,  food,  and  all  the  many  other  component  parts  of 
the  nation's  strength.  Here,  again,  he  should  not  attempt 
to  become  cither  a  bank  manager,  a  ship-builder,  a  cotton- 
spinner,  or  even  a  farmer,  but  he  ought  to  be  able  to 
appreciate  the  values,  relative  and  collective,  of  the  re- 
sources with  which  these  experts  deal,  and  to  recognise  the 
point  where,  in  the  nation's  interests,  his  control  should 
intervene  and  where  it  should  be  withheld. 


THE  DUTIES  OF  STATESMEN  385 

It  is  much  too  commonly  supposed  that  war  is  a  matter 
solely  for  armies  and  navies,  and  that  a  statesman's  duties 
are  concerned  almost  entirely  with  those  services.  This  is 
as  wide  apart  as  the  poles  from  being  the  truth.  War 
draws  into  its  vortex  every  element  of  the  national  life, 
nothing  escapes  it,  and  upon  the  statesman  devolves  the 
responsibility,  once  war  is  declared,  for  combining  the  whole 
diplomatic,  poHtical,  financial,  industrial,  naval,  and  mili- 
tary powers  of  the  nation  for  the  defeat  of  the  enemy. 

It  seems  impossible  that  he  can  properly  carry  out  this 
task  unless  previously  fortified  with  a  good  knowledge  of 
the  business  of  war,  and  there  is  little  doubt  that  if  political 
and  mihtary  history  had  been  more  carefully  studied  by 
British  statesmen  in  the  years  before  the  Great  War,  the 
evils  attending  constant  changes  from  one  military  plan  to 
another  would  have  been  better  understood  by  them ; 
there  would  have  been  less  repetition  of  the  mistakes  made 
in  the  Napoleonic  wars  of  dissipating  our  forces  in  secondary 
and  unsound  enterprises  ;  our  commercial,  industrial,  and 
man-power  resources  would  have  been  more  intelligently  co- 
ordinated and  brought  into  requisition  at  an  earlier  date  ; 
income-tax  would  probably  now  be  at  a  lower  rate  than 
six  shillings  in  the  pound  ;  and,  most  important  of  all,  fewer 
wooden  crosses  might  be  seen  on  the  battlefields  of  France 
and  elsewhere. 

Again,  a  knowledge  of  military  history  is  as  indispensable 
to  the  statesman  in  peace  as  it  is  in  war.  At  the  present 
moment,  for  example,  there  is  an  outcry  for  greater  economy, 
and  the  fighting  services,  being  of  an  unproductive  character, 
are  rightly  regarded  as  being  amongst  the  first  where  reduc- 
tion of  expenditure  should  begin.  An  essential  preliminary, 
however,  to  this  step  is  the  adoption  of  a  sound  and  stable 
policy  based  on  established  principles  of  war,  and  on  a  com- 
prehensive survey  of  the  whole  question  of  Imperial  Defence. 
If  our  military  edifice  is  built  on  this  foundation,  it  will  be 
both  safe  and  economical  ;  if  it  is  erected  on  the  shifting 
sands  of  opportunism  and  political  expediency,  it  will  be 
neither  economical  nor  able  to  weather  the  storms  to  which 
it  may  be  exposed. 

These  observations  on  the  duties  of  the  statesman  may 

2C 


386        FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 

seem  to  imply  that  he  alone  made  mistakes  in  the  Great  War, 
and  that  the  soldier  and  sailor  were  convicted  of  none.  I 
can  assure  the  reader  that  this  is  far  from  being  my  opinion, 
so  far  as  the  soldier  is  concerned.  He  frequently  omitted  to 
practise  the  things  that  he  had  been  so  careful  to  learn  before 
the  war  ;  he  was  taught  a  great  deal  that  he  had  not  before 
known  ;  and  he  was  compelled  to  realise  that  the  principles 
he  had  been  at  such  pains  to  lay  down  required  much  amend- 
ment in  their  apphcation.  My  desire  is  not  to  draw  an 
unfavourable  comparison  as  between  the  statesman  and 
the  fighting  man,  but  to  emphasise  the  increased  importance 
of  the  statesman's  duties,  and  the  necessity  of  their  being 
undertaken  only  by  men  who  have  been  educated  to  carry 
them  out.  I  have  seen  the  Government  machine  at  work 
at  close  quarters  for  many  years  during  peace,  and  for  a 
longer  period  than  any  other  British  General  during  war, 
and  the  conclusion  to  which  I  have  come  is  that  the  conduct 
of  modem  war  is  so  complex  that,  in  the  Cabinet  as  elsewhere, 
the  days  of  the  amateur  are  over. 

It  is  for  this  reason,  and  at  the  risk  of  appearing  to 
trespass  beyond  my  legitimate  sphere,  that  I  venture  to 
suggest  that  all  those  who  aspire  to  exercise  ministerial 
control  over  the  future  destinies  of  the  Empire  should  make 
military  history  the  subject  of  much  more  systematic 
study  than  has  hitherto  been  the  custom.  By  this  means 
only,  so  it  seems  to  me,  can  they  hope  efficiently  to  dis- 
charge the  duties  devolving  upon  them  in  peace,  and  use- 
fully to  assist  in  guiding  their  country  through  the  ordeal 
of  war. 


DATES  OF  PROMOTION 


/i'l*.  GfiJ 


Enlisted 
Lance-Corporal 
Corporal 
Lance-Sergeant 
Sergeant 
Troop  Sergeant-Major 
Second-Lieutenant 
Lieutenant 
Captain    . 
Major 

Lieutenant-Colonel 
_Colonel    . 
Major-General    . 
Lieutenant-General 
General   . 
Field-Marshal     . 


November  1877. 
February  1879. 
April  1879. 
May  1881. 
January  1882. 
March  1885. 
June  1888. 
March  1891. 
April  1895. 
March  1900. 
November  1900. 
November  1903. 
December  19^0.- 
October  1915. 
June  1916. 
March  1920. 


.p£C    (9p? 


387 


FOREIGN   HONOURS  RECEIVED  DURING  THE 
GREAT  WAR 

American — Distinguished  Service  Medal. 

Belgian— L'Ordre  de  la  Couronne  (Grand  Cordon),  and  Croix 
de  Guerre. 

Chinese— Order  of  Chia  Ho  (Excellent  Crop)  ist  Class. 

French — Legion  d'Honneur  (Grand  Officier),  and  Croix  de 
Guerre  avec  Palme. 

Italian — Order  of  St.  Maurice  and  St.  Lazarus  (Grand  Cross), 
and  Order  of  the  Crown  of  Italy  (Grand  Cross). 

Japanese — Order  of  the  Rising  Sun  (Grand  Cordon). 

Russian— Order  of  St.  Alexander  Nevsky,  with  Swords. 

Servian— Order  of  the  White  Eagle,  ist  Class,  with  Swords. 

The  Russian  Order  was  one  of  the  last  of  its  class  bestowed 
on  a  foreign  officer  by  the  late  Czar. 

The  American  medal  was  presented  by  General  Pershing, 
and  the  Legion  of  Hofiour  was  received  from  the  hands  of  General 
Joffre. 

The  French  Army  Order,  or  citation,  regarding  the  award  of 
the  Croix  de  Guerre  was  as  follows  : 

"  Officier  General  du  plus  grand  merite  et  des  plus  distingues. 
Apres  avoir  rempli  en  France,  sous  les  ordres  du  Marechal  French, 
differents  postes  de  haute  confiance  dans  lesquels  il  a  deploye 
les  qualites  de  bravoure,  d'energie  et  d'endurance,  qui  I'ont  rendu 
h'gendaire  dans  les  Armees  Brittaniques,  s'est  vu  confier  par  son 
Gouvemement  le  poste  de  Chef  d'Etat  Major  Imperial  qu'il  a 
rempli  pendant  la  plus  grande  partie  de  la  Guerre  et  oii  il  s'est 
particuli^rement  distingue." 


388 


INDEX 


Abbeville,  215 

Abbottabad,  65 

Acheson,  Commander,  358 

Adirondacks,  146 

Admiralty,      relations      with      the 

General  Staff,  294  ;  reorganisation 

of,  295 
Adrianople,  148 
Advisers,   naval  and  military,   254, 

255.  318,  319 
Afghanistan,     description     of,    53  ; 

boundary  questions,  55 
Africa,  Northern,  visit  to,  143 
Afzul-ul-Mulk,  67 
Aircraft,  167,  168,  349,  350,  351 
Aisne,  the,  213,  214 
Aix-la-Chapelie,  371 
Albert  Victor,  Prince,  40 
Aldershot,  stationed  at,  2,  24,  33,  153 
Alexandretta,    proposed    operations 

from,  against  the  Turks,  314,  315 
Alexeieff,  Gen.,  252,  306 
Allen,  Gen.,  367,  376 
AUenby,     Field-Marshal     Viscount, 

83,  88,  89.  306 
Altham,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  E.,  95,  97,  98, 

129,  138 
America,  entry  into  Great  War,  326  ; 

shipping  for  troops,  324,  326 
Amiens,  visit  of  Staff  College  stu- 
dents to,  181  ;    advanced  base  in 

Great  War,  202,  206,  209 
Amir  Abdul  Rahman,  53 
Ammunition,  shortage  of,  in  Great 

War,  214,  217,  221,  227,  232,  233 
Antwerp,    British   troops    sent    to, 

215 
Aosta,  Duke  of,  297 
Ardagh,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  91,  99,  loi 
Army,  British,  general  conditions  of 

soldier's  life  in  1877,  3  et  seq.  ;   in 

1907,  155.  156,  157 
Army   Headquarters  in   India    and 


Great     Britain,     comparison     of 

systems,  50,  51 
Army  policy  in  1888,  92,  93,  94  ;   in 

1901,  128  ;   in  1914,  192,  193 
Army  Staff  system  in  the  field,  197, 

198 
Articles  of  War,  12 
Artillery,  heavy,  152,  214,  217,  227 
Ashmore,  Maj.-Gen.,  349 
Asquith,   Mr.,    189,    195,    235,    253, 

261,  274,  287,  305 
Asser,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  357 
Astor,  58 

Babington,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  2 
Babusar  Pass,  65 
Bacon,  Admiral,  293,  294 
Baghdad,  capture  of,  275 
Balfour,  Mr.,  103,  189,  268,  373 
Balkans,  visit  to,  147  et  seq. 
Ballard,  Brig. -Gen.,  173 
Baramula,  57 
Baroghil  Pass,  64 

Barrow,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  G.,  85,  88,  173 
Barry,  Col.  Stanley,  345 
Bartholomew,  Col.,  222,  251 
Bases,  Overseas,  198 
Battlefields,  1870  war,  85,  180 
Battye,  Lt.-Col.,  74 
Beatty,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Earl, 

352 
Beauchamp,  Earl,  354 
Belgians,  King  of  the,  366,  375 
Belgium,  probable  infringement  of 

neutrahty  by  Germany,  144 
Belgrade,  150 
Beresford,    Admiral    Lord    Charles. 

371.  372 
Berlin,  148 
Biddle,  Col.,  376 
Bird,  Brig. -Gen.,  251 
Birdwood,  Gen.  Sir  W.,  42 
Black,  Col.,  132 


389 


390 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


Black  Mountain  Expedition,    1891, 

45 
Blair,  Col.,  2 
Bliss,  Gen.,  326,  329,  367 
Bloemfontein,  117 
Blood,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  B.,  70 
Boer  War,  see  South  African  War 
Boriani,  Col.,  296 
Boscawen,  Maj.,  154 
Boselli,  M.,  292 
Bosphorus,  149 

Boulogne,  base  at,  202,  205,  209 
Bovey,  Capt.,  345 

Braekenbury,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  50,  86,  87 
Brade,  Sir  R.,  252 
Braithwaite,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  365 
Brewis,  Capt.,  170 
Briand,  M.,  291 
Brighton,  stationed  at,  19 
British   Expeditionary   Force,    140, 

203 
Brooke,  Mr.  C,  339 
Bucephalus,  monument  to,  42 
Bucharest,  148 
Buckley,  Col.,  251 
Buda  Pesth,  150 

Bulgarian  troops,  inspection  of,  148 
Buller,  Gen.   Sir  Redvers,   86,    loi, 

102,  109 
Burnham,  Mr.,  American  Scout,  121 
Burzil  Pass,  58 
Busaco,  battlefield  of,  145 
Buston,  Brig.-Gen.,  154 
Butler,  Capt.,  251 

Cadet  battalions  in  Great  War,  267 
Cadorna,  Gen.,  252,  296,  297,  312, 

314,  332 
Callwell,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  C,  138,  251, 

252,  270 
Cambrai,  battle  of,  312 
Cambridge,  Duke  of,  5,  6,  17 
Cambridge     University,      honorary 

degree,  373 
Campbell,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  W.,  154 
Campbell-Bannerman,  Sir  H.,  93 
Canada,  visit  to,  146 
Canadian  Division,  the,  230 
Canterbury,  Cavalry  Depot.  34 
Caporettn,  battle  of,  312,  313 
Capper,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  J.,  168 
Capper,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  T.,  88,  233 
Cardwell,  Mr.,  2 
Carthews,  Pte.,  244 
Castelnau,  Gen.  dc,  310 
Champagne,  attack  in,  232,  233 


Chantilly,  conferences  at,  234,  284, 

285,  307.  325.  327 
Chatham,  stationed  at,  21 
Chichester,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  E.,  358 
Chief  of  General  Staff,  at  Aldershot, 

153  et  seq.  ;  in  France,  218  et  seq. 
Chief  of  Imperial  General  Staff,  236 

et  seq.,  246  et  seq. 
Chilas,  65 
Chitral,  66,  67 

Chitral  Relief  Force,  66  et  seq. 
Christian,     Prince,     of     Schleswig- 

Holstein,  46 
Church  Army,  362 
Churchill,  Mr.  Winston,  353,  369,  379 
Clemenceau,  M.,  292,  332,  371 
Clive,  Brig.-Gen.  S.,  252,  361 
Coast  defence,  see  Home  defence 
Cockerill,  Brig.-Gen.,  251 
Cody,  Col.,  167,  168 
Colonial  Defence  Committee,  94,  137 
Colonial   Section,   employed   in,    95 

et  seq. 
Cohdlle,  Vice-Admiral  Hon.  Sir  S., 

179 
Commissions,  grant  of,  to  rankers, 

29  et  seq. 
Committee  of  Imperial  Defence,  see 

Imperial  defence 
Compiegne,  212 

Compulsory  service,  see  Man-power 
Conferences,  Allied,  292  ;    at  Rome, 

292  ;    at  Calais,  307  ;    at  Rapallo, 

327,  328  ;   at  Versailles,  330  et  seq. 
Connaught,  Duke  of,  86,  184,  366 
Constantinople,  148 
Coulommiers,  213 
Cowans,  Gen.  Sir  J.,  201 
Cox,  Col.,  222,  251 
Craufurd,  Gen.,  122 
Crimes  while  in  ranks,  14,  19 
Crofton- Atkins,  Maj.,  21  r 
Cronje,  105,  109,  no,  in,  113 
Crowe,  Col.,  132 
Culme  -  Seymour,        Admiral       Sir 

Michael,  371,  372 
Curragh  incident,  the,  193 
Curzon,  Earl,  54 

Dallas,  Maj. -Gen.,  345 
Dammartin,  212 
Dardanelles  Committee,  253 
Dardanelles  operations,  see  Gallipoli 

Peninsula 
Darkot  Pass,  63,  64 
Davidson,  Maj. -Gen.  Sir  J.,  174 


INDEX 


391 


Dawkins,  Col.,  201,  212,  218 

De  Burgh,  Capt.,  345 

Decquis,  M.,  202 

Deedes,  Col.,  222 

Deer-stalking  in  Scotland,  371 

Defence  Committee  of  Cabinet,  94, 

loi,  134 
Degoutte,  Gen.,  36S,  375 
De  Lisle,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  H.,  154 
Delme-Radcliife,  Brig. -Gen.  Sir  C, 

252,  296 
Demobilisation  difficulties  in   191 9, 

353.  363 
Derby,  Earl  of,  287,  333,  334,  335 
Deshumbert,  M.,  84 
Despatch  riders  in  the  Great  War, 

211,  212 
Detroit,  146 
De  Wet,  115,  125 
Diamond  Hill,  battle  of,  124 
]^illon,  Lt.-Col.,  185,  357,  376 
Dir,  68,  75,  76 

Directors,  administrative,  201 
Dobson,  Driver,  377 
Dominions   Overseas,    Ministers   of, 

338 
Douglas,  Gen.  Sir  C,  195,  196 
Douro,  passage  of,  145 
Dragoon  Guards,  3rd,  service  in,  36 

et  seq. 
Drill,  defective  methods  of,  6,  1 5 
Dublin,  stationed  at,  27 
Du  Cane,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  222 
Dugdale,  Capt.,  25,  28 
Dundalk,  stationed  at,  24,  33 

East  Africa,  campaign  in  1914-17, 
279,  280 

Eastern  Command,  Commander-in- 
Chief  of,  342,  343,  344 

Eddowes,  Lt.-Col.,  345 

Edmonds,  Col.,  132 

Egypt,  operations  ir,  258,  275,  276, 
306 

Elles,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  E.,  52 

EUes,  Col.  Sir  H.,  52,  222 

Elles,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  43,  45 

Ellington,  Col.,  251 

Esher  Committee,  1903-4,  94,  136 

Evans,  Capt.,  294 

Executive  Committee  of  Supreme 
War  Council,  see  Supreme  War 
Council 

Falkenhayn,  Gen.  von,  232,  233, 
323 


Fasson,  Col.,  132 

Fay,  Sir  S.,  338 

Fayolle,  Marshal,  368,  371 

Fere-en-Tardenois,  213 

Fergusson,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  C,  361 

Festubert,  battle  of,  231,  232 

Fielding,  Maj.-Gen.,  345 

Fisher,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Lord, 

136,  295.  296 
Flying  Corps,  Royal,  224,  225 
Foch,  Marshal,  231,  232,  309,  310, 

311,  312,  325,  330,  332,  333,  358, 

366,  367,  370,  378 
Ford,  Maj.-Gen.,  211 
Forestier- Walker,  Maj.-Gen.,  88,  132 
Forster,  Lord,  338 
Foster,  Col.,  174 
Fowke,   Lt.-Gen.   Sir  G.,   222,   223, 

340 
Fowler,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  62,  222,  223 
France,  our  relations  with,   before 

the  Great  War,  133,  138,  140 
French,  Col.,  251 
French,    Field-Marshal    Earl,     109, 

III,  115,  153,  184,  258,  332,  345 
French  language,  study  of,  84,  95 
Freyer,  Col.  Sir  P.,  347 
Fuller,  Brig. -Gen.,  358 
Furse,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  173 

Gallipoli    Peninsula,   operations  in, 

247,  248,  269,  270 
Garrett,  Maj.,  24 
Gas,  use  of,  in  war,  230,  351 
Gaza,  battle  of,  306 
General   Staff,    formation   of,    136; 

reorganisation  of,  in  France,  191 5, 

219,  220,  221  ;    at  War  Office  in 

1 916,  249  et  seq. 
George,   Mr.   Lloyd,   253,   287,   318, 

331 
Germany,  our  relations  \%dth,  before 

the  Great  War,  134,  139 
G.H.Q.  in  France,  225,  226,  227 
Gilgit,  58,  60,  65 
Gilpin,  Col.,  211 

Godley,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  154,  365 
Gore-I3rowne,  Lt.-Col.,  357,  376,  377 
Gough,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  H.,  173 
Gough,  Brig.-Gen.  J.,  173 
Gouraud,  Gen.,  368,  370 
Graduated  battaUons,  305,  363 
Graham,  Capt.,  2,  14 
Granet,  Sir  G.,  338 
Great  Britain,  Commander-in-Chief. 

345  et  seq. 


392 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


Greaves,  Gen.  Sir  G.,  36 

Greene,  Sir  Conyngham,  148 

Grenfell,  Field-Marshal  Lord,  142 

Grey,  Lord,  139 

Grierson,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  J.,   114,   lar, 

122,  137,  140,  153,  195 
Guard  Room  at  Aldershot,  1 1 
Gujrat,  41 
Gupis,  62 

Haig,    Field-Marshal   Earl,    83,    88, 

89,  244,  307,  330,  332,  334 
Haking,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  R.,  88,  244 
Haldane,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  J.,  365 
Haldane,  Lord,  140,  141,  178 
Hamilton,  Gen.  Sir  Ian,  23 
Hand-grenades  or  bombs,  192 
Harper,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  G.,  174 
Harris,  Sir  C,  338 
Hartington  Commission,  92,  93,  94 
Hassan  Abdal,  45,  46 
Havre,  base  at,  205,  209 
Hay  ward,  Mr.,  murder  of.  62 
Heath,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  C,  153 
Henderson,  Mr.  A.,  297 
Henderson,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  D.,  224 
Henderson,  Col.  G.,  82,  83,  103,  106, 

107,  117,  118,  119 
Hildyard,  Lt.-Gen.   Sir  H.,   81,   82, 

171.  174 
Himalayas,  41,  63 
Hindu  Kush,  54,  58,  63 
Holman,  Maj.-Gen.,  78,  132,  135 
Home   defence,   92,    128,   165,    166, 

186,  187,  188,  189,  190,  191,  258, 

343.  347.  348.  349,  352 
Home  forces,  see  Home  defence 
Hoskins,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  174 
Hospitals,   military,   good  work  of, 

346,  347 
Howell,  Capt.,  173 
Huguet,  Col.,  140 
Hull,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  174 
Hunza,  60,  61 
Huron,  lake,  146 
Hutchison,  Col.,  222,  265,  267,  358, 

376.  377 
Hythe,  School  of  Musketry,  23,  34 

Imperial   defence,   94,   95,   96,    129, 

136.  137.  253.  385 
Imperiali,  Marquis,  297 
India,  defence  of,  54,  56,   134,  135, 

136,  139 
India,  service  in,  34  et  seq.  ;    value 

of,  to  officers,  79,  80 


Indus,  river,  47,  60,  64 

Inspector-General,  duties  of,  186, 
187 

Inspector-General  of  Communica- 
tions, 199,  200,  205 

IntelUgence  derived  from  enemy's 
press,  100 

Intelligence  Branch,  India,  organi- 
sation of  and  employment  in,  50 
et  seq. 

Intelligence  Branch,  War  Office, 
organisation  of  and  employment 
in,  91  et  seq.,  129  et  seq. 

Invasion  of  Great  Britain,  see  Home 
defence 

Ireland,  situation  in,  24  ;  rebellion 
of  1916,  265 

Italy,  King  of,  297 

Jackson,  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Sir 

H.,  179,  294 
Jacob,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  C,  365 
Jacobsdal,  no 
James,  Brig. -Gen.,  244 
Janbatai  Pass,  75 
Jandol  valley,  73 
Japan,  our  relations  with,  before  the 

Great  War,  139 
Jebb,  Col.,  201 
Jellicoe,     Admiral     of     the     Fleet, 

Viscount,  294,  297 
Jerusalem,  capture  of,  306 
Jhelum,  41,  57 
Jhula,  or  rope-bridge,  59 
Joffre,  Marshal,  202,  232,  234,  244, 

245,  252,  284,  285,  286,  323,  332, 

368 
Johannesburg,  123 
Jones,  Brig.-Gen.,  345 

Kafiristan,  55 

Kaiserslautern,  371 

Kanjutis,  61 

Kashmir,  57  e/  seq. 

Katgola  Pass,  73 

Kekewich,  Maj.-Gen.,  109 

Kell.  Col.  Sir  V.,  251 

Kelly,  Col.,  69 

Kelly-Kenny,  Maj.-Gen.,   106,    in, 

112,  115 
Kennedy,  Maj.-Gen.,  361 
Kerr,  Major  F.,  154 
Khagan,  65 
Khar,  action  of,  72 
Kimberley,  siege  of,  109,  no 
King,  Col.,  211 


INDEX 


393 


King  Edward,  visit  to  Paris,  138; 
visits  to  Aldershot,  166 

King  George, visits  to  Aldershot,  167 ; 
at  army  manoeuvres,  182,  183,  184 

Kirke,  Col.,  251 

Kishanganga,  river,  58 

Kitchener,  Field-Marshal  Earl,  103, 
112,  135,  136,  235,  236  et  seq.,  250, 
263,  264,  268,  269,  270,  271,  272, 
276,  287  ei  seq.,  305,  306 

Kohat,  45,  46 

Kunar,  river,  64,  70 

Kurnaul,  38 

Kushalgarh,  45  et  seq. 

Kut-el-Amara,  siege  of,  see  Meso- 
potamia 

Ladysmith,  siege  of,  loi,  102 

Lagny,  212 

Lahore,  38 

Lake,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  P.,  274 

Lambton,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  225 

Lancers,  i6th,  enlisted  in,  i 

Languages,  oriental,  36,  41,  43,  44, 

45.  49,  65 
Lansdowne,  Marquis  of,  99,  139 
Lawrence,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  132 
Lawson,  I-t.-Gen.  Sir  H.,  153,  154 
Leave  Club,  Cologne,  362 
Le  Cateau,  202,  203,  204,  207 
Lectures,  miUtary,  142,  143 
Le  Mans,  206 
Liaison  officers,  226 
Liggett,  Gen.,  366,  367 
Lincoln,  visit  to,  342 
Lockhart,  Gen.  Sir  W.,  45,  46,  54,  66 
Locusts,  plague  of,  47,  48 
Loos,  battle  of,  232,  233 
Low,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  R.,  69 
Lowarai  Pass,  76 
Lucas,  Lt.-Col.,  215,  222,  243,  296, 

339.  345 
Luck,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  R.,  38,  44 
Ludendorff,    Gen.    von,    233,    281, 

320.  323 
Ludhiana,  38 
Lyautey,  Marshal,  291 
Lynden-Bell,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  132, 

215 
Lyttelton,  Gen.  Sir  N.,  137 

Macbean,  Col.,  132 
McCracken,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  F.,  345 
Macdonogh,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  G.,  221,  251 
Macedonia,    visits    to,    149 ;     cam- 
paign in,  277,  278,  279,  323 


Machine  guns,  34,  152,  214 

McKenna,  Mr.,  261,  268 

Mackenzie,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  C,  n8 

McMahon,  Major,  154 

Macready,  Gen.  Sir  N.,  198 

Mahsud  Waziri,  campaign  in  1894, 
66 

Maillard,  Lt.-Col.,  32,  33 

Malakand  Pass,  battle  of,  70,  71,  72 

Malcolm,  Maj.-Gen.  H.,  132 

Malone,  Maj.,  28 

Mangin,  Gen.,  368,  369,  370 

Manoeuvres  at  Aldershot,  162,  163  ; 
conduct  of,  163,  164,  182 

Manoeuvres,  army,  1898,  86  ;  1912 
andi9i3,  182,  183,  184  ;  prepara- 
tion for,  in  1914,  195 

Man-power  question  in  Great  War, 
260  et  seq.,  297  et  seq.,  343 

Mardan,  70 

Marne,  battle  of  the,  213 

Martial  Law,  meaning  of,  360,  361 

Mason,  Lt.-Col.,  52,  66,  78 

Mastuj,  69 

Mathew,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  C,  209 

Maude,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  S.,  89,  193,  270, 

274.  275 
Maud'huy,  Gen.,  370 
Maurice,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  F.,  221,  243, 

250 
Maxwell,  Gen.  Sir  J.,  265,  276,  345 
Maxwell,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  R.,  200,  218 
Mayence,  370 
Meerut,  36 
Melun,  212 

Melville,  Mr.  Leslie,  30 
Mesopotamia,  campaign  in,  248,  259, 

271,  272,  274,  275,  305,  307 
Messines  Ridge,  battle  of,  311,  312 
Metz,  visits  to,  86,  143,  144,  370 
Meuse  valley  defences,  86,  144 
Miankilai,  73,  75 
Michel,  Gen.,  367,  375 
Midleton,  Earl  of,  128 
Miles,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  H.,  81,  171 
Military  attaches,  131 
Military   Governor  on   Rhine,   359, 

362 
Mihtary  history,  value  of,  to  minis- 
ters, 383  et  seq. 
Mihtary  situation  at  end  of   191 5, 

235.  247  et  seq.  ;    1916,  281  et  seq.  ; 

1917,  320  et  seq. 
Military  Training,  Director  of,  186  el 

seq. 
Millerand,  M.,  370 


394 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


Milne,  Gen.  Sir  G.,  88,  89,  120,  132, 

278,  292 
Ministers,  onerous  duties  of,  in  war, 

385 
Miranzai  expedition  in   1891,  45  et 

seq. 
Monro,  Gen.  Sir  C,  23,  89,  269,  275, 

317.  338 
Mons,  retreat  from,  206  et  seq. 
Montgomery,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  358 
Montgomery,  Col.  H.,  222 
Montgomery,  Maj.-Gen.  I'^:.,  154 
Montreal,  146 
Mora  Pass,  70 

Morland,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  T.,  365,  375 
Mounted  Infantry  in  South  African 

War,  105 
Muridki,  camp  of  exercise,  37  el  seq. 
Murray,  Gen.  Sir  A.,  88,   153,   154, 

186,  196,  198,  218,  236,  257,  275, 

276,  306,  345 
Murray,  Col.  Sir  M.,  366 
Murree,  42,  57 

Musketry,  training  in,  13,  15 
Muster  parades,  12 
Muttra,  stationed  at,  36,  37 

Nagar,  60 

Nanga  Par  bat,  58 

Naval  flotilla  on  the  Rhine,  358,  359 

Neuve  Chapelle,  battle  of,  229,  230 

New  Armies,  180,  217,  29S 

Newman,  Lt.-Col.,  357 

Niagara  frontier,  146 

NichoU,  Col.,  154 

Nicholson,  Field-Marshal  Lord,  loG, 

128,  137,  153,  167,  168 
Niederbronn,  85 
Nivelle,  Gen.,    285,    307,    308,    309, 

325.  327.  332 
Nixon,  Gen.  Sir  J.,  70 
Nizam-ul-Mulk,  67,  68 
Non-commissioned  officers,  influence 

of,  28 
Northumberland,  Duke  of,  251 
North-west  frontier  of  India,  52  et 

seq. 
Nowshera,  69 
Noyon,  212 

Officers,  proficiency  and  training  of, 
16,  17  ;  provision  of,  266,  267,  268 

Officers'  Training  Corps,  186 

Oliver,  Mr.,  283 

Operations,  military,  oflicial  ac- 
counts of,  119 


Oporto,  145 

Ordnance,  Army,  regulations  of,  208 

Orleans,  180 

Ottawa,  146 

Owen,  Major  Roddy,  74 

Oxford  University,  honorary  degree, 

373 
Oxley,  Col.,  182,  183 

Paardeberg,  battle  of,  112 

Paderewski,  M.,  373 

Painleve,  M.,  292,  309 

Palestine,  operations  in,  306,  315, 
316,  317,  318,  331,  334 

Palmer,  Gen.  Sir  P.,  44 

Pamirs,  57  e/  seq. 

Panjkora,  river,  70,  73,  75,  76 

Paris,  202,  212 

Passchendaele,  battle  of,  312 

Pay,  officers',  150,  354,  355 

Peace  celebrations  in  1919,  208,  371 

Peek,  Capt.,  345,  357 

Pelle,  Gen.,  244 

Peninsula  battlefields,  144,  145 

Perceval,  Maj.-Gen.,  173,  221 

Percival,  Col.,  174,  201,  210 

Percy,  Earl,  251 

Pershing,  Gen.,  326,  366 

Peshawar,  44,  69 

Petain,  Marshal,  308,  309,  330,  368 

Phillips,  Lt.,  358 

Picquart,  Gen.,  181 

Pir  Panjal,  58 

Pirrie,  Lord,  339,  340 

Placid,  Lake,  146 

Plans,  alternative,  313  e^  seq. 

Plevna,  148 

Plumer,  Field-Marshal  Lord,  169, 
231.  335.  336.  358 

Poincare,  M.,  371 

Policy,  as  affecting  war  prepara- 
tions, 132,  133 

Poplar  Grove,  battle  of,  115,  116 

Portland,  Duke  of,  371,  372 

Pretoria,  occupation  of,  123 

Pulteney,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  345 

Punishment,  military,  system  of,  11, 
12,  13 

Quartermaster  -  General,  in  Great 
War,  197  et  seq.  ;  duties  of,  in  the 
field,  197,  198 

Quebec,  146 

Radcliffe,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  P.,  222 
Rakapushi,  Go 


INDEX 


395 


Ramghat,  58,  65 
Rankers,  promotion  of,  30,  31 
Rapallo  Conference,  328,  332 
Rawal  Pindi,  stationed  at,  41  ci  seq. 
Rawlinson,  Gen.  Lord,  171 
Recruit's  life  in  the  army  in  1877, 

2  et  seq. 
Reshun,  69 
Rheims,  202 
Rhine,  Command  of  British  Army  of 

the,  356  et  seq. 
Rhineland  High  Commission,    374, 

375.  376 
Ribot,  M.,  292 
Robat,  76 

Robb,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  F.,  154,  200,  344 
Roberts,  Field-Marshal  Earl,  39,  51, 

52,    69,   83,    103,    105,    107,    108, 

112,  113,  115,  116,  117,  122,  125. 

126,  127,  134,  136,  141,  217 
Robertson,  Capt.  B.,  244,  296 
Robertson,  Sir  G.,  68 
Robinson,  Rifleman,  377 
Rodd,  Sir  R.,  313 
Rome,  291,  313 
Romer,  Maj.-Gen.,  132,  345 
Rosebery,  Lord,  295,  296 
Ross,  Col.,  173 
Rumania,  visit  to,  148  ;    entry  into 

v/ar,  281 
Russia,  our  relations  with,  before  the 

Great  War,  133,  134,  138  ;    Lord 

Kitchener's  mission  to,  305,  306  ; 

inter-Allied  mission  to,  306 

Sado,  73,  76 

St.  Nazaire,  base  at,  206,  209 

St.  Omer,  215,  217 

St.  Quentin,  212 

St.  Vincent,  Capt.  Lord,  26 

Salonika,  visit  to,  149  ;  see  also 
Macedonia 

Sarrail,  Gen.,  278,  292 

Sars-lc-Bruyere,  conference  at,  be- 
fore battle  of  Mons,  206 

Sault  Ste.  Marie  canals,  visit  to,  146 

Schwabe,  Lt.-Col.,  25,  30,  31.  32 

Science,  its  value  in  war,  351 

Sclater,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  345 

Sentries,  duties  of,  10 

Settle,  R.,  244 

Seymour,  Lt.-Col.,  357 

Shakot  Pass,  70 

Shawitakh  Pass,  64,  65 

Sher  Afzul,  67,  68,  75 

Shinaz,  or  skin  raft,  59 


I    Shipping,   importance  of,  in    Great 
I        War,  324,  326,  327 
i   Sick,  treatment  of,  in  army,  7 
j   Signal   communications,    160,    161, 
223,  224 

Signallers,  regimental,  25,  43 

Sillem,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  A.,  358 

Simla,  stationed  at,  50  et  seq. 

Sims,  Admiral,  351 

Sinai  Peninsula,  operations  in,  275, 
276 

Skill-at-arms,  18,  40,  42 

Smith-Dorrien,  Gen.  Sir  H.,  153, 
157,  158,  162,  164,  165,  231,  279 

Smuts,  Lt.-Gen.,  279,  280 

Snow,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  T.,  345 

Sofia,  148 

Soldier,  British,  in  the  'seventies,  2  ; 
relations  with  his  officers,  107, 
108,  380;  characteristics  of,  380 

Somme,  battle  of,  280,  281,  285,  307 

Sonnino,  Baron,  292 

South  African  War,  preparations 
for,  96  et  seq.  ;  advance  from  the 
Modder  to  Bloemfontein,  109  ef 
seq.;  strategy  and  tactics,  iiy, 
118;  advance  from  Bloemfontein 
to  Pretoria,  121  et  seq. ;  subsequent 
operations,  123 

Speeches  in  pubhc,  266 

Spencer,  Earl,  184 

Srinagar,  57,  65 

Staff,  first  appointment  to,  52 

Staff  College,  preparation  for  en- 
trance, 78  ;  student  at,  81  et  seq.  ; 
value  of  course,  88,  89,  90  ;  com- 
mandant of,  169  et  seq.  ;  history 
of,  169,  170  ;  advice  given  to 
students,  176,  177,  178 

Staff  officers,  duties  of,  at  G.H.Q., 
225,  226  ;  relations  with  troops, 
226 

Staff  school,  268 

Staff  tours,  165,  172 

Stanhope,  Mr.,  92,  97 

Stephenson,  Maj.-Gen.,  153 

Stewart,  Col.  C,  174 

Steyn,  President,  121 

Stopford,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  L.,  222 

Stopford,  Capt.,  222 

Strasburg,  370 

Strikes,  industrial,  on  the  Rhine,  362 

Stuart,  Sir  H.,  375,  376 

Summary  Courts,  361 

Supply,  system  of,  in  war,  198,  199, 
200,  201 


396 


FROM  PRIVATE  TO  FIELD-MARSHAL 


Supreme    War    Council,    234,    313. 

327  et  seq. 
Swat,  68,  70,  72,  73 
Sydenham,  Col.  Lord,  94,  136 

Tagart,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  H.,  345 

Tandy,  Col.,  222 

Tanks,  168,  268,  269 

Territorial  Force,  140,  190 

Thesiger,  Maj.-Gen.,  233 

Thomas,  M.,  291 

Thwaites,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  W.,  132 

Tirard,  M.,  376 

Toronto,  146 

Torres  Vedras,  lines  of,  144 

Townshend,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  C,  62, 
68,  75,  248 

Tragbal  Pass,  58 

Training,  military,  in  the  'seventies, 
14  et  seq.  ;  in  India,  38,  39;  at 
Aldershot  before  the  Great  War, 
156,  157,  158,  159;  during  the 
war,  220 

Trenchard,  Air-Marshal  Sir  H.,  224 

Trinity  College,  Cambridge,  183 

Tritton,  Sir  W.,  342 

Troopships,  life  on  board,  35 

Trotter,  Col.,  129 

Udine,  296,  313 

Ulster,  proposed  coercion  of,  in  191 4, 

193,  194,  195 
Umra  Khan,  55,  68,  69,  73,  75 
United  States,  visit  to,  146,  147 
Unity    of    command,    see    Supreme 

War  Council 

Van  Dewenter,  Gen.,  279,  280 
Venizelos,  M.,  373 
Verdun,  battle  of,  280,  281,  370 
Versailles  Conference,  315,  ^^oetseq. 
Vienna,  148 
Vimy  Ridge,  231,  232 
Voluntary     enlistment,      disadvan- 
tages of,  16,  159 
Volunteers,  19,  128,  140 


Walter,  Capt.,  37 

War  Cabinet,  253,  254,  256 

War  Committee,  253 

War,  the  Great,  unreadiness  for, 
192,  193,  228,  229 

War,  supreme  conduct  of,  235  et  seq., 
253,  282,  283,  284,  313  et  seq. ;  pre- 
paration for,  includes  systematic 
training  of  ministers,  383  et  seq. 

Waterfield,  Brig. -Gen.,  73 

Waters,  Col.,  95 

Way,  Capt.,  154 

Wester  Wemyss,  Admiral  of  the 
Fleet,  Lord,  294 

West  Front,  importance  of,  232,  235, 
311,  323,  324,  325 

Weygand,  Gen.,  296,  328,  367 

Whigham,  Lt.-Col.,  2,  20,  25,  29,  30 

Whigham,    Maj.-Gen.    Sir    R.,   221, 

243 
Wliite,  Field-Marshal  Sir  G.,  69,  79, 

98 
Wigram,  Lt.-Col.  Clive,  154,  184 
Wigram,  Col.  K.,  222 
Williams,  Maj.-Gen.  Sir  B.,  132 
Wing,  Maj.-Gen.,  154,  233 
Wolseley,    Field-Marshal    Viscount, 

17.  79.  87,  99,  102,  127 
Wood,  Field-Marshal  Sir  E.,  17,  21 
Wood,  Capt.,  154 

Woodroffe,  Col.,  201,  .02,  203,  215 
WooUcombe,  Lt.-Gen.  Sir  C,  345 
Worcester,  visit  to,  354 
Wular  Lake,  57 
Wyndham  Quinn,  Col.,  28 

Yarde-Buller,  Brig. -Gen.,  252 

Yarkand,  river,  61,  64 

Yarkhun,  river,  64 

Yasin,  62,  63 

Y.M.C.A.,  362 

York,  stationed  at,  23 

Young  Soldier  battalions,  305,  355, 

362 
Younghusband,  Sir  F.,  68 
Ypres,  battles  of,  216,  230,  231,  312 


THE   END 


I'linicd  in  Great  liritain  by  K.  &  R.  Clark,  Limited,  Edinhurgh. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 

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This  book  is  DUE  on  the  last  date  stamped  below. 


KECD  LD  UW 

MAR  2  9 1986 


MONDAY,      FEBRUARY       1 3 ,      1933 


Field  Marshal 
Wm.  Robertson 
Dies  in  London 


Chief  of  Imperial  General 
Staff  ill  World  War  Rose 
From  Private  Soldier 


Visited    America    Twice 


Wrote  in  Memoirs  of  Differ- 
ences With  Lloyd  George 


By  The  United  Press 
LONDON,  Feb.  12.— Field  Marshal 
Sir  William  Robert  Robertson,  one  of 
Britain's  greatest  soldiers,  who  was 
Chief  of  the  Imperial  General  Staff  dur- 
ing the  World  War,  died  of  a  heart  at- 
tack during  the  night  at  his  home 
here.  He  was  found  lifeless  in  bed 
early  this  morning.  He  was  seventy- 
three  years  old. 


From  Private  to  Field  Marshal 

Sir  William  was  the  only  man  in  the 
history  of  the  British  army  to  rise  from 
private  to  the  rank  of  field  marshal, 
one  of  the  rare  examples  of  the  Napo- 
leonic maxim  that  "every  soldier  car- 
ries a  field  marshal's  baton  in  his  knap- 
sack." Sir  William  was  beloved  of  the 
rank  and  file  of  the  army,  which  nick- 
named him  "Wullie."  Unaided  by 
wealth  or  social  position,  he  was  a 
hard --headed,  iron- jawed  Scotsman  who 
climbed  to  the  top  by  sheer  force  of 
character  and  ability. 

No  man  ever  had  a  more  spectacular 
rise  in  the  British  army  than  Sir  Wil- 
lianlf  not  excepting  even  the  ill-fated 
Sir  Hector  MacDonald,  one  of  the  most 
famous  officers  ever  to  come  out  of  the 
ranks.  He  was  born  in  Welbourne, 
Lincolnshire,  in  September,  1859,  the 
son  of  Thomas  C.  Robertson.  A  poor 
^oy.  without  influence  of  any  sort,  he 
received  an  elementary  educatipn  at  a 
small  private  school  and  then,  serving 
as  a  hall  boy  In  the  employ  of  an  Eng- 
lish nobleman,  he  had  a  row  with  the 
butler,  cast  aside  his  livery  and  took 
the  "Queen's  shilling" — the  shilling 
bonus  given  recruits — enlisting  in  the 
army  when  he  was  eighteen  years  old. 

Never  did  he  make  a  secret  of  his 
humble  origin,  not  even  in  later  years 
when  he  had  succeeded  Lord  Kltchen.'r 
as  the  empire's  chief  military  adviser. 
Once,  at  a  dinner  given  in  his  honor, 
he  said  to  an  elderly  peeress: 

"You  do  not  remember  me,  my  lady, 
but  when  you  were  a  girl,  I  had  the 
pleasure  of  being  present  at  a  dlnnr^r 

of    nrVilnVi    vnii    mpra   nnp   nf   thp    (Tlie.qt-S. 


Succeeded  Kitchener 


Associated  Press  photo 
Field  Marshal  Sir  William 
Robertson 


the  later  months  of  1917  It  became 
harder  for  him  in  view  of  the  disap- 
pointing results  of  the  Allied  offensives 
there  to  convince  the  War  Cabinet  that 
the  diversion  of  troops  to  Palestlm 
or  the  Balkans  or  the  Au.stro-Itallan 
frontier  endangered  the  prospects  of 
victory  on  the  Western  front.  He  held 
that  th .  plan  of  having  a  supreme  war 
c  lAncil  composed  of  military  repre- 
sentatives of  the  Allies,  such  as  was 
introduced  toward  the  end  of  the  yea'- 
was  unworkable. 

In  February,  1918,  therefore,  he  ri 
signed — just  a  month  before  the  sue 
cess  that  attended  the  great  Germai 
offensive  added  weight  to  his  warning.' 
He  received  the  eastern  command  li* 
England  and  three  months  la^er  sue 
ceeded  Lord  French  as  commander-in 
chief  in  Great  Britain.     In  the  fina 
distribution    of    war    honors,    he    wa 
given  a  baronetcy  and  a  grant  of  lO.OOi 
pounds.     From  April,  1919,  to  Marclu 
1920.  he  commanded  the  British  troops 
on  the  Rhine  and  after  relinquishing 
that  post  when  the  force  was  reduced 
he  was  promoted  to  field  marshal. 
Criticised  Lloyd  George 

His  memoirs  "From  Private  to  Flela 
Marshal,"  published  in  1921.  touched 
uron  his  differences  with  Prime  Min- 
ister Lloyd  George  which  had  led  to 
his  removal  from  the  War  Office.  He 
asserted  that  the  credit  for  the  first 
Idea  of  a  united  command  over  the 


3  1158  00617  8262 


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